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This thesis constitutes one of the first attempts to investigate police use of the 
electric-shock weapon the Taser in England and Wales, between 2004 – 2014. 
The research combines an inter-disciplinary approach—drawing on the 
criminology and policing literature, as well as on Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), Actor Network Theory (ANT) and Social Psychology—with 
mixed methods and novel data sources.  It benefits from virtually 
unprecedented access to sources including internal police datasets, the College 
of Policing’s Lead Instructor Taser Training, Taser training in two forces, 
interviews with police officers and individuals subject to Taser.   
The thesis first explores how, and in what circumstances, Taser is used in 
selected forces in England and Wales, before looking at consequences of use 
for officers and subjects.  It then discusses the broader legal, policy, training 
and accountability framework around the weapon, via an examination of three 
inter-related and widespread stories told about the weapon and its regulation: 
that Taser is a neutral tool, that appropriate use is a responsibility for, and at the 
discretion of, individual officers, and that it is subject to robust accountability 
mechanisms.  It is argued that these stories, whilst not incorrect, are 
incomplete. Descriptions of the weapon as a neutral tool are understandable but 
not always convincing, decisions on its use are not just the preserve of 
individual officers, and accountability mechanisms are not always as robust as 
is claimed. 
The conclusions have implications for practitioners and for the literature on 
Taser.  They also contribute to wider criminology debates around use of force, 
discretion and accountability, and to sociological debates about the relevance of 
STS and ANT approaches.  Finally, the thesis not only highlights areas for 
future research, but also highlights some tentative recommendations for policy 
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ACPO: Association of Chief Police Officers. (The NPCC replaced ACPO in 
2015). 
AFID: Anti-Felon Identification.  
ANT: Actor-Network Theory. 
AEP: Attenuating Energy Projectile. 
APP: Authorised Professional Practice. 
CED: Conducted Energy Device (a term commonly used to describe projectile 
electric-shock weapons, such as Taser.  Please see the entry for Taser, below). 
CPS: Crown Prosecution Service. 
CCTV: Closed Circuit Television. 
CS: 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile. 
DOMILL: Defence Scientific Advisory Council Sub-committee on the Medical 
Implications of Less-lethal Weapons. 
ECHR: European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights  
ESRC: Economic and Social Research Council. 
FOIA: Freedom of Information Act. 
HMIC: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary. 
HOSDB: Home Office Scientific Development Branch. 
IACP: International Association of the Chiefs of Police. 
IPCC: Independent Police Complaints Commission. 
LLWs: Less Lethal Weapons 
MPS: Metropolitan Police Service. 
MoU: Memorandum of Understanding. 
NDM: National Decision Model. 
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation. 
NIJ: National Institute of Justice. 
NMI: Neuro-Muscular Incapacitation.   
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NPCC: National Police Chief Council.  (The NPCC replaced ACPO in 2015). 
OC: Oleoresin Capsicum. 
PALG: Police Action Lawyers Group. 
PERF: Police Executive Research Forum. 
PPE: Personal Protective Equipment. 
PSCO: Police Community Support Officer. 
PSNI: Police Service of Northern Ireland. 
PTSD: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
PSDB: Police Science Development Branch. 
SACMILL: Scientific Advisory Committee on the Medical Implications of Less 
Lethal Weapons. 
SCOT: Social Construction of Technology Approach. 
SPOC: Single Point of Contact (for Taser). 
STS: Science and Technology Studies. 
Taser:  a term used to refer to electric-shock weapons manufactured by the 
American company Taser International.  The name itself is an abbreviation of 
‘Thomas A Swift and his Electrical Rifle’, taken from the Thomas Swift series of 
children’s science fiction books written in the early 20th century.   TASER® is a 
registered trademarks of TASER International, Inc., registered in the U.S. All 
rights reserved.  It is common practice in the literature to refer to such weapons 
as Taser(s), a convention which I follow here.  
 
Taser X26: the model of Taser in use throughout England and Wales at the time 
of writing.  Unless otherwise specified, I use the term Taser to refer to the X26 
model.  The X26 is a registered trademark of TASER International, Inc., 
registered in the U.S. All rights reserved. 
                                                                                                                                               
Taser M26: An earlier model previously used by some police forces in England 
and Wales, but which is not currently in use in the jurisdiction.  The M26 is a 
registered trademark of TASER International, Inc., registered in the U.S. All 
rights reserved. 
                                                                                                                                                  
UK: United Kingdom. 
UN: United Nations. 
UNCAT: United Nation Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
USA: United States of America. 
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An Introduction to Taser in England and Wales. 
                                                                                                                              
‘Use of force… is a controversial topic strangely neglected by criminology 
... (with) only (one) independent empirical study of how British police 
officers are trained to use force’ (Buttle 2007: 166). 
‘Whilst (Taser) is a vital weapon for police to have at their disposal for 
incidents which pose a risk to the public, police or the alleged 
perpetrator, it is not something that we use lightly.  I welcome the 
continuing scrutiny of Taser use' (Commander Basu, National Police 
Chief’s Council National Lead on Less Lethal Weapons, in NPCC 2014). 
                                                                                                                                             
The police’s ability to use force is one of the most crucial and controversial 
powers at their disposal (Bittner in Fyfe 1991).  Yet despite calls from a range of 
academics and stakeholders—including those detailed above—for further 
attention to be paid to the topic, it has been relatively ‘neglected’ by criminology.   
One of the most controversial force options available to officers is the projectile 
electric-shock weapon the Taser (Adams and Jennison 2007, De Angelis and 
Wolf 2013).  In brief, Taser 1 is a weapon manufactured by the American 
company Taser International  that uses wires and probes to deliver a potentially 
incapacitating electric-shock to a subject at a distance of up to 6.4 meters 
(College of Policing 2014a), and can also deliver a shock when pressed directly 
up against an individual.  An impressive piece of engineering, and a noteworthy 
addition to the police officers’ toolkit perhaps – but why would anyone think it 
sufficiently important to be the topic of a thesis, or interesting enough to hold 
readers’ attention for hundreds of pages? 
In fact, there are several reasons.  Taser use is increasingly common in 
England and Wales.  Since its introduction in 2004 to firearms officers, it has 
since been rolled out to specially trained (non-firearms) officers.  It is estimated 
that 11% of officers are armed with the weapon (Arnett 2013), and it is fired, on 
average, 5 times a day across England and Wales in 2014 alone (Home Office 
                                                          
1
 Whilst rival electric-shock projectile products are produced by rival manufacturers, the term Taser is a 
brand name and should only be used to refer to those weapons manufactured by Taser International. 
TASER®, M26 and X26 are registered trademarks of TASER International, Inc., registered in the U.S. 




2015a) 2.  Yet relatively little attention has been given to how, when and why 
this weapon is used in England and Wales, or to its impact on officers and 
subjects.  Nor have the policies, guidance and training around the use of the 
weapon – or the accountability mechanisms surrounding it – been subject to 
much academic scrutiny.  In addition much of the existing work on the weapon 
comes from the USA (see, for example, Adams and Jennison 2007: Alpert and 
Dunham 2010: Crow and Adrion 2011: Gau et al 2010: Lee et al 2009: 
MacDonald et al 2009: Paoline et al 2012: Ready et al 2008: Sousa et al 2010 
and Terril and Paoline 2013), with a small number of studies looking at Canada 
(e.g. Oriola et al 2012).  It is assumed that findings from North America are 
relevant elsewhere – which may not necessarily be the case.  
Despite this ‘neglect’, police use of Taser in England and Wales is an important 
issue, with crucial questions around the weapon’s association with death and 
serious injury, its impact on officer and subject injury rates, patterns of use and 
misuse, risks and benefits for human rights, and appropriate levels of regulation 
and accountability. These are important issues in their own right. Indeed, if  
academic work is seen as playing a crucial role in acting not only as a ‘mirror’ to 
the police, but acting as a ‘motor’ for reform (Innes 2010), then they are also 
key issues for academics (Anais 2015), amongst them PhD students.  Such 
issues also take on an additional importance given the relationship between 
Taser use, use of force and police legitimacy, with ‘robust oversight of cases 
involving Taser (and) transparency around how and when it is used… (being) 
essential for maintaining public confidence’ (IPCC 2014: 2).    
The use of Taser in England and Wales also has implications for a number of 
other topics.  Taser occupies an interesting unique position, being described all 
at once as a ‘tool’, a technology, a policing innovation, a use of force option, 
and a site of police decision making and of police accountability.  As such, the 
question of Taser use sits at the heart of, and has implications for, a number of 
broader theoretical, substantive, methodological and ethical debates.   
At a theoretical level, one important sociological debate is how best to 
conceptualise various technologies, the role they might play in society, and how 
                                                          
2
 Official Home Office statistics note that the weapon was fired in probe firing mode 1, 724 times in 
2014, and used in drive stun or angled drive stun mode 256 times, making a total of 1980 discharges, or 
5.4 discharges a day.  
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the objects of study—from the particular technology of interest to the very 
concept of ‘technology’ and ‘society’—should be constructed (Sismondo 2008).  
As shall be seen  in Chapter 1, there is a vast amount of sociological literature 
in the field of constructivist Science and Technology Studies (STS) – including 
the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach, and a school of 
thought termed Actor-Network Theory (ANT)—that grapples with such 
questions.  Such issues are seldom explicitly discussed in debates around the 
weapon, but analysts’ implicit, often unstated views on such topics will 
nevertheless impact their work on, and approach to, different technologies 
including Taser.   
A thesis looking at the role of any one particular technology, such as Taser, 
ignores this work in STS at its peril. Failing to engage with or simply ignoring the 
large body of work that is explicitly concerned with theorising technology, 
technological change and the relationships between technology and society 
risks doing such an important topic a disservice and ‘reinventing the wheel’ 
(Edge 1995: 18).  This may be particularly pertinent in criminology which, Aas 
argues, needs more studies examining the potential relevance of STS and 
Actor-Network Theory in particular (2015: xii).  My work aims to be a small step 
towards answering this call, and towards assessing the utility and novelty of 
constructivist STS approaches in general, and ANT in particular.  At the same 
time, engaging in an empirical case study can benefit STS by providing a 
practical, concrete application of these theories to a particular technology.  The 
focus on Taser is particularly timely, as STS has been criticised for ignoring 
weapon technologies (Woodhouse et al 2002) – another gap this thesis aims to 
help fill.   
At a substantive level, a careful consideration of the myriad roles and varied 
impacts that technologies can have may generate implications for our 
understanding of police discretion – a concept that has traditionally been 
centred around discussions of human agency, and free will (Campbell 1999).  
Broadening out our focus to look at how particular technologies may interact 
with the humans charged with using them has the potential to shed new light on 
the topic.  Similarly, focusing on the legal, policy and training framework and the 
accountability mechanisms around the weapon, also has the potential to add to 
13 
 
long-standing discussions around how best to regulate police force and ensure 
accountability.   
This discussion is particularly important because, whilst the majority of agencies 
in the USA use some kind of use of force continuum to assist in their regulation 
of the weapon (Paoline et al 2012), England and Wales have moved away from 
such conceptualisations in favour of an approach in line with the National 
Decision Model (ACPO 2012): a model promoting step by step assessment and 
review of decision making. Within this model officers are given relatively little 
guidance about the situations in which Taser use may be appropriate. Instead, 
the approach stresses that decisions about the use of Taser, and other police 
weaponry, are for individual officers to make on a case by case basis, using 
their own, subjective assessments of proportionality and necessity. The 
implications of this shift have been little studied, but would seem to merit further 
consideration. For, whilst continuum approaches are often criticised on 
numerous grounds, including their chilling effect on decision making (Terrill et al 
2013: 57), the alternatives to them should also be assessed.   
An exploration of Taser use in England and Wales may also have relevance for 
broader discussions over the use of different methods in policing and 
criminology more generally, in particular debates over the value (and limitations) 
of quantitative methods in criminology (Greene 2014, Sparrow 2011, Thacher 
2001, Weisburd and Neyroud 2011). Last but not least, given its highly 
controversial status, a study of Taser also gives us a unique vantage point into 
important ethical issues, including the role that academic research can, and 
should, play in policing.   
Having started by making the general case for attention to be paid to the use of 
Taser in England and Wales, and detailing the ways in which such a study can 
make an original contribution to knowledge both on Taser, and on a variety of 
academic debates more broadly, this introductory chapter now turns to the role 
of this thesis specifically.   I now set out, in turn: my overall thesis aims, the 





Aims of the Thesis 
This thesis aims to make a distinct contribution to our knowledge on the subject 
of Taser in four ways.  First, it is exploratory in scope. As one of the first pieces 
of work looking at Taser in England and Wales, it uses an interdisciplinary, 
mixed-methods approach to provide a snapshot of how the weapon is currently 
used, the law, guidance and training surrounding its use, and the accountability 
mechanisms in place – topics that have not been analysed in depth before.  
Second, however, the thesis also aims to move beyond exploration to provide a 
constructive critique of Taser in England and Wales, with the researcher acting 
as what the police might call a ‘critical friend’ on this important topic.    
Third, I aim to use the issue of Taser in England and Wales as a case study to 
contribute to broader discussions and debates in the police literature and, 
indeed, in sociology more generally, as outlined above.  Fourth and finally, the 
thesis—and  the process I have gone through in the course of researching and 
writing it—also aims to make a positive, constructive contribution to the policy 
debate, generating practical recommendations for academics and practitioners 
alike. 
Thesis Questions 
In light of these aims, this thesis addresses a number of questions pertaining to 
the use of the weapon by police in England and Wales up until 2014, namely: 
1) How is Taser used?  
2) How has it impacted officers and subjects?  
3) What stories are told about the weapon and its regulation, and how 
complete are they? 
4) How is Taser regulated and accounted for?  
I use the term ‘story’, instead of the term ‘theme’, or the more specialist term 
‘narrative’, throughout the thesis as it speaks to the literature on the importance 
of story-telling in police work (see Shearing and Ericson 1991, Van Hulst 2013), 
as well as to the literature on the importance of story-telling in policy making 
environments (see, for example, Stevens 2011).  In so doing, it helps ‘distance 
us from the naive assumption that what police officers say they do truly equals 
what they really think or do’, whilst reminding us that stories are not merely 
passive but can be active agents that can ‘do all kinds of work’ (Van Hulst 2013: 
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625).  This work includes not just relaying information but providing instructions 
for ‘seeing the world and acting in it’ (Shearing and Ericson 1991:488).  It also 
evokes a sense that there may be multiple stories, and that they are always 
partial, incomplete and unfinished.   
This study is interdisciplinary in scope and draws on a number of different 
bodies of literature—from the use of discretion by the police, to police 
subculture, to social psychology—to focus on Taser and various issues around 
it.  Yet, as my focus is not just on police practices per se, but on the use of a 
particular technology in policing, it also seems appropriate to explicitly consider 
the extent to which the (broadly constructivist) Science and Technologies 
Studies literature can aide our understanding, if at all.  As such, I therefore have 
a final question, namely: 
5) How helpful are constructivist STS approaches in answering these 
questions? 
It is important to note that these questions were not strictly defined at the 
beginning of the PhD process but instead evolved throughout the research 
process. As I detail in chapter 3, the questions listed above were thus  subject 
to change as  my understanding of the topic developed, as the research 
process and semi-structured interviews highlighted the importance of certain 
issues, and as unique opportunities for research—such as unprecedented 
access to a police force's internal use of force dataset—presented themselves.   
Nor are these the only relevant questions around Taser.  There are clearly a 
great number of questions and other important issues that could be tackled, and 
which I do not have space to  do here.  Similarly, the stories about the weapon, 
its regulation and accountability that I have drawn out here are those that I felt 
most strongly emerged, and I encountered time and time again, both through 
the course of my fieldwork, and through my close engagement with the 
academic literature.  They are stories that I feel are particularly significant, and 
which deserve more attention than they have been given in the literature to 
date.  I recognise, however, that other authors and analysts might choose to 
focus on other topics and stories (as have, for example, Ho 2009 and Jauchem 
2015), and I am fully aware that this thesis is not able to capture and examine 
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all the relevant themes, stories and questions that have emerged around this 
controversial weapon.   
Thesis Structure 
In order to answer the questions above, the thesis is divided into three parts.   
Part 1 
Part 1 provides the basic information necessary to guide the reader through the 
thesis.  Chapter 1 outlines the main approaches to conceiving of the 
relationship between technology and society, namely instrumentalism 
(technology as a neutral tool), substantivism (technology as deterministic), and 
constructivist Science and Technology Studies, discussing the Social 
Construction of Technology approach, and Actor Network Theory, in particular.  
After using these approaches to discuss and classify the existing literature on 
Taser, various ‘testing grounds’— i.e. areas where constructivist STS studies 
are said to differ from their predecessors—are set out, and will be referred to 
throughout the thesis. Finally, a detailed definition and discussion of Taser, 
drawing on the schools of thought outlined in this chapter, is provided.   
Chapter 2 provides details about the methodological approach taken and the 
methods used.  It also provides a rationale for particular choices made during 
the research process, including the decision to focus on Taser (as opposed to 
other electric-shock weapons, or other policing technologies), to focus on a 
particular time period (2004 – 2014), on a particular jurisdiction (England and 
Wales) and on two forces within that jurisdiction (referred to throughout this 
thesis as Force A and Force B, to preserve their anonymity).  However this 
chapter is merely intended to provide an overview of the methods used and the 
methodological choices made.  As the research is mixed-method, using some 
complex techniques, further details and rationales for particular methods are 
discussed in the relevant chapter. 
With this information covered, Parts 2 and 3 then attempt to answer the 





Part 2 uses mixed methods research to explore how Taser is used in England 
and Wales, and the implications it has for subjects and officers (Questions 1 
and 2 above). As one of the first academic studies to look at Taser use in this 
jurisdiction it is an exploratory piece of work, aiming more to provide an initial 
first look at such questions than to provide definitive answers to them.  
Specifically, Chapter 3 aims to advance our understanding of how, when and in 
what circumstances Taser is used and determinants of use, via descriptive and 
multivariate analysis of a secondary use of force data set provided by Force A, 
an anonymised semi-rural police force in England and Wales. Chapters 4 and 6 
use the same dataset to examine the association between Taser use and 
reported injury rates to subjects and officers, respectively. These quantitative 
chapters aim to contribute to the existing criminology literature in this area, 
almost all of which relies on quantitative data and complex multivariate 
statistical techniques of the kind utilised here, to answer such questions.  As 
such, the reader may be grateful for the advance warning that Part 2 starts off 
on quite a quantitative note.  Further information on the statistical tests 
conducted, the results and tables can be found in Appendix 1. 
Yet it is also important to acknowledge the limitations of quantitative accounts, 
and to complement these with other sources of evidence (see, for example, 
Rojek et al 2012, Root et al 2013 and De Angelis and Wolf 2013). This is 
particularly important in an environment where many analysts tend to jump too 
quickly from statistical models to policy recommendations (Terrill and Paoline 
2012) and where the debate around the weapon’s impact and consequences is 
often reduced to quantitative assessments of injury rates (for the limitations of 
relying solely on quantitative work in criminology more broadly, see Sampson 
2010). As such, Chapters 5 and 7 aim to go beyond statistical analysis, looking 
at details that quantitative work is not always able to capture. Chapter 5 draws 
on interviews with those subjected to Taser, and their representatives, to try and 
examine the far-reaching, highly personal consequences of the weapon’s use, 
which helps complement the quantitative analysis of visible, recorded injuries in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 7 draws on interviews with officers who use the weapon in 
Force A and Force B to discuss how it may impact their safety in ways both 
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positive and negative, and via routes not easily amenable to statistical analysis.  
Throughout Part 2 the added value of constructivist STS approaches, including 
ANT, are discussed (Question 5).  Further information on the questions asked 
during interviews; the University of Exeter’s Ethical Approval Certificate; and the 
Information and Consent Form given to interviewees, and a rough indicator of 
questions asked can be found, respectively, in Appendices 2 – 4. 
Part 3 
Whilst Part 2 focuses on how Taser is used in practice, and some of its 
consequences, Part 3 seeks to broaden our focus, recognising that this use 
shapes, and is in turn shaped by, recurring themes and stories around the 
weapon, as well as by various regulatory frameworks and accountability 
structures.  Drawing on publicly available documents and on interviews and 
participant observation in Forces A and B, Part 3 aims to examine three 
widespread, inter-related stories around Taser—the notion of decisions around 
the weapon being a responsibility for the individual officer, an image of the 
weapon as a neutral ‘tool’, and the existence of sufficient accountability 
mechanisms—and argues that these are not inaccurate, but that they are 
incomplete.   Chapter 8 focuses on the stories of ‘individual responsibility’ and 
‘Taser as a tool’, whilst Chapter 9 focuses on the story of ‘robust’ accountability 
mechanisms. This division of labour also allows Chapter 8 to focus on the 
mechanisms in place prior to Taser use—i.e. the guidance and 
training  provided to officers before they use the weapon—and Chapter 9 to 
focus on the accountability mechanisms in place after its use.  Taken together, 
Part 3 attempts to provide answers to questions 3, 4 and 5 listed above, whilst 
Chapter 10 provides an overall conclusion.  
The division of labour between the two substantive parts of the thesis—such 
that Part 2 focuses on issues around how Taser is used in practice, and Part 3 
focuses on the regulatory framework and stories told  around the weapon—has 
been chosen quite deliberately.  Given the lack of work on Taser in England and 
Wales I felt it was important to gain a better understanding of use in practice, 
before discussing broader issues around the weapon. Moreover, whilst I 
recognise regulatory processes and guidance have a key role to play, I wanted 
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to avoid reinforcing the notion that they directly dictate how the weapon is used 
– and instead to examine this as an important topic in its own right.  
Introducing some key arguments 
Throughout this structure, this thesis seeks to advance the following, four-part 
argument around Taser use.  First it suggests that, in line with the IPCC (2014a) 
and HMIC’s (2016a) findings, the weapon has much to recommend it and there 
are elements of good practice in its use and in the regulation, policy, training 
and accountability mechanisms surrounding it. In Force A, for example, Taser 
use accounts for a very small proportion of the total number of reported 
incidents where force is used, and there is a statistically significant relationship 
between incidents involving the use of Taser, reported presence of a weapon 
on the subject, and higher levels of subject resistance.    These findings 
contrast markedly with previous findings in the literature (which have almost 
always been focused on the USA), which tend to show relatively high, 
widespread levels of Taser use.   
At the same time, however—and this is my second point—the evidence 
presented here suggests there is also some cause for concern over certain 
elements of the weapon’s use in practice.  As set out in Chapter 3, there is a 
statistically significant relationship between incidents involving the firing of the 
weapon and individuals who are recorded as experiencing mental ill-health 
(even after controlling for other relevant factors), and in the majority of cases 
where the weapon is fired, it is used on individuals who were described as 
unarmed.   
Such trends give pause for thought as, third, my research shows that the use of 
the weapon is far from consequence free.  Whilst it is often claimed that the use 
of the weapon reduces subject and officer injury rates (see, for example, 
Kaminski et al 2013 for a good overview of the literature, and Jenkinson et al 
2006 for an English and Welsh perspective), this thesis—in particular chapters 
4 – 7—shows that the picture is a little more complex than that.  My statistical 
analysis paints a mixed picture and highlights the need for collection of 
additional variables in order to get a clearer picture of subject injury patterns, as 
well as the need for a careful, critical examination of the data as a whole.  
Moreover, individuals who have been subjected to Taser express concerns not 
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just about injury, but also about the pain, fear, loss of control and psychological 
issues experienced as a result of what they believe to be excessive use of 
force.  Similarly, whilst Taser offers certain advantages in terms of officer safety, 
and many officers state that they value the weapon because of the safety 
benefits it brings, paradoxically the socio-technical network around the weapon 
may put officers at enhanced risk, by virtue of the incidents to which they are 
sent, and how they handle them.   
Such trends highlight the need for appropriate safeguards to be put in place to 
ensure that the weapon is used appropriately, for the benefit of officers and 
subjects alike.  Yet, fourth, the evidence presented in Chapters 8 and 9 
suggests that there is some room for improvement in this respect.  English and 
Welsh law, policy and training give officers little guidance about when use of the 
weapon is appropriate, and devolve responsibility for decisions around the use 
of Taser to the individual officer armed with the weapon, with little additional 
clarification offered by senior officials.  The assumption is that officers, assisted 
by the National Decision Model, will use their discretion to judge when use of 
the weapon is appropriate, and will be held to account where this is not the 
case. Yet a number of human and non-human factors—from commonly held 
beliefs that the weapon is a more sophisticated, ‘nicer’ use of force option than 
the alternatives, to peer pressure from colleagues, to the content of police use 
of force training, and the physical presence of the weapon—may influence how 
the officer exercises that discretion, subtlety encouraging them to use the 
weapon.  Various features of the weapon, and the broader system around it, 
increase the risk that it may be abused, or used too frequently. 
Where this does happen, the accountability mechanisms that have been put in 
place are not always as robust as is claimed.  There is room for improvement 
both in internal police oversight mechanisms and external mechanisms such as 
the IPCC, considerable barriers to justice in both civil and criminal courts, and a 
related risk that the National Decision Model may be used in ways which do not 
enhance but, rather, undermine the possibilities for accountability.  Thus, whilst 
many officers use the weapon responsibly, there is no room for complacency - 
and a need for additional measures to be put in place to help ensure 
responsible use across the board.  In particular, stricter guidance, enhanced 
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training, improved data capture and stronger accountability measures are not 
only desirable but eminently possible.  
These substantive arguments will be elaborated throughout the thesis, and their 
theoretical, methodological, ethical and practical implications will be discussed 
in more detail.  However, as this argument cannot be fully understood without 
reference to the sociological literature on society and technology, the 
criminology literature on Taser and the research methods used, it is to these 







Part 1: Background Information. 
 
Chapter 1: Approaches to technology and their implications for Taser. 
 
Whilst the last chapter provided an introduction to the thesis as a whole, this 
chapter aims to provide an introduction to two specific issues that are central to 
this thesis: firstly, the longstanding and rich literature concerned with theorising 
the relationship between technology and society more broadly and, second, the 
implications that these approaches have for our definitions and discussions of 
the Taser weapon.   
I start off, in Part 1, by outlining three distinctive approaches to theorising 
technology, and their associated criticisms.  These comprise substantivist 
perspectives (i.e. technological determinism),  instrumental perspectives (i.e. 
technology  as a neutral tool), and (broadly termed) constructivist STS 
approaches (which are then further sub-divided into different schools of 
thought—such as Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) perspectives—which have varying similarities and 
differences).  Instead of discussing these theories in the abstract, each 
perspective will be discussed as it pertains to Taser, and the case will be made 
that constructivist STS inspired perspectives have been under-represented in 
the literature around Taser to date (although I recognise that, within the policing 
literature more broadly, authors such as Innes et al (2005), Lynch and Cole 
(2005) and Johnson et al (2003) use STS inspired insights to tackle topics as 
varied as police crime analysts and DNA databases). 
Playing devil’s advocate, however, it should not be presumed that this is lack of 
STS inspired Taser studies is problematic.   Indeed, it could be argued that 
explicitly incorporating insights from constructivist STS may advance neither 
this thesis, nor our understanding of  Taser in England and Wales more broadly.  
Thus in Part 2 I set out the criteria for establishing the relevance of 
constructivist STS and some of the differing schools of thought within it, as well 
as  the ‘testing grounds’ on which they will be assessed throughout Chapters 3 
– 10 of this thesis.  Finally, I draw on these theories and discussions to provide 
a detailed overview of the Taser weapon, and the socio-technical network 
surrounding it.  In such a way this chapter aims to provide the necessary 
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background to assist when reading the rest of the thesis, and to answer calls by 
Robert and Dufresne for criminologists to ‘think out-loud’ about the relevance of 
ANT (2015: 1, see also Aas 2015 and Dymond 2014a, where I discuss the 
potential relevance of ANT for analysing police use of Taser). 
Conceiving of the relationship between technology and society. 
It is often argued that the theoretical perspectives pertaining to technology and 
society can be differentiated into a number of relatively discrete approaches.  
There is a key difference for many between so-called STS approaches—a term 
which is often used to encompass constructivist STS perspectives such as the 
Social Construction of Technology  and Actor-Network Theory type 
approaches—and other, more conventional approaches (Latour 2000, 
Sismondo 2008, 3.   
For many (see Edge 1995: 18), what differentiates (constructivist) STS 
approaches, amongst them ANT, from the latter, is their willingness to challenge 
the ‘old, positivist image’ of science and technology as ‘abstract, timeless 
entities’.  Instead of dismissing technologies as empty objects, constructivist 
STS insists on extending sociological analysis to encompass a broad range of 
natural and material artefacts (Latour 2000).  Instead of seeing technologies as 
decontextualized entities with predetermined effects, or simply as neutral tools, 
STS approaches look at the myriad influences, interactions and interpretations 
that shape the design, use and consequences of technologies.  In short, STS 
approaches look at how ‘the things it studies are constructed’ (Sismondo 2008: 
18) and are united in their belief that ‘things are unfairly accused of being just 
‘things’. (Latour 2000: 117, see also Innes 2005, Lynch and Cole 2005). 
                                                          
3 As this discussion shows, many accounts tend to see STS, and constructivist approaches, as one and 
the same Yet whilst constructivist approaches have tended to dominate within STS (Cutcliffe and 
Mitcham in Bijker 2001, Rappert 2004: 6), there are many flavours within STS, and some exceptions to 
this.  Moreover, constructivism as an approach is much broader than, the development of the particular 
sub-field of STS.   For these reasons, then, I favour the term ‘constructivist STS’, instead of STS, to avoid 
confusion. Similarly, I use the term ‘constructivist STS’ as a shorthand, and a convenient umbrella term, 
to refer to those perspectives—including SCOT and ANT—that, whilst differing in some respects, share 
the common features detailed in this section, and in the penultimate section of this Chapter: features 
which can be contrasted with instrumental and substantive (technological determinist) perspectives.  
Whilst one of the founders of ANT (Latour 2000) has elucidated the features that ANT and 
(constructivist) STS accounts share, it is important to note, however, that ANT theorists would not see 
themselves as social constructivists—given what they perceive as limitations in the way that the term 
‘social’ is invoked, and the narrow number of actants seen to comprise the ‘social’—and to recognise 
that ANT has implications far beyond Science and Technology Studies (Cowan and Carr 2008). 
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Further distinctions can be made between constructivist STS approaches and 
their more traditional counterparts.  Bourne (2012) differentiates between three 
approaches, which he calls instrumental approaches (where technology is seen 
as a neutral tool subordinated to social ends), substantivist approaches (where 
technology is seen as the determining factor in producing particular outcomes) 
and constructivist approaches, which stress contingency, negotiation and 
unpredictability.  Latour differentiates between ‘sociologist’ perspectives, where 
technologies are ‘tools… neutral carriers of will’, ‘materialist’ approaches (where 
technologies transform the humans that use them), and a third approach, Actor-
Network Theory, that he helped to found (1994: 31).  Kaplan (2009) 
differentiates between  constructivist approaches, ‘neutral’ approaches (which, 
again, see technology as a tool) and technological determinism.  He further 
distinguishes between a ‘strong version’ of technological determinism, where 
technology ‘imposes… specific social-political consequences’, and a ‘weak 
version’ where technology merely ‘influences’ the humans and societies with 
which it interacts (Kaplan 2009: xvii).  Similarly, Mackenzie and Wajcman note, 
with approval,  the existence of a ‘soft’ determinism which  recognises that, ‘in 
adopting a technology, we may be opting for far more… than appears at first 
sight’ (1999: 4). 
To what extent, though, are these distinctions—between instrumental accounts, 
substantivist approaches, and constructivist STS accounts—helpful for mapping 
the Taser literature? 
Instrumental Approaches: Taser as tool. 
A convincing case can be made that the ‘instrumental’ approach is alive and 
well in the literature around less lethal weapons (LLWs) and Taser (a topic I 
return to in greater detail in Chapter 8).  Several commentators have noted, 
whilst surveying the literature on policing and LLWs as a whole, a general 
tendency to either fail to consider weapon technologies at all or to simply see 
the weapons as neutral objects or mere tools.  Thus Robert and Dufresne argue 
that, within criminology as a whole, ‘the relevance of technology, materiality and 
objects still needs to be emphasised. Whilst many… crime control practices 
necessarily involve the use of devices, little analytical attention has been given 




Anais turns her attention to the treatment of LLWs in criminology specifically, 
and notes that the most common conception is of them as ‘neutral objects that 
do not do anything until human beings… use them to act on… (their) intent' 
(2015: 27). She criticises such work for ‘seem(ing) to neglect the possibility that 
technologies take a range of contingent forms, have a range of unintended 
consequences and exist in... complex and often inarticulate relationship(s) ' 
(2015: 13, 138).   
 
This tendency can also be found in much of the academic literature on Taser, 
which similarly presents the weapon as a tool, as a simple transporter of human 
will. For Jauchem, the weapon is an ‘important… tool’ for officers seeking to 
carry out a wide range of legitimate ‘law enforcement activities’ (2010: 53), for 
Spriggs it is a ‘valuable tool for law enforcement agencies when used 
appropriately’ (2009: 495), particularly useful as ‘a tool for safely incapacitating 
belligerent drug and alcohol users’ (2009: 515). For other academics, Taser is a 
tool in a less positive sense. Oriola et al describe it as a tool ‘to terrorise the 
down-trodden’ (2012: 66) and ‘socially disempowered’ individuals, and a visible 
manifestation of the ‘aggressive’ and ‘repressive’ policing of the working class. 
For Wright, LLWs such as Taser are similarly ‘tools’ for ‘mass repression’ and 
‘socio-political control’ (1991: 35).   Whilst writers in this approach differ 
markedly, they nevertheless share a conception of Taser as a tool for conveying 
human will. 
   
Technological determinism: Taser causes particular outcomes.   
If the ‘instrumental’ approach is well represented in the literature, 
technologically deterministic (substantivist) views are less common. Wyatt 
(2008) notes that technological determinism is comprised of two distinct 
arguments: first, that technologies have their own, external logic, developing 
outside of and independent from society.  Second, once introduced into society, 
they somehow cause or straightforwardly determine social change.  Thus, 
critics of the weapon might argue, the introduction of Taser is destined to result 
in repression and excessive use of force whilst, for proponents, the introduction 
of Taser is destined to result in lower levels of force being used.   
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Whilst remnants of such beliefs may be implicit in some of the literature (as 
Rejali 2009 argues), there are few accounts explicitly making such arguments.  
The discourses outlined by those promoting the weapon perhaps come closest 
to making similar points.  For example, Taser International  (n.d) notes that:   
‘TASER products protect lives, prevent injuries, reduce litigation, and 
save agencies money. More than 700 reviews have affirmed TASER 
technology's life-saving value’. 
Yet these stories  are not solely deterministic.  Even the original patent for 
projectile electric-shock technology, which sets out the apparent benefits of the 
technology, does not see these as inevitable:  
With the growing problems arising from the indiscriminate use of lethal 
weapons… new devices must be found which can immobilize and 
capture without inflicting serious or irreversible harm in the process. It 
would be desirable to have a compact, hand-held device that is capable 
of subduing without serious or permanent harm (emphasis added) 
(Cover 1974).  
Whilst a degree of determinism is implied, nowhere is it explicitly stated that this 
is an inevitable outcome of Taser use.  Instead, the position is much more 
nuanced.   
Moreover, Rappert (2004) notes that the accounts provided by academics, 
human rights NGOs and weapons manufacturer Taser International alike seek 
to locate the acceptability of the weapon, at least in part, with reference to the 
‘context’ in which the technology arose, and in which it is used (see also 
Moreau De Belliang 2015, who makes similar points about NGO accounts of 
Taser).  Many accounts then further supplement this focus with an emphasis on 
the highly inter-related issues of ‘user training, motivations (and) accountability’ 
(Rappert 2004: 13).  Thus few of these accounts could be said to be 
technologically determinist, but instead make space for a range of influences 
impacting on how the technology is received.  Many organisations make 
‘multiple and competing claims… about electrical weapons’ that are not easily 
reduced to one approach or another (Rappert 2004: 31 see also Rejali 2008). 
Nor is this observation restricted to Taser: commentators looking at the debates 
around other weapons have noted that, whilst instrumental accounts abound, 
deterministic approaches are less common (Bourne 2012).  Similarly, Leonardi 
and Barli convincingly argue that many researchers ‘overlook’ the complexity in 
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so called deterministic accounts, and instead ‘inappropriately’ use them as a 
‘foil’ to make their own findings to make their own findings appear more 
‘surprising’ than they actually are (2008: 163).   
Thus, whilst the notion of technology as a neutral tool still holds some sway, 
and is one I shall return to in Chapter 8, nowadays it is difficult to find more 
extreme accounts stating that weapon technologies alone determine the 
character of social and cultural relations, and have particular effects.  
Nevertheless as the rise of Constructivist and Actor-Network Theory 
approaches within the broader ‘church’ of STS can be understood partly in 
response to concerns about the limitations of instrumental and substantive 
approaches—and in turn the apparent decline of technological determinism 
might be attributed to them (Walters 2014)—it is to these theories that I now 
turn. 
Constructivist Approaches 
There are a variety of branches of constructivism, with constructivist inspired 
approaches found throughout the social sciences – including in STS (see Innes 
et al 2005 for a good discussion of constructivism in relation to crime 
intelligence analysis within the police). Indeed, within STS, a particularly 
prominent example of constructivism is SCOT, or the Social Construction of 
Technology approach, closely associated with Bijker (e.g. Bijker 2001).  Another 
widely regarded school of thought is Actor-Network Theory, closely associated  
with the work of theorists such as Callon (1986), Latour (1991), and Law (1992, 
1999) which is sometimes also described as a constructivist approach within 
STS (Bijker 2010, Woodhouse et al 2004).  I shall examine the similarities 
between both approaches in this section—identifying a common ‘core’ to 
(constructivist) STS approaches--whilst dedicating the next section to 
investigating differences between the two approaches, and what is said to be 
distinctive about ANT.  Broadly speaking, then, as STS accounts,   SCOT and 
ANT approaches have the following features.  
Black-Boxing and Interpretive Flexibility 
If instrumental and substantivist approaches do not concern themselves with 
the details and material features of particular technologies, their effects, or how 
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they came into being,  SCOT and ANT approaches share a desire to open the 
‘black box’ of technology.  Specifically, they argue that, whilst technologies may 
appear as unified artefacts that possess certain material features and have 
particular effects, they are also complex weapons, whose design and 
subsequent use are ‘under-determined’ by material constraints 
(Pfaffenberger 1992a :282).  These approaches thus highlight contingency in 
the design of a particular technology.  The choice of a given design is not the 
product of necessity but of a range of complex, intertwined socio-technical 
factors.   
 
They also highlight contingency in the reception, adoption and use of a given 
technology, stressing ‘interpretive flexibility’: the notion that multiple meanings 
and interpretations can be attached to the same object or artefact.  The key 
insight here is that the technology itself, and its characteristics, is insufficient to 
determine how it will be received.  Recognising this flexibility can help explain 
the wide variety of uses to which technologies are put, and how widespread this 
use becomes.  More than that, however, the very ‘'working' and 'nonworking' of 
an artefact, its effectiveness, its effects and its success (or lack thereof) come to  
be seen, not as qualities intrinsic to the weapon itself, but as constructed 
assessments (Bijker in Constant 1999: 328).  Such themes have also been 
picked up by Manning (2008: 24), in his work on the use of information 
technologies in policing, who notes that such technologies ‘must be interpreted 
and used in spite of (their) often invisible workings’  
 
Most authors adopt a ‘middle ground’ in these debates (Rappert 2003a: 
569).  Whilst paying attention to how uses of technologies, and their efficacy, 
are subject to considerable interpretation, they also acknowledge that 
‘interpretations… are still interpretations of something’ (Rappert 2003a: 566).  
Thus  useful terms here are those of  ‘affordances’—‘aspects of technology that 
frame but do not determine the possibilities for action’ (Rappert 2003a: 566)—
and ‘materiality’, a term that encourages us to attend to technologies, their 
material features and affordances to look at how they mediate, shape and effect 
broader relationships, processes, institutions and human actions (see Walters 
2014).  So STS authors encourage us not only to look at ‘social’ elements, but 
also encourage us to pay attention to the  role of technologies, as well as the 
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‘material…features (of technologies) that provide opportunities for or constraints 
on action’ (Leonardi and Barli 2008: 162, see also Callon and Law 2005).   
 
Symmetry  
Another important point of emphasis for both SCOT and ANT is the need to be 
‘symmetrical’ in the ‘style of explanations’ adopted, looking for ‘the same types 
of cause to explain, say, true or false beliefs’ (Bloor in Law 2004: 102, see also 
Lynch and Cole 2005).  Thus constructivists warn against explaining ‘true’ 
beliefs with reference to ‘reality’, and ‘false’ beliefs with reference to ‘socio-
psychological’ causes, to the ‘distorting influence of society’ (Bloor 1999: 84). 
Instead, all systems of belief—regardless of whether they are judged ‘true’ or 
‘false’ by the analyst—should be the object of curiosity, with ‘nature’ and 
‘society’, ‘the world of things’ and ‘the world of people’, all seen as potentially 
playing a part in their formation (Bloor 1999: 88). When applied to technology, 
the symmetry postulate helps remind us that the success or efficacy of a 
technology should not be simply explained by the ‘fact’ that it is successful or 
effective: instead, the fact that it is seen to be successful or effective is what 
needs to be explained in the first place.  (Pinch and Bijker 1984: 24). 
  
Whilst emphasising the role of interpretive flexibility,  constructivists 
nevertheless need to explain how this flexibility diminishes.  Bijker (2010: 69) 
looks at how meanings and interpretations of technologies come to be 
structured via a ‘‘technological frame’, a paradigm which ‘structures the 
interactions amongst the members of a relevant social group, and shapes their 
thinking and action’, and actor network theorists look at how networks stabilise 
and become ‘punctualised’ and appear as black-boxed entities (Law 1992: 
385).  In both approaches the amount of interpretive flexibility diminishes, and 
there is ‘closure’ around the debate.  Yet this closure is only temporarily: 
‘‘reality’ is not a final, definitive state.... nothing becomes real to the point of not 
needing a network in which to upkeep its existence’ (Latour 1991: 118). 
 
From Tools to Assemblages and Networks  
Thus it is necessary not just to look at a given technology, but at the ‘technical, 
social, organisational, economic and political elements’ surrounding it.  The 
adoption of any given technology requires the ‘successful modification of social 
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and non-social actors so that they work together harmoniously’ (Pfaffenberger 
1992b: 498).   The engineers’ task is not just to create a technology, but to 
create a market and various social groups – what Law calls 
‘heterogeneous engineering’ (in Mclean and Hassard 2004: 501).   Similarly, 
Latour (1991: 106) argues that studying the introduction of a new technology, is 
not a case of following a ‘statement through a context’ but ‘follow(ing) 
the simultaneous production of a ‘text’ and a ‘context’. Hence the unit of 
analysis is not the individual artefact, per se, but what is variously referred to 
as a socio-technical ensemble, assemblage or network.    For many 
constructivists, then, the challenge is to use this broader perspective—this shift 
in focus from the object to the socio-technical network surrounding it—to 
highlight that ‘technological artefacts... are socially shaped’ (Hutchby 2001: 
441).  As shall be seen, however, other authors, in particular those associated 
with actor-network theory, reject this very society-technology dualism.  
 
Actor-Network Theory  
Thus far, I have provided an overview of some of the key features of 
constructivist STS accounts in general, highlighting the similarities between 
ANT and constructivist approaches such as SCOT.  Indeed, for some the 
differences between ANT and the rest of (constructivist) STS have been 
overstated: indeed, for Fuller (2000), they amount to no more than ‘niche 
differentiation in… a crowded field’.  Others, however, argue that there are  
fundamental differences. 
 
Whilst many constructivist approaches seek to demonstrate how social factors 
impact the design, reception, evaluation and use of particular technologies—
thus, for example, Bijker’s SCOT approach seeks to analyse technological 
development ‘as a social process’ (1993: 117, emphasis added)—it has been 
argued by some (e.g. Prout 1996) that ANT’s approach is quite different. 
Instead of providing social explanations of various phenomena, ANT argues 
that ‘society’, and the humans within it, can only be understood with reference 
to the ‘missing masses’ of non-human entities.  Because of this, distinctions 
between human/nonhuman and society/technology are arbitrary, artificial and 
obscure more than they reveal – and binary distinctions and dualisms of all 




Thus ANT provides a perspective ‘quite distinct in one crucial and radical 
respect: ANT rejects the assumption that society is constructed through human 
action and meaning alone’ (Prout 1996: 220). As Callon and Latour (1992: 348) 
note ‘we have never been interested of giving a social explanation of anything, 
but we want to explain society’.  This becomes a particularly notable 
contribution if we consider that, as Leonardi and Barli (2008: 163) argue,  many 
within STS—keen to avoid the label of technological determinism—have 
(over)emphasised the social, looking, for example, at the groups around 
particular technologies, rather than the affordances of these technologies.   
 
Generalised Symmetry 
Thus, if SCOT applies the principle of symmetry to beliefs around ‘successful / 
unsuccessful’ and ‘working / non-working’ technologies, ANT further extends 
this symmetry principle.  Instead of assuming, a priori, that humans are the only 
powerful, meaningful actors, ANT asks us to assess humans and non-humans 
(such as nature, animals and technologies) in the same way, in a move often 
referred to as ‘generalised symmetry’.  Humans and non-humans should be 
assessed equally on the grounds of their ability to ‘make others do things’ 
(Latour in Waltz 2005: 58).  Thus many ANT studies use the term ‘actant’, a 
term which can be applied to both human and non-human entities, and does not 
imply anything about the characteristics of the entity under discussion. 
 
So instead of a key distinction being between human and non-human, a key 
distinction is whether the actants in question are intermediaries or mediators.  
Whilst the former is predictable, and simply acts as a conduit to transmit ideas 
and meanings, the latter is unpredictable and can bring about transformations 
and effects (Latour in Waltz 2005: 61). ANT thus recognises that ‘humans are 
not always actors, frequently they are intermediaries and... not all nonhumans 
are intermediaries, for they can often act in ways which change (human) 
worlds’ (Murdock 1998: 367).  So the outcomes and effects associated with 
introducing particular technologies cannot be predicted in advance but are fluid, 
changeable and unpredictable, produced by unique interactions with human 




In the elegant phrasing of Pickering (a post-humanist whose work has close 
overlaps with ANT), such outcomes result from a ‘dance of agency’ between 
human and non-human (2005:2).  In Manning’s work on information 
technologies in policing, a key insight is that technology is not just a passive 
entity but, instead, ‘stimulates…mediates relationships and elaborates 
complexity’ (Manning 2008: 1). 
 
Given this fluidity, some theorists go further and argue that there are no 
inherent essences to technologies, no singular ‘it’ that can be talked about in 
isolation from the network in which it is embedded.  All actants are, in turn, 
comprised of networks, and should both be considered purely ‘relational effects’ 
of this network (Law 2007).  Thus some ANT approaches start neither with the 
human or the technology, but the interactions between the two, and the ‘hybrid’ 
actor that is created when the two meld together.  For Munro ‘the focus in ANT 
is on the organising power of combinations’ (2009: 125).  Latour argues that ‘we 
are never faced with objects or social relations, we are faced with chains which 
are associations of humans and non-humans’ (1991: 106).  For Gad and Brunn-
Jenson 2010: 270) ‘all things are what they are in relation to other things, not 
because of essential qualities’.  There is thus a strong strand of relativism and 
idealism in many works inspired by ANT and by STS more broadly – although, 
as Bijker (2010: 63) notes, ultimately ‘constructivist technology studies can be 
agnostic about this idealism–realism question: both ontological positions are 
compatible with constructivist sociology of technology, and the sociology of 
technology cannot provide empirical arguments to choose for either ontological 
position’ (see also Whittle and Spicer 2008, and Mackenzie and Wacjman, who 
note that such approaches are  ‘wholly compatible with a thoroughly realist, 
even a materialist, viewpoint’ 1999: 32).  
 
Thus for many working with the approach, the focus is on interactions and on 
process: specifically how everything from the  identity of actors, to the goals 
they hold dear are continually and forever ‘negotiated’ and ‘translated’ (Callon 
1986: 6). The term ‘translation’ has been particularly favoured (e.g. Callon 
1986) as a way of emphasising that concepts, definitions, ideas and 
technologies are not just transmitted outwards and passively received by 
audiences.  Instead actors may attempt to convince, negotiate or ‘enrol’ others 
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to their programme of action, changing and negotiating the aims and objectives 
of others in the process.  In so doing they attempt to make themselves an 
‘obligatory passage point’ – i.e. to make it compulsory for other actors to go 
through them, and to speak on behalf of others in the network.   
 
Criticisms 
However, SCOT and actor-network theory approaches have also been subject 
to criticism.  Those writing from the latter perspective have accused social 
constructivist approaches such as SCOT of ignoring the role that non-human 
actors can play, and simply invoking the ‘social’ as an explanation in its own 
right, rather than looking carefully at how—and what—the ‘social’ is  comprised.  
Both approaches have been criticised for ignoring issues of power, ethics and 
unequal access to information (Winner 1993).  It is ANT, however, that has 
perhaps come in for the most criticism, four strands of which I will pick up here.   
First, ANT’s emphasis on generalised symmetry and the role of non-human 
actors may risk ignoring what is distinctive about humans, including 
consciousness and intentionality (Fine 2005, Murdock 1998, Laurier and Philo 
1999).  In seeking, usefully, to highlight the importance of the non-human, they 
risk diminishing the importance of the human.  In seeking, usefully, to unpack 
myriad influences on human decisions and the changing nature of human will, 
they risk detracting attention away from situations where powerful human 
actants are able to exert their clearly defined wishes on their less powerful 
counterparts, be they human or non-human. 
Second, on paper Actor-Network theory asks us not just to incorporate the 
notion of the non-human into our analysis but, further, to jettison the very notion 
of a distinction between human and non-human, and in their place to see only 
heterogeneous, hybrid actors.  For ANT, these actors are created solely by 
interactions in networks: there is nothing essential or pre-existing about them, 
and thus talking of discrete human and non-human actants is inaccurate and 
misleading.   
 
Yet, as many commentators have noted, it is much easier to criticise other 
analysts for reproducing binary human – non-human distinctions than it is to 
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reject such distinctions oneself.  Whittle and Spicer (2008: 613-4) argue that 
whilst ANT claims to ‘resist explanations that appeal to the essential 
characteristics of actors, such as technologies’, it nevertheless ‘continues to rely 
upon the notion of inherent agential capacities when attributing properties to 
natural and material objects’, assuming in practice that ‘man-made artefacts 
have certain ‘real’ properties’.  They note that ‘this leaves ANT closer to the 
critical realist approach, where the content… or affordances… of objects such 
as machines are allocated an explanatory role… (with) innate properties of an 
object… explain(ing) why objects and artefacts have certain ‘effects’ (2008: 
614).  Fine notes that ‘by criticizing others for sins that are inevitably 
reproduced, if concealed by abstruse terminology… ANT generates a distinct 
flavor of ‘‘having your cake and eating it’’’ (2005: 93).  Moreover, if taken to 
extremes, idealist, anti-essentialist, relational perspectives that emphasise not 
just one reality, but multiple versions of it, it may leave us unable to make 
important claims about broader forces, trends and objects, and the impacts 
associated with them (Castree 2002).   
 
This is compounded by a related difficulty that ANT tends to be empirically and 
methodologically vague, with few texts providing a clear guide to methods, and 
to how grand concepts such as ‘generalised symmetry’ and ‘agnosticism’ 
should be operationalised in practice.  As Strathern notes, ‘reading ANT texts 
for their methodology is often quite disappointing. Most texts… do not say much 
about how to go about doing ANT, practically speaking’ (1999: 73).   
 
Moreover, whilst ANT urges us to go beyond notions of human and non-human 
and, instead, explore the idea of interactions and of hybrid actants, it is not quite 
clear what this involves, or might look like, in practice.  Several who have tried 
to attempt such a task have found it ‘quite challenging’ noticing their tendency to 
either leave ‘the material realm unexamined, or emphasizing the agency of the 
material to the detriment of understanding the entangled practice’ (Wagner, 
Newell and Piccoli in Mutch 2013: 31).  As both ANT accounts and more 
conventional analyses stress the importance of material artefacts, and the 
effects they may have, the differences between these accounts and weaker 
versions of technological determinism can be overstated, and difficult to 
untangle (Leonardi and Barli 2008).  Similarly, Mackenzie notes that 
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‘technological determinism contains a partial truth. Technology matters… not 
just to the material condition of our lives… but to the way we live together 
socially’ (Mackenzie and Wacjman 1999: 2).  For many, then, it is not just the 
differences not just between constructivist approaches and ANT that have been 
overstated, but the differences between ANT and so called technological 
deterministic approaches.   
 
Third, many writing from a range of critical perspectives have emphasised that 
ANT’s notion of power and accountability needs to be augmented.  ANT tends 
to see power as relational, as created by and as an effect of, a particular 
network, and as located at several different points throughout in this network.  
This has the effect that the focus is taken off one or two powerful human actors 
or institutions, and is diffused to a broad network of allies, human and non-
human.  This development, worries Fuller, ‘makes it difficult to hold anyone 
accountable for anything’ (2000:26).   This is compounded by what some see as 
a tendency in ANT—and in constructivist studies more generally—towards 
political inertia, ethical relativism and away from critically engaged, action-
orientated studies (Woodhouse et al 2002). 
 
Finally, as Latour himself noted, the perspective is at risk of generating ‘trivial’ 
insights – such as the fact that ‘a technology must be … activated by a human 
subject’ (1994: 45).  Those writing from outside of the theory have gone even 
further to argue that the theory generates no new, meaningful insights at all.  
For some it is simply a way of dressing up, in complicated academic language, 
observations that were already commonplace - and could be made with or 
without Actor-Network Theory and its ‘imprecise and undefined’ terminology 
(Scott 1991: 11).  Fuller (2000: 8) argues that ANT simply represents ‘one of 
those all too familiar… moments in academic life when a move that appears 
radical within the terms of a paradigm is equivalent to the prose that everyone 
else outside the paradigm has been always speaking’. 
 
In face of these criticisms, many have sought to adopt a weaker version of ANT.  
Thus Castree uses a blend of ANT and critical approaches such as Marxism to 
‘remain critical of binarist thinking, of asymmetry, of limited conceptions of 
agency and of centred conceptions of power. However, at the same time, it 
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would concede… (that) it is the ‘social’ relations that are often disproportionately 
directive… (and) that power, while dispersed, can be directed by some (namely, 
specific social actors) more than others’ (2002: 135).  Many others—for 
example Frickel (1996) and Mutch (2013)--have also worked with a watered 
down version of ANT, or have been loosely inspired by the approach (see also 
Mol 2010).  Frickel notes many of ANT’s criticisms are ‘ultimately avoidable’ if 
the approach is not seen as an ‘all or nothing adventure’ (1996: 49).  Indeed, 
Mol argues that ‘the strength of ANT… is not that it is solid, but rather that it is 
adaptable’ (2010: 265).  Bearing in mind these issues, then, just how, if at all, 
have constructivist STS approaches been applied to Taser?   
 
Constructivist STS Accounts and Taser 
In fact, studies inspired by constructivist STS approaches in the broader 
sense—much less by SCOT or ANT specifically—are relatively rare in 
criminology. Robert and Defresne (2015: 2) note that, ‘while they are multiplying 
over the last year, there is still a paucity of ANT studies in the (criminology) field’ 
– though such a lack of studies may not be surprising, given that this is a 
relative niche area.  There are, however, a few pieces that have appeared in the 
last year that explicitly draw on ANT and which focus in broad terms on the use 
of Taser.   
Anais draws on constructivist STS approaches in her analysis of the 
construction of ‘excited delirium’, a term sometimes used in cases where 
individuals have died following use of Taser.  Anais aims to reveal not whether 
the syndrome is ‘real’ or false, but the ‘networks of legal and medical experts 
(that) make it real’ (2014: 47).  Similarly, her broader work on LLWs, by her own 
admission, seeks to ‘avoid’ what she notes are ‘important empirical questions’ 
around ‘use and abuses of less lethal technologies’ in favour of ‘questioning the 
process through which the boundaries between lethal and non-lethal have been 
stabilised' and asking ‘what differences the concept of non-lethality has 
introduced into the relationship between military and policing agencies… and 
the people who serve as the living targets of non-lethal weapons' (2015: 138).  
She calls for further studies of LLWs that ‘marshal insights from…STS 
perspectives’ to see these objects as ‘elements with agency that open up new 
spaces of possibility and as things that make things happen’ (2015: 52).   
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Moreau De Belliang’s analysis of the use of Taser in France does not draw 
particularly heavily on ANT, but does analyse the arguments put forward by 
those in favour of the weapon, and those ‘opposed’ to it.  He finds that those in 
the latter camp are already thinking in ‘ANT-ish’ ways, noting that whilst 
proponents focus on the technical superiority of the weapon:  
‘Those who are against (Taser) guns… share Latour’s attention to the 
distribution of agency… They do not only target the technical specifics of 
the Taser. They try to re-establish the human / non-human assemblages 
that have been created by the introduction of the Taser into policing… By 
meticulously taking care to recompose the network made up of Taser, 
the person who uses it and the situations in which they are involved, the 
opponents of the Taser want to show that the miracle of the technique 
assuming the sole responsibility is an illusion that can only exist thanks 
to the concealment of numerous links of the network’ (2015: 105). 
Perhaps more numerous are Taser studies which, whilst not necessarily 
defining themselves as ANT, SCOT or constructivist STS studies per se, could 
be argued in various ways to have a broadly constructivist flair to them.  The 
work of three disparate authors—Rappert (2004), Rejali (2009) and White 
(2014)—could be said to fall into this camp, and also help illustrate some of the 
difficulties associated with labelling complex pieces of academic work in this 
way.   
Rappert’s work on Taser is not focused on the weapon ‘itself’ but instead uses 
the ‘constructivist gaze’ (2004: 28) to analyse the debate around it and attempts 
to make claims about the acceptability of the weapon.  Arguing against views of 
the weapon’s acceptability based solely on assessments of the weapon’s (so-
called) purpose and origins, or on assessments of the context in which it is 
used, or on assessments of the pain produced—and noting the way that, in 
practice, accounts often merge two or more of these categories—he calls for 
‘constructivist examinations’ of Taser that actively ‘debate the nature of 
technology, context and purpose as well as how they are approached in the 
course of analyses’ (2004: 18). 
Rejali’s study of Taser incorporates many elements of constructivist  STS.  
Discussing various incarnations and changes made to the weapon over time, he 
presents the story of the adoption of Taser not as a simple one where the 
technology was introduced to a society which then ‘responds by adopting or 
resisting it’, but as a process of assembling a series of alliances.  Taking a leaf 
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from ANT, he notes that these alliances were not comprised solely of humans, 
but involved ‘enrolling’ a number of non-human actants (2009: 237).  He 
explains how Jack Cover, the original inventor of Taser, tried to mobilise a 
number of different alliances until he found one that was successful.  It was only 
at that point that the spread of the technology then came to seem ‘magical’, to 
seem ‘as if the devices were powered by their own utility’ (2009: 231).   
His work thus looks inside the ‘black box’ of Taser, and in so doing incorporates 
notions of symmetry.  One should not ascribe cases where the technology 
succeeded to technological superiority, and explain away cases where the 
technology was less successful as a result of societal resistance.  Instead, the 
socio-technical network around the weapon should be considered to help 
explain both successes and failures alike.  He powerfully and eloquently 
highlights the considerable degree of interpretive flexibility around the weapon, 
following its eventual adoption.  
His account also stresses the difficulty in differentiating between the ‘social’ and 
the ‘technical’ and—whilst he doesn’t use phrases such as generalized 
symmetry or actants--is  at pains to stress the role played by non-humans.  
Throughout, Rejali is at pains to differentiate his account from many other 
commentators who, he argues, simply tell the ‘story’ of Taser technology as if 
the ‘technological product emerges full blown… and then it was simply a social 
problem, of overcoming resistance’ (2009: 237).  As shall be seen, such 
accounts continue today – even amongst approaches that seem to adopt some 
elements of the constructivist approach.   
One such example is the work of White (2014), whose account also nicely 
illustrates the difficulties faced when attempting to neatly classify complex 
academic works into one or other of these overarching (and sometimes quite 
vague) schools of thought. White’s work seeks to apply the so-called ‘innovation 
of diffusion’ approach, or ‘diffusion paradigm’ to Taser technology.  In brief the 
‘diffusion paradigm’, started with Ryan and Gross’ work on hybrid-corn 
technology in America (White 2014), was elaborated by Wejnert (2002).  
Wejnert (2002: 297) provided a conceptual framework for the study of the 
adoption and use of various technologies based around three key factors: the 
‘characteristics of the innovation itself’, the characteristics of the innovators—
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including their ‘socioeconomic characteristics’ and ‘personal qualities’—and the 
environmental context.  
White (2014: 16) argues, in line with this framework, that the popularity of 
TASER is due to ‘the rational consequence of an interplay between key features 
of the innovation itself… the innovators and the environmental context’.   For 
White, the ‘key features’ of the weapon are its ‘benefits’, specifically ‘it’s 
relatively short duration of recovery time among those who are exposed, its 
reliability from a distance (up to 35 feet depending on the model), its compact 
size and utility’ and its efficacy (2014: 6).  Innovators are law enforcement 
agencies, Taser International and policy bodies, who can play an important role 
in increasing uptake.  Finally, environmental context includes the pre-existing 
search by police agencies for less-lethal weapons, geographical proximity to 
forces that had adopted the technology, and court rulings favourable to its use.  
In view of these factors he found its adoption to be a ‘natural, rational 
development in policing’ (2014: 1).   
Such an approach has elements which seem to go beyond instrumental and 
substantivist approaches, and acknowledge issues of construction and 
interpretation. Thus there is a role here for ‘social networks’ in explaining the 
weapon’s popularity, and an acknowledgment that ‘laws, values, norms, 
ideologies, and belief systems can either facilitate or hinder the adoption 
patterns of an innovation’ (2014: 292).  There is also talk of ‘interplay’ between 
technology, human actors and the ‘environmental context’ (2014: 282).  
Yet there are also elements of technological determinism, with White explaining 
that, amongst other factors, the ‘effectiveness of the Taser’ has overcome the 
‘traditional inflexibility that defines police departments’ (2014: 293).  Success is 
seen, at least in part, as determined by the technology itself.  Hence, writes 
White, ‘innovations with greater upsides’, such as Taser, will ‘diffuse rapidly’ 
compared to innovations with ‘more risks than rewards’ (2014: 284) – with little 
consideration given to the notion that the rewards themselves may be socially 
construed.  Cast in one light, this could be a classic example of exactly the 
trend that Rejali warned about: that of presuming a clear trajectory for a 
superior technological product, and characterising the ‘social’  as a given, pre-
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existing backdrop whose main function appears to be presenting ‘resistance’ to 
the march of technology. 
There are other elements of White’s work at odds with constructivist STS 
approaches.  Whilst there is a consideration of how social factors impact the 
spread of a particular technology and its rate of diffusion—given pre-existing 
assessments of its efficacy, utility and effects—there is little consideration of 
how such factors may impact assessments of efficacy and utility in the first 
place.   Some echoes of this approach can be seen in the work of Squires and 
Kennison (2010: 57), who—whilst not mentioning Taser specifically—argue that 
the arming of the police has become ‘technologically driven’.  If  ‘proven 
effective’ new weapons are adopted by the police, to be used ‘as the situation 
demands’.  Again, there is little consideration of how some weapons may come 
to be seen to offer operational benefits in certain carefully defined situations, 
and others may not. 
Thus beliefs around the advantages and merits of the weapon are taken at face 
value and treated as if they are inevitable, rational responses to objective 
qualities of the Taser weapon.  However risks and disadvantages associated 
with the weapon are seen as ‘false’ beliefs that can only be explained by social 
factors to explain their spread.   Thus in contrast to constructivist STS’ 
emphasis on symmetry, there is a fundamental asymmetry here: ‘false’ ideas 
are seen as something in need of explanation, ‘true’ beliefs are not.  The social 
is a resource to be drawn on to explain why misconceptions around the weapon 
exist, but is not as relevant when looking at the positive features of the weapon.  
Thus White notes that ‘interest groups’ and ‘politicized city councils’ can delay 
the spread of the device (2014: 291).   
Another asymmetry also needs pointing out, again relating to one’s perception 
of the social. Wejnert notes, and White agrees, that innovations ‘evolve in a 
specific ecological and cultural context and their successful transfer depends on 
their suitability to the new environments they enter during diffusion’ (in White 
2014: 14). So the social is seen as fixed, unchanging context into which 
technologies such as Taser are introduced, with greater or lesser success.  The 
social can impact the reception of a given technology, but there is little 
consideration of the inverse: how technologies, such as Taser, can impact ‘the 
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social’.  There is thus no consideration of the ANT concept of ‘generalised 
symmetry’ – adopting the same approach to investigate both so-called ‘social’ 
and ‘technological’ factors. 
As White’s paper nicely illustrates—and as should be clear by now—there are 
some key differences between constructivist STS approaches and more 
traditional, conventional forms of analysis, and it is to precisely these 
differences that I now turn.  
Testing the Theories: Assessment Criteria. 
Thus far in this chapter  I have reviewed three perspectives—substantivist, 
instrumental and constructivist STS approaches--concerned with 
conceptualising the relationship between technology, humans and society, 
examined the differences between SCOT and ANT approaches within STS, and 
demonstrated a relative lack of studies drawing on STS insights.  Nevertheless 
the work that Anais (2015), Rejali (2009), Rappert (2004) and others have 
conducted has demonstrated that constructivist inspired STS studies are useful 
in suggesting new, novel lines of enquiry around Taser and police weaponry, in 
place of more traditional, conventional lines of enquiry.  As Mol notes, such 
approaches can help us to ‘ways of asking questions and techniques for turning 
issues inside out or upside down’ (2010: 261).  
Yet if constructivist STS studies—and SCOT and ANT within them-- can add 
value by suggesting new lines of enquiry, can they also assist us in examining 
some of the more traditional, conventional topics and concerns that are central 
to the criminology debate around Taser? This is an interesting point of enquiry 
not just for empirical reasons, but also for theoretical ones.  After all, if you use 
a theory to examine the issues and tasks it was designed to do, and to answer 
the questions that it poses, then it is likely you will find it does prove useful.  But 
I am not interested, here, in producing a PhD solely concerned with theory for 
its own sake, but in discussing crucial issues around Taser.  Thus an additional 
test of a theory is how it fares with tackling perennial questions set, not by its 
advocates and proponents, but by the academic community as a whole – and it 
is this latter test I am keen to implement here.  The case of Taser makes a 
particularly interesting example for testing such theories for, as Woodhouse et 
al note, STS has ‘never been strong on weaponry technologies’ (2002: 303).  
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Similarly, Walters notes his surprise that ‘few researchers employ actor-network 
theory, or science studies more generally, to examine questions of… armed 
conflict or weapons research’ (2014: 105).  
To take a leaf from the constructivist book, then, it is not enough simply to 
assume that (constructivist) STS—and SCOT and ANT within that—are helpful 
approaches.  Instead, the analyst needs to be agnostic about the value of such 
approaches, using symmetry—instead of assumptions—to tease out the extent 
to which they add value. Otherwise we may end up assuming exactly what it is 
we should be investigating. 
So let us set out some parameters for this test.  In terms of my assessment 
criteria, I see theories as being helpful if they are useful and novel.  By 
emphasising utility I am aiming to assess the extent to which such theories can 
provide concrete, practical assistance in tackling the questions at the heart of 
this thesis.  The related test of novelty is designed to assess whether the 
application of such theories actually lead us to new insights that could not be 
generated any other ways, or whether the same insights could have been 
arrived at anyway, without the aid of these theories.  (If this is the case, it would 
not demonstrate such theories to be unhelpful or irrelevant—as there may be 
many ways to generate important insights—but would just demonstrate that 
such insights are not unique).  
However, having clear assessment criteria alone is necessary but not sufficient.  
It is necessary to draw out, from the discussion above, some (alleged) 
differences between constructivist STS and their alternatives in order to define 
three testing grounds on which the utility and novelty of the theory will be 
assessed. I seek to examine these three areas in more detail in order to assess 
both i) whether the STS take on these questions can add value to the existing 
literature on Taser and, relatedly ii) whether, indeed, the alleged, stated 
differences between STS and alternative approaches and literatures on these 
topics are as significant as some have claimed.   
Assemblages and their implications 
First, as demonstrated above, constructivist STS accounts, including SCOT and 
ANT, stress that that technologies should be considered, not in isolation, but as 
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part of the socio-technical assemblages, or networks, in which they are 
embedded, and whose effects are unpredictable, variable and anything but 
deterministic (for an interesting application of this approach see, for example, 
Johnson et al 2003, who look at the socio-technical assemblage around the 
DNA database).  At first glance, this sounds novel, innovative and helpful —yet 
many authors readily concede and accept such premises, even if they do not 
use STS or ANT language to do so.  Thus Bishop et al’s (2014) study looking at 
the impact of policy change around police use of Taser, or Adam and 
Jennison’s (2007) call to pay attention to a broad range of issues around the 
weapon—amongst them training, guidance and interaction with other force 
options—already recognise the need to look at complex networks and 
interactions around the weapon, as do many NGO accounts (Moreau De 
Belliang 2015, Rappert 2004).  Moreover, the latter—in seeking to explore 
possibilities of change in the network—necessarily adopt the position that the 
socio-technical relations around the weapon are not fixed and static, but may be 
more or less amenable to change.   
Furthermore, as the preceding discussion has shown, whilst broadening out 
one’s focus from the technology in question—and the humans who use it—to 
the network around the weapon may have value, it also brings with it risks: in 
this case, a risk that accountability for negative effects may be watered down.  
Can such issues be obviated, as Frickel (1996) suggests? Or does using an 
ANT approach add little to our understanding of the weapon, whilst 
simultaneously limiting our ability to hold key actors to account for any negative 
effects associated with it?  Such questions will be tackled at different points 
throughout the thesis, but particularly in Chapter 6 (which looks at officer safety 
and their views on the weapon), Chapter 8 (which looks at the  story of Taser as 
a tool) and Chapter 9 (which looks at the accountability mechanisms around the 
weapon). 
A symmetrical approach to truth claims - or Taser as an ‘empirical reality’. 
Second, as previously noted, traditional perspectives  to the study of 
technologies such as Taser can tend to treat the effects and efficacy of the 
weapon as a set of objective, given, independent facts (Innes et al 2005).  They 
are seen as an ‘empirical reality’ (Terrill and Paoline 2012: 153) that can be 
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demonstrated, a singular ‘truth’ that can be uncovered (Ho 2009, Truth Not 
Taser 2008), and as a set of ‘misunderstandings’ that can be clarified (Jauchem 
2015), often via statistical analyses.  They thus come close to what Hilgartner 
(2014: 85) has termed a ‘sociology of error’.   
In this context constructivist STS approaches, including ANT and SCOT, may 
(or may not) remind analysts to pay attention to how commonly held beliefs, 
such as the efficacy and effects of the Taser weapon—and the statistical 
analysis that underpins this—are not simply objective facts, but may be, at least 
in part, socially constructed.  As Innes et al (2005: 50) notes, in so doing, they 
pose a ‘challenge to…overly rationalized accounts of scientific practice’.   
Similarly they may, or may not, serve as a useful reminder to investigate, 
symmetrically, the reasons for a particular technology’s success, considering 
the notion that ‘success explains efficiency, efficiency does not explain success’ 
(Feenberg 2010: 7).   
At the same time, however, the novelty of constructivist STS approaches should 
not be presumed.  Whilst it has been a long time coming, the recent discussion 
between Kaminski et al (2013) and Terrill and Paoline (2012) makes explicit 
reference to the notion of injuries from Taser being a ‘social construct’ – an 
exchange that has been conducted quite without the aid of any explicit 
reference to the STS literature, or to the complex vocabularies associated with 
ANT.  So just how novel, and useful, is this approach? And does it genuinely 
shed new light on the use of the Taser weapon, and its consequences?  I 
address these issues in Chapter 3, 4 and 6 when interpreting the results of my 
own statistical analysis into the use of, and injuries associated with, the Taser 
weapon, and in Chapter 7, where I discuss how beliefs around the weapon may 
be shaping perceptions of its efficacy and effects.   
Generalised symmetry of actants – or Taser as a tool.  
Finally, as detailed above, it has been argued that traditional criminology 
approaches pay too little attention to the technologies in question—treating 
them as a straightforward tool, as a slave of human will—and thus fail to fully 
explore the possibility that technologies such as Taser may affect the humans 
who are using it and the context into which it is introduced.  
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Thus Robert and Dufresne argue that, within criminology as a whole, ‘the 
relevance of technology, materiality and objects still needs to be emphasised’ 
(2015: 2).  Similarly, Sousa et al (2010: 38) lament that researchers ‘have not 
yet fully explored the impact of (Taser)… on police decisions’ to use force, and 
note that ‘a wider range of options (of force techniques) may change the 
decision-making process’.  
But can our understanding of Taser—and of decision making around the 
weapon—be enhanced by a focus on the weapon, its materiality and its 
interaction with human actants, and by efforts to open up the ‘black box’ 
surrounding the technology? How widespread are notions and assumptions of 
Taser as a tool? Can constructivist STS studies—in particular ANT, which urges 
us to pay attention to the ‘missing masses’ of non-human actors and their 
‘agency’-- assist us in questioning these assumptions, and does this add 
anything new to our understanding of Taser?  As has been demonstrated, 
analysts have already started to explore how Taser may impact use of force 
decisions, quite unaided by any assistance that STS in general, and ANT in 
particular, has to offer.  In addition at least one article has paid attention to the 
distinct effects and agency that Taser may have (e.g. Lee 2009).  So just how 
novel are constructivist STS approaches in such situations? Such questions are 
discussed in Chapter 8, where the story of  Taser as a tool is discussed in more 
detail.  
Conclusions and Definitions. 
In this chapter I have sought to provide a relatively broad ranging introduction to 
the academic literature on technology and society and around the Taser 
weapon more specifically, delineating the main schools of thought and 
examining the extent to which the literature on Taser fits into these approaches.  
I have argued that, whilst there is a body of work looking at certain policing 
technologies (from information technologies to crime analytics) in a way that is 
sensitive to STS insights (Cole and Lynch 2006, Innes et al 2005, Johnson et al 
2003), there are a paucity of STS inspired studies looking at Taser.  Whilst 
these approaches remain as criticised and as controversial as the Taser 
weapon itself, opportunities exist for taming these approaches, using weaker 
versions which avoid ‘symmetrical absurdity’ (McLean and Hassard 2004: 493) 
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whilst taking what is best from these perspectives.  Yet the key tenets of such 
perspectives themselves—tenets which place a high emphasis on empirical 
investigation and thoughtful, symmetrical analysis—caution us against simply 
assuming that their application will automatically generate useful and novel 
insights into our understanding of Taser.  The extent to which these approaches 
genuinely lead to new insights will thus be a key question to be addressed 
throughout this thesis. 
Before closing, however, I want to use this chapter to do one more piece of 
work.  Clearly, one’s definition of Taser cannot help but be affected by the 
perspective of the author on the relationship between technology and society, 
and the school of thought with which they are most closely aligned.  To define 
Taser in a specific way is to do much more than to offer a simple description.  
Equally, choosing not to describe the weapon or its technical characteristics in 
detail is also a performative act.  Certainly for the purposes of the thesis, some 
kind of introduction to the weapon is needed.  By way of closing, then, I would 
like to draw out the implications of this chapter for providing a definition of Taser 
and to provide a description that will serve us well throughout the following 
thesis.  This introduction should include a description of the weapon and its 
characteristics but it should not stop there.   
Towards a Definition of Taser. 
Taser: its (socio)technical features. 
The Taser weapon  is a brand of electric shock weapon marketed 
predominantly (albeit not exclusively) to law enforcement agencies.  In 
particular, the term Taser refers to electric-shock weapons manufactured by the 
American company Taser International. Whilst other projectile electric-shock 
weapons are available, Taser models are in use in over a hundred countries 
(TASER International, 2012) and are the only projectile electric-shock weapon 
currently authorized for use by law enforcement agencies in England and 
Wales. The name Taser is an abbreviation of ‘Thomas A Swift and his Electrical 
Rifle’, taken from the Thomas Swift series of children’s science fiction books 
written in the early 20th century (O’Brien et al 2007). 
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The X26 Taser, the model currently in use in England and Wales, is loaded with 
a single cartridge which delivers a potentially incapacitating electric-shock via 
tethered wires and probes to subjects up to 6.4 metres away, an effect known 
as neuro-muscular incapacitation (NMI). The X26 is  programmed to 
automatically deliver a five second shock of electricity via this cartridge when 
the trigger is depressed, although police officers can over-ride this and deliver a 
longer shock by keeping the trigger held down for longer. The degree of neuro 
muscular incapacitation achieved depends partly on the placement of the 
probes (Ho 2012)—with probes that are further away from each other potentially 
more likely to increase the incapacitation effect—as well as on a range of 
human and non-human factors (from the accuracy of shot placement, to the 
type of clothing worn).  The weapon can also be used in ‘drive-stun’ mode 
where the end of the weapon, with the cartridge removed, is pressed directly up 
against the subject to deliver an electric-shock.  Unlike probe firing mode, this 
does not incapacitate but works by pain compliance alone 4.  Unless otherwise 
specified, I use the term Taser to refer to the Taser X26 model specifically. 
The weapon can also be used in a number of other ways.  As shall be 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 7, some evidence suggests that drawing and / or 
aiming the weapon can have a deterrent effect.  The device can also be ‘red-
dotted’, a term used to refer to the action of pointing the red-dot laser sight of 
the weapon at a subject.  This action is a good example of particular effects not 
being pre-determined by the technology itself, or by the society into which it is 
introduced, but evolving from a series of complex interactions.  Whilst initially 
intended as an aide to assist accuracy when firing, pointing the red-dot at a 
subject has come to be seen as a valuable function, and a powerful deterrent, in 
its own right – an unforeseen outcome resulting from a dance of agency 
between subject, officer and technology.    
The Taser weapon also has accountability mechanisms built into its design.  
Whenever a cartridge is fired 15 – 20 Anti Felon Identification Discs (AFIDs)--
confetti-like tags, each bearing the serial number of the cartridge in question—
                                                          
4
 More recently a third method of firing, ‘angled drive stun’, has also evolved.  The NPCC 
describe angled drive stun as a method for when ‘the Taser has been fired towards the intended 
subject and one probe has missed, or the Taser has been deployed towards the subject and the 
probes are too close together to incapacitate…  In these circumstances if an officer then places 
the end of the taser in a part of the body away from the probe(s) then it is possible that 
incapacitation can be achieved’ (NPCC 2015).   
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are released.  These can provide confirmation as to which cartridge was fired, 
and additional details about the location of the firing.  Additional documentary 
evidence can also be provided by the weapon’s internal data logging system, 
which records the time and date that the current was discharged as well as the 
length of discharge.  
From technical characteristics to the socio-technical. 
Whilst it is important to note such features, it is also important not simply to stop 
there but to recognise the extent to which the weapon and its features are 
embedded into a broader socio-technical assemblage or network.  As Rejali 
(2009) notes, these features did not magically, inevitably appear, but were the 
product of a series of choices, compromises and alliances between human and 
non-human actants.  Indeed the Taser weapon went through several different 
incarnations before appearing in the form that it does today.   Nor should it be 
assumed that these features of the weapon un-problematically result in a series 
of ‘effects’, be they good or bad.  Instead, significant debate exists around the 
efficacy of the weapon, its ability to incapacitate and the term ‘less lethal’ – and 
as such, considerable ‘interpretive flexibility’ exists around the weapon.  (The 
issue of ‘interpretive flexibility’ around the functioning and effects of Taser will 
be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 which deal, respectively, with officer and 
subject views of the weapon). 
Moreover, whilst understanding the weapon’s operations and features are 
crucial, these must not be looked at in isolation.  For example, certain of the 
weapon’s capabilities—such as its use in angled drive-stun mode, and its use in 
red-dotting mode—have changed over time, as weapon and user evolved, co-
mingled and found new ways of interacting.  Nor are the weapon’s much lauded 
accountability features able to live up to their promise independent from human 
interaction – they require human actants to collect the AFIDs, download the 
internal memory, and analyse and act on the data retrieved.   
For our purposes, it is also necessary not just to discuss the socio-technical 
network around the weapon in general terms, but also to provide an overview of 
key features of the network or assemblage around the weapon in England and 
Wales.   
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Taser in England and Wales 
In-depth evaluation of projectile electric-shock weapons in England and Wales 
first started in 2001, with products produced by Taser International, and 
competitors, examined by the Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB 
2002). The testing regime encompassed a range of variables, including barb 
accuracy and dispersion, electrical output and reliability and handling 
characteristics (reported in DOMILL 2002) and showed Taser products to be 
‘the most consistently accurate’. In parallel to this process, DOMILL, a ‘standing 
committee of independent clinicians’ (now replaced by SACMILL) advised on 
the medical implications of Taser weapons. Their 2002 statement found that (for 
the M26 model) ‘the risk of life-threatening or serious injuries… appears to be 
very low’ and ‘certainly much lower than that from conventional firearms’. 
However they stated that this advice could only be based on ‘the available 
evidence on the use of the device’ – and noted significant gaps in this evidence 
base (DOMILL 2002). 
Following this advice, a year-long pilot study of the M26, a predecessor to the 
X26, was conducted in five police forces between 2003 and 2004. It use was 
initially restricted to authorised firearms officers at the forces in question. The 
pilot study was reviewed by Price Water House Cooper (2004), and later on that 
year Taser was rolled out to firearms officers in England and Wales, with the 
following Ministerial statement accompanying the announcement:  
‘In the light of the results of the (Taser) trial, I have authorised chief 
officers throughout England and Wales to deploy Taser for use in the 
same strictly limited circumstances. Chief Officers can now make…  
Taser available to authorised firearms officers in their force as a less 
lethal alternative for use in situations where a firearms authority has been 
granted’ (House of Commons debate 2004: column 150WS). 
The weapon’s use by specially trained (i.e. non-firearms) officers—and its use 
by firearms officers at incidents where firearms authority had not been granted--
was also piloted between 2007 - 8 and was accompanied by a DOMILL 
statement on this expansion in use (DOMILL 2007), and a HOSDB summary of 
the pilot (HOSDB 2008). This trial involved not just the older M26 model, but the 
use of the newer X26 model (which is the focus of this thesis) and, in fact, the 
‘overwhelming majority’ of incidents in the trial involved the latter.   
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In the intervening period DOMILL had also produced two additional statements 
on the safety of the M26 and X26 weapon (DOMILL 2004: DOMILL 2005). 
Some of the gaps identified by DOMILL in 2002 were partially filled in by these 
statements. Both the 2nd and 3rd reviews again concluded that the ‘risk of life-
threatening or serious injuries’ from both the M26 Taser and the newer variant 
in use today, the X26, ‘is low’. Throughout this period, some sought to make a 
distinction between two categories of injuries associated with the weapon, and 
one that that will be referenced throughout this thesis: that is, a distinction 
between the primary injuries that are ‘directly attributable to the application of 
the Taser currents’ and the ‘secondary’ injuries such as ‘barb wounds’ and 
‘head injuries from falls’ that are ‘physical injuries directly associated with Taser 
use’ (ACPO 2008a: 18).  Taser was subsequently rolled out to specially trained 
officers in England and Wales in 2008, at the discretion of Chief Constables, 
and with some financial assistance from the Home Office5.  It is estimated that 
11% of officers carry the weapon (Laville 2013).   
Current practice 
Whilst details of how the weapon is currently being used in practice are scanty 
and, as will be discussed in the next chapters, the statistics issued by the Home 
Office need to be treated with considerable caution, the most recent set of these 
statistics seem to show three trends emerging from the data.  First, there are 
large discrepancies in rates of use between different forces.  Indeed as the 
IPCC (2014a: 3) has noted, ‘some police forces…(have) a proportionately much 
higher rate of Taser use in relation to their size than others.’  With that caveat in 
place, the second trend is that Taser firings tend to account for a small 
proportion of overall uses of the weapon.  For example, during 2011 - 2013 red-
dotting of the weapon accounted for 51% of uses, and the percentage of uses 
involving probe firing of the weapon decreased from 21% to 17% (Home Office 
2014a).  
                                                          
5
 The Home Secretary at the time announced that she was ‘making funding available to forces to support 
the purchase of up to 10,000 Tasers. This will allow chief officers to take a decision on Taser deployment 
according to operational need, without being encumbered by financial restrictions’. House of Commons 




Third, whilst firings  make up a small percentage of Taser uses, uses of all kinds 
have increased over time.  Comparing the six month period from April to 
September 2009 (the earliest statistics that are available on a quarterly basis) to 
the six month period between January to June 2014 (the most recent statistics 
available) shows increases in every category of use.  The number of times 
Taser has been used in probe-firing mode has increased by 174% (to 826 
times): the use of the weapon in drive stun mode has increased 41% (to 78 
times), and the number of times the weapon is used but not discharged has 
increased 337% (to 4, 158 times) (Home Office 2013a, Home Office 2014b).  
The Regulatory Framework around the weapon. 
There are a number of regulatory mechanisms around the weapon, including 
domestic and European laws and conventions (including the 1967 Criminal Law 
Act, the 2008 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act and the European 
Convention on Human Rights) and UN soft law standards (including the UN 
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms and the UN Code of Conduct 
for Law Enforcement Officials 6).  Guidance  provided by the College of Policing 
via Authorised Professional Practice (APP) (College of Policing 2014a),  the 
National Decision Model (NDM)  (College of Policing 2014b), and a 
standardised Taser training curriculum, also  provide input to officers to help 
inform their use of Taser (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8).   
Once the weapon has been used there are a range of accountability 
mechanisms in place.  In addition to the features discussed above, they include 
the completion of a 7 page form whenever the weapon is used (even if it is 
merely drawn) and overview and assessment of the form by the force’s in-
house Taser Single Point of Contact.  Externally there is the potential for 
involvement by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (particularly in 
cases of death, serious injury or complaint) and from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of the Constabulary, as well as by SACMILL, who review the use of Taser and 
request notification  if and when guidelines for use change, so that they can 
assess and provide statements as appropriate (for example, as happened with 
                                                          
6
 The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, along with the UN Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials are two notable international texts pertaining to police use of force, but are only 
soft law instruments.  Key provisions of these texts are further discussed in Dymond and Corney (2014). 
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the roll-out of Taser to non-firearms officers). These features, their strengths 
and drawbacks will be considered in more detail in Chapter 9 – and highlight the 
importance not just at looking at the weapon, and its features, in more detail, 
but also looking at the network in which it is embedded. 
This chapter has sought to provide an overview of the four main approaches to 
technology and society—instrumentalism, substantivism, constructivist STS 
accounts, such as SCOT, and actor-network theory--and has discussed how 
they apply to the Taser literature.  It has then used these insights to generate a 
definition of Taser and the network around the weapon that, it is hoped, will 
serve as a useful basis for readers who may be less, or more, familiar with such 
discussions.    Before delving straight into the empirical chapters of this thesis, 
however, one further discussion is necessary: that of the research methods and 
methodologies employed to answer my aims, objectives and research 
questions.  It is to this topic I now turn.  
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Chapter 2: Methodology. 
 
This chapter aims to provide information about, and a rationale for, decisions 
made in the research process, as well as the methodology and methods used, 
in order to act as a single reference point throughout the thesis.  For ease of 
reading, some of the finer points of the methods used in different chapters are 
discussed in the relevant chapter, and  this chapter sets out the  rationales for 
the broader choices that have been made around the research and how it is 
conducted.   I first consider why the research topic has been narrowed down in 
the way that it has, before looking at how and why the specific research 
questions have been selected.  I then consider how the two police forces where 
I conducted the bulk of the field work were chosen, before discussing the 
justification for the research methods used.  Issues of ontology, epistemology, 
research limitations, ethics and impact are discussed throughout the chapter. 
 
Refining the focusing of the thesis  
Having outlined in the introduction the  rationale for focusing on the use of 
projectile electric-shock weapons in England and Wales, it seems appropriate to 
clarify here some additional choices that were made to narrow down the topic.  
Ultimately this thesis has a specific and limited remit—to focus on one type of 
electric shock weapon (the Taser X26), in a specific jurisdiction (England and 
Wales), over a particular time period (2004 – 2014)—for several reasons.    
First, whilst alternative projectile electric-shock weapons exist, Taser 
International’s products are the most widely used, and their products are the 
only projectile electric-shock technologies currently approved for use in England 
and Wales.  Second, whilst Taser International has produced a range of 
projectile electric-shock devices, again, the X26 is the only model currently in 
use in England and Wales at the time of writing.  
 
The time period was chosen for two reasons: first, the majority of my field work 
took place in 2013 – 2014, and the statistical database I had access to only 
covered up until 1st January 2015.  Second, and more pragmatically, choosing 
an end-point also facilitated the write-up.  Whilst I was cognisant of 
developments happening after 2014—such as the potential introduction of the 
‘next generation’ of Taser weapons into England and Wales, and the trialling of 
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a standardised, nation-wide use of force database—I did not have to continually 
change the text to try and keep pace with on-going developments.  The starting 
date of the thesis, 2004, was chosen to reflect the fact that it was in this year 
that Taser was first introduced to England and Wales, but does not imply that 
my findings are equally relevant to all of this time period, given the years in 
which my fieldwork was conducted. 
 
It was decided to focus the fieldwork  on two police forces in England and 
Wales—with one of these forces also providing the dataset to be analysed in 
Chapters 3, 5 and 6—not just because of their physical proximity and 
accessibility, but because of the welcome my research received in the 
jurisdiction, a welcome that would prove crucial to my ability to carry out 
research in such a controversial and sensitive area.   It was clear from relatively 
early on in the process that research on Taser was welcomed by many.  For 
example, one Taser trainer stated that he valued the research, because: 
 
‘gaining an outsiders view of what we do, um, I think that’s important.  It’s 
really important to get people in… (to) cast a critical eye over everything.   
It’s quite nice as well to be a little bit more open about it’ (Taser trainer, 
force details omitted).   
 
This was crucial because, as Marks (2004) has noted, securing active buy in 
from a range of officials at all levels of policing organisationsis crucial when 
conducting research into the police.  Similarly, civil society organisations, 
oversight bodies and lawyers representing individuals subject to Taser, 
generously gave up their time to assist and to answer questions, as did Taser 
International, the manufacturers of the weapon in question.  This not only meant 
that I had virtually unprecedented access to issues around Taser in England 
and Wales—including access to Taser training, internal use of force statistics 
and a chance to examine the weapon up close—it also meant that I had a 
unique opportunity, I felt, to use the research to generate impact.  Although I 
could not have predicted the exact routes to impact that would unfold as a result 
of the research, the possibility that this might occur was a second reason for 
choosing to focus on England and Wales.  Indeed, my assessment was proved 
correct when a variety of opportunities, detailed in the next section, occurred 
during the research.  
55 
 
Pathways to Impact. 
One of the aims of this PhD was to engage with and generate practical 
recommendations for practitioners, and I benefitted from some unique 
opportunities to do so, including: 
 My work, in a part-time capacity, with the Omega Research Foundation, 
an NGO that works on the human rights impact of LLWs such as Taser, 
and my engagement with Amnesty International UK, and other civil 
society organisations, as a result of these links (2009 to the present day).  
 
 An invitation to sit on the Metropolitan Police’s Taser Reference Group 
between 2013 - 2015.  This gave me a unique opportunity to discuss my 
research officially and directly with key stakeholders, from the NPCC 
Lead on Less Lethal Weapons, including Taser and the Metropolitan 
Police’s Lead on Taser to representatives from Amnesty International 
and other civil society groups, medical and mental health experts, 
religious leaders and academics.   
 
 An invitation to speak at the Association of Chief Police Officers’ Seminar 
for force leads (Single Points of Contact) on Taser in 2013 and 2014, to 
which Taser leads in all English and Welsh forces were invited. 
 
 The writing of a submission detailing my interim impressions of Taser 
training, requested by the College of Policing in 2014, who were keen to 
hear my views in advance of a review of the training package.   
 
 An invitation to visit the Headquarters of Taser International in 2014 and 
to present my research over 10 senior officials, including the Chief 
Executive, Senior Legal Counsel, other members of the legal team, 
Medical Advisors and the Vice President of Strategic Communications, 
with travel costs paid for by the company. 
 
The ESRC funded Expert’s Meeting on Taser that I organised in 2015, 
which provided an opportunity to engage key stakeholders and to 
present interim research findings.  The meeting was attended by 
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representatives from the ACPO, the  College  of  Policing, the Police 
Federation, the  Home Office, the Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory, the SACMILL and medical professionals, the IPPC and from 
relevant companies and NGOs, as well as  academics, 
lawyers  representing individuals subject to  TASER, 
and  TASER  officers and trainers.  (For further details see Dymond 2015 
, which provides further details and notes of the day 
 A research placement with the NPCC between 2015 - 2016, funded by 
the ESRC, to enable me to act as a researcher and advisor to the Police 
Use of Force Reporting Review, announced in 2014 by the then Home 
Secretary, the Rt. Hon. Theresa May. This review aims to introduce, for 
the first time in England and Wales, a standardised system to capture 
and record incidents where police officers have used force, including 
Taser. I am on the ‘Programme Board’—which provides strategic 
oversight—and the ‘Project Team’, tasked with implementing the details 
of the review, and am the only academic on these panels. 
Selecting Research Questions 
Having set out the broad aims, and objectives of my research, narrowed my 
focus, and explored pathways to impact, I still had to focus down on the exact 
questions that I would seek to answer.  As previously noted, many constructivist 
studies in STS start by closely examining and then carefully deconstructing a 
given technology such as Taser, in order to better understand the interactions 
shaping the design of the technology, the uses to which it is put, and how it is 
received.  However such a study has already been done (see Rejali 2009), and 
the idea of duplicating such an approach did not appeal.  
Instead, I was guided by my initial primary and secondary research into the 
topic, and iteratively used themes that emerged from this research—combined 
with a sprinkling of what Jacobson et al (2013: 7) would call ‘serendipity’—to 
help refine the questions.  For example, during my initial desk-based research it 
soon became clear that much of the literature on Taser use was focused on its 
consequences for officer and subject safety, with consequences defined 
narrowly as physical injury rates.  Thus the literature on the consequences of 
Taser use for officers and subjects was not only highly focused on one 
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jurisdiction—the USA—but, as I shall demonstrate,  tended to be highly 
quantitative, ignoring the experiences of those subjected to and charged with 
carrying the weapon.  I thus saw an opportunity to contribute to knowledge by 
exploring the qualitative dimensions of these topics.   
Through exploring these qualitative dimensions, I was then given access to 
unique quantitative data: a police force’s internal use of force data-set.  This 
was not something that had been anticipated at the start of the research 
process, but I recognised the value in complimenting my qualitative work with 
quantitative analysis, and was keen to take on the challenge. 
My background as an NGO worker undoubtedly also influenced my choice of 
topic. Some authors and institutions looking at various aspects of policing 
clearly see their role as assisting the police with implementation and 
operationalization issues – in other words, to conduct research for the police.  In 
the arena of use of force research, Kaminski et al criticise researchers who use 
definitions of use of force and injury that are not accepted by police officers, and 
who produce accounts ‘unhelpful to practitioners and police executives seeking 
to better understanding correlates of force’ (2013: 618).   Jauchem argues that 
academics can play an important role in pointing out ‘misconceptions’ around 
the Taser weapon, which he sees as ‘an important law enforcement tool’ (2015: 
53).  Jenkinson et al (2006: 239) are keen to argue, on the basis of limited data 
and (by their own admission) limited statistical analysis of said data, that the 
weapon should be made available more widely in England and Wales and are 
quick to dismiss concerns that it ‘will be deployed as instruments of torture’.  
Such analysis is taking place in a broader context of a shift from the ‘sociology 
of the police to sociology for the police’ (Reiner 2012: 91).  
Yet my civil society background allowed me to see the benefits of a slightly 
different, and arguably more challenging, conception of police research – one 
that allowed the researcher to be a ‘critical friend’ to the police, neither being 
unduly critical, nor shying away from tackling difficult and sensitive issues.  In so 
doing, I adopted an approach similar to that advocated by Delaney (2014: 23), 
one that sought to highlight ‘common ground’ yet was ‘at once confrontational 
and collaborative’.  Such research then, is not so much for the police—although 
it may well bring a range of benefits—as it is on the police (see also Innes 
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2010).  As such, encouraged by the call from the NPCC’s Lead on Less Lethal 
Weapons for ‘continued scrutiny’ of the weapon, I wanted to be able to explore 
the regulatory and accountability mechanisms around the weapon, the stories  
so often heard about its use, and the consequences for officers and subjects, 
from this perspective.   
Selecting Police Forces 
Providing answers to the questions in this thesis involved engaging with police 
forces in England and Wales to observe Taser training, observe officers at 
work, access sensitive statistics on the use of Taser and other less lethal 
weapons and conduct interviews.  However this involved making some tough 
choices.  As there are 43 territorial and 8 non-geographic police forces in 
England and Wales, it was impractical to look at all of them.  Indeed, given the 
sensitivity of the research, it was necessary to establish and maintain close and 
constructive relationships with a small number of forces in order to ensure 
success (Marks 2004).  I ruled out studying non-territorial forces, as they, by 
definition, have a different mandate from their geographical counterparts which 
would further complicate analysis. In addition, the Home Office publishes 
statistics on Taser use for territorial English and Welsh forces, but not for their 
non-territorial counterparts, or for Police Scotland, which would make data 
triangulation more problematic.  For all these reasons, it made sense to focus 
on English and Welsh territorial forces – but it was still not clear how many, or 
which ones..   
 
In the final analysis the qualitative research in England and Wales centred on 
two forces both of whom agreed to participate under conditions of anonymity, 
and the quantitative research focused on a dataset supplied by one of these 
forces.  (I describe the dataset itself  at the start of Part 2, so that readers can 
refer back to it when reading the subsequent chapters).  Force A—which 
covered a mainly rural area—was selected for several reasons: it was very 
interested in the research with high levels of buy-in throughout the organisation: 
it was a highly influential force—thus bringing with it opportunities to maximise 
the impact of the research—and it was in line with the national average for the 
frequency with which Taser was drawn, re-dotted, fired, and used in drive stun 
mode, thus aiding generalizability of any observations gathered.  It was also 
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one of the few forces in England and Wales that collected detailed statistics on 
the use of less lethal force by police officers —including, but not limited to, 
Taser—and was willing and able to make these available to me 7.  
 
It was, however, recognised that looking at one force in England and Wales was 
far from sufficient - as any dynamics observed might well be unique to that 
particular force.  As such, I attended an ACPO Conference on the use of Taser 
and appealed for co-operation from forces that were willing and able to facilitate 
the research.  This resulted in a second force (Force B), with a territorial remit 
that included some rural areas but also included a major city, coming forward.  
This force was in an alliance with several other forces, meaning that other 
forces in the arrangement shared the same training materials, and this was also 
considered to help aid generalizability of the findings drawn.   Whereas Force A 
closely matched the national average on Taser firings, Force B had a higher 
than average percentage of Taser firings (out of all Taser uses) and did not 
collect use of force statistics, other than the Taser statistics mandated by the 
Home Office.  Given these differences between the two forces, their selection 
was considered appropriate.   
 
However, it can be assumed that the police forces able and willing to participate 
in the research were probably those with most capacity around Taser use and 
management, and those who saw themselves as having little to hide – and that 
I was therefore capturing, arguably, the best of the best.  In order to help 
combat this issue, I used Freedom of Information requests to all forces in 
England and Wales to explore particular issues and to better understand 
whether particular practices were limited to the two forces in question, or were 
more widespread.  As I detail below, I was also able to observe the College of 
Policing’s Lead Instructor’s Training—an advanced course aimed at individuals 
who were already Taser trainers in their home force—and to conduct interviews 
                                                          
7
 The initial plan was to use datasets from multiple forces in England and Wales.  As such the 
research owes a large debt of gratitude to the (then) ACPO Armed Policing Secretariat, who 
approached all forces who were in the same Home Office ‘Most Similar Forces’ group as Force 
A—and thus broadly similar on a range of characteristics—and who were understood to collect 
some data on use of less lethal force, on my behalf (Home Office 2013b).  However, due to 
limitations and gaps in the data captured by these forces, it was necessary to limit the analysis 
of Taser statistics in England and Wales to the single anonymous police force detailed above: 
an approach in keeping with Kaminski et al’s work (2013): White and Ready (2008),   White and 
Ready (2010), Lin and Jones (2010) and Castillo et al (2012), all of whom used data from a 
single force in their analysis.   
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with many of the participants.  This gave me an excellent opportunity to speak 
with trainers and Taser Single Points of Contact at a number of other police 
forces, thus enhancing the reach of my research, and I conducted 35 interviews 
with police officers, SPOCs and / or trainers in total.  Nevertheless, this 
remained a perennial concern– particularly as few Taser studies address in any 
detail how the forces in question came to be involved in the research and what 
implications this may have (White and Ready 2007 provide just one example of 
this tendency).   
                                                                                                                             
Accessing other voices 
I was also keen not just to speak with police officials, but also to speak with 
those who might have a different perspective on the weapon: in particular 
individuals who had been subject to Taser, and their representatives.   Access 
to these individuals was sought via NGOs working with individuals subject to 
Taser discharge and the solicitors and barristers representing them (see 
Chapter 5 for further details). 
 Cognisant of the potential negative impact of the research on participants’ 
mental well-being, advice was sought from the gatekeepers identified above, 
and only certain individuals approached.  The selected individuals were 
approached by the gatekeepers themselves, not by me, to minimise the risk that 
they felt pressurised to participate in the research process and were be 
informed of their ability to terminate the interview at any time.    
Moreover, as remarks made in interview—and subsequently made public—may 
have the potential to jeopardise ongoing legal proceedings (should they be 
taking place), I refrained from giving highly detailed or specific accounts of the 
circumstances around Taser use that could identify the individuals concerned.  
In total, I conducted detailed interviews with five individuals, two of whom had 
been subjected to Taser, two of whom were providing legal representation to 
individuals subjected to Taser, and one NGO representative who was working 
on Taser issues in England and Wales. To complement these accounts, a 
search of the academic and grey literature--including NGO reports, newspaper 
articles, radio interviews, blogs and other fora—was also conducted.   
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Selecting Appropriate Methods.  
I used a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods to answer my research 
questions.  Quantitative methods have been detailed above, and qualitative 
techniques mainly comprised semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation. As noted above, I conducted 40 semi-structured interviews with 
Taser trainers, Personal Safety Trainers, Taser Single Point of Contacts and 
police officers in England and Wales, individuals subject to Taser and their 
representatives 8. Whilst the majority of interviews were conducted at two police 
forces—identified here as Forces A and B—interviews were also conducted 
with Taser trainers and SPOCs at a number of other forces.  The Ethical 
Approval Form, Information and Consent Form and indicative list of questions 
asked can be found, respectively, at Appendices 2 – 4.  
I supplemented this with auto-ethnographic techniques—including, as I detail in 
Chapter 5, volunteering to be Tasered under controlled conditions—to deepen 
my understanding of the weapon, and some of the related effects associated 
with it.  Furthermore, I was given access to a random stratified sample of over 
60 detailed Taser use of force reporting forms from Force A, which provided 
further details of the circumstances in which Taser was used, officer rationales 
for use, and how officers tended to describe the scenarios with which they were 
faced.   
I also conducted nearly 275 hours of observations, including observing the 
College of Policing’s national Lead Instructor Training, Taser Initial training, 
Taser Refresher training courses, Officer Safety Training, ride-alongs with 
officers on patrol, and attending the Inquest into the death of a young man, 
Jordan Begley, subject to the use of Taser.   
Participant observation was chosen as it is considered by many to be essential 
for conducting research in policing environments.  Marks writes not only that 
                                                          
8
 I also conducted 20 additional interviews that, whilst not strictly required for, or used in, the thesis, 
nevertheless deepened my understanding of the issues involved.  This included interviews with officers 
from the Police Service of Northern Ireland, with senior officials in the UK and interviews with officials 
from Taser International –  material that I look forward to utilising in a later stage of my career.  The year 
long placement I conducted with the NPCC on the Use of Force Reporting Review announced by the then 
Home Secretary, the Rt Hon, Theresa May (detailed above), also gave me an invaluable opportunity to 





such an approach ‘may be the researcher’s only way of securing other methods 
of doing research’, but that it also improves the quality of information gathered, 
as police officers are less likely to ‘conceal what they believe to be ‘in house’ 
knowledge’ (Marks 2004: 871). In my experience, participant observation 
proved highly useful in encouraging officers to take part in interviews and  
encouraging them to open up, and to build rapport, once in an interview 
situation.  In most cases, officers were advised prior to the course commencing 
that  I would be attending, were given the information and consent form 
pertaining to my research in advance and advised that they had the opportunity 
to engage in interviews, should they so wish.  I then provided a short verbal 
introduction to the research at the start of the course, and asked officers to 
make themselves known if they were interested in being interviews, with 
interviews themselves being conducted during lunch and break times in the 
course schedule.  Semi-structured interviews were chosen as they allowed me 
to cover topics of interest, pick up on points raised in my quantitative and 
qualitative work, and retain space to explore additional topics raised by 
participants (Stephens 2007: 206).    As Leech (2002: 668) has noted, such a 
style of interviewing is particularly suitable with highly knowledgeable, elite 
respondents as it ‘gives them the chance to be the experts’.   
Participant / observer status and relationship adopted with participants. 
My approach to research, and the relationship adopted with participants, could 
perhaps best be described as inspired by participatory action inquiry, and I 
aimed to achieve a moderate degree of participation throughout the research 
process.  Whilst over 35 variants of participatory action inquiry have been 
identified worldwide, in general terms participatory action research is 
characterised both by ‘political participation’--the tenet that ‘research subjects 
have a basic human right to participate fully in designing the research that 
intends to gather knowledge about them’ (Heron and Reason 1997: 281)—and 
by a desire ‘to change the world’ (Fals Borda in Heron and Reason 1997).  
Because of these tenets, participatory action is particularly suitable for this 
research and its aims.  It is also, perhaps, particularly important given my 
chosen research setting; as Marks (2004; 883) notes, ‘proper access and fair 
research on the police requires being able to give something back… and  it 
would seem that participatory research is an important route to follow.’  
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I adopted a participatory approach both in terms of research design – choosing 
semi-structured interviews to explore topics of interest, and giving participants 
space in the interview to raise topics that were important to them, but that may 
not have been adequately covered in the rest of interview—and in terms of 
discussion of interim results and research process.  I also took care to discuss 
the interim results of the research with participants who had previously indicated 
an interest in participating in such discussions through a variety of routes.  
These included participation in the Expert’s Meeting on Taser, the Metropolitan 
Police’s Taser Reference Group and the national Police Use of Force Reporting 
Review (conducted between 2013 – 2016, and discussed above), as well as a 
series of meetings held in summer 2016, with the police forces, lawyers and 
NGOs who had participated in the research as well as oversight bodies 
(specifically the IPCC, HMIC and SACMILL) and the NPCC, Home Office and 
College of Policing. 
There are, however, limits to the extent to which I have been able to incorporate 
the participatory action approach into my research and, as such, I use the term 
with care. Hagey criticises authors who ‘abuse’ PAR by ‘using its good 
reputation… while conducting research within the conventional sets of relations. 
The obvious motivation is to retain control of research and to be accountable to 
one’s bureaucracy’ (in Allen and Hutchinson 2009).  Yet many (including Allen 
and Hutchinson 2009) have faced challenges in implementing participatory 
techniques as fully as they would like.   
My research is no exception and it is necessary to acknowledge this.  Minkler et 
al (2002) argue that ‘a fundamental tenet of PAR involves ensuring that the 
issue to be investigated and acted upon comes from the community and not an 
outside professional or funding source’, and whilst I had the clear support and 
interest of a wide range of stakeholders for my research topic, as detailed 
above, I ultimately retained decision-making power over what issues to address 
and how to address them.  I would thus describe my research not as fully 
participatory but as more participatory than some STS research, characterised 
best by ‘participation by consultation’ (Pimbert and Pretty 1997: 309) or ‘user-
sensitive research’ (Campbell et al in Allen 2009; 125), than by more holistic 
participatory methods.  
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Data Analysis and Triangulation 
My choice of mixed methods research and my approach to triangulation was, 
like many researchers, a highly pragmatic one (Johnson et al  2007).  From a 
practical perspective the range of quantitative and quantitative techniques 
adopted allowed me to use techniques that were particularly suited to 
answering particular questions.  For example, the statistical analysis was well 
suited to analysing trends in officer’s use of the weapon, whilst qualitative 
analysis was well suited to understanding their perspectives. Furthermore, 
using both quantitative and qualitative techniques allowed me to reach a deeper 
understanding of the topic than I would have done using only one type of 
technique.  Just as my quantitative work pointed to interesting directions for my 
qualitative research, so my qualitative research allowed me to alternatively 
make sense of, nuance and unpack findings from the quantitative work and 
from the quantitative literature more broadly.  As well as using what Denzin 
terms ‘methodological triangulation’—in particular, the ‘between method’ 
qualitative and quantitative triangulation that he recommends—I also used ‘data 
triangulation’, drawing together a range of data sources to aid my understanding 
of the topic under investigation (in Johnson et al 2007: 114).   
My practical approach to data analysis was predominantly what Moore has 
characterised as ‘simultaneous triangulation’, in which findings from multiple 
methods are analysed, and then drawn together at the interpretation stage, as 
opposed to ‘sequential’ designs where the research is planned such that the 
findings from one method then inform the next phase of the study, which goes 
onto utilise a second method (in Johnson et al 2007: 114).  .  In my case, this 
was necessary because access police use of force data was not something that 
had been anticipated, and therefore planned for, during the research planning 
process.  This approach was also reflected in the design of the thesis, which 
allowed me to use quantitative methods to speak to questions (such as officer 
and subject injury rates) usually tackled via quantitative methods in particular 
chapters (for example Chapters 4 and 6), and then complement this, and 
unpack it further, with reference to qualitative findings (for example in Chapters 
5 and 7 – something I return to in more detail in the next section of the thesis). 
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Nevertheless, I was at times also able to use ‘sequential’ triangulation. For 
example, when analysing subject injury rates using quantitative data I was able 
to conduct additional interviews with officers to help further understand when, 
how and why they were classifying certain incidents as resulting in injury, and to 
feed this information back into relevant discussions. 
My ontological and epistemological approach to triangulation and data analysis 
was also pragmatic and could best be described as critical realist, in that I make 
room for constructivism and interpretation—in particular for multiple 
interpretations of reality and the objects that help constitute it—yet equally seek 
to retain some notion of reality, truth and material objects existing outside of 
such interpretations. As Seale (1999: 470) notes, those working from such 
perspectives are able to take the view that: 
‘Although we always perceive the world from a particular viewpoint, the 
world acts back on us to constrain the points of view that are possible. 
The researcher treading this middle way is continually aware of the 
somewhat constructed nature of research but avoids the wholesale 
application of constructivism to his or her own practice, which would 
result in a descent into nihilism’.  
In this approach, then, triangulation is seen as useful not only because it helps 
to increase breadth and depth of the research (see Seale 1999: 230), but also 
because it has the potential to allow one to further explore  and corroborate 
findings (Johnson et al 2007).   In line with Johnson et al (2007), I aim to 
‘respect’ both singular ways of viewing the world, and ways which  emphasise 
multiple or relative truths, whilst adopting a ‘pragmatic’, ‘middle’ solution 
between the two extremes (Johnson et al 2007: 113).   
Limitations and ethical issues. 
However the use of these methods came with their own limitations. Whilst I 
explore these limitations in more detail in the relevant chapters, I wish to pull out 
four overarching issues here.  First, as noted above, whilst some researchers 
are able to carefully plan the type of triangulation they are using, in my case the 
adoption of mixed methods was a little more opportunist, as it was only once I 
had started conducting qualitative research at Force A that I was granted 
access to their data.   In practice, then, my quantitative analysis largely came 
after I had conducted my interviews and participant observations – meaning that 
66 
 
I had then to schedule some additional interviews to help clarify issues raised 
by the data, and that my research perhaps wasn’t as well planned as it could 
have been. 
Second, when engaging in all these methods I was conscious of what Giddens 
has termed the ‘double-hermeneutic’ twist: the ‘mutual interpretative interplay 
between social science and those whose activities compose its subject matter' 
(Giddens 1984: xxxii).  Whilst the double hermeneutic has many implications, 
one may be that my presence might change the conduct of those being 
observed.  Although I did try to minimise my influence by making my 
participation in class, or on patrol, as unobtrusive as possible, it is likely my 
presence had an impact, making it difficult to generalise too much on the basis 
of the events I witnessed. 
Third, using interviews has certain limitations.   Those subjects who were willing 
to be interviewed may have been more likely to hold more negative views of the 
weapon,  whilst officers may be more likely to hold highly positive views about 
the weapon, or at least to feel that they have something important to say about 
its use.  Moreover, as Holdaway notes, the interviews that police officers tell are 
often exaggerated (in Waddington 1999), and many researchers (e.g. Marks 
2004) have documented the unwillingness of officers to be fully truthful with 
researchers perceived as coming from the ‘outside’.  I am keenly aware that  
officers might have been stressing the benefits of Taser for my ‘benefit’, keen to 
correct what many perceived was the overwhelmingly negative press coverage 
of the weapon.  
Fourth, whilst conducting research of any kind necessarily brings with it a host 
of ethical issues, these issues are, perhaps, heightened when conducting 
research on sensitive and controversial topics such as police use of force. As 
Marks has stated, one key challenge with police research is to ‘make use of 
meaningful and possibly compromising information… (while not) bring(ing) any 
harm to the individual police or the organisation itself’ (Marks 2004: 884).  
Working so closely with police officers in such settings, then, sharply illustrates 
a key ethical issue with my research discussed above: namely, how to 
appropriately, effectively and fairly address any issues that may be identified by 
the research, whilst recognising the elements of good practice that do exist, and 
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minimising the negative impact on those who so generously gave their time to 
facilitate the research.    At the same time one also needs to be cognisant of, 
and recognise the severe limitations associated with, using use of force 
datasets that rely on police accounts (an issue I come back to in Chapter 5).  
 
A related issue stems from the power dynamics at play, and from my position as 
a relatively inexperienced doctoral student.  Throughout the research I have 
been conscious that inadvertently raising concerns in the wrong way or at the 
wrong time could not only threaten the very access on which my research 
depends but could potentially jeopardize the work of future researchers in this 
important area.  Similarly, another related risk is that my research might not be 
critical or independent enough.  This is a particular concern given longstanding 
concerns about the risks of ‘going native’ when working with the police (Savage 
2013) and in light of the fact that, given issues with access and time limitations, 
I had more interviews with police officials than other stakeholders.   
Whilst such ethical issues can never be eliminated, I was able to minimise them 
by a series of measures.  These measures included the negotiation of 
Memorandums of Understanding with ACPO and the individual police forces 
where I was conducting my work, which included provisions on anonymity (of 
the force in question, and of individuals) and of early sight of the thesis (and any 
related publications) and its recommendations, prior to publication.  However 
ACPO and police forces had no veto over, or ability to amend, the content of the 
thesis or related publications.  I also  worked with the University of Exeter Ethics 
Committee, who gave ethical clearance for the research, to design Information 
and Consent forms that were given to all interviewees, and which stressed their 
ability to withdraw from the research, or to amend what they had said at 
interview, at any time prior to publication.  (No interviewees withdrew, but I did 
have one participant who requested a transcript of the interview and then 
amended some comments that he had made).  When quoting individuals, I 
omitted any details that might help to identify their identity, or the identity of the 
Force in question.  This was particularly important when conducting interviews 
with Taser trainers and Single Points of Contact who, by virtue of their senior 
status, could be more easily identified from their remarks than could Taser 
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officers.  For this reason, whilst I generally identify whether the interviewee is 
from Force A or Force B, I make an exception for Taser trainers and SPOCs. 
Whilst anonymity of participants was standard, I gave interviewees the chance 
to waive their anonymity, should this be desired – an option exercised by a few 
participants.  On occasions where I was observing police training, I contacted 
the relevant trainer in advance with the information and consent form for him to 
circulate to potential attendees, so that they had advance notice that I would be 
observing the training and could decide whether or not they wanted to be 
interviewed for the research.  I also took care to report back on the interim 
findings of my research as it was developing, to a range of stakeholders, via the 
routes to impact discussed above.  Whilst such strategies have helped me 
handle the issues associated with working on such a sensitive, and important, 
area of research, they have not eliminated these ethical considerations. 
A related ethical concern is that my experience conducting prior research on 
this topic prior to starting the PhD may well affect the conclusions reached in 
this thesis, in ways I may not fully be aware.  Indeed some might argue that my 
research is compromised and biased either as a result of my involvement with 
the NPCC and Home Office Use of Force Reporting review, detailed above, and 
/ or due to my engagement with Taser International, and my trip to their 
Headquarters in Scottsdale, Arizona, detailed in Chapter 5) and / or as a result 
of my previous, and ongoing, work for the human rights NGO the Omega 
Research Foundation, which works explicitly on issues around LLWs. Moreover, 
as a member of the public, it is likely that the preconceived ideas I had around 
the weapon were at odds with the police view of the weapon (IPCC 2014a).  I 
have no simple answer to these questions—particularly if, as the social 
psychological literature tells us, humans not only have a tendency towards 
‘confirmation bias’ (i.e. to subconsciously interpret new information in a way 
which confirms pre-existing beliefs), also but perceive biases to be ‘more 
prevalent in others than in themselves’ (West et al 2012: 506).   
 
Yet I would argue that whilst such experiences have undoubtedly impacted the 
research, the appropriate response is not to somehow remove any trace of 
myself as individual from the research—an impossible undertaking at the best 
of times--or to condemn the research and its findings.  Instead, an alternative 
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response—and one that I seek to implement at various places in this thesis—is 
to acknowledge the influences that may have impacted on my research, in just 
the same way that the unique positions of other researchers will also have 
impacted theirs, and to be open about limitations and challenges faced.   
 
Seen from this perspective, I would argue that my engagement with various 
actors—from NGOs to the NPCC, to the Home Office and Taser International—
has strengthened the research, giving me unique insights into the use of Taser, 
and the complexities of data collection, that I would not otherwise have.  
Ultimately, one of the key criteria for judging academic research and doctoral 
theses should not be whether the research could be accused of subjectivity, or 
of bias—a charge that could be levied at any work—but whether the research 
generates new insights on a specific topic (in this case, Taser).  Whilst I think 
this is the case here, I will leave the reader to draw their own conclusions. 
                                                                                                                                 
Conclusion. 
This chapter has sought to outline the topic, methodology and methods used in 
the research, and to outline and justify the choices made by the researcher as 
part of this process.  To summarise, the research into Taser in England and 
Wales uses qualitative techniques (predominantly semi-structured interviews 
and participant observation) as well as quantitative analysis of use of force data 
sets.  Qualitative engagement with police participants centres around two 
forces, one of which was also able to supply the secondary statistics necessary 
to facilitate the quantitative analysis, and I also engage with a broad range of 
participants from outside of the police.  Yet if I have stressed the choices I have 
made during the research process, and the rationale for these decisions, I have 
also sought to bring to the fore the limits to this agency, acknowledging the role 
of chance, contingency and uncertainty in the research process.  Having given 
the reader details of the methodology and methods used, it is now time to turn 
to the empirical chapters of this thesis.  I start, then, with Part 2, which focuses 




Part 2: Taser use and its consequences.  
 
Introduction to Part 2. 
This Part of the thesis aims to use mixed methods research to consider how, 
and with what consequences, Taser is used in England and Wales.  Chapters 3, 
4 and 6 use statistical analysis to look, respectively, at how Taser is used, the 
association between Taser use and subject injury, and the association between 
Taser use and officer injury.  Chapters 5 and 7 seek to complement this 
analysis by exploring more qualitative forms of evidence around the relationship 
between subject and officer safety more broadly conceived.  My aim is that the 
quantitative chapters can be read as conventional statistical analyses—thus 
contributing to the (almost exclusively) quantitative literature on this topic—but 
that they also provide an occasion to explore the added value that constructivist 
STS approaches can bring to the study of Taser.  As quantitative studies follow 
a commonly accepted layout, I aim to follow this structure as closely as 
possible, and include discussion of the implications of constructivist STS and 
ANT approaches in the concluding sections, and including a text box in the 
discussion of dependent variables in Chapter 4, to minimise the extent to which 
the chapter departs from academic conventions around the presentation and 
discussion of quantitative findings  In order to limit duplication, before turning to 
the Chapters in question, I now provide a detailed description of the dataset in 
question, before introducing some insights from constructivist STS that should 
be bourne in mind when reading the subsequent chapters.   
The dataset. 
The force from which the dataset is taken covers a relatively large geographical 
area that is predominantly rural, but which also contains some large towns.  
During the period covered by the force database (2007 – 2014), officers were 
equipped with a range of force options, including irritant spray 9 and baton, and 
also received training in empty hand techniques and the use of fabric restraint 
belts.  The force employs dog handlers, and has a number of other specialist 
units, including firearms officers.  Taser was rolled out to firearms officers in 
                                                          
9
 The force in question used CS irritant spray throughout most of the period in question, but transitioned 
to PAVA in the latter few years of the data set under consideration here. 
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2005, to a small number of road policing officers (less than fifty) in 2009, and to 
a limited number of response officers (less than a hundred) in 2013 – 2014.   
The data set initially comprised all recorded uses of force by officers between 
1st January 2007 and 1st January 2015.  After excluding cases where force had 
been used against property, the total number of cases on the database 
numbered 27,652.  Each individual record represented a case in which an 
individual officer used one or more types of force in a particular incident.  Thus if 
two officers used force in the same incident, the incident would be recorded 
twice.  Force was defined broadly to include drawing of baton, incapacitant 
spray, Taser and baton gun, as well as the physical use of a range of 
techniques including: empty hand techniques, non-compliant handcuffing10, 
shield use, Taser, baton, irritant spray, canine and ‘other’.  In addition to the 
type of force used, its (officer-rated) efficacy, and civilian and officer injuries, the 
database captures a number of important additional variables. These include 
the time, date, location and type of the incident, the number of officers and 
civilians present, the role, rank and length of service of the officer, the level of 
resistance offered by the subject, and the subject’s gender, ethnicity, disability 
and mental health status (as assessed by the officer).   
Data Aggregation 
Whilst the dataset contained many variables of interest, the requirement that all 
officers using force in an incident submit a separate use of force form meant 
officer and subject injuries were likely to be over-estimated.  For example, if six 
officers used force on one subject, any resultant injury would be captured six 
times.  Moreover, as officers were often recording on their forms not just 
whether they themselves received injuries, but whether injuries were received 
by any of the officers involved, this risked similarly over-estimating the 
frequency of officer injuries.  I therefore restructured the data according to 
incident, in order to minimise over-representation of subject and officer injuries 
without compromising sample size.  
The data was aggregated according to date, time and station of the officers 
involved.  This resulted in a data set of 23,556 incidents. Thus, for separate 
                                                          
10
 Whilst the Use of Force form only asks officers to record non-compliant handcuffing, interviews with 
officers revealed some confusion around the term, with the upshot that some officers were using the form 
to record every time that they used handcuffs, even if their application was compliant and routine. 
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uses of force by multiple officers to be considered part of the same incident, 
they had to have been recorded as happening on the same day, at exactly the 
same time (down to the minute), and in the same station area (the most detailed 
geographical indicator available) 11.     
Combining Variables from Different Records 
Whilst one would expect different reports of the same use of force incident to 
offer largely similar accounts, there may be instances where these accounts 
vary.  As such, where discrepancies existed, it was important that the data 
aggregation methods adopted were able to minimise the loss of potentially 
relevant data and that the methods by which one value was chosen over 
another (where necessary) were clearly set out.  As such, the following 
techniques were employed: 
 Force options were coded as being used if this had been stated by at 
least one officer in the incident.  The option in question was considered 
effective if this had been stated by at least one officer in the incident.   
 Injuries to officers and subjects, and subject characteristics (e.g. whether 
the subject had taken alcohol or drugs: whether subject was armed with 
a knife) were similarly considered to be present if this had been stated by 
at least one officer in the incident. 
 Nature and site of subject injuries were summed.  This meant that, in 
case of discrepancies, both sets of data would be retained in the new 
dataset.  Similar information on officer injuries was not captured in the 
data set. 
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 As an additional verification measure, a cross section of the aggregated records (N = 20) were also 
manually checked against the original dataset, with notes of the incident and incident numbers (where 
available), and other available variables checked for any evidence that might suggest the cases had been 
combined incorrectly.  No such evidence was found.  This manual check did, however, suggest that in a 
small number of cases (3 out of the 20 reviewed) the opposite tendency might be at work: that records had 
not been combined when they possibly could have been  - a notable limitation of the data.  Such cases, 
which had the same date, station location and OIS number, had not been combined due to variations in 
the time of when the incident was reported to have happened.  However it was felt preferable to stick with 
the requirement for cases to have exactly the same time (as well as location and date) in order for them to 
be combined, for several reasons.  First, whilst in one instance the discrepancy was as little as a minute—
which  implied that the officers had simply entered slightly different times for the same event—in another 
instance, the time differed by as much as ten minutes.  This raised the possibility, detailed above, that the 
records did, indeed, refer to separate use of force occurrences.  Second, relaxing the time requirement 
further would have risked erroneously combining incidents that were, in fact, distinct.  Third, manually 
reviewing all incidents to see if they could be further combined was not practical in light of the size of the 
data set.  Given the absence of comprehensive officer notes for each record, it would have also raised 
issues of inconsistency and analyst bias in determining whether incidents should be further collated, or 
should remain as separate entries. 
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 Officer characteristics: Where multiple officers were attending, and these 
officers had different ranks and different lengths of service, the highest 
rank and longest length of service were captured, in order to be able to 
reflect the expertise available at the scene.  Where different values were 
given for the number of officers and subjects present, and for the number 
of officers using force, the largest numbers given were used.  Where 
different values were given for the length of time that had elapsed since 
personal safety training, the longest gap between training was captured.  
Response officers, firearm-trained officers (ARVs), traffic officers and 
‘other’ officers were all binary (yes/no) variables, and were coded as 
being present if at least one officer with this role description was present 
at the incident. 
 Incident characteristics:  Where different values were given for incident 
characteristics, values were selected that reflected the extent of the 
danger faced by officers, subjects and bystanders.  Thus the most 
aggressive interpretation of the subject’s conduct was recorded, and 
force was recorded as having been used to protect officers, the subject 
or others (as opposed to other reasons) if at least one officer had so 
indicated. This also meant that the longest duration of time since an 
officer had received personal safety training was included, and the 
incident was characterised as taking place at night-time or dawn/dusk if 
this had been mentioned by at least one officer present.  
 Incident characteristics: Where different values were given for the type of 
incident (e.g. whether the incident was a domestic, a traffic incident etc.), 
the description that occurred first in the dataset was chosen, to avoid 
introducing bias into the results.  
 
Selecting Statistical Controls. 
Whilst the outcome of interest varies across chapters, the control measures 
entered into the models remain consistent throughout12.  Previous studies into 
                                                          
12
 Spearman’s Rho tests were performed on control variables being considered for inclusion into the 
models to assess the extent of correlation between them.  This analysis revealed that certain pairings of 
variables (i.e. year / policy) were significantly and strongly correlated, whilst other variables—namely  
mental health issues / disability, lighting levels / alcohol and officers present / officers using force—were 
weakly correlated (with rs values of between .20 - .39).  For reasons discussed below, I decided to keep 
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the factors affecting police use of force tend to include a number of relevant 
controls, which differ somewhat from model to model.  Gau et al (2010) control 
for subject race, levels of subject resistance, whether the incident was a traffic 
stop, levels of lighting, and officer characteristics (namely the age, gender, race, 
height and weight ratio).  Avdi (2013) controlled for subject age, gender and 
race, their demeanour, whether they had taken drugs or alcohol, physical 
resistance, and age, gender and race of the officer, and their years of service.  
Lin and Jones (2010) controlled for officer and subject gender and race, length 
of officer service and subject resistance – and also add in a control for year.  
Crow and Adrion (2011) similarly controlled for subject resistance, type of 
incident, age, gender and race of subject and officer and also control for 
changes to Taser policy made by the department.  There is thus no one clear 
set of controls for models concerned with factors influencing police use of force, 
or Taser more specifically. 
Nor, as Terrill and Paoline (2012: 165) have noted, is there agreement on the 
measures that should be included in models of subject and officer injury, with 
controls varying depending on the variables captured in the dataset to hand.  
Virtually all studies control for subject resistance (Terrill and Paoline 2012, Lin 
and Jones 2010, Macdonald et al 2009, Smith et al 2007, Smith et al 2010, 
Kaminski et al 2013).  Many control for the age, gender, ethnicity and, where 
possible, drug and alcohol consumption of the subject (Lin and Jones 2010, 
Macdonald 2009, Terrill and Paoline 2012, Smith et al 2007, Smith et al 2010 
and Taylor and Woods 2010 are able to control for all, or most, of these 
variables).  Some studies also control for officer characteristics which, 
depending on the datasets, can include gender, ethnicity and length of service 
(Terrill and Paoline 2012, Lin and Jones 2010, Smith et al 2010, Kaminski et al 
2013), with at least one study also controlling for officer rank (Crow and Adrion 
2011).  Whilst the importance of incident level characteristics has been 
recognised (see, for example, Crawford and Burns 2008), studies that control 
for such characteristics are few and far between.  Those that do typically control 
for year (Lin and Jones 2010, MacDonald et al 2009), for the number of 
subjects and/or officers involved in the incident (Smith et al 2007 and 2010,   
                                                                                                                                                                          
these variables, entering them into the initial models, on the caveat that multicollinearity tests be 
performed on all models, and models adjusted where necessary. 
75 
 
Kaminski et al 2013), and for the type of incident (Crow and Adrion 2011, see 
also Gau et al 2010). 
Cognisant of this literature, as well as the lack of an overarching consensus on 
the measures that should be included, I controlled for subject characteristics, 
including ethnicity (whether their officer defined ethnicity was White, Asian or 
Oriental, Afro-Caribbean or other, with White as the reference group), gender 
(male, female or unknown, with male as the reference group) and disability (with 
no recorded disability as the reference group, followed by officer identified 
mental health disability as a second group and physical, sensory, learning 
disability or other as a third group).  I also controlled for whether they had taken 
drugs or alcohol (simple yes / no measures, with no as the reference group), 
and whether the officer indicated that the person had mental health issues (as 
well, or instead, as having a mental health disability), again a simple yes / no 
measure, with no as the reference group. 
Officer level characteristics were also included, namely whether firearms 
officers were present, whether traffic officers were present, and whether 
response officers were present (with the reference category being no such 
officers present).  It was considered important to control for this, as firearms and 
traffic officers were much more likely to have Taser at their disposal than 
response officers, and the level of training that these officers receive also 
varies.  I also controlled for officer rank (with incidents where Constable was the 
highest rank present being the reference category, compared to incidents where 
Sergeants or those of a higher rank were present), the time since officers had 
received Personal Safety Training (PST) training on the use of empty hand 
techniques, baton, irritant spray and handcuffing, and length of service, based 
on the pre-existing categories present in the data set (five years or less being 
the reference category, compared to 6 – 10 years and over 10 years), as this 
might influence their choice of force tactic. 
Incident level characteristics were controlled for, including levels of subject 
resistance with passive resistance or spitting the reference group, and ‘making 
off’ (i.e. attempting escape) and threats, general struggle and unarmed 
aggression (comprising general struggle, head-butting, kicking, punching or 
biting) and use of a weapon as the other categories.  A separate control was 
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also added in to account for whether the officer had recorded a weapon as 
being present at the incident, irrespective of whether it was used against the 
officer (as there may be incidents where subjects do not use a weapon, but 
nevertheless have one on their person or otherwise close to hand).  Controls 
were added for the levels of lighting / time of day (night time or low light as the 
reference category, and daylight as the other category) the number of subjects 
present, the number of officers present and the number of officers using force.   
It was felt important to control both for the number of officers present, and the 
number of officers using force, as they capture slightly different things.  The 
number of officers present may impact on injury rates in a number of ways.  
Having more officers present may impact officer and subject behaviours in 
positive or negative ways and may give officers more options for dealing with 
situations in which force is necessary, whilst the number of officers actually 
using force may exacerbate injury rates (more officers using force leads to more 
injury) or minimise them (more officers using force means the situation can be 
controlled).   
Further controls were added in for year that the incident took place (as 
recommended by a reviewer given the possibility that the data may not be time 
invariant) and the type of incident. In line with Crow and Adrion’s 2011 study, 
the only one to control for the type of incident in detail, incidents were divided 
into order maintenance (the reference category, comprising incidents that were 
termed either ‘public order’, ‘football duty’ or ‘domestic’), suspicious person / 
activity (comprising incidents involving ‘suspicious person’ and ‘alarm’), violent 
crime (comprising incidents of ‘assault’, ‘sexual offence’, firearm’ or ‘hostage’), 
traffic and other (‘crime’, ‘warrant’ or ‘other).  Whilst Crow and Adrion did not 
include separate groupings for incidents taking place in custody or incidents 
involving detention under the Mental Health Act (or the equivalent legislation in 
the USA), use of force in these incidents are clearly distinct, and often highly 
controversial, so I ensured that they were captured separately. 
In keeping with Crow and Adrion (2011), and Bishopp et al (2014), I also 
controlled for Taser policy change in this period.  Policy governing Taser in 
England and Wales is complex and ambiguous, and it could be argued that 
there was not a significant policy shift.  However in 2012 national guidance was 
77 
 
replaced by an Authorised Professional Practice (APP) document that put 
increased emphasis on individual officer decision making via the NDM and no 
longer made explicit reference to the criteria for use of ‘violence of such 
severity’ (College of Policing 2015)—although this wording still continued to be 
used by the Home Office (2014a) and the IPCC (2014a).  Given these potential 
factors, policy change was considered worthy of inclusion.  APP was introduced 
in October 2012 (College of Policing 2015) and, following the lead of Bishopp et 
al (2014), allowances were made for the time taken to disseminate the policy.  
Lagging the variable by a year ensured that all officers would have had access 
to refresher training following the introduction of the APP 13. 
One final control measure deserves discussion. Whilst it is commonplace for 
researchers to control for the level of resistance offered by a suspect, this does 
not capture the level of violence that the individual may represent to himself or 
other members of the public.  In such a situation, officers may have no choice 
but to use force and to sustain injury.  This omission might not be too much of a 
problem if the risks of attending such an incident were equally distributed across 
the data set.  But specially trained officers with Taser may be much more likely 
than their non-Taser trained counterparts to be sent to incidents that are likely 
to involve violence or the threat of violence.  Thus if officers are more likely to 
be injured in situations involving Taser, this may not reflect concerns around the 
weapon, but the heightened injury potential of the situation.  The dataset 
contains a measure that might help control for this tendency.  Officers are asked 
to record why they used force, and can choose from a series of ten different 
responses14.  Three of the responses—to ‘protect (the) public’, ‘protect 
self/other officer’ and ‘protect subject’—allow officers to indicate that a risk of 
violence is present.  As such this variable was divided into cases where the 
officer explained his recourse to force by explicitly referencing the need to 
protect his/herself or others, and incidents where that was not the case.   
                                                          
13
 As expected, the control for policy change was moderately and significantly correlated with the control 
for year (rs = .64, p = 0.01).  It was decided to keep both variables in, as they measure different features, 




 Namely to effect arrest, effect search, fingerprint, prevent escape, prevent offence, protect public, 
protect secure property / evidence, protect self / other officer, protect subject and other. 
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The inclusion of other controls was desirable but not possible given data 
constraints.  It was not possible to control for whether a particular officer 
actually had Taser at their disposal, nor for the type of Taser firing (probe-firing, 
drive or angled-drive stun), the number of firing, and the length of exposures - 
though it should be noted that, to the best of my knowledge, no other studies 
are able to include these controls.  Nor was it possible to control for officer 
gender and ethnicity, suspect age, or for incident level characteristics – 
including the officer’s prior knowledge of the subject and the type of community 
in which the incident occurs--factors that Klahm and Tillyer (2010) argue are 
crucial but, again, rarely included in models.   
Statistical Modelling and its limits: an STS inspired discussion. 
Whilst the discussion so far has provided an assessment of the dataset and the 
models used from a conventional quantitative perspective (i.e. from something 
of an ‘insiders’ perspective), the dataset and models can also be assessed with 
reference to (constructivist) STS approaches (i.e. from more of an ‘outsiders’ 
perspective).   Indeed, given the stark differences and productive tensions 
between the two approaches, this may yet yield some further insights.  For 
example, ANT in particular seeks to overcome binary divisions of all kinds, the 
statistical technique used here (and in the vast majority of quantitative articles 
on Taser) models real world complexity precisely by using such divisions: it is 
quite literally referred to as binary logistic regression. This does not mean that 
ANT theorists see no role for statistical analyses.  Latour is critical of ‘statistical 
records that lose…the inner quantification of the organism’, but challenges us to 
‘find ways to gather the individual ‘he’ and ‘she’ without losing out on the 
specific ways in which they are able to mingle, in a standard, in a code… in a 
technology’ (2010: 155, see also Callon and Law 2005) – and this challenge, as 
well as broader challenges posed by constructivist STS, can help highlight 
certain limitations to statistical approaches.  
Insufficiently capturing complex interactions and networks around technology. 
Constructivist STS approaches serve to underscore, first, that the statistical 
assumptions built into most regression models—assumptions that, because of 
their basic, foundational nature are left unexamined in many statistical articles—
tend to downplay the extent to which technologies (and other discrete variables) 
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‘mingle’ with a whole host of other artefacts and entities, creating outcomes that 
can only be understood by looking at the broader assemblages around them.    
By default, binary logistic regression models are structured in a way that 
assumes (in the absence of including interaction effects to the contrary) 
that predictor variables are independent from each other, and thus the effect 
that one particular predictor variable has on the outcome variable does not 
change as other predictor variables alter (Fitzmaurice 2000: 314).  Instead, the 
impact of one predictor variable can be examined with the others held constant. 
So they assume, for example, that firing Taser has the same impact on subject 
injury regardless of subject consumption of drugs or alcohol.  Yet this may not 
always be an accurate depiction – instead, it is possible, for example, that Taser 
could be associated with higher or lower odds of injury depending on drug or 
alcohol consumption15.   
Few analysts, either those working on Taser, or those using regression models 
more generally, include interaction terms that would try to capture some of this 
complexity 16.  Moreover, whilst many analysts, including myself, do run 
collinearity diagnostics to assess the extent to which predictor variables may be 
correlated (with themselves, if not necessarily with the outcome of interest) high 
levels of collinearity are typically seen as a ‘problem’, as ‘bad news’, and as 
complicating efforts to understand ‘which variable is important’ (Field 2009: 223-
4). Moreover, as often there is no simple solution to the issue of 
multicollinearity, researchers sometimes deal with the ‘problem’ by removing 
one of the related variables (Field 2009: 299).  In general, then, statistical 
techniques such as binary logistic regression are designed to tease out and 
isolate the unique impact that different, discrete variables might have on an 
                                                          
15
 See, for example, Kroll et al 2008 (677-8) who dismiss the ‘erroneous statement’ that ‘cocaine 




 Some models include one or more interaction terms in their models, by combining the two relevant 
variables together.  However, it should be noted that very few papers on taser—the exception being the 
NIJ—have included interaction effects in their models.  Nor is this limited to those working on Taser: 
Morris et al (in Jaccard et al 1990: 467) note the ‘persistant failure’ of analysts to include and detect 
interaction effects more generally (see also Fitzmaurice 2000). Moreover, the most common framework 
used to assess interaction effects—the moderator framework—‘tends to mask the fact that the same 
interaction parameter characterizes the effect of X on Y when Z is the moderator variable as well as the 
effect of Z on Y when X is the moderator’ (Jaccard et al 1990: 16). In other words, interaction terms tend 
to look at the interconnections in just one direction but not at more complex sets of interconnections.  
They also tend to focus on interactions between just two variables but, as Fitzmaurice notes, interactions 
can occur between many more variables. 
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outcome of interest.  As such, they are not necessarily geared up to looking at 
relationships and interactions between variables.  This means that many 
statistical models around Taser—including my own—are ill-placed to capture 
the intricacies and complex dynamics between humans and non-humans that, 
together, may make particular outcomes more or less likely.   
Moreover, as this method of modelling assumes that the value of a predictor 
variable can be easily changed for another value—so, for example, empty hand 
techniques can be changed for the use of Taser, whilst keeping everything else 
constant—it implies that it is possible to measure the impact that this one 
change has on the dependent variable (for example, subject injury) regardless 
of the broader network around the weapon.  Such an approach, whilst it has 
much to recommend it in statistical terms, is nevertheless ill-placed to capture 
the broader impact of different assemblages and networks within which different 
weapons sit.  It points to the need to interpret statistical models with care, and 
for a cautious approach when it comes to drawing conclusions, and making 
policy recommendations, on the basis of such models. 
Bracketing the networks and material features within technology. 
An STS inspired approach can help sensitise us to other issues with statistical 
analysis, too.  For if the statistical models presented here are ill-equipped to 
capture the networks around the weapon, they are also ill-equipped to capture 
the networks within the weapon.  For practical reasons, statistical models have 
to black-box complex heterogeneous actors into ‘irritant spray’, ‘Taser’ or 
‘officer’ and to treat them as a discrete whole.  There is nothing wrong with 
doing this, of course, but one has to be prepared to re-open the ‘black box’ 
where necessary, and make sure not to bracket out such questions 
permanently. Details such as the composition of particular weapons—for 
example, the type and strength of the irritant spray used, or the type of electric-
shock weapon used—can have a crucial impact on the outcomes of interest. 
Seeing the process of statistical analysis—and the outputs it produces—as 
reflective of reality, rather than a product of socio-technical relations. 
Constructivist STS approaches can also help resist the temptation to present 
findings as ‘facts’ and instead to consider the contingent and constructed nature 
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of statistics and the interpretive flexibility contained within them (see, for 
example, Innes et al 2005).  As Callon and Law note (2005: 719), calculations 
of any kind involve entities being ‘detached, and displayed within a single 
space…manipulated and transformed… (and) a result is extracted. A new entity 
is produced… This new entity corresponds precisely to - is nothing other than - 
the relations and manipulations that have been performed along the way’.   
Of course, we don’t need STS to tell us that there are risks in reducing complex 
real world interactions into statistical models, and to treating data as if it is 
somehow distinct from, and independent of, the context in which it has arisen.  
Many analysts from a range of perspectives already make a range of useful 
points in this respect.  However, such a sensitivity can be a useful reminder at a 
time when:  
‘there seems to be an assumption…that the ‘social bit’ doesn’t really 
matter: instead what matters are the data… (many) methodological 
approaches don’t so much as even nod to how important social meaning, 
context, history, culture, notions of agency or structure might be – and yet 
these matter enormously to how we use data’ (Uprichard 2015: 1). 
As Uprichard et al (2008: 610) notes, such tendencies have been exacerbated 
by the arrival of a non-human actor, SPSS, which has encouraged a practical 
focus on how to use the software ‘at the expense of discussing more 
philosophical concerns… about the decision making processes involved in 
making substantive interpretations about the analytical findings’.  As shall be 
seen, awareness of such issues can be highly useful in a context where 
regression analyses are all too often presented simply as proof of the safety (or 
otherwise) of Taser, and used all-too-quickly to justify far reaching policy 
recommendations (Terrill and Paoline 2012).  Taken together, then, 
constructivist STS provides some useful insights that I would urge the reader to 
keep in mind—and shall indeed come back to—throughout the statistical 
analyses presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 6. 
Having provided an overview of dataset and the variables used throughout Part 
2, as well as a discussion of STS inspired considerations, it is now time  to 
move to data analysis itself, starting with analysis of how, and in what 
circumstances Taser is used – the task of the next Chapter.   
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Chapter 3: How, and in what circumstances, is Taser used? 
The circumstances in which police use Taser, and other forms of force, and the 
factors associated with this use, are important topics of analysis for academics 
and practitioners alike (Gau et al 2010: Avdi 2013: White and Ready 2007).  
This is particularly important because the literature on this topic is ‘sketchy and 
incomplete’ (Adams and Jennison 2007: 456), but tends to show that Taser is 
used widely and frequently.  Alpert and Dunham (2010: 251) characterise them 
as the police officer's ‘response of choice’.  Crow and Adrion (2011: 380) find 
that ‘officers tend to use Tasers in response to lower levels of resistance... 
(including) verbal resistance’ and Gau et al note their concern that police are 
‘substituting this weapon for verbal de-escalation’ (2010: 452).  Nevertheless 
most works also show increases in subject resistance, aggression and/or 
presence of a weapon to be significant predictors of Taser use (Lin and Jones 
2010: Advi 2013: Crow and Adrion 2011 c.f. Gau et al 2010). Authors have also 
pointed to concerns around use of the weapon on ethnic minorities (Gau et al 
2011: O’Brien et al 2011: Lin and Jones 2010 c.f. Advi 2013) and on individuals 
who are mentally ill (White and Ready 2007, O’Brien et al 2011).  
This literature, whilst helpful, suffers from five limitations for our purposes here– 
issues that I intend to address with this chapter.   First, with the exception of 
Oriola et al’s (2012) work in Canada, and O’Brien et al’s (2011, 2014) work in 
New Zealand, it comes mainly from the USA.  However, given the marked 
differences between the USA and England and Wales on a number of 
variables—including the length and content of the Taser training undertaken, 
the medical guidance on use, the degree to which Taser has been rolled out to 
police officers, the extent to which citizens can bear arms, and police-civilian 
relations more broadly—it would be reasonable to expect patterns and 
determinants of use to differ between the two jurisdictions.   
Yet the peer reviewed academic literature specifically on Taser use in England 
and Wales remains limited – a gap I attend to here.  There are a handful of 
articles for, and by, medical practitioners (such as Bleetman et al 2004, Little et 
al 2012a, Little et al 2012b) and one article assessing comparative injury rates 
to officers  from Taser and other less lethal options (Jenkinson et al 2006), 
which focuses on the earlier M26 Taser no longer in use in England and Wales.  
There is also a highly useful survey of English and Welsh police forces 
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conducted by Payne-James et al (2014a), which shows that the use of 
incapacitant spray, Taser and baton rounds have increased.  However none of 
these studies have looked at when, and in what circumstances, officers deploy 
the device, and the factors associated with its use.   
Second, existing work tends not to look at trends and patterns over time (for two 
exceptions, see Taylor and Woods 2010 and MacDonald et al 2009).  However, 
as Adams and Jennison note (2007: 453- 3), documenting rates of use over 
time—as I intend to do here—is particularly important because new 
technologies can impact overall use of force rates in multiple ways, by 
increasing or decreasing overall levels of force used, or by being substituted for 
other force options.  
Third, not all studies are able to put the use of Taser into the context of use of 
force more broadly.  Oriola et al (2012) focus on Taser-related fatalities in 
Canada, but do not analyse fatalities that occur after other police uses of force 
or detail whether other uses of force were also used in the incident in question. 
White and Ready (2007: 176) argue that it is important to understand ‘the 
context in which the weapon is used, whom it is used against, and its degree of 
effectiveness’, but restrict their analysis only to cases where Taser is used, as 
does  O’Brien in his work on mental health in New Zealand (O’Brien et al 2011).  
Such analyses, whilst highly appropriate for certain purposes, are ill-equipped to 
analyse Taser in the context of other force options.  In such circumstances, 
looking at how Taser is used in relation to other force options—and ascertaining 
whether patterns and issues associated with Taser use  are unique to the 
weapon, or are reflecting issues with police use of force more broadly—can be 
a highly useful endeavour. 
Fourth, limitations in data analysis are also important, as several studies 
(including White and Ready 2007: Adams and Jennison 2007: Oriola et al 2012: 
O’Brien et al 2011, Jenkinson et al 2006) do not employ the multivariate 
techniques that can help assess whether, and to what extent, different factors 
are associated with Taser use: techniques I intend to apply here.  
Fifth, there is a lack of conceptual clarity around Taser use.  Crow and Adrion 
(2011) note that their dependent variable is Taser ‘use’ or ‘deployment’, but do 
not define the term: similarly Gau et al (2010) focus on two dependent 
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variables—if Taser is the first form of force used, or if Taser is used at all during 
the account—but again don’t define the term use.  Yet given that the weapon 
can be used in seven different ways, definitions matter.  It is particularly 
important to differentiate between instances where Taser has been fired and 
instances where it has been used, but not fired - and, ideally, to make further 
distinctions within these categories.  Moreover, whilst much attention is focused 
on use of the device in probe-firing mode, factors influencing whether the 
weapon is drawn and displayed are in need of further study (Lin and Jones 
2010, Dymond 2014c, where I call for further research on this area, and detail 
some of the associated difficulties).  There is thus space for an  inquiry into 
how, on whom, and in what circumstances different methods of Taser use, and 
other force options, are deployed in England and Wales: a task I intend to tackle 
in this chapter.   
The Current Inquiry 
The first section of this chapter uses descriptive statistics to address basic 
questions around police use of Taser, namely: how often is it used and in what 
circumstances.  The second section builds on this analysis by using multivariate 
logistic regression models to explore which factors, if any, are significantly 
associated with  i) Taser firings (whether in drive-stun, angled drive-stun or 
probe-firing mode), and ii) incidents where Taser is drawn (with drawn also 
including aiming the weapon, and using the red-dot laser sight) but not fired.   
Based on the previous research summarised above, I hypothesise that subject 
conduct and presence of a weapon will be significantly associated with 
increased odds of Taser firing, given the broad consensus in the literature on 
this issue.  I also predict that the risk posed by the subject is an important 
variable and, as such, I hypothesise that it will be significantly associated with 
increased odds of Taser firing.  However, there is insufficient literature on 
factors associated with Taser drawing to allow me to venture a clear hypothesis 
on this topic. 
The dataset has been described in detail above, so suffice it to say that it 
comprises 23, 556 occasions between 2007 and 2014 in which one or more 
forms of force—including the drawing of weapons—were used by one or more 
police officers in a given incident.  As has been previously discussed, variables 
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analysed include a range of subject characteristics (such as subject gender, 
disability, mental health issues, drug and alcohol consumption), officer 
characteristics (including their role, rank, experience and length of time since 
Personal Safety Training) and incident characteristics (including the year in 
which the incident took place, the number of officers and subjects present, the 
conduct of the subject, the presence of a weapon, and the threat posed to 
themselves or others). Please see the ‘Introduction to Part 2’ for further details 
about the dataset and the variables used.  Details of variable coding and 
descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3.1, in Appendix 1. 
**See Appendix 1, page 266 for                                                                              
‘Table 3.1: Variable Coding & descriptive statistics **. 
Descriptive Statistics.  
How often is Taser used? 
Whilst much literature is focused on Taser, in this data set it is fired very 
infrequently, in only 1% of cases (N = 263), and was drawn, but not fired, in 3% 
of cases (N = 624)17.  This contrasts markedly with the literature from the USA, 
which routinely finds Taser is used in between 40% - 50% of incidents in the 
forces under examination (Lin and Jones 2010, Crow and Adrion 2011,  Gau et 
al 2010).  In fact, the most common use of force featuring in this data set is 
open-handed techniques, which are used in 70% of cases in the sample (N = 
16, 637).  In half of cases where Taser was fired, another weapon or use of 
force technique was also physically used, speaking to the importance of looking 
at Taser alongside other force options (see Table 3.1 for a further breakdown of 
this).    
**See Appendix 1, page 268 for                                                                                      
‘Table 3.2: Incidents where Taser Fired with Other Force’ ** 
It is also important to put such trends in the context of changes over time.    In 
this instance the data shows that the numbers of incidents in which officers 
have used force have increased substantially during the period in question – 
findings in line with Payne-James et al’s (2014a) analysis.  In 2007 the total use 
of force incidents on the data set used here totalled 2,016.  In 2014, the last 
                                                          
17
 Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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year captured by the dataset, they had increased by over 60%, to 3,29218.  The 
data also indicates that the number of suspects using violent resistance 19 in 
their encounters with the police has also increased during this period, by just 
over 800 cases (from 1,523 incidents in 2007 to 2,350 incidents in 2012).  
During this period, the number of Taser firings increased by over 200% (from .5 
to 1% of cases) - although this percentage masks a small absolute increase, 
from 11 to 34 uses.   
Thus such findings support Adam and Jennison’s (2007) contention that looking 
at changes in force rates over time is important – yet they also support their call 
for more work to be done in this area to help explicate the relationship between 
Taser use and use of force patterns.  For whilst the data indicate an absolute 
increase in the amount of force used, given the relatively small number of Taser 
firings, the latter does not appear to be substantively driving the former.  
Similarly whilst Taser may be being substituted for other force options in the 
instances where it is fired, as Taser firings only account for 1% of uses of force 
overall, any substitution effect that may occur is likely to be limited.  These 
findings directly contrast with the literature in the USA where, for example, one 
year after its introduction into the Washington State Patrol following its 
introduction, Taser was used in 40% of incidents (Lin and Jones 2010). 
Overall, then, whilst Taser firings have increased and force patterns evolved 
over time, the weapon is only fired in 1% of incidents involving force, and of 
these cases 50% will involve another force technique.  Such points need to be 
born in mind when moving on to discuss the individuals on whom, and 
circumstances in which, Taser is used – a topic to which I now turn. 
Who is Taser used on?  
Across the dataset as a whole, 93% of incidents involved the use of force on 
white individuals and 85% of incidents involved the use of force on males.  By 
                                                          
18 Even after excluding the 21 cases that happened on 1st January 2015, this represents an increase of 
62%, some 1200 cases, during a time at which officer numbers have remained constant, and have even 
slightly fallen. Whilst some of this may be down to increased reporting, it is unlikely that this explains all 
the increase.  Similarly whilst some of this increase simply captures a larger number of in incidents where 
officers drew, but did not use, a weapon (a subset of incidents which increased from 70 in 2007 to 155 in 
2014), and increases in cases where the sole force used was non-compliant handcuffing (which accounted 
for 85 cases in 2007 and 218 cases in 2014), these factors alone cannot fully account for this increase.  
19
 Defined as including the following categories of reported behaviour: ‘general struggle’, biting, head-
butting, kicking, punching, or holding a weapon. 
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comparison, incidents where Taser was fired were more likely to involve male 
subjects (95% as opposed to 85%) and those who consumed drugs (32% 
compared to 20% in general), whilst percentages were similar for ethnicity and 
for alcohol.  There is also some evidence that incidents involving Taser are 
more likely, when compared to all uses of force as a whole, to involve 
individuals recorded as experiencing some kind of mental distress, up to and 
including a recognised mental health condition.  In 9% of all incidents on the 
database, police officers recorded subjects as having a mental health condition 
/ disability.  This percentage increased to 22% when incidents involved Taser 
firings, and 17% of incidents where Taser was drawn but not fired.   
Officers also had at their disposal a second variable around mental health, a 
yes / no variable which asked the officer to indicate whether they believed that 
the subject had some kind of issues with their mental health.  These issues 
might not be as severe as a condition or disability (as indicated by the variable 
previously discussed), but might include more minor and / or temporary forms of 
emotional and mental distress.   In 36% of incidents involving Taser firings, and 
34% of incidents where Taser was drawn but not fired, the individual was 
reported as having such issues, compared to 18% across the database as a 
whole.  Thus, when compared to all use of force incidents, those involving 
Taser are more likely to involve males and individuals who have consumed 
drugs or have mental health issues, with no differentiation in terms of ethnicity.  
In what circumstances is Taser used? 
There are clear differences in the circumstances reported when Taser is fired, 
vis-à-vis other force techniques.   Officers reported that Taser was fired to 
protect officers, suspects or the public in 77% of cases, where force more 
generally was only used for these reasons in 47% of the time.  Moreover, in 
29% of cases where Taser was fired, the levels of resistance posed by the 
subject included the use of a weapon, compared to 4% of times when force was 
used in general.  The flip side to this is that, in the majority of cases where 
Taser is fired, or drawn, it was used on someone who was not recorded as 
using a weapon to resist the officer.  It is exactly this kind of detail that the 
current Home Office statistics—which produce only decontextualized, headline 
figures of how often Taser is used, without any of the detail about the 
circumstances of use—do not capture. 
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In addition to recording the kinds of suspect resistance offered—which may 
include use of a weapon—the database also has a separate variable where 
officers can detail what kind of weapon is present, if any.  Whilst these variables 
overlap (as clearly a weapon must be present in order to be used) this latter 
variable also captures incidents where the subject may not have a weapon, but 
there is one close to hand.  Combining these variables (subject recorded as 
using a weapon to resist officer, and officer indicating weapon was more 
generally present) into one single measure of whether a weapon has been 
recorded at the incident provides further evidence that the majority (55%) of 
instances where Taser is fired—and the majority (53%) of instances where 
Taser is drawn, but not fired—occur in cases where no weapon has been 
recorded, a point to which I return later. 
**See Appendix 1, page 269, for ‘Table 3.3:  Frequency of Taser use in 
instances where weapons have been recorded’ **. 
Thus far, the data provides some indication that there are marked differences in 
the kinds of situations in which Taser is fired and in the behaviour and 
characteristics of those subjected to the weapon, when compared to other uses 
of force.  But are these apparent differences actually significant? How important 
are these various factors—such as reported subject resistance, gender, and 
mental health status—in predicting whether Taser will be used?  In the next 
section I follow the lead of Avdi (2013), Crow and Adrion (2011), and Gau et al 
(2010) in using logistic regression models to attempt to provide answers to 
these questions.   
Results 
Model Variables and methods. 
In the first model, the outcome variable is whether Taser was fired in an incident 
(with firing including use of the weapon in probe-firing, drive-stun and angled 
drive-stun modes).  In the second model the outcome variable was whether 
Taser was drawn, but not fired, in an incident – i.e. the highest use of Taser was 
the drawing of the weapon.    As discussed in the introduction to Part 2, a series 
of controls at the officer, subject and incident level were also added. 
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Following comments from reviewers on an earlier draft of this chapter presented 
for publication, I use the forced entry method and report insignificant controls to 
both enhance transparency and to ensure that suppressor effects (i.e. where a 
variable has an effect only when a second variable remains constant) are 
accounted for.  Studenmund and Cassidy (1987) contend that forced entry is 
the most appropriate technique for theory testing, as stepwise techniques can 
be sensitive to random variation (Field 2009: 213).  I also ran a series of 
diagnostics to check the degree of multi-collinearity (association between two or 
more dependent variables impacting on model results) in the model – 
something that Callagan and Chen (2008) argue is all too often over-looked by 
analysts, particularly those from a social science background.  Tests revealed 
that collinearity did not exceed accepted parameters.  
Predictor of Taser firings. 
As anticipated, increased levels of subject resistance, and presence of a 
weapon at the incident were statistically significant and associated with 
increased odds of Taser firing, and there was also a statistically significant 
correlation between the officer reporting that force was necessary to protect 
himself or others, and increased odds of Taser being fired.    
Moreover, results from the first model showed that the presence of an officer 
who was ARV (firearms) trained, or the presence of an officer utilised in a traffic 
role, was a significant predictor that the odds of Taser being fired would 
increase, reflecting the fact that these officers are more likely than their 
counterparts working in response roles to have the weapon at their disposal.  
The presence of officers with more than six years’ experience was also 
associated with increased odds of Taser firings, perhaps reflecting that such 
officers may be more likely to be trained in the weapon in the first place.   2009 
and 2010 were statistically significant, perhaps reflecting the policy change that 
saw Taser issued to non-firearms officers from 2009 onwards.   
Officer identification of the subject as having mental health issues were 
associated with increased odds of Taser being fired (see White and Ready 
2007, O’Brien et al 2011), as was officer identification that the individual was on 
drugs.  Whilst physical, sensory or other disability was not significant, mental 
health disability was significant and associated with increased odds of Taser 
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firing.  Subject ethnicity was not significantly associated with Taser being fired 
(Gau et al 2011: O’Brien et al 2011: Lin and Jones 2010 c.f. Advi 2013), and 
neither was alcohol consumption and numbers of officers present.  The odds of 
Taser being fired were significantly decreased in custody situations, but 
increased in traffic incidents, again perhaps reflecting that traffic officers were 
routinely equipped with the weapon.  Finally, incidents where one or more 
officers had received PST training over a year ago were associated with 
increased odds of Taser firing when compared to incidents where officers had 
received training more recently. 
** See Appendix One, page 270, for ‘Table 3.4:                                                                          
Logistic regression results for Taser firings’ **. 
Predictors of Taser drawing. 
Results from the second model showed that many of the factors that were 
significant predictors of increased odds for Taser being fired were also 
significant predictors of an increase in the odds of Taser being drawn, but not 
fired.  Thus as in the previous model, the role of the officer, the gender of the 
subject and whether they were experiencing mental health issues, whether the 
subject posed a risk to themselves or others, if they were resisting using a 
weapon, and if a weapon was present at the incident, were all significant 
predictors of increased odds of Taser being drawn, but not fired.   Policy 
change, lighting, and the number of officers remained insignificant, and general 
struggle and unarmed aggression was associated with decreased odds of Taser 
being drawn – perhaps reflecting that, as shown in the previous model, it was 
associated with increased odds of Taser actually being fired.   
Unlike the previous model, alcohol was a significant predictor but drugs were 
not significant and nor was the length of time that had elapsed since the officer 
received PST training, whilst the presence of two subjects was a significant 
predictor that the odds of Taser being drawn would increase. 
** See Appendix One, page 272, for ‘Table 3.5:                                                                          




These results point to issues of academic and public policy importance.  They 
provide additional confirmation—in keeping with the previous literature from the 
USA—that engaging (reportedly) in higher levels of resistance, being male, 
experiencing mental health issues and using drugs are associated with 
increased odds of Taser firings (Lin and Jones 2010: Advi 2013: Crow and 
Adrion 2011, White and Ready 2007, O’Brien et al 2011). However in contrast 
to much of this literature (namely, Gau et al 2010, O’Brien et al 2011: Lin and 
Jones 2010), little evidence of racial bias was found.  This may well reflect the 
fact that the force in question covered a semi-rural environment, with less 
diverse communities than may be found in other areas.  It therefore cautions us 
against assuming that findings in one particular context will automatically 
translate into other jurisdictions.   The findings also point to the importance of 
controlling for an additional variable seldom included in previous models – that 
is, whether the subject poses a risk to themselves to or others.  At least in this 
context, the variable was seen to be significant and to be associated with an 
increased likelihood of Taser being drawn (without being fired) and of Taser 
being fired. 
The findings also provide some confirmation of the need to investigate concerns 
that those suffering from mental health issues are more likely to have Taser 
drawn on them, and fired at them: an area where some have called for more 
research to help supplement the  anecdotal nature of the evidence that exists at 
present (MacAttram in London Assembly 2013: see also DOMILL 2012).  Of 
particular interest is the finding that mental health disability continued to be 
significantly associated with Taser firing even after controlling for the conduct of 
the subject, and for whether they pose a risk to themselves or others.  This is 
worthy of further study given DOMILL’s findings that ‘some drugs used in the 
treatment of certain mental health conditions… may predispose [a person] to an 
adverse cardiac event’ (2012: 24): and that ‘the longer-term psychological 
implications of exposure to an extremely painful Taser discharge… remain 
unexplored’ (2012: 5).   
 
Similarly the finding that reported drug use was associated with increased odds 
of Taser firing, even after controlling for the other factors listed above, may also 
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be of concern given DOMILL’s warning that ‘the threshold for development of 
cardiac adverse outcomes in drug-intoxicated individuals subjected to Taser 
discharge or other types of force may be lowered’ (2012: 25: see also Zipes 
2013 c.f. Kroll 2008, Kroll et al 2008).  The current College of Policing Taser 
guidance refers only to vulnerable groups and does not specifically mention 
these factors as enhancing the risk associated with the weapon, but previous 
ACPO Guidance (2008: 11) explicitly mentioned ‘mental disorder and illness’ 
and drug consumption as ‘specific risk factors.’  Further work is needed into the 
nature of these associations for, as I discuss below, it may be that officers are 
more likely to record such details in cases where Taser is used, than in cases 
where other force options have been deployed. 
 
The finding that incidents involving officers who had received their personal 
safety training refresher 20 over a year ago were more likely to result in the firing 
of Taser than incidents involving officers who those who had received their 
training more recently, is also of interest.   This area deserves further 
investigation before reaching any conclusions, as the relationship between the 
two variables is not clear.  As this dataset does not capture which officers at the 
incident were equipped with Taser, it is unclear whether these results indicate 
that Taser trained officers who have had PST training less recently are more 
likely to use the weapon, or whether more complicated, indirect mechanisms 
are at work 21.  This would be an important area to research as it presents the 
intriguing possibility, one of many, that those officers who are less familiar with, 
and less confident in, their use of alternative techniques may be more likely to 
use Taser.  It would interesting to see if similar results are found in other forces, 
and if a clearer, more definite association between training in other force 
techniques and the propensity to use Taser can be established. 
Finally, whilst the literature in the USA tended to conclude that Taser was being 
used as the weapon of choice in response to relatively low levels of force, the 
                                                          
20
 At the force in question officers are meant to undertake a two day refresher course on personal safety 
training annually.  This refresher covers a range of topics, including the use of empty hand techniques, 
baton strikes and irritant spray - the options that non-firearms officers will have at their disposal as 
alternatives to Taser.   
 
21
 For example as, by definition, some officers are going longer than the recommended 12 months 
between refresher courses, it may indicate that there is something unusual about these individuals that is 
not captured in the data set, an underlying variable—such as long period of absence from work—that 
might explain increased odds of Taser firings, either by them or by colleagues.   
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findings here are not as clear cut.  The small number of instances where Taser 
was fired (263 over an eight year period) indicates—at least in this Force—that 
Taser is not being discharged frequently or routinely or that officers have been 
turning to Taser instead of using other force options on a large scale.  However, 
these findings need to be put in national context, where there have been 
dramatic increases in the rates of Taser firing, as discussed in the introduction 
to Part 2. 
Moreover, the presence of a weapon on a subject was the single strongest 
predictor of whether Taser would be fired in a given instance, and a significant 
and large predictor of whether Taser would be drawn.  The odds of Taser being 
drawn or fired was also significantly increased if the subject posed a risk to 
themselves or others.  However, as noted above, in the majority of instances 
where Taser was fired, it was fired at individuals who were not recorded as 
using weapons to resist officers.  Given the small absolute number of Taser 
firings, this constitutes a small number of incidents over an eight year period.  
There may well be extenuating circumstances in such cases, including the high 
level of violence that some unarmed individuals are capable of posing, the 
threat certain subjects may pose were they to flee, or potential access to 
weapons nearby.  In some instances, the absence of weapon use may raise 
concerns about the proportionality of the force used, and may be suggestive of 
other ways of handling the situation, without recourse to Taser.    
Yet again, however, these findings point to the need to consider the use of 
Taser in context.  Individuals who were not recorded as using a weapon in their 
conduct with officers were more likely to be subject to irritant spray (N = 1,569) 
or baton (N = 547) than Taser (N = 186), despite the latter being widely 
regarded as more controversial.  Such incidents also account for a very small 
proportion of the 23, 556 use of force cases recorded, and of the 22, 643 cases 
where subject conduct does not include weapon use. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has been the first piece of academic work to analyse how Taser 
and other forms of less lethal force are used by police forces in England and 
Wales, and has generated findings of both methodological and substantive 
import.  In terms of the former it has highlighted the need to look at changes in 
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force techniques over time, to consider Taser in the context of other force 
options, and to differentiate between different types of Taser ‘use’.  It has also 
shown the value of controlling for the risk that subjects pose to themselves or 
others when assessing Taser use in England and Wales – an important 
methodological innovation.  
In terms of the latter, it has found—in keeping with the previous literature—that 
reportedly higher levels of subject resistance, being male, experiencing mental 
health issues, and drug consumption are found to increase the odds of Taser 
being fired.  In contrast to the previous literature, subject ethnicity is not a 
statistically significant determinant of Taser firings or Taser drawing.  The 
finding that incidents involving officers who had received their personal safety 
training refresher over a year ago were more likely to result in the firing of Taser 
than incidents involving officers who those who had received their training more 
recently, is also novel and potentially of interest.  The findings also show that 
whilst clear differences exist between situations in which Taser is fired and 
situations involving other force options—with the former significantly more likely 
to involve the presence of a weapon, and threats to subjects or others—Taser, 
and other LLWs, are sometimes fired on unarmed individuals.   
That said the findings detailed here should be interpreted with caution for 
several reasons. Due to data limitations it has only been possible to analyse 
data from one force, and there is a need for more systematic data collection and 
analysis to help assess whether the findings detailed above are isolated 
examples or indicative of a broader trend.  Nor has it been possible to include 
several factors of interest, including whether Taser was available for use, which 
officer used the weapon, officer gender, age and ethnicity, and subject age.  
Neither was it possible to ascertain the order in which different force techniques 
were used: and how often, and for how long, a particular technique was used.  
No distinction could be made between instances in which Taser was drawn, 
drawn and red-dotted or sparked: these various uses were all recorded as 
‘drawing’ of Taser.  Similarly, Taser firing conflated firing the weapon in probe-
firing, drive-stun and angled drive-stun mode. 
Third, even where relevant variables are captured, their interpretation is not 
clear cut.  Instead of seeing statistical analyses as reflective of the ‘reality’ and 
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‘facts’ around Taser, constructivist STS encourages us to examine the way in 
which particular facts may be created, and come into being.  Seen from this 
perspective, whilst a statistically significant association between Taser use and 
particular subject characteristics might be a neutral reflection of an underlying 
pattern, other possibilities also present themselves.  It should not simply be 
assumed that such correlations can shed light on the independent reality of 
Taser use: instead, these statistical results they produce should be seen as the 
outcome of complex socio-technical processes and interactions between, for 
example, officers, technologies, forms, statistical software and researchers – 
and should therefore be treated accordingly.  It may be, for example, that 
officers are more likely to record additional details around, mental health status, 
subject conduct, weapon possession, and drug intoxication in instances where 
Taser was fired, as they perceive its use to need additional justification.  They 
are also used to filling out a detailed additional Home Office form every time 
Taser is used, which may encourage them to provide more detail on the in-
house database than they might do for other uses of force.  Such issues also 
highlight a broader limitation common to many use of force studies – namely, 
reliance on officer accounts of particular incidents. 
Such limitations notwithstanding, this chapter has attempted to focus our 
attention on a relatively neglected issue: how Taser is being used in England 
and Wales, and the factors associated with the weapon being drawn and fired.  
Equally important, however, are questions around the outcome of such 
incidents, in particular the injuries to subjects and officers associated with the 
discharge of Taser and other force options - and it is to this topic I now turn in 
the next chapter, before looking, in the following chapters, at officer and subject 
views of the weapon.    
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Chapter 4: Taser and Subject Injury Rates: A Multivariate Analysis. 
One of the most studied consequences of Taser use is the association between 
the firing of the weapon and (visible) subject injury - and it is easy to understand 
why.  The relationship between police use of force and injury to subjects is an 
important one particularly as, under soft law standards, officers have a 
responsibility to ‘minimise damage and injury’ to those on whom force is used 
(UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, 1990).  This throws into 
sharp relief the need to measure and compare the extent, number and type of 
injuries inflicted by different force techniques to enable officers to make 
informed decisions about which options may be least injurious.   
Such topics lend themselves to statistical analyses and the peer reviewed 
literature on this topic is highly quantitative (Kaminski et al 2013, National 
Institute of Justice 2011, Smith et al 2007, Smith et al 2010,  Taylor and Bruce 
2010, Terrill and Paoline 2012).  Whilst this literature, at least theoretically, 
includes instances where police force has been followed by the death of a 
subject, in practice fatalities following the use of ‘less-lethal’ force have not 
occurred (or have not been reported to have occurred) in the vast majority of 
studies focusing on injury rates.  There thus tends to be one body of work, 
located within quantitative criminology, focusing on non-lethal injuries 
associated with Taser firing - and a second, more diverse body of work focusing 
on police fatalities.  However, studies in this latter category often comprise 
highly specialised debates conducted by physicians, electrical engineers and 
physicists, amongst others (e.g. Kroll et al 2014, Sheridan 2014, Zipes 2014).    
 
The value this chapter can add is located firmly in the former category, 
concerned predominantly with the relationship between Taser firing and non-
lethal subject injury.  Like the previous studies before it, it does not look 
specifically at the association between Taser use and fatalities, due to lack of 
deaths in the dataset in question.  Nor does it look at consequences of use 
other than visible injury – this discussion is one I return to in the next Chapter.  
Instead, it aims to add to the quantitative literature on the relationship between 
Taser and subject injury rates – which, for many, is seen as the only 
consequence worth considering (Kaminski et al 2013).  As such, Section 1 
reviews the literature on Taser and subject injury.  Section 2 sets out the 
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research questions arising from this review, and the models used to answer 
them.  Section 3 presents descriptive statistics, Section 4 presents model 
results and Section 5 provides supplementary analysis, before concluding.  
The Existing Literature   
On the whole, studies find that Taser is associated with reductions in subject 
injury.  Alpert and Dunham argue that ‘the evidence is consistent that…(the 
weapon) reduces the risk of injuries to suspects’ (2010: 248), and Kaminski et al 
argue that the evidence is ‘relatively consistent’ (2013: 2).  For example, Bruce 
and Taylor (2010: 260) compared forces who had Taser to those who didn’t, 
and found that the former had ‘lower rates of… suspect severe injuries’.  
MacDonald et al (2009: 2268) conducted time-series analysis of forces before 
and after the adoption of Taser and found that the ‘monthly incidence of injury in 
2 police departments declined significantly, by 25% to 62%, after adoption of 
CEDs’.  Studies using logistic regression have also found an association 
between Taser and reduced subject injury rates (MacDonald et al 2009: NIJ 
2011: Smith et al 2007).   
However the evidence is not unanimous.  Research conducted for the NIJ by 
Smith et al (2010, 4-8) found Taser use was associated with decreases in 
suspect injury in two forces but was statistically insignificant in a third.  Lee at al 
(2009) found ‘an increase in sudden deaths… in the early period of Taser 
deployment and then a decrease in these events to pre-deployment levels’, 
whilst Lin and Jones (2010) found that Taser use was correlated with a 
decrease in subject injuries in one year, but correlated with an increase in 
subject injury the following year.  In addition, many of these studies used the 
same datasets (Neuscheler and Freidlin, 2015), meaning that any 
idiosyncrasies or flaws in a particular dataset may be replicated more broadly (a 
point I return to in the officer injuries chapter).  Moreover, almost all of these 
studies were based in the USA.  Whilst the only study to look at subject injury 
rates in England and Wales (Jenkinson et al 2006) found that they were lower in 
cases involving Taser, than in cases involving irritant spray or baton, the injury 
rates following Taser were taken from the Taser International database and the 




The existing literature has other issues, too.  A common technique is to set up a 
dichotomous variable, differentiating between incidents where Taser was fired 
and where it wasn’t fired (e.g. National Institute of Justice 2011: MacDonald et 
al 2009, Smith et al 2007, Smith et al 2010).  Such models have advanced our 
understanding in several ways, but are unable to differentiate between 
instances where Taser was used by itself and instances where it was used in 
conjunction with other weapons, and compare Taser use to broad, general 
reference categories.  The former may mean that the independent effect of 
Taser on injury is obscured, whilst the latter may complicate efforts to compare 
it with other force options (Terrill and Paoline 2012, Paoline et al 2012).  In 
addition, in several papers (e.g. Smith et al 2010 and MacDonald et al 2009) the 
term ‘use’ is not defined.  As such, it is not clear whether Taser ‘use’ is 
restricted to those situations where the weapon is fired—which presumably is 
the case—or also includes situations where the weapon was only drawn or red-
dotted.  Indeed Lin and Jones (2010) provide, to my knowledge, the only 
multivariate analysis looking specifically at the impact of drawing the  weapon.   
 
In order to overcome such issues, alternative logistic regression models are 
sometimes used.  PERF (2009: 46) differentiated between instances in which 
Taser was the sole force used (with use defined as firing), and instances where 
hands on techniques, baton, or pepper spray were the sole force used.  This 
facilitated direct comparisons between Taser and other force techniques.  The 
authors found that Taser was associated with increased odds of subject injury 
by 27% when compared to a reference category comprised use of weapons 
‘other than CEDs, baton or OC spray’, or of multiple forms of force (2009: 48) – 
but that it was associated with decreased odds of severe injury. Yet, again, this 
study did not directly compare instances where Taser was the sole force used 
to instances where Taser was used with other force.  
 
Cognisant of such issues, Terrill and Paoline (2012) and Paoline et al (2012) 
created a series of models capable of differentiating between instances in which 
Taser was fired by itself and instances where it was fired with other force 
options, and of comparing these to a range of clearly delineated reference 
groups - models subsequently also used by Kaminski et al (2013).  Terrill and 
Paoline’s results showed that Tasers, both when used by themselves and when 
99 
 
used with other force options, were associated with a significantly higher 
probability of injury to subjects compared to cases when no CED was used, and 
when compared specifically to a variety of other use of force options (2012, 
though see Kaminski et al 2013).   
 
Several points emerge from this review of the literature.  First, there is a need 
for work analysing the relationship between Taser and injury rates in countries 
other than the USA.  Second, there is a need to build on previous analyses by 
using statistical techniques capable of controlling for confounding variables, of 
differentiating between instances in which Tasers are the sole use of force used 
and instances where they are used with other weapons, and of comparing these 
instances directly to other force options.   Third, there is a need to clearly define 
what kinds of ‘use’ of Taser are being considered in the models, and to look not 
only at cases where Taser is physically fired, but also to look at cases where 
Taser, and other uses of force, are drawn but not fired.  This chapter intends to 
address such limitations and, in so doing, to answer Terrill and Paoline’s (2012) 
call for further research capable of separating out the various types of force 
used.   
The Current Inquiry 
The key question this chapter aims to answer is: Whether instances where 
Taser is fired (either by itself or in conjunction with other force techniques) are 
associated with decreases in the odds of subject injury when compared to 
instances where Taser is not fired. Two supplementary questions are also 
addressed, namely: how do instances where Taser is drawn, but not fired, 
impact subject injury rates? How does this effect compare to instances where 
other weapons (namely baton and irritant spray) are drawn but not physically 
used?   
I hypothesise that, in keeping with Terrill and Paoline’s (2012) findings—whose 
statistical models I have broadly duplicated here—instances where Taser is 
fired will be associated with increased odds of subject injury, whilst instances 
where Taser is drawing, but not fired, will be associated with decreased odds of 






The dependent variable is whether a subject injury occurred as a result of police 
action, and is binary coded 22.  As the original data provided distinguished 
between three outcomes: i) no suspect injury: ii) suspect injury caused by the 
police and iii) suspect injury caused by other, this was recoded as one where 
injuries were caused by the police, and zero where no injury was present, or an 
injury was present but not caused by the police.   As such, due to data 
limitations it is not possible to say how many subjects were injured, only that an 
injury had occurred to at least one subject due to police action. 
Unlike some authors (e.g. MacDonald et al 2009), I do not reclassify certain 
types of officer recorded injury—namely ‘skin irritation’ from pepper spray, and 
‘CED dart punctures’—as non-injuries for several reasons, not least the 
logistical challenges in so doing.  Whilst Kaminski et al (2013) were able to 
subtract Taser probe injuries from their dataset, the structure of my data does 
not specifically differentiate injuries caused by probes 23.  Moreover, there may 
well be some reason why the officer has seen fit to record this particular 
‘laceration’ as an injury.  My model relies on the officer’s judgement—in the 
same way for injuries as it does for other variables—and doesn’t attempt to 
second-guess this judgement in the coding stage of the work, although I return 
to such issues in the analysis of results.  As such, if an officer has noted that an 
injury has occurred, it is coded as such on the dataset.  However as officers 
were given no instructions on what constituted an injury (a practice common in 
other agencies, see Kaminski 2013), it is likely that the definition of injury will 
vary from officer to officer.  Moreover, interviews with officers reveal that many 
consider it appropriate to record the relatively minor probe marks from Taser as 
injuries.  A fairly representative comment included the following:  
‘If you have got it in flesh I think you would, you would record it (injury) on 
the form.  Because if there is not an operational necessity to take the barb 
                                                          
22 Please see the detailed description of the dataset in the introduction to Part 2 for further details.   
 
23
 It does allow officers to categorise injury into different categories, including ‘lacerations’ and 
‘bruising’—and one could guess that all lacerations in incidents involving Taser were probe lacerations—
but this is problematic as the former is not synonymous with the latter.  Indeed, it is a broad category, 
found in incidents involving baton, canines and empty hand techniques.   
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out they are going to have paramedics or hospital staff remove it, so there is 
a risk, and there is an injury, at the end of the day’. 
 
What’s social about being Tasered?                                                                               
The construction of injuries around Taser. 
The debate around Taser and subject injury has long been conducted as if it 
were simply a matter of revealing the ‘truth’ about the impact of the weapon – a 
truth which can be revealed through progressive refinements to our variables, 
datasets and statistical models.  For Terrill and Paoline (2012: 153), there is a 
definitive ‘empirical reality’ about injuries caused by the weapon.  For Ho (2009: 
771), it is time for ‘truth about Taser’, for Jauchem (2015: 55) we need to clear 
up the ‘incorrect’ perception that Taser causes more injuries than canines, and 
for others we need ‘Truth not Taser’ (Truth not Taser 2008).   
In such a situation, insights from constructivist STS studies and ANT can serve 
us well. In a key paper,  Grint and Woolgar once invited us to consider ‘what’s 
social about being shot’ —and answered that everything was, with so called 
technical features, descriptions and outcomes ‘always’ comprised of ‘aspects of 
the social’ (1992: 378).  If the injuries resulting from firearms use, up to and 
including death, are subject to considerable interpretation, then the same 
undoubtedly holds true of injuries and other outcomes said to follow Taser use.  
The characterisation of something as an ‘injury’ is not some objective, 
straightforward assessment, but the product of interpretation – an interpretation 
that may vary according to the weapon used, and the nature of the harm 
occasioned. The implications from this are profound, as analyses of injury rates 
may say more about differing approaches to, and characterisations of, injury 
and harm, than they do about the ‘real’ injury and harm occasioned.   
Yet, given the far reaching impact that constructivism has had in a number of 
fields, it should not be presumed that one needs to work from within an STS 
perspective to generate such insights.  Indeed, within criminology the terms of 
the debate have taken on a somewhat constructionist hue of late, thanks to a 
recent exchange between Terrill and Paoline (2012), and Kaminski et al 
(2013)—neither of whom work from an explicitly STS perspective—centring 
around the classification of certain Taser injuries.  The former argue that 
punctures from Taser probes and other ‘minor’ injuries should be counted, as 
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they still constitute injuries.  The latter argue that probe punctures do not ‘meet 
the standard definition of injury typically used by law enforcement officials and 
the courts’ and that ‘routine minor wounds … expected as part of the 
deployment of the device should not be included’.   In making such arguments, 
protagonists on both sides recognise the role of social construction in producing 
injuries.  Kaminski et al (2013: 619) explicitly state that ‘the definition of injuries 
resulting from force incidents is a social construct’, whilst Terrill and Paoline 
(2012: 178) note that the inclusion and exclusion of certain injuries in data 
analyses—in particular the decision to exclude probe marks—are ‘decision(s) 
made by social scientists’ and tantamount to ‘changing the rules for assessing 
injuries’ depending on the weapon used.   
Such discussions serve to highlight that one does not need to be versed in the 
complexities of STS, SCOT and ANT to make arguments about how ‘facts’ 
around particular technologies can be created and constructed, and thus that 
the novelty of insights derived from these approaches can be overstated.  At the 
same time, however, such discussions also highlight the potential of such 
approaches, for two reasons.  First STS theorists are, at least on paper,  
motivated by appeals to symmetry, by a commitment to treat claims about the 
‘truth’ of technologies as constructed, contingent accomplishments,  regardless 
from whence they originate (though see Pels (1996) for a discussion of some of 
the limitations of symmetry). In contrast, in the Taser debate, appeals to 
constructivism seem to be somewhat asymmetrical.  Those whose evidence 
pointed to the reduced injury potential of the weapon have historically paid little 
attention to the ways in which this evidence, itself, has been constructed.   It 
was only following Terrill and Paoline’s research (2012)—research that used a 
different definition of injury, and found a markedly different picture—that such 
issues came to the forefront.  One is left with the distinct impression from both 
sides in the discussion that, whilst they now make space to acknowledge that 
injuries are a social construct, they see such processes more as a nefarious 
activity that their opponents engage in to shore up their own interpretations and 
to obscure the underlying reality around the weapon, rather than as an 
inescapable feature of socio-technical life.   
Second, and relatedly, constructivist STS theorists may have a slightly different 
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conception of the role of the analyst than do some in the Taser debate.  For 
certain authors, the role of the researcher is not only to engage in increasingly 
sophisticated models of data analysis to uncover the truth and end 
‘misconceptions’ (Jauchem 2015: 53) around Taser, but to unquestioningly 
adopt the definitions favoured by the police in order to do so.  Thus, for 
example, Kaminski et al (2013: 617) criticise Terrill and Paoline for including 
‘actions that law enforcement and others do not consider to be uses of force’, 
for using definitions of injury not  ‘typically used by law enforcement’, and for the 
‘disconnect… between research and practice’ that this has created. 
Yet for Venturini (2010: 268), those scholars inspired by Actor-Network Theory 
are not ‘responsible for deciding controversies…It is a matter of respect (as) 
controversies belong to (the) actors (themselves)… Researchers can certainly 
express their ideas… (but) in displaying their opinions, they should pay the 
greatest attention not to hide others’.  Similarly, for Mol (2003), STS research 
has a key role to play not in uncovering a singular reality, but in highlighting the 
multiple realities that co-exist around any particular entity.  So, in the same way 
that medical professionals and those affected with the disease may have 
different interpretations of atherosclerosis, so the police and those affected by 
the weapon may have different interpretations of the injuries associated with 
Taser.  In neither case is the researcher compelled to adopt the interpretations 
used by any one particular actant in the controversy – particularly if doing so 
would help to silence the voices of others.   
Taken together, such insights from STS studies do not preclude the researcher 
from drawing their own conclusions, but do usefully remind us that such 
conclusions should be respectful, cautious, partial and appropriately caveated.  
 
Force variables: 
Two variables for Taser firing were created.  The first captured incidents where 
Taser had been fired and other force had also physically been used.  Taser was 
considered to have been used in conjunction with other force if the record 
indicated that one or more of empty hand techniques, shield techniques, non-
compliant handcuffing techniques, fabric restraints, irritant spray, baton, 
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canines, baton gun, firearm or ‘other’ force had also been deployed in the same 
incident.  Taser was considered to be the sole force used if none of these force 
options had been physically used in the same incident.  These variables were 
initially compared to all incidents where Taser was not fired, and then to more 
specific reference categories, namely: incidents involving empty hand 
techniques only, incidents involving physical baton use only, and incidents 
involving the discharge of irritant spray only.  In these later models, all other 
uses of force (i.e. incidents that do not involve Taser firing, and are not in the 
reference category) are entered as a fourth variable, thus enabling us to retain 
all cases of interest in the model. This allows us to directly examine whether 
incidents involving Taser are less, or more injurious, than incidents involving the 
alternative use of force options.   
Drawing, but not physically using, force options was not considered a use of 
force when calculating these variables, in order to differentiate between 
instances where a weapon was physically fired, and where it was drawn, and in 
order to facilitate comparison with the rest of the literature on this topic.  Instead 
the impact of drawing (but not using) weapons is the subject of a separate, final 
model, whereby variables were created to represent instances where irritant 
spray has been drawn but not fired, Taser has been drawn but not fired, and 
baton has been drawn but not fired, to allow us to take a first, exploratory look 
at how the drawing not just of Taser, but of other force options, is associated 
with subject injury, if at all.  A variety of controls were also used, as discussed in 
further detail in the introduction to Part 2 24. 
Descriptive Statistics  
14% (N = 3,189) of incidents recorded on the database are listed as resulting in 
subject injury that has been caused by the police.  Bruising, CS, laceration and 
                                                          
24
 Subject level controls comprise subject ethnicity, gender and disability status, as well as 
whether they have drug, alcohol or mental health issues. Officer level controls include whether 
firearms officers, response officers and traffic officers attended the incident, as well as officer 
rank, length of service and the length of time since personal safety training.  Incident level 
controls include: subject conduct, whether a weapon was present on the subject, whether the 
subject was posing a risk to themselves or others, the type of incident, time of day / level of 
lighting, the number of officer and subjects present and the number of officers using force.  Year 
of the incident and policy in place at the time are also controlled.   
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other injury each account for roughly a quarter of all such injuries 25.  By 
comparison, incidents in which Taser was fired result in injuries 46% of the time 
(N = 120).  Of these injuries, 70% are detailed as ‘other’ injury, 16% as 
laceration and 6% are specifically listed as being from other uses of force used 
in the same incident. 
** See Appendix 1, page 274, for ‘Table 4.1: Frequency of injury type’ **. 
As such there is a clear need to differentiate between instances where Taser is 
the sole force used, and instances where it is used with other force techniques 
– not least because injuries in the latter category may not be caused by Taser, 
but by the other force techniques used.  It should also be noted that the relative 
frequency of injuries following incidents where Taser is used is by no means 
unique to this weapon.  Indeed broadly similar rates of injury (between 39 – 
50%) are associated with instances in which other force options (namely, 
incapacitant spray, baton gun and baton) are used 26.  By contrast the use of 
empty hand techniques, non-compliant handcuffing and other force are 
associated with a much lower rate of subject injury of between 12 - 15%.  
Looking in more detail at the cases where Taser was fired alongside other force 
options, the other force option in question was often empty hand techniques.  
Indeed 78 cases (59% of cases involving Taser and other force) involve the use 
of Taser and of empty hand techniques (either with, or without other forms of 
force).      
 
**See Appendix 1, pages 275 and 276, for ‘Table 4.2: Injury frequency for 
different force techniques’ and ‘Table 4.3: Incidents where Taser is Fired 
with Other Force’ **. 
 
Also of interest is the decrease in both absolute and relative recorded subject 
injury rates over time.  Not only have recorded injuries inflicted by the police 
decreased substantially, they have done so at a time when the number of 
                                                          
25 Officers are able to select the type of injury inflicted from a range of options, namely: broken 
bones, bruising, CS, dog bite, laceration and other.   
26
 The rate of injury following incidents in which canines are deployed is much lower, reflecting 




incidents involving force has actually been increasing.  Whether this shift 
reflects differences in the rate of officer recording of injuries, or differences in 
the rates of injury themselves, is something that deserves further investigation - 
but it is clear from this analysis that injury rates are time-sensitive, and that year 
may prove a useful control variable. 
**See Appendix 1, page 277, for ‘Table 4.4: Decrease in Subject Injuries 
over Time’ **. 
                                                                                                                                          
With these controls in mind, I move onto the first model: comparing incidents 
where Taser firing was the sole force used, and incidents where Taser was fired 
alongside other force, to a reference category of incidents where Taser was not 
fired – a model  described as the ‘most straightforward manner in which to 
assess the probability of CED use on citizen injuries’ (Terrill and Paoline 2012: 
171).   
Results  
 
Model 1: Reference Group Instances where Taser is not fired. 
The results of this model showed that both incidents where Taser was fired with 
other weapons, and where it was the only force used, significantly increased 
odds of subject injury when compared to incidents where Taser wasn’t fired.  
However, incidents involving the firing of Taser and the use of other force 
options were associated with larger increases in the odds of subject injury than 
incidents where Taser was the sole force used. 
Some control variables were also significant across the model and, indeed, in 
all models involving Taser firing (Model 1 – 4).  For example, being female was 
significantly associated with decreased odds of injury and as the number of 
officers present (but not necessarily using force) increased, the odds of subject 
injury decreased.  Increased levels of subject resistance, the presence of a 
weapon and two or more officers using force were all associated with large 
increases in the odds of subject injury of roughly between 30% - 100%.  
Incidents where officers reported that they needed to use force to protect 
themselves or others were associated with smaller increases in the odds of 
subject injury.  
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** Please see Appendix 1, page 278, for ‘Table 4.5: Results for Model 1.                            
Reference Category: Incidents where Taser is not fired’ **. 
Whilst such a model is useful, it is unable to tell us little about how Taser 
directly compares to other force techniques.  With this in mind the models now 
aim, in turn, to compare Taser directly to instances where empty hand 
techniques are the sole force used, where baton is the sole force used, and 
where irritant spray is the sole force used – models used in prior research, 
including Terrill and Paoline (2012), and further discussed in Kaminski et al 
(2013). 
Model 2 - 4: Reference categories: empty hand techniques only, baton only, 
irritant spray only. 
Model 2 compared incidents where Taser was fired, either by itself or with other 
uses of force, to incidents where empty hand techniques were the sole force 
used (the reference category).  The results indicate that incidents in which 
Taser is fired are associated with significant increases in the odds of subject 
injury, when compared to incidents where empty hand techniques are the sole 
force used.  Incidents where Taser is used with other weapons are associated 
with larger increase in odds than incidents where Taser firing is the sole force 
used.  This suggests that empty hand techniques may be less likely to result in 
injury than Taser firings. 
Model 3 compared incidents where Taser was fired, either by itself or with other 
uses of force, to incidents where baton was the sole force used (the reference 
category).  Incidents where Taser was fired but no other force was used were 
insignificant, whilst incidents where Taser was fired with other forms of force 
were associated with increases in the odds of subject injury, suggesting no 
clear evidence was available from this model to help one assess whether Taser 
is more injurious than baton.   
Model 4 sought to compare instances where irritant spray was the sole force 
used (the reference category) to instances where Taser was fired by itself, and 
with other force.  Incidents where Taser firing was the sole form of force used 
were significant, and associated with decreases in the odds of subject injury, 
whilst incidents where Taser was fired with other forms of force were 
insignificant.  This suggests that (officer identified) subject injuries are higher in 
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instances where irritant spray is used than in instances where Taser is used 
(fired) – a point to which I return shortly.   
**See Appendix 1, p280, for ‘Table 4.6: Logistic regression models 2 – 4’ ** 
Model 5: Taser drawn but not fired: Reference Group all other uses of force.   
Focusing on injuries inflicted in instances where weapons have been fired (or 
force has otherwise been physically used) is a useful endeavour but, it might be 
argued, is one that can only take you so far.  The deterrent value of simply 
drawing the Taser is often described as one of the key advantages of the device 
(a point I come back to in Chapter 7) and one might expect that, if simply 
drawing a weapon was effective, there would be no need to use physical force 
and thus no injuries to subjects at all.   
Thus it is necessary to look at the relationship between the drawing of a 
weapon and subject injury, and for this I turn, again, to a logistic regression 
model.  It was tempting to follow in the footsteps of Lin and Jones (2010), 
whose logistic regression models simply compared incidents where Taser was 
fired, and incidents where Taser was drawn but not fired, to instances where 
Taser was not used at all.  Such a model has much to recommend it—not least 
a commendable simplicity—but is unable to consider the similar deterrent value 
that the drawing of other weapons may have.  Cognisant of such issues, I run a 
slightly different model.  This model, previously described in the methods 
section of this chapter, again has subject injury as its outcome measure and 
includes the same controls as the other models.  Yet, in contrast to the previous 
models, the variables for the force used are not whether Taser was fired, but 
whether Taser was drawn (but not fired), whether irritant spray was drawn (but 
not fired) and whether baton was drawn (but not fired) - or, to put it another way, 
where drawing was the highest use of the weapon in question.   
**See Appendix 1, page 283, for Table 4.7:                                                                               
Frequency with which weapons are drawn but not physically used’. ** 
This model thus follows the lead of the NIJ, and others, by introducing into the 
model a series of binary variables, coded 1 if a particular force technique was 
used, and 0 if the technique in question was not used.  But whilst the force 
techniques of interest in the NIJ models were the physical use of a weapon (in 
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their model, OC spray, Taser, baton, canines and empty hand techniques), it is 
the drawing of the weapon that is the force technique of interest in this model.  
Thus instances where, for example, Taser was drawn but not fired are coded as 
1, and are compared to all other instances on the database (i.e. instances 
where Taser is either not used, or where Taser is fired), which are coded as 0.  
This allows for cases where, say, both Taser and irritant spray have been 
drawn, to be in multiple categories. 
The model shows that the drawing (but not using) of baton, irritant spray and 
Taser, are all associated with reductions in the odds of subject injury.  Out of 
the three variables, the drawing (but not firing) of Taser has the largest effect on 
the odds of subject injury, reducing the odds of such injury by over 70%, whilst 
drawing of baton and irritant spray are both associated with reduction of the 
odds of subject injury by around a half.  This provides additional confirmation 
that the drawing of Taser is associated with a reduction in the odds of subject 
injury.  However further work needs to be done to compare the drawing of 
Taser, irritant spray and baton to a common reference group, and to further 
differentiate between instances where Taser is the sole force drawn, where 
irritant spray is the sole force drawn, and where baton is the sole force drawn – 
an interesting agenda for future research.    
**See Appendix 1, page 284 for Table 4.8: Logistic regression models for 
drawing of Taser, irritant spray and baton **. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The models above have shown that a variety of factors impact subject injury.  
The odds of (reported) subject injury occurring are decreasing over time: a 
finding that deserves additional attention to ascertain whether this pattern is 
widespread in other forces and, if so, whether it represents a shift in the nature 
of reporting, a shift in the frequency of injury, or something else entirely.  
Moreover, and in keeping with the previous literature (e.g. Lin and Jones 2010, 
NIJ 2011, PERF 2009, Terrill and Paoline 2012), being female was associated 
with decreased odds of injury, whilst a number of factors were associated with 
increased odds of injury, including increased levels of subject resistance and 
the presence of a weapon at the incident, and the number of officers using 
force.  The control for whether a subject posed a risk to themselves or others 
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was also statistically significant, and associated with increased odds of injury, 
pointing to the value of controlling for this hitherto ignored variable.   
 
Interestingly, whilst an increase in the number of officers using force was 
associated with an increase in the odds of subject injury, an increase in the 
number of officers present (but not necessarily using force) was associated with 
a decrease in the odds of subject injury.  The mechanisms behind this 
association are unclear, but it may be that the presence of multiple officers 
dissuades individuals from using the highest levels of force, or from using force 
at all, and changes the dynamics of civilian-police encounters in other ways.  
Whilst not central to this thesis, this finding should nevertheless be explored 
further in future research, as it may have important safety implications at a time 
when police budgets are coming under increased pressure. 
 
After controlling for these and other variables, the models indicate, in keeping 
with previous studies (Terrill and Paoline 2012, Lin and Jones 2010), and 
partially in keeping with my expectations, that incidents where Taser is drawn 
but not fired, are associated with decreased odds of subject injury—but that the 
deterrent value of Taser is far from unique—and that incidents where Taser is 
fired are sometimes associated with increased odds of subject injury, when 
compared to a variety of reference groups.  More specifically, incidents where 
Taser firing was the sole force used were associated with higher rates of 
reported subject injury than incidents where empty hand techniques were the 
sole force used, with lower rates of subject injury when compared to incidents 
where irritant spray was the sole force fired/used, and were insignificant when 
compared to baton.  In keeping with my expectations, incidents where Taser 
was fired with other force options were generally associated with significantly 
increased odds of subject injury than incidents where Taser was the sole form 
of force used, and when compared with a variety of other force techniques.  
Thus it cannot be assumed that firing Taser automatically reduces subject 
injury, and it is important to look at whether Taser is used by itself, or with other 
force – and, if so, with what other force.  Where Taser is used with other force, it 
is most commonly used with empty hand techniques, suggesting that 
consideration be given to training officers on the empty hand techniques that 
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are the least injurious and most suitable to be used alongside Taser, to the risks 
associated with them, and to mitigation measures that can be put in place.   
Findings on injury rates and other force  
However, focusing solely on Taser, at the expense of other force options, would 
be a mistake.  It is particularly noteworthy that incidents involving irritant spray 
appear to be highly injurious, both in terms of absolute percentages, and when 
compared to incidents where Taser has been fired.  This finding differs from 
much of the literature in the States (e.g. Terrill and Paoline 2012), which found 
incapacitants to be significantly safer. These different findings are clearly driven, 
at least in part, by differences in measurement.  Yet it is also possible that these 
findings point to something more significant than differences in how to 
operationalise key variables.   
Indeed, some of this difference may be explained by the type of incapacitant 
used in the various forces being studied.  Most studies in the States have 
looked at forces that use some form of pepper spray, often OC, whilst this force 
used CS spray for most—although not all—of the time period under 
consideration.  There are some indications that the latter may be more harmful 
than some versions of the former, and that the form of CS used in England and 
Wales gives particular cause for concern (Rappert 2003b).  Not only has the 
strength of the spray itself been criticised for containing 25 times more irritant 
than other versions of CS (Grey in Rappert 2003b: 1272),  but concerns have 
been raised around the short and long term effects of the chemical in which it is 
carried (see Payne-James 2014b). This attests to the need to pay serious 
attention to the materiality of the weapon, and its particular technical 
characteristics. 
Some STS Inspired Considerations About Injury and Irritant Spray. 
Moreover, from a constructivist STS perspective, differences in the injury rates 
associated with different types of irritant spray may not (or may not just) be 
reflective of different injuries ‘caused’ by the weapon and its technical features, 
but may also be reflective of the different ways in which humans, technologies 
and texts interact to construct something as an injury (or not).  In this case, 
ACPO Guidance on CS Spray (ACPO 2009) has historically advised that 
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subjects should make a ‘significant recovery’ from the spray within 15 – 20 
minutes of being moved to fresh air.  It is possible that officers are recording the 
effects of CS spray as injuries because subjects are failing to recover in this 
timeframe – and there is evidence that this may be happening relatively 
frequently.  Payne-James et al (2014b) looked at 99 cases where suspects 
were exposed to chemical irritant spray during arrest by the Metropolitan Police, 
of whom 88% were exposed to CS spray.  They found that 50% were still 
experiencing effects at an average of 2.8 hours after exposure.   
Important questions around whether CS symptoms should be classed as an 
injury notwithstanding, on a practical level, this study provides some additional 
limited evidence to underscore Payne-James et al’s concerns about the effects 
of CS spray (2014b).  It also points to the need for analysts to be prepared to 
‘unblack-box’ particular technologies when interpreting their statistical analyses.  
Instead of just treating all irritant sprays as broadly similar, and dismissing the 
findings as a result of human agency (e.g. as stemming from differences in how 
humans have operationalised injury) it is necessary to take the materiality and 
the technical aspects of particular technologies seriously, appreciating that the 
designs and features of some weapons may be more likely to lend themselves 
to injury than others. 
More fundamentally, however, it points to the need to go a step further still and 
see injuries not as simply produced by these technical features, but as co-
produced by the interaction between the weapon, the texts governing its use, 
and the humans involved – relationships that are hard to capture via statistical 
models. 
 
From findings to recommendations on Taser use? 
At this stage in analysis, it is common to close by discussing the policy 
ramifications of the work and by making recommendations for the use of Taser 
(see, for example, Jenkinson et al 2006).  Instead, I wish to argue that there are 
important limitations both to the specific analysis outlined above – and to 
statistical assessment of subject injury rates more broadly – that should lead us 
to be cautious in making far-reaching policy recommendations.  
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As noted previously, limitations of this data set include an inability to incorporate 
certain relevant controls, to differentiate between probe firing and drive-stun use 
of Taser and to control for how many times and how often particular force 
options, including Taser, are used—variables that may potentially have a large 
impact on subject injury.  It should come as no surprise, then, that the 
Nagelkerke statistics for these models are low (although not unusually low for 
the literature), which provides some indication that the models are only able to 
account for a small proportion of the variance in the data.  It has also proved 
impossible to distinguish between the severity of injuries – a key limitation 
common to almost all quantitative work in this area, and one that risks conflating 
relatively minor injuries with life-threatening ones.  Another limitation well worth 
reiterating here is that data was drawn from only one police force.  As such any 
attempt to draw conclusions is fraught with difficulty.    
More generally, however, some additional issues with this type of statistical 
analysis should also be mentioned. Several factors suggest the association 
between subject injury and incidents involving Taser use may not be 
straightforward.  First, within the police force in question, only a limited number 
of officers are trained to use Taser.  Whilst, as shall be discussed in Chapter 7, 
Taser officers may be sent to the more violent, higher risk incidents, 
practicalities may mean that non-Taser trained officers may have arrived before 
them.  It may be that other techniques were tried, and resulted in injury, before 
Taser was used to resolve the situation.  As the data does not specify which 
force technique resulted in injury, any conclusions about weapon safety need to 
be heavily caveated. 
Second, in order for officers to document harm they need to be vividly aware of 
it – which is perhaps easiest if visible injuries are occasioned.  But what about 
those mechanisms of harm that leave few visible traces? The carcinogenic 
potential of the solvent, Methyl isobutyl ketone or MIBK, used in the CS spray 
deployed in England and Wales could potentially present a greater risk to long 
term health—of both officers and subjects—than many of the minor injuries 
captured here, but is something that would be systematically missing from the 
database altogether.   
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Finally, as I noted at various places throughout this chapter, looking at data 
analysis through a constructivist STS lens helps remind us that the data is not 
measuring actual injury, but officer defined injury – and the two things are not 
necessary the same.  Officers may have powerful incentives to minimise the 
extent of injury inflicted by their use of force, irrespective of the force option 
used.  Conversely, they may also have incentives to err on the side of caution 
by reporting injury, even if this is not confirmed, in order to ‘cover themselves’.  
Moreover, by enabling officers to easily identify injuries caused by certain force 
techniques but not others—as the drop-down menu for ‘injury’ does by allowing 
officers to specifically select injuries caused by ‘CS’ or dogs—the structure of 
the data set itself may predispose officers towards indicating higher rates for 
some force techniques than others.    
Such tensions may be heightened with Taser.  On the one hand, some 
practitioners believe that officers may be more likely to report subject injuries 
associated with Taser than injuries associated with other forms of weapons.  
This tendency may be heightened by current practice whereby officers also 
have to fill out an additional form which is sent to ACPO and the Home Office 
for additional analysis whenever Taser is used, as well as the fact that the 
effects of Taser are not always as straightforward, predictable or as easy to 
assess as the effects of other use of force.  Such factors may mean that, 
unconsciously, officers are more likely to report that injuries occur with Taser 
than they are with other weapons.  Thus one Taser officer noted how: 
‘It’s one of those things, its drilled into us that… it (injury) could be 
invisible.  You do (record) it, because you have punctured the skin.  And 
with the potential for secondary injury when they fall and the environment 
around them, you don’t know.  It could be the spine, it could be the head, 
you don’t know.  If the Taser had been successful and they had gone 
down… (or) if you are sticking a probe into somebody, there is an injury 
there’ (Taser officer, Force A). 
On the other hand, others (Anais 2009) have argued that it is easier for the 
effects of Taser to be dismissed than it is to dismiss the effects of more 
traditional weapons – and, of course, both tendencies may be at work 
simultaneously.   
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Such issues again draw our attention to the ways in which the data, and the 
measurements of injury contained within them, may be constructed by those 
collecting the data – and those interpreting it – leading us to question the ability 
of such datasets to uncover the ‘empirical reality’ (Terrill and Paoline 2012: 153) 
around Taser.  It is clear is that any resultant statistics need to be treated with 
extreme caution.  Whilst one intriguing and highly worthwhile  suggestion might  
be to follow the lead of Payne-James et al (2014b), and ask forensic physicians 
and custody nurses to fill out a detailed form whenever force (or a specific force 
option of interest) is used, such a research programme would not necessarily 
completely eliminate the kinds of considerations discussed here.  It is therefore 
necessary to bear in mind that the results of statistical analyses may say more 
about differing approaches to, and characterisations of, injury, than they do 
about the ‘real’ injury caused.   
Such limitations highlight some of the difficulties faced not only by myself but by 
other academics working on the topic, when they seek to draw firm conclusions, 
and make policy recommendations, on the basis of limited statistical 
information.  As such attempts to make statements about the comparative 
safety of different use of force options, including Taser, should be treated with 
caution, given the limits of the statistical models on which they are based, as 
well as concerns about the ability of any datasets—no matter how complex—to 
capture important information around the impact that police use of force can 
have. Ultimately the debate around subject injury, however defined and 
constructed, can only take us so far.  Moreover, injury rates should not be used 
as a proxy for assessing how new technologies impact those subjected to them: 
the latter cannot be reduced to the former.   In order to more fully assess the 
consequences associated with technologies such as Taser, it is necessary to 
complement quantitative work with qualitative techniques capable of capturing 
nuances of subject experience that may not always be easily quantifiable. As 
such, the next chapter aims to discuss the views of individuals subjected to 




Chapter 5: What Statistics on Subject Injury won’t tell you:                                               
Listening to those negatively affected. 
 
Collecting and using any form of evidence in research brings (or should bring) 
with it questions about whose knowledge, and what kinds of knowledge, should 
be taken seriously, and are worthy of our consideration.  Such issues are 
inherent in any kind of data collection, but are perhaps particularly relevant with 
analysis of quantitative data sets.  In particular, relying solely on the kinds of 
secondary data examined in Chapters 3 and 4—data collected by the police for 
the police—means privileging certain voices whilst other voices and 
perspectives, in particular the views of those subjected to the weapon, are 
silenced.  As such these sources have been described as ‘inherently 
problematic’ (Root et al 2013: 145:  see also Rojek et al 2012).  Perhaps partly 
as a consequence of this, the peer reviewed literature on the consequences of 
Taser use for subjects tends to focus on the odds of subject injury, ignoring 
other consequences that the weapon may have for those exposed to it and 
other concerns around its use. These important limitations seldom receive 
extensive discussion in quantitative accounts (e.g. Jenkinson et al 2006: 
Macdonald et al 2009: Smith et al 2007: for exceptions, see Root et al 2013 and 
Rojek et al 2012).  Neither do such concerns seem to preclude authors from 
using their data to make far-reaching policy recommendations (a point also 
noted by Terrill and Paoline 2012).   
This is particularly concerning given that ‘very few studies… have focused on 
the consequences that exposure to police use of force has on suspects’ and, as 
such, our understanding of the consequences that police use of force has for 
subjects is ‘underdeveloped’ (Meade et al 2015: 1).  Indeed, Meade et al call for 
‘future studies’ on this topic (2015: 12).  This chapter aims to develop our 
‘understanding’ of subject experiences of the consequences of Taser use—and 
the barriers they face in conveying these experiences—and to highlight 
limitations with the quantitative studies that have dominated the literature (and 
this thesis) to date.   
Part 1 discusses methods, looking at the techniques used to research this 
chapter, their limitations and practical issues. Part 2 outlines some of the issues 
that individuals subjected to Taser face when speaking about their experiences.  
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Part 3 draws on Reiss’ (1991) fear expectancy theory to outline some of the 
main concerns that these individuals have—namely the pain, fear and loss of 
control experienced: psychological correlates with use: and concerns about 
necessity —none of which are adequately captured by the dataset in use here, 
or by the quantitative research into Taser more broadly 27.  Part 4 concludes by 
drawing out the broader implications of these concerns for the assessment of 
the weapon more broadly.   
Methods. 
Three different methods were used to research this chapter. First, a search of 
academic and non-academic sources was conducted (NGO reports, newspaper 
articles, radio interviews, blogs and other fora, gathered through systematic 
online searches) to gather testimony from people subjected to the weapon.  
Second, auto-ethnographic techniques—volunteering myself to be exposed to 
the weapon in probe-firing and drive-stun mode, and reflecting on my own 
experiences—were used to generate new insights into the topic in question 
(Root et al 2013).   
These sources were supplemented, third, with interviews with people affected 
by Taser, or their representatives.  Lawyers and advocacy organisations 
working with those subjected to Taser were identified using existing contacts, 
and by internet search engines, and were contacted to ask if they would be 
interested in being interviewed for the research.  They were also asked to 
consider forwarding my details to other lawyers and representatives who might 
be interested, and to clients that were deemed at a suitable stage in their legal 
proceedings, and to be mentally well enough, to provide informed consent to 
the research, should they be interested in participating. As a result of these 
enquiries I was able to secure face to face interviews with four legal 
representatives / advocates, who between them circulated details of my 
research to at least seven of their clients.  I was subsequently contacted by four 
                                                          
27
 Whilst the issue of physical injury is touched on at certain points throughout the chapter, it is not 
discussed at any length, partly because this has already been covered in the quantitative chapter on 
injuries, and partly due to the issues raised by those to whom I spoke in the course of the work.  
Specifically, whilst exploring the qualitative elements of such injuries is highly useful--as, for example, 
injuries that may appear minor on paper can have extensive, unpredictable impacts on people’s lives—
and I asked questions about injuries during interviews, none of the individuals involved in the research 
had suffered such injuries – but did mention the other themes discussed throughout the chapter.   
118 
 
individuals affected by Taser, and was able to interview two of them.  (The other 
two, despite expressing initial interest, did not respond to follow up prompts).   
Limitations 
Several limitations of these methods should be noted. As the subjects I spoke to 
were contacted through lawyers and NGOs, they are by definition more likely to 
consider that they have had negative experiences with the weapon – and I have 
reflected this appropriately in the chapter heading.  Such experiences are by no 
means universal, and anecdotal evidence suggests that there may be incidents 
where individuals on whom Taser is used have acknowledged afterwards that 
the intervention was appropriate.  However, perhaps due to the long-
documented bias of the media towards bad news, both in general (Galtung and 
Ruge in Harcup and O’Neill 2001), and in the UK in particular (Harcup and 
O’Neill 2001), it is difficult to find publicly available testimonies from individuals 
who have had more positive experiences of the weapon.   
Moreover, complaints about Taser use are relatively low.  The IPCC notes that 
the number of complaints referred to them between 2004 and 2013 (including a 
period, 2009 to 2013, during which it was mandatory for police forces to refer 
Taser complaints to the organisation) total just under 500 (IPCC 2014a).  They 
estimate that between 2009 and 2013 the number of Taser uses resulting in a 
complaint has remained stable, at about 1% (IPCC 2014a: 17).  But there are 
many reasons why individuals negatively affected by Taser use may not 
complain - and evidence to suggest that young people and those from black 
and minority ethnic groups are less likely to complain than others (IPCC 2015a: 
11).  There is also general evidence to suggest that some people have initially 
been denied the right to have their complaint recorded in the first place (IPCC 
2015a: 12), although no evidence to suggest that this is an issue specific to 
Taser complaints28.  Gauging the scale of those negatively affected – and how 
representative and widespread the concerns set out by those who participated 
in this study may be – is no easy task. 
                                                          
28
 There are, however, related concerns about attempts by some forces to handle Taser complaints via 
the ‘local resolution’ complaints mechanism, designed only for minor issues, and concerns that not all 
complaints involving the firing of Taser were referred to the IPCC during the period in which it was 
mandatory to do so.  These issues are merely footnoted as we shall return to them in Chapter 9. 
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Furthermore, focusing on the views of those on whom Taser is used—some of 
whom may, at least in theory, be threatening others with severe violence—
excludes the views of bystanders and those who may have been saved from 
such violence through the use of the weapon.  (I have conducted multiple 
interviews with officers on their views of the weapon—captured in Chapter 7—
and many of these points are discussed in more detail there).  It should also be 
noted that, due to time limitations, I did not conduct similar interviews with 
individuals subject to other forms of police use of force, making it difficult to 
compare the impact of incidents involving Taser to the impact of incidents 
involving other weapons.  Finally it was not possible to interview the officers 
involved in the incidents described by participants in order to understand their 
perspectives (a technique used highly effectively by Rojek et al 2012), and it is 
not claimed that subject perspectives and perceptions necessarily present an 
‘accurate’ account of events (see Rojek et al 2012).   
Despite such issues it is appropriate to include such experiences here, for 
several reasons.  First, whilst such negative experiences may be only a small 
fraction of overall Taser experiences, they are an important and valid part of a 
much broader range of experiences around the weapon. Second, for reasons 
that I detail in the next section, proponents of the weapon, and those who have 
had only positive experiences with it, often face fewer barriers to getting their 
voice heard than those who have had negative experiences.  Whilst the case for 
advanced policing technologies, amongst them Taser, can be easily made by its 
advocates (Bowling et al 2008), it is important to make space to hear those who 
may otherwise have trouble getting their voices heard.  Third, such accounts 
can provide a useful counterpoint to a debate dominated by quantitative 
analysis of officer accounts.   
Practical issues 
One additional limitation should be noted: the small number of interviews 
conducted. To some degree this may be due to fears (perceived or real) about 
the research, and the identity of the  researcher, not least given my membership 
of the Metropolitan Police’s Taser Reference Group for some of the research. 
The small number of interviews may also be in part a reflection of the difficulties 
faced when accessing those subject to Taser. Rojek et al (2012) noted that a 
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third of subjects contacted for their study into police use of force, including 
Taser, declined to participate in the research – and such generic difficulties may 
be heightened for populations on whom Taser has been used.  As Oliver 
Sprague, Amnesty UK’s Programme Director for Military, Security and Police 
noted, the psychological effects of incidents involving the weapon can be far-
reaching: 
‘(one client has suffered) psychological scarring, he basically can’t go 
outside, he is scared of the outside world.   He has become incredibly 
insular.  He doesn’t want to talk about what happened to him.  His ability 
to live his life has been has been significantly impaired because of the 
Taser’. 
I return to the issues raised later on in the chapter, but for now it is important to 
note that such factors may have an impact on subject recruitment.  Indeed, a 
legal representative explained that one client whom they had advised of the 
opportunity to participate in the research had not responded as he was: ‘trying 
to work out whether he wants to talk about it all, or whether he just doesn’t want 
to.  It’s going over it again in detail that he finds quite hard.  He is thinking ‘do I 
want to keep on trying to make a point about this? Or do I just draw a line under 
it?’. 
Even if subjects do choose to speak about their experiences, they face 
considerable difficulties in having their experiences taken seriously.  As such, 
before considering what they have to say, it is important to consider such 
difficulties– the subject of next section.  
Disadvantages faced by subjects. 
In this section I argue that subjects wishing to convey their negative 
experiences of Taser are doubly disadvantaged: not only do they face 
significant sources of disadvantage when attempting to communicate their 
experiences, when they do communicate they are also faced with a series of 
strategies which seek to minimise the significance of the pain and suffering they 
have faced. 
Difficulties faced by subjects: 
As shall be seen, pain is central to many subjects’ experiences of Taser.  Yet 
describing pain is seldom straightforward: indeed, it has been argued that the 
‘in-expressability’ of pain is an ‘essential’ component of it (Scarry 1985: 3).   
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Whilst various strategies to convey pain have been developed—including 
documenting the injuries caused, and making visible the instruments used to 
inflict the pain (Scarry 1985) – those subjected to Taser are often denied such 
strategies, for four reasons.  First, sometimes the only visible injury from the 
incident will be the small incisions where probes have entered: incisions which 
may help make the electric shock possible but are unable to bear full testimony 
to its painful effects.  Without such ‘visible body damage’, the pain inflicted by a 
particular weapon—whilst ‘indisputably real’ to the sufferer—remains ‘unreal to 
others’ (Scarry 1985: 56).   
Second, images of, for example, batons or more rudimentary weapons such as 
nails or sticks allow people to imagine the pain inflicted by the devices.  
Similarly, upon seeing the Taser probes, it is possible to imagine—albeit in 
ways that may only dimly approximate the experience—the feeling of the metal 
probes embedding into skin.  Yet visually seeing the Taser weapon itself gives 
little clue as to nature of the pain experienced.  This can be a disadvantage for 
those seeking to convey their experiences for, as Scarry (1985: 16: emphasis 
added) notes, ‘the point… is not just that pain can be apprehended in the image 
of a weapon but that it almost cannot be apprehended without it’.   
Third, Anais (2009: 54) has argued that because the ‘physiological 
consequences of its use are not immediately apparent…(Taser does) not bear 
the same scrutiny as police technologies which had rendered bodies neutral by 
breaking them’.   Watching Taser be deployed is not only (often) less visceral 
than watching people being exposed to other forms of force, I would also argue 
that the auditory elements of the experiences are also less available for external 
examination.  Whilst one may hear the thud of a baton hitting the skin, the 
closing of handcuffs around someone’s wrist, if Taser is working successfully, it 
is completely silent.  To this extent, then, ‘the Taser strike is decidedly less 
harrowing and easier to answer for than… baton blows’ (Anais 2009: 54).  At 
the same time, however, the awe and mystique engendered by a weapon 
whose outward effects (freezing, immobilisation, paralysis, collapse) are all too 
clear, whilst the mechanism perpetrating them remains mysterious and invisible, 
should not be ignored (Razac 2010).  Witnessing a Taser exposure thus 
manages to be both less and more harrowing than traditional forms of force – 
and much more difficult to communicate. 
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Fourth, assessments and interpretations of people’s experiences—including of 
pain they have suffered—are often bound up with judgements about their 
credibility (Rappert 2004).  Highly educated individuals have struggled to 
describe the pain associated with being Tasered: Rappert (2004: 25) notes that 
‘trying to convey that sense of pain beyond just saying it was ‘painful’… is quite 
difficult’.  Difficulties  conveying thoughts and feelings about the weapon were 
not restricted to the pain felt, but were also experienced by participants when 
trying to convey other facets of the weapon.  Thus, as the following extract 
shows, when trying to explain why they thought the weapon was different from 
other use of force options, even exceptionally articulate respondents recognized 
that they struggled to adequately convey their thoughts: 
‘I think a Taser just feels like it’s in a very different category.  And I don’t 
know whether that’s just an intrinsic feeling about… firing it, I don’t know.  
It’s very hard to explain it… It’s just very different’ (interview with 
Solicitor).   
Additionally, the very factors that may make individuals prone to Taser use may 
mean that they may not always be able to describe the experiences as 
eloquently as they might like, and are seen as less credible witnesses 
(Sussman 2012).  Taken together, such ‘hurdles’ and difficulties may mean that 
those who have been subjected to the weapon are reluctant to talk about, or 
raise issues around, their experiences with the weapon. 
Dismissal techniques 
Such difficulties are compounded by techniques that help to dismiss many of 
these concerns.  If electric-shock weapons are to be widely adopted, Taser 
International, other electric-shock manufacturers, police officials, and other 
stakeholders need to highlight the efficacy of being shocked – yet also secure 
its relative acceptability (Rappert 2004). Marketing materials and strategies by 
Taser International, and other electric-shock manufacturers, need to make clear 
the pain suffered, yet simultaneously provide strategies to help audiences, 
potential users and purchasers minimise any moral discomfort or lingering 
unease they may experience.   
One strategy is to use marketing materials which present ‘idealised images of 
the police… as ‘heroes’ while discrediting perceived ‘villains’’ (Wozniak and 
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Uggen 2009: 276), thus making it easier to justify the infliction of pain upon the 
latter.  Similarly, Anais notes, ‘the technical language of patents… and the 
tactical language of police’ rarely refer to those shocked by projectile electric-
shock weapons as ‘human’,  but see them as ‘unruly’, as ‘mobs’, as ‘living 
targets’ (Anais 2009: 55).  It has been argued that such themes are also picked 
up by the media which, at least in the USA, ‘cast victims of police killings as 
physical and social threats and situate police actions within legitimate 
institutional roles’ (Hirshfield and Simon 2010: 155).  Whilst such trends did not 
necessarily originate from England and Wales, they may nevertheless 
contribute to a climate in which the experiences of those who have been 
shocked are undervalued. 
Another strategy is to minimise the seriousness of exposure. Conferences 
sponsored by electric-shock manufacturers provide an occasion to show ‘light-
hearted’ videos of staff members being hit by electric-shock weapons, often met 
with ‘wild cheers and applause’, and even laughter, from the audience  
(Wozniak and Uggen 2009: see also Rappert 2004).  Similarly, Lim and Seet 
(2009: 170) express concern about the 'disregard for the potential hazards of 
TASER use' shown in 'video vignettes' hosted on video-sharing websites.   
Showing exposures in such ways is not particularly conducive to reflection on 
the consequences of inflicting severe pain on individuals, or what such pain 
may mean for those experiencing it.   
If witnessing ‘light-hearted’ exposures can serve to minimise the seriousness of 
the event, that is not all that it does.  As noted above, to witness someone being 
Tasered is to also bear testimony to the mysterious and overwhelming power of 
the weapon, and the helplessness engendered. The message underscored is 
not just that being Tasered is a source of comic amusement.  Rather it is that 
Taser can both paralyse and inflict severe pain upon you, and that, having 
witnessed your subjection and powerlessness at the hands of the weapon, 
those present will quite possibly laugh at your predicament (Razac 2010), or at 
the very least seek to minimise and trivialise the experience.  Nothing, notes 
Razac, could be more disarming - nor more effective in silencing those who 
have experienced the weapon.  
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A third strategy is to provide opportunities for people to be exposed to Taser 
shocks themselves, in highly supportive and artificial settings.  Rappert (2004: 
23) has noted that, when participants receive shocks together, and recover 
quickly, such experiences ‘provide a basis for downplaying the experiences of 
others who did not recover with ease’ – despite the many differences between 
collective voluntary exposure and use in the field, where subjects may feel they 
had little choice over being hit with the weapon.  
Taken together, then, this section has shown that such strategies—such as 
portraying ‘heroes’ and villains’ in marketing material and in the mass media, 
providing lighthearted footage of those exposed to the weapon, and voluntarily 
providing people with exposure to the weapon—are combined with very real 
barriers that subjects face when trying to convey their experiences.  
This highlights the difficulties subjects face when seeking to talk about their 
experiences.   Yet it also underscores the difficulties faced when trying to 
quantify and directly compare the benefits, costs and harms of different 
weapons.  Instead of seeing accounts of benefits, injuries and harms as 
straightforward reflections of the reality about the weapon itself, such accounts 
need to be understood in terms of the different socio-technical networks and 
assemblages around each particular weapon.  These assemblages may lead 
one to conceptualise and make sense of experiences in different ways, to 
emphasize certain features of the experience whilst downplaying others, and 
may make expressing certain perspectives more or less difficult.  As I have 
shown, subject testimony may then be received in different ways, and seen as 
more or less credible.  
Yet despite such issues, some people exposed to the weapon are keen to 
discuss their experiences.  As such, in the next section of the chapter I discuss, 
in turn, three heavily inter-related, significant aspects of their experiences: the 
pain, fear and loss of control experienced: the short and long term psychological 
symptoms associated with the weapon: and concerns over the proportionality of 
force used. 
Subject Experiences  
Pain, fear and helplessness. 
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Whilst the notion of physical pain is central to many individual’s experiences of 
Taser, the topic is ‘barely mentioned’ in discussions around the weapon 
(Rappert 2004: 18), either in the official College of Policing Guidance around 
the weapon, or in human rights publications.  In terms of the former, pain is 
mentioned once in the College of Policing Taser guidance, in the context of a 
reminder that it should be used to mitigate specific threats, and not ‘solely to 
inflict severe pain or suffering’ (College of Policing 2014: no page number).  In 
terms of the latter, the ‘extreme’ pain caused by the weapon is certainly a key 
component of Amnesty International’s concerns but takes up only half a page of 
their report into the weapon (Amnesty International 2008).  
Yet pain is important.  Taser International themselves stress that Taser use ‘can 
cause startle, panic, fear… temporary discomfort, pain, or stress which may be 
injurious or fatal to some people’ (Taser International 2013) and the UN 
Committee Against Torture has noted that the ‘severe pain’ produced by the 
weapon constitutes ‘a form of torture’ (2008: point 14).  Understandably, then, 
interviewees tried to convey their experiences of the pain inflicted.  Participants 
described the experience thusly:  
‘It was something I’d never felt it before, do you know what I mean, to 
say it was shocking was the least, it was really quite bad. I felt it awful in 
my body and then I just blanked out’. 
‘I remember the pop going off and the next minute, it’s difficult to 
describe but it’s like muscle cramp, very, very severe muscle cramp for 
those seconds.   And you want that turned off, to be quite honest.  I 
remember saying to myself, no don't do it anymore.  Whatever you want 
me to do, I’ll do it’. 
Others who have been Tasered describe the pain as ‘excruciating’ (Rappert 
2004) and as ‘the most profound pain I have ever felt’ (in Sussman 2012: 1353).  
As such quotes demonstrate, the ‘profound’ amounts of pain caused are 
exacerbated its all-encompassing nature.  Whilst baton strikes and handcuffs, 
for example, tend to be experienced as localised pain, many of those subjected 
to Taser talk about it affecting everywhere, taking over their whole body: 
‘I did feel it and not just between the two areas (where the probes hit).  If 
it had been just between the two areas you could probably put up with it, 
fight against it, you know.  But it was the shock of it, it spread all over my 
back, it paralysed me’. 
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A journalist, exposed to the weapon in the course of an article he was writing for 
the popular publication GQ, similarly described the experience thusly: 
‘My body is rigid, falling, and no longer mine… I have to jump out of my 
body, but I'm trapped inside it…  It doesn't feel like something coming 
from outside me: it feels like the whole inside of me's been taken over. 
Being tased is… like what I think it would be to be possessed… Instantly 
I was not in charge of me, and there was nothing I could do about it’ 
(Gross 2010: no page number). 
The familiarity (or otherwise) of the nature of the pain experienced may also be 
important.   As the quotes above show, many subjects stressed the unfamiliarity 
of a kind of pain they had ‘never felt before’.  This is a point also made by many 
of the lawyers I interviewed, one of whom noted that: 
‘It’s a very frightening experience (for many clients) because it’s so unlike 
anything else… The Taser is something quite different, there’s something 
about losing control and being shot at.   For individuals, it’s a lasting 
memory that you can’t really get away from, because it is like nothing 
they’ve ever experienced’. 
Fear: 
No wonder, then, that those subjected to the weapon talk about the fear and 
mental anguish experienced.  Reiss’ expectancy model (Reiss 1991) holds that 
there are three fundamental fears: fear of death/injury: fear of negative 
evaluation and fear of fear (or fear of anxiety) itself.  Each of these types of 
fears are comprised of the individuals’ expectations that a particular event might 
happen (as an event that one individual might perceive to be highly likely, 
another might see as a rarity) and their individual sensitivity to the event if it did 
occur (i.e. how perturbed they would be).  I argue that the use of Taser taps into 
all three of these fears, whilst exacerbating expectations of the particular event 
occurring in the first place.   
In terms of the fear of fear itself, it could be argued that the anxiety, fear and 
‘highly emotional’ states (Kroll et al 2014: 93) felt by many subjects exposed to 
police arrest and use of force could be exacerbated by the unfamiliar nature of 
Taser exposure.  Sussman (2012: 1355) has made exactly this argument, 
noting that ‘the fact that a Taser’s … electrical current (is) unlike anything most 
people have experienced… exacerbates fear because the brain does not know 
the extent of the bodily threat’. 
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Fear of death / injury is, almost by definition, a fear with which all weapons are 
associated.  Yet individuals’ expectations that such an outcome could occur 
may well be heightened in the case of Taser, given the controversial, high 
profile deaths surrounding the weapon, and the tendency of the media to over-
report incidents where death has occurred (Ready et al 2008).   Indeed, fear of 
death features in many subject accounts of the experience. 
‘I could have died out there as far as I was concerned… Once you get 
Tasered with one Taser, you could have a heart-attack or you could die.  
There have been people in Britain that have died from being Tasered 
once…let alone being Tasered several times’. 
‘As you know, there are 6 or 7 people that have died in the past few 
years from the Taser use....  Well that could have been me.  You may 
have a heart condition… how do you know that wouldn't have caused the 
heart to stop?  You know you don't know how the individual's body is 
going to react’.   
The third fear identified by Reiss, that of negative evaluation, is also highly 
relevant.  A strong case can be made that not knowing, or being able to control, 
how your ‘body is going to react’ to the weapon, brings with it a fear of 
embarrassment, humiliation and negative evaluation from others (a theme I 
expand on in my personal account of being Tasered, below).  This is less 
present with other weapons where, whilst the degree of injury may differ, 
responses to its use tend to be largely predictable.  Whilst under certain 
conditions exposure to certain weapons—such as tear gas—can actually be a 
collective experience which facilitates resistance, and increases subject’s 
capacity for action (Roelvink 2010, Hynes and Sharpe in Roelvink 2010), 
exposure to Taser and one’s bodily reactions is often highly individual.   
Loss of control. 
This loss of control, whilst related to fear of negative evaluation, is an important 
point that subjects raised more broadly in the course of our discussions.   To 
some extent loss of control is an issue when experiencing any kind of violence 
(Macmillan in Meade et al 2015: 3 – 4).  Such feelings may be exacerbated 
when the violence experienced is inflicted by State agents, such as the police.  
As one subject noted: ‘I didn't have a problem with them before, I thought they 
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were just doing their job.  But now it’s completely different, I wouldn't trust a 
word they said.’ 
Such feelings may also be exacerbated by Taser, and its interaction with 
subjects.  Whilst subjects may be subdued or cowed by the application of other 
forms of force, they nevertheless remain in control of their faculties (Anais 
2009).  When so called ‘pain compliance’ techniques are used in certain 
situations, they can present individuals with a choice to submit and to stop what 
they are doing, or to fight through the pain.  Individuals are ‘controlled, then, but 
nonetheless and necessarily in control’.  In contrast, argues Anais, when Taser 
is used ‘the freedom to remain in control of oneself and one’s body is something 
that the person… utterly lacks’ (Anais 2009: 56).  As a result, agrees Klinig 
(2007: 6), ‘Tasering seemingly violates dignity in a way that wrestling into 
submission does not’. 
There are some potential issues with such a line of reasoning.  One has to be 
careful neither to overstate the efficacy of Taser, to understate the ability of 
determined individuals to fight through the shock (see Ho et al 2012 for further 
discussion), nor to presume that freezing and loss of control is necessarily a 
result of Neuro-Muscular Incapacitation, as opposed to the pain and terror of 
the discharge.  Care also needs to be taken not to simply assume such 
incapacitation is an inherent feature of the weapon, a state externally imposed 
by Taser, but to recognise it may be a complex phenomenon resulting precisely 
from this interaction between, and blending of, human and non-human, and the 
environment in which such interactions occur.    
Nevertheless such insights point us to a virtually unique aspect of the Taser 
experience: the sense of powerlessness invoked and how terrifying this loss of 
control can be.  This is of profound importance to those subjected to the 
weapon:  
‘(Individuals exposed to Taser) can’t remember much about the incident 
apart from the overwhelming sense of pain and loss of control… There is 
something that makes it slightly different from a baton strike… the fact 
that not only is it incredibly painful but you have lost all control… You 
ignore at your peril that feeling’. 
‘(Clients) mention the feeling of incapacitation, feeling like jelly, the 
helplessness they felt…. Not all of them have secondary injuries but... 
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anybody who has been Tasered will talk to you about having nightmares 
of being Tasered and feeling helpless and so forth.’  
‘While its operating you can't move at all... You have no control and you 
don't know when the thing is going to stop, you just want it to stop. That's 
why I would say it’s a horrible thing to use.   So it’s not a very good thing 
to have, is it, they can do all sorts of things.’  
Thus some people that have been Tasered by the police highlight a set of 
interconnected, qualitative aspects of the experience, aspects they struggle to 
articulate but which include: an intense, all-encompassing, unfamiliar pain and 
fear, accompanied by a loss of control of bodily functions, and a sense of 
powerlessness.   
My experience of being Tasered 
My own, voluntary exposure to the weapon came when Taser International paid 
for me to visit their Arizona Headquarters in November 2014.  I was asked to 
sign an indemnification agreement and instructed to wear safety goggles, to 
stand on a padded matt, and had two men either side to control my fall.  It was 
explained that they would fire the weapon into my back for a standard five 
second discharge.  I stood looking straight ahead, and heard a ‘pop’ indicating 
the Taser had been discharged.  The time it took for the probes to hit me felt 
like an eternity, and when they did I involuntarily screamed in pain.   The pain 
was like nothing I had felt before: it was like a throbbing, pulsing sensation all 
through my body, taking over my body at regular intervals.  Whilst it was painful, 
it was also unfamiliar: the part of my brain that was able to reflect on what was 
happening was trying to make sense of it all, to classify it and compare it to 
something more familiar– but to no avail.   
The five seconds ended, the discharge stopped and I was lowered to the 
ground.  I was asked how I was feeling and, to my surprise, whilst I felt a little 
shaken up, I did not feel badly affected and felt back to normal pretty much 
straight away 
After a short break, I asked them to use the weapon on me in drive-stun mode.  
I felt quite nervous as it is reputed to be extremely painful, and we agreed 
company officials would touch the weapon in drive-stun mode against my arm 
for a second or two, instead of the full five, which they then did.  The pain from 
drive-stun was much more familiar—I experienced it as similar to the electric-
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shock you would get from an electric-fence—but much more painful.  It 
provoked an instinctive reaction to move my arm away, which I did, resulting in 
only a fraction of the normal exposure. 
What, if anything, did this experience bring to my research? First, prior to my 
exposure I had been somewhat sceptical about claims people could get back to 
normal straight away, but I can now see how that might be true, in certain 
circumstances.  I was able to walk about, pain free, minutes after exposure: 
something I do not believe would have been the case were I to be hit with baton 
or chemical irritant.  Second, I can see how the weapon induces extreme 
amounts of pain and fear in those subjected to it.  After all, my experience was 
(relatively) manageable not only because I was able to control the time, location 
and duration of my exposure – and whether I was exposed in the first place—
but also because of my prior knowledge of the weapon.  Despite this, it was 
extremely painful and panic inducing, and I can see how it could be deeply 
traumatising.  I also felt a renewed appreciation for calls for drive-stun to be 
prohibited, given the pain experienced.   
Third, the experience heightened concerns about ‘secondary injuries’.  I was 
concerned not that I might suffer an adverse cardiac effect, but that I would 
injure myself during the fall, and/or suffer injury as a result of the intense muscle 
contractions. The presence of the two men either side of me—and their actions 
in lowering me to the floor—further highlighted the artificial nature of my 
exposure and reinforced my concerns about what would have happened in their 
absence. 
Fourth, it also brought to my attention an allied concern, related to this loss of 
control.  I was apprehensive that, in losing control of my body, I would do 
something to embarrass or humiliate myself (scream, collapse, fall awkwardly, 
who knows?) and concerned enough that I asked them to Taser me somewhere 
a little more ‘private’.   On the face of it, this is itself a trivial concern that is, in 
itself, slightly embarrassing—after all, who would be superficial enough to worry 
about how they were perceived whilst being Tasered—but one that points to 
something more fundamental.  Namely that not being able to anticipate how one 
will respond, or necessarily control that response—whilst simultaneously having 
one’s involuntary bodily responses on show for all to see—is an important 
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element that both adds to the mystique and fear around the weapon and also 
impacts on (or threatens to impact on) human dignity.  As such this provides a 
good example of Ferrell’s insight that auto-ethnographer’s attempts to wrestle 
with seemingly personal troubles can help shed light on broader public issues 
(Root et al 2013).Neuro-cognitive and Psychological issues. 
Having discussed issues around pain, fear and loss of control, a second set of 
closely related issues, raised both by DOMILL (2012) and Meade et al (2015)—
as well as by those exposed to the weapon, and their representatives—is the 
psychological effects associated with the use of the weapon, and the need for 
further research into this area.  This is clearly a much broader piece of work 
which is outside of the scope of this research, and outside of the author’s skill 
set.  Yet, having devoted an entire chapter to physical injuries, it would be 
remiss of me not to discuss other issues associated with the weapon.  Indeed 
exposure to electrical injuries—from electrical sources very different in nature 
and in origin to Taser—have been associated with cognitive, and emotional 
problems, as well as depression, schizophrenia-like illnesses, and post-
traumatic stress disorder (White et al 2015).  At the same time, as Meade et al 
(2015: 1) note, 'it is logical to expect that individuals who are exposed to police 
use of force could experience mental health problems.... (affecting) cognitive, 
emotional, or social abilities'. 
The few studies that have been conducted in this area have tended to 
concentrate on the neuro-cognitive effects of the weapon (i.e. it’s impact on 
learning and memory, visual search abilities, speed of processing, mental 
flexibility, attention and concentration, and motor function), with less attention 
given to its impact on the emotional well-being, psychological functioning and 
mental health of those exposed to Taser.  Studies in the former area, some 
conducted by analysts with links to Taser International, have found no long 
lasting impact on neuro-cognitive skills following the use of the weapon, and 
have not found consistent evidence to suggest the effects of Taser to be more 
severe than the effects of other force techniques (see, for example, Dawes et al 
2014).   
Studies in the latter area are similarly sparse.  White et al (2015) looked at 
levels of reported anxiety and self-control before and after exposure to different 
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types of force (physical exertion designed to mimic fighting with an officer: 
Taser exposure: and physical exertion and Taser combined).  They found that, 
immediately following the event, subject’s subjective, self-reported levels of 
anxiety were significantly higher for those who had been Tasered, and for those 
who had been subject to physical exertion and Taser, when compared to those 
who had just undergone physical exertion alone, with differences found an hour 
after the event, but not present after a day.    When compared to the group that 
had experienced Taser exposure, those that had experienced Taser and 
physical exertion were also significantly more likely to report higher levels of 
feeling overwhelmed immediately after the event, and an hour later.  (No 
statistically significant differences of overwhelm were found between the group 
that had experienced only a Taser discharge and those that had experienced 
exertion).   
Whilst White's study—which excluded individuals previously diagnosed with a 
psychiatric problem—found anxiety and feelings of overwhelm to be short-lived, 
evidence suggests this is not always the case.  Meade et al (2015) conducted 
one of the first studies looking at the links between police use of force and 
subject mental health, although they did not differentiate between the type of 
force options used, and the definition of force used in the dataset did not 
explicitly include use of Taser.  They used multivariate techniques to analyse a 
dataset of prison inmates, amongst them people with a recognised mental 
illness, and controlled for a number of variables, including whether inmates had 
reported a pre-existing mental health condition.  They found that inmates who 
had force used against them were more likely than people that had not 
experienced force to report  manic symptoms and symptoms of depression. 
This study is noteworthy for revealing the range of psychological effects 
experienced, as well as the longevity of emotional disturbances – the average 
time between arrest date and interview being just under five years.   
The two subjects that I spoke to, both of whom had been Tasered more than a 
year ago—all noted the psychological complications associated with incidents 
involving Taser:  
‘I don't feel safe or content anymore, do you know what I mean, I'm not 
the happy person that I was before, as I say psychologically… I've been 
sort of having nightmares and stuff about it as well.  It’s not too bad now, 
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though I have panic attacks sometimes when I see police, I don't like to 
be around them.  If I see them, I’d avoid them’. 
‘There's no physically long lasting effects but mentally it has made me 
sort of, more scared of police with Tasers.  There's been a couple of 
incidents afterwards, I was assaulted somewhere else (name of location 
omitted), and I was going to phone the police but it put me off’. 
Similarly, Oliver Sprague, Amnesty UK’s Programme Director for Military, 
Security and Police noted that, in several of the cases they reviewed, the 
weapon has been associated with far-reaching psychological effects.  Indeed, 
for one particular individual the ‘Taser event has been linked to a very significant 
relapse of PTSD- like symptoms… He’s clearly not sleeping, he’s having more 
incidents of paranoia, he has clear agoraphobia.’  He argues that some cases 
are notable for the fact that whilst subjects have: 
 
‘had a variety of use of force placed on them … the thing that’s causing 
the flashbacks, causing the traumatic event, has been the use of 
Taser….  It’s clear that the use of the weapon has been deeply 
psychologically troubling to them and they are reliving those moments 
time and time again… the only thing I can attribute it to is the painful 
effects of the Taser weapon are triggering some kind of deep traumatic 
response and they are reliving that moment over and over again and its 
sticking in their minds….  So that clearly, to me, is evidence of an effect 
that’s not really understood, because it’s not really about physical injury.  
There’s no follow up done on these people, how are they feeling, how 
has their health issues been affected by it’.  
 
In other cases, whilst Taser is an ‘important’ factor, it is part of a broader 
‘package’ causing psychological difficulties.  One lawyer noted that, for one 
client: 
‘Just the Taser would have been sufficient to give him psychological 
injuries.  If he had just been Tasered and arrested that would still have 
had an effect on him.  But I think the whole package, for him, that’s 
what’s caused it, the whole thing.  It’s flashbacks, its nightmares, it’s 
reliving the experience again…(in another case) it isn’t to do with Taser 
necessarily… He said that one of the things that he felt afterwards, his 
children would run and jump on him and want to play and it would spark 
off a flashback to that time.  I suspect it was more to do with the restraint, 
I don’t know.  For most people I think it’s the whole experience’. 
This is not, necessarily, to suggest that Taser causes more psychological 
distress than other weapons—indeed, as Meade et al (2015) note, research 
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suggests that violence in general (not necessarily that generated by police) may 
induce PTSD symptoms—but simply that this is an area in need of further 
research.  Further research is particularly important because the research 
outlined in Chapter 3 indicates that Taser may be more likely to be used on 
individuals who are reported as having mental health issues (see also O’Brien 
et al 2011): and that, in turn, individuals who are Tasered may then be less 
likely to engage with the police in the future, should they need to for their safety 
or the safety of others.   
Unnecessary force. 
A fourth concern raised by subjects exposed to the weapon is the 
proportionality of force used.  As one solicitor noted, for many clients: ‘the thing 
that has disturbed them the most is (that) the use of Taser… (has) just not been 
called for at all’.  The subjects that I spoke to were keen to explain the incidents 
in which they were involved, from their perspective, and to explain why they felt 
the use of Taser had been disproportionate.  In one incident, following an 
argument with individuals in the street, officers went to the house of one of the 
individuals concerned, who noted: 
‘There are cases when it (Taser) might be the best option.  If you've got 
someone high on drugs, being very violent, that's justification.  But what I 
am saying is in my case, it should never have been used.  He (the 
officer) was on a mission and decided to take a thing against me (some 
details omitted to preserve anonymity)... He tried to arrest me and they, 
sort of, tried to push me through the door to put handcuffs on.  And of 
course I held my arms so they couldn't. I wasn't trying to assault them, I 
was just resisting what was going on.  He was straight in (with Taser).  It 
would have been far better if he'd...said 'Excuse me, could we talk to 
you?’… He should have been composed and calming it down… But he 
was like a bull in a china shop.  And he dealt with it wrong’.    
In another incident police were asked to assist medical staff to section an 
individual.  The individual involved described the incident as he recalls it: 
‘I parked up, and got out (of my car).  The police were asking me my 
name… they were talking to me at first so why couldn’t they carry on in 
that manner?... They were saying I was trying to get something out of my 
trousers… they were saying I was going for a knife… but because my 
arms were spread, I think I was just trying to get them down, to, like, put 
my keys in my pocket. (They Tasered me and) I fell to the ground.  I was 
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wondering, then, why they didn't arrest me… But they let me walk away, 
and Tasered me, then let me walk away again, and Tasered me again.  
They didn't have to Taser me… they chose to’.   
Such vignettes illustrate the complexity of many of the issues involved, as well 
the difficulty in trying to reach an ‘accurate’ account of what ‘really’ happened.  
They also illustrate the overlapping concerns of many of the individuals 
involved, who are concerned both about the propriety of using Taser 
specifically, but also have concerns over the necessity of using any force 
whatsoever in the incidents as they have described them.  In both situations 
subjects felt that the communication tactics had not been appropriate, and that 
opportunities for engagement had not been exhausted before Taser was 
deployed.   They also felt that their cases were not isolated incidents, but part of 
a larger trend whereby officers used the weapon in circumstances where it was 
not required.  Indeed, subjects identified the incidents in which they were 
involved as part of a trend where officers use the weapon ‘willy nilly and use 
them on certain people’, and where they are ‘trigger happy’ - ‘shoot first, ask 
questions later'.  One subject noted:  
‘They think they've got a harmless weapon… they just go Tasering 
everybody, thinking that it’s safe. The Taser makes them behave 
differently, they've got an instant way of control and they're trigger happy, 
you know.  (In my case) I'm quite certain it was the mind-set of the officer, 
combined with the trigger happy way that officers use it (Taser) and also 
with the fact that… he didn't like the idea that I was suddenly a citizen 
standing up for my rights… Using it in situations where a person might 
harm themselves, commit suicide, or to stop a violent crime… I can 
understand that but it’s being abused’. 
Points such as these might not ever use the complex terminology of the 
constructivist STS literature, or of ANT, but clearly come close to what 
academics might call an STS inspired understanding of the weapon.  Attention 
is given to the role of material devices such as Taser, which are not assumed 
merely to be passive tools, but are seen as having the ability to ‘make them 
(humans) behave differently’.  Yet at the same time negative outcomes (in this 
case, the ‘abuse’ of the weapon) are not seen as determined solely by the 
weapon, but are seen as resulting from complex interactions between the 
weapon, beliefs about that weapon (it’s ‘harmless’ nature), individual ‘mind-sets’ 
and the nature and kind of interactions between human actants (in this case, an 
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interaction involving ‘a citizen’ claiming his ‘rights’).  Such accounts also 
highlight that concerns about necessity and proportionality should not be seen 
in isolation but are heavily intertwined with issues around fear, pain and 
suffering, loss of control, and the mental health issues and psychological effects 
experienced by subjects both before and after Taser deployment 29.   
It should not be presumed, however, that such responses are unique to 
incidents involving Taser.  Indeed, as one representative noted: 
‘In all my cases, clients would say that the use of force as a whole is 
unnecessary.  It’s not just the Taser, it’s the whole thing, and it’s difficult 
to differentiate between them.  You know, at what point is Taser 
completely disproportionate but not other force?  It’s a difficult line to 
draw’.   
Indeed, Rojek et al (2012: 314-6) observe ‘unanimous’ themes of ‘injustice’ and 
‘excessive force’ throughout all citizens’ accounts, regardless of the type of 
force that was used on them.  There are thus risks in assuming that such 
concerns are unique to Taser.   
Moreover, whilst some people subjected to the weapon have concerns about its 
necessity and proportionality, others have no such qualms and are ‘glad’ for its 
use, as the following testimony demonstrates.   In this case, the individual 
concerned had been sectioned by police after threatening members of the 
public with a knife.  After waking up in hospital, the woman describes how she 
smashed a bowl and: 
‘picked up a sharp piece of crockery.  I was saying to people I was going 
to kill them… At one stage I walked towards one officer with the shard in 
my hand saying I was going to kill him too.  It was at that point that he 
pulled out the Taser.  It was very scary.  It was the one thing that made 
me stop… It made me step back.  I put the crockery to my throat and that 
point he drew the Taser again and said I needed to take it away.  
Eventually I did put it down on the ground.  I am really glad they had the 
Taser with them.  Had they not had the Taser, perhaps they would have 
tried to restrain me physically and it would have been a dangerous 
                                                          
29
 Concerns about disproportionality are intertwined with concerns about accountability and 
redress – a topic discussed at length in Chapter 9 of the thesis.  One subject noted: ‘the whole 
incident upset me - and also how it had been dealt with.  It’s a bit of a bug bear to me and this 
is, well this is nearly two years ago since the Taser incident happened, and it goes on and on.  
You feel like there's no apology, no help, no effort to apologise or deal with it.  That’s upsetting 
because you feel that you have been done an injustice’.  I do not deal with this issue here, as it 
is dealt with later, but wish to note that it is an important feature raised in interviews. 
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situation all round.  The police were very professional and they handled it 
exactly as they should have done.  There was a positive outcome for 
them and for me, and we got away with no injuries’ (BBC Radio 4 2013).  
Thus it should not be assumed  that all experiences of the weapon are negative, 
or that all of the negative issues associated with Taser use are restricted solely 
to that particular force option.  Such contrasting viewpoints also highlight the 
degree of ‘interpretive flexibility’ that exists around the weapon, with different 
interpretations, assessments and verdicts—ranging from the ‘positive’ to ‘not 
very good’ to ‘horrible’--being offered by those who have been subjected to it: a 
point I shall also return to in Chapter 7, when looking at police officers’ views on 
the weapon, which broaden the scope for interpretive flexibility out further. 
Conclusion 
To date the literature assessing the use of Taser has tended to focus on 
abstract statistical assessments of the physical injuries associated with the 
weapon – and the two previous chapters have been no exception.  Yet use of 
force experiences are also highly personal and meaningful for those involved 
and, in contrast to much of the literature, this chapter has aimed to bring to the 
fore some of the qualitative experiences of those subjected to the weapon.  In 
so doing, I have sought to offer an important counter-point to officer accounts of 
the weapon, and to highlight some of the micro elements around police use of 
force (Root et al 2013).  As such, this chapter has highlighted some of the 
difficulties subjects face when talking about their experiences as well as the 
techniques used to dismiss the impact that the weapon causes.  Whilst the 
possibility of physical injury should not be discounted, participants also stressed 
more intangible elements of their experiences. They were concerned with the 
pain, fear and loss of control—and, in some cases, long term psychological 
impacts—experienced as a result of what many believed to be part of a trend 
towards gratuitous, unnecessary use of force.   
Interestingly, many of these accounts shared certain features with constructivist 
STS accounts of technologies inside of academia—including an emphasis on 
the role of the non-human, and attention to interactions between human and 
non-human.  This reinforces the concerns of critics (e.g. Fuller 2000: 8) that, 
whilst such approaches might ‘appear radical’, they are ‘equivalent to the prose 
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that everyone else outside the paradigm has been always speaking’, and 
suggests that such approaches may not be as novel as they seem. 
Such accounts can also highlight some of the limits to statistical accounts, 
which tend to focus on physical injury, and have traditionally provided the main 
way of assessing the impact of the weapon.  This is important for several 
reasons.  First, a focus solely on physical injury may serve to downplay the pain 
and suffering that Taser, and other police weapons, inflict, and that has been so 
vividly described here.  Severe pain and suffering often constitutes a key 
element of subject experiences, and is central to definitions of torture and ill-
treatment (see, for example, Article 1 of the UN Convention Against Torture, 
1984, henceforward UNCAT) – yet, as it is hardly amenable to quantitative 
analysis, can be left out of academic and other debates.    Second, the 
difficulties that those subjected to the weapon face when expressing their 
experiences also complicates attempts to directly associate particular harms 
with particular weapons.  Instead of seeing such harms as stemming inexorably 
from and being produced as a direct result of the material properties of, say, CS 
or Taser,  accounts of injuries and harm also need to be understood in terms of 
the different socio-technical networks and assemblages around each particular 
weapon, which may make expressing certain features of one’s lived experience 
more or less difficult, and may mean that, once expressed, they are received in 
different ways, and seen as more or less credible.    
Third, focusing solely on injury caused draws attention to the outcome of using 
force: but what about the process, and rationale, for having used such force in 
the first place? The focus on the former brackets key questions about 
proportionality of the force that was used: the latter brings them sharply into 
focus (see Kleinig 2007 for a similar discussion on the debate around Taser 
saving lives).  Taser may, or may not, cause fewer serious injuries than other 
options available.  Yet, as the evidence from subjects detailed above reminds 
us, a focus on such topics can mask another important question: whether any 
such injuries that could arise—and the pain and suffering that almost 
undoubtedly will—were justifiable in the first place, or whether they were the 
product of an unnecessary use of Taser and / or an unnecessary use of police 
force.  Whether or not a weapon such as Taser is likely to cause serious injury 
is immaterial if it is used in situations where it’s use is inappropriate, 
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disproportionate and thus potentially illegal.  Article 1 of the UNCAT excludes 
from its definition of torture and ill-treatment ‘pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions’.  If the sanctions are not legal then, 
irrespective of the nature or severity of any ‘injury’ incurred, attention must also 
be given to the pain and suffering injured.   
Fourth, the concerns raised here about the longer psychological impact of 
exposure to police force—including Taser—reinforce Meade et al’s (2015: 2) 
call for more attention to be paid to ‘whether exposure to police use of force 
impacts suspects’ long-term psychological well-being’.  As Meade et al (2015: 
2) noted, ‘police use of force may function as a trauma, similar to violent 
victimisation.  Researchers have observed that youths exposed to violence in 
the home or in the community display greater…aggressive behaviour, and 
antisocial attitudes’.  Similar tendencies may be at play following police use of 
force—and are all the more likely when that force is seen to be 
disproportionate—and if this is the case, using such force may create as many 
problems as it solves.  However it is important that such effects can be captured 
systematically, and attempts made to analyse whether particular weapons have 
a bigger psychological footprint than others, and to what extent it is the forceful 
encounter with the police itself that causes problems.   
Some of these issues may be more or less amenable to quantitative analysis.  
Yet in any case, quantitative work should not be considered the sole form of 
evidence (Weisburd and Neyroud 2011:  Moore 2006). Even if further study in 
certain areas may be problematic, the qualitative evidence discussed here 
serve as a useful reminder of the utility of such approaches, as well as a 
warning not to jump too quickly to real-life policy suggestions and solutions from 
quantitative evidence alone (see also Terrill and Paoline 2012), or to assume 
that all effects associated with incidents involving Taser are a direct result of the 
weapon.  Such caveats and limitations to the value of quantitative work are 
important to bear in mind as I  turn, now, from looking at consequences of the 
use of Taser and other force options for subjects, to looking at the 
consequences for officers.    
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Chapter 6: Taser and Officer Injury Rates: A Multivariate Analysis. 
 
Having looked at issues around Taser use and its consequences for subjects, 
this chapter focuses on consequences for officers.  More specifically, it aims to 
answer the most question most commonly asked about Taser use and its 
impact on officer safety—namely, whether it reduces officer injury rates—using 
the techniques most commonly used to provide answers, namely descriptive 
statistics and binary logistic regression.  Given its practical importance for 
policing, this topic is a crucial area of study for many academics, both from 
policing and governmental backgrounds (NIJ 2009, 2011, PERF 2009) and from 
more critical perspectives (Terrill and Paoline 2012).  It is of additional 
importance given the (often unsubstantiated) claims that are often made about 
the impact of less-lethal weapons, including Taser, on officer injury rates (Lin 
and Jones 2010) and the ‘requirement’ that the risks officers face are 
‘minimised as far as reasonably practicable’  (Health and Safety Executive 
2009: 2).  
Thus this chapter aims to provide a quantitative study of officer injury rates 
specifically.  Yet I also recognise that Taser may have wider, more complex 
consequences for officers, and the following chapter (Chapter 7) uses 
qualitative techniques to widen out the focus from officer injury to officer safety 
more broadly.  For now, however, this chapter proceeds as follows.  After 
reviewing the existing literature in the first part of this chapter, I then set out the 
methods and models used in Part Two.  Parts Three and Four presents 
descriptive statistics and model results.  Finally Part Five discusses these 
results and their broader implications.   
Existing literature 
So what does the existing literature—a literature, almost without exception, 
based on data from the USA—tell us? The majority of studies on Taser and 
officer injury (Alpert and Dunham 2010, Jenkinson et al 2006, NIJ 2009, NIJ 
2011, Neuscheler and Freidlin 2015) suggests that its’ use is associated with 
decreased rates of injury to officers.  Whilst many of these studies, mine 
included, apply logistic regression techniques to datasets from forces that have 
already adopted Taser, other researchers have been able to look at officer 
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injury rates prior to, and following, the introduction of Taser - and tend to come 
to similar conclusions.  Lin and Jones (2010: 163) look at officer injury rates 
before and after the introduction of Taser, and find that ‘the adoption of ECD did 
indeed reduce the rate of officer injury to a noteworthy extent’ – although they 
are unable to control for relevant factors impacting injury rates.  Macdonald et al 
(2009: 2270) show a reduction in officer injury when time-series analysis is 
used, and after controlling for relevant variables, but find ‘no relationship 
between CED use and officer injury’ using logistic regression.  PERF (2009: 55) 
conduct analysis of forces before and after the introduction of the weapon, and 
also compare these forces to matched forces with the weapon.  They find that 
‘agencies that have deployed CEDs are associated with fewer cases of officers 
receiving medical attention for injuries related to use-of-force’.  
As such, most work finds that Taser reduces injuries to officers – but there are 
some exceptions, as the results for Macdonald et al’s (2009) logistic regression 
models, described above, indicate.  Similarly, Smith et al (2007) also found that 
Taser had no statistically significant effects on officer injury in one force, 
although there was a significant reduction in a second force.  Paoline et al 2012 
found that Tasers were associated with a decreased probability of officer injury 
when used by themselves, but an increased probability of injury when used with 
other forms of force.  It is tempting to agree with follow Neuscheler and 
Freidlin’s assessment that, whilst the literature is ‘by no means unequivocal’, it 
offers ‘significant support for the contention that ECWs reduce injuries to 
officers to some degree’ (2015: 41).    
Why, then, another study on officer injury rates?  There are at least three 
reasons.  First, at present, not enough is known about how less-lethal force is 
actually used in the England and Wales to ascertain whether, and to what 
extent, findings from the USA also hold true here. There has only been one 
article assessing comparative injury rates to officers from Taser and other less 
lethal options (Jenkinson et al 2006: 229, 232), which found that officer injury 
rates were lower with Taser than with irritant spray and baton use, but focused 
on an old Taser model no longer in use, and failed to control for any variables 
that may have been confounding the relationship.   
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Second, as Paoline et al (2012) indicate, much of the literature on officer injury 
rates suffers from the same limitation as the literature on subject injury rates: 
namely, a failure to distinguish sufficiently between the different types of force 
used.  Many statistical models are unable to differentiate between instances 
where Taser was used by itself and instances where it was used in conjunction 
with other weapons, and are unable to compare outcomes from Taser use with 
outcomes from the use of specific force options (instead tending to compare 
Taser use to all other incidents involving force).  Yet, as Paoline et al’s work 
indicates, such distinctions are crucial, and more work along such lines is 
needed.   
Third, and relatedly, with the exception of Lin and Jones (2010), the empirical 
work around Taser tends to focus on firings, and leaves unexamined the impact 
of drawing, but not firing, the weapon.  It is, as Lin and Jones note (2010: 153 -
6), an ‘article of faith’ that drawing of Taser prevents serious injury to both 
suspect and officer’ – but an assumption that should be empirically tested.  
The Current Inquiry 
The key question this chapter aims to answer is: Whether instances where 
Taser is fired (either by itself or in conjunction with other force techniques) are 
associated with decreases in the odds of officer injury when compared to 
instances where Taser is not fired. Two supplementary questions are also 
addressed, namely: how do instances where Taser is drawn, but not fired, 
impact officer injury rates? How does this effect compare to instances where 
other weapons (namely baton and irritant spray) are drawn but not physically 
used? 
I hypothesise that, in keeping with Paoline et al’s (2012) findings—whose 
statistical models I have broadly duplicated here—instances where Taser is 
drawn but not fired, and instances where Taser firing is the sole form of force 
used will be associated with decreased odds of officer injury, but instances 
where Taser is fired with other forms of force will be associated with increased 
odds of officer injury. 
The models adopted to investigate these associations mirror those adopted in 
Chapter 4 to look at subject injury.  The outcome measure is a binary variable, 
coded 1 if injury occurred to one or more officers and 0 if no injury occurred.  
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Given findings from my qualitative work, which indicated that officers were 
interpreting the ‘officer injury’ field in different ways—some recording officer 
injury only if they, themselves, had been injured, and others recording officer 
injury if any officer present had been injured—it was not possible to say how 
many officers were injured in a given incident, only that an injury had occurred 
to at least one officer.  One particular limitation of this is that, as with previous 
data sets (e.g. Jenkinson et al 2006), the unwanted effects of CS spray—which 
can often contaminate officers, as well as the intended subject—may  be 
underestimated. 
The control variables are the same as those discussed in Chapter 430, as are 
the force variables used, and are also discussed at length in the introduction to 
Part 2 of the thesis.  To briefly recap, two variables for Taser firing were 
created.  The first captured incidents where Taser had been fired and other 
force had also physically been used31.  Taser firing was considered to be the 
sole force used if no other force options had been physically used in the same 
incident.  These variables were compared to all incidents where Taser was not 
fired, and then to more specific reference categories, namely: incidents 
involving empty hand techniques only, incidents involving physical baton use 
only, and incidents involving the discharge of irritant spray only.  In these later 
models, all other uses of force (i.e. incidents that do not involve Taser firing, and 
are not in the reference category) are entered as a fourth variable, thus 
enabling us to retain all cases of interest in the model. These latter models 
allow us to directly examine whether incidents involving Taser are less, or more 
injurious, than incidents involving the alternative use of force options available 
to police officers in England and Wales – and thus follow the methodology used 
by Paoline et al (2012) and Macdonald et al (2013).   
                                                          
30
 As previously discussed, subject level variables comprise subject ethnicity, gender and disability status, 
as well as whether they have drug, alcohol or mental health issues. Officer level variables include whether 
firearms officers, response officers and traffic officers attended the incident, as well as officer rank, 
length of service and the length of time since personal safety training.  Incident level controls include: 
subject conduct, whether a weapon was present, whether the subject was posing a risk to themselves or 
others, the type of incident, time of day / level of lighting, the number of officer and subjects present and 
the number of officers using force.  The year of the incident and policy in place at the time are also 
controlled for.   
 
31
 As previously discussed, Taser was considered to have been used in conjunction with other force if the 
record indicated that one or more of empty hand techniques, shield techniques, non-compliant 
handcuffing techniques, fabric restraints, irritant spray, baton, canines, baton gun, firearm or ‘other’ force 
had also been deployed in the same incident.   
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Drawing, but not physically using, force options was not considered a use of 
force when calculating these variables, in order to differentiate between 
instances where a weapon was physically fired, and where it was drawn, and in 
order to facilitate comparison with the rest of the literature on this topic.  Instead 
the impact of drawing (but not using) weapons is the subject of a separate 
model, whereby variables were created to represent instances where irritant 
spray has been drawn but not fired, Taser has been drawn but not fired, and 
baton has been drawn but not fired, to allow us to take a first look at how the 
drawing not just of Taser, but of other force options, is associated with officer 
injury, if at all.   
Before turning to the results of these regression models, it is first necessary to 
take a brief look at some descriptive statistics for the data set as a whole. 
Descriptive Statistics.  
10% of incidents recorded on the database (N = 2,446) are listed as resulting in 
injury to at least one officer.  Due to data limitations it is not possible to give 
more detail about how many officers were injured, the nature or severity of the 
injuries inflicted, the cause of the injury, or the point in time at which the incident 
occurred.  Incidents in which Taser is fired have an officer injury rate of 13%, 
but further subdividing these incidents shows that the bulk of these injuries 
occur in situations where Taser is used (fired) with other force.  Incidents where 
Taser is the sole form of force used (fired) have a relatively low officer injury 
rate of 7%, but incidents where Taser is used (fired) with other force options has 
a higher injury rate of 20% - providing further evidence of the need to 
differentiate between the different types of incidents in which Taser is used, 
following Paoline et al’s (2012) models.   
**See Appendix 1, page 286, for ‘Table 6.1:                                                                                     
Injury frequency for incidents involving different force techniques’. 
In 42% of incidents where Taser is used (fired) with other force, it was used 
alongside at least two other force options.  In 24% of incidents where Taser was 
used with other weapons, empty hand techniques were the only force used 
alongside Taser, and in 15% of cases Taser was used alongside non-complaint 
handcuffing techniques only.  In 42% of all incidents where Taser was used with 
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other force options, multiple forms of force were used, which often included 
empty hand techniques. 
**See Appendix 1, page 287, for ‘Table 6.2:                                                                               
Taser Fired with Other Force’ **. 
Turning to incidents where weapons are drawn but not fired, incidents involving 
the drawing of Taser result in recorded officer injury in 5% of cases, compared 
to 9% of cases where baton is drawn but not fired, and 13% of cases where 
irritant spray is drawn but not fired.  This provides an indication that the 
deterrent effects of drawing Taser, and its benefits for officer injury, should be 
further investigated. I come back to this issue in the logistic regression models, 
to which I now turn. 
**See Appendix 1, page 288, for ‘Table 6.3:                                                                                   
Injury frequency for incidents involving drawing of force options’ **. 
Results  
Model 1: Reference Group Instances where Taser is not fired. 
In the first model, incidents where Taser firing was the sole force used, and 
incidents where Taser was fired alongside other uses of force, were compared 
to a reference category of incidents where Taser was not fired.  This model has 
been described as the ‘most straightforward’ way to assess the association 
between Taser use and injury (Terrill and Paoline 2012: 171). 
The results from Model 1 indicate that, when compared to instances where 
Taser was not fired, incidents where Taser firing is the sole force used are 
associated with decreased odds of injury, but not statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. Incidents where Taser is used (fired) alongside other weapons are 
statistically significant and associated with increased odds of officer injury: 
findings broadly in line with Paoline et al’s (2012) work.  Multi-collinearity was 
assessed and found to be within accepted parameters.   
Several of the control variables are also worthy of note. In this model and most, 
if not all, of the models discussed in this chapter, subject drug consumption, 
presence of a weapon, presence of three or more subjects, multiple officers 
using force, and higher levels of subject resistance are all significantly 
associated with increased odds of officer injury.  However results were 
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insignificant for incidents where subject resistance involved the physical use of 
a weapon - perhaps given the amount of diversity present in this category.  
Incidents involving violent crime are also associated with increases in the odds 
of officer injury, whilst incidents involving detention under the Mental Health Act, 
or taking place in detention, were associated with lower odds of officer injury.  
As the number of officers present increase, the odds of an officer being injured 
decrease.  The odds of injury significantly decrease over time, with incidents in 
later years less likely to result in injury than those occurring in 2007, as 
discussed above. 
The type of officers present at an incident also made a difference.  Whilst 
incidents where firearms officers were present were associated with a 
decreased risk of officer injury (when compared to incidents where firearms 
officers were not present), incidents where response officers were present were 
associated with an increased risk of officer injury (when compared to instances 
where response officers were not present). Such a finding, which initially seems 
counter-intuitive—surely, one might assume, given the higher risk incidents to 
which they are sent, firearms officers would have higher odds of injury—may 
make more sense when one considers the enhanced deterrent value of firearms 
officers, the additional training they receive, and the fact that they work in teams 
and are rarely (if ever) single crewed. 
**See Appendix One, page 289, for ‘Table 6.4:  Logistic regression results 
for Model 1. Reference Group: Incidents where Taser is not fired’ **. 
Whilst these results are interesting, they have little to say about how Taser 
directly compares to other force techniques.  With this in mind the models now 
aim, in turn, to compare Taser to instances where empty hand techniques are 
the sole force used, where baton is the sole force used, and where irritant spray 
is the sole force used. 
Model 2 - 4: Reference categories: empty hand techniques only, baton only, 
irritant spray only. 
Model 2 compared incidents where Taser firing was the sole force used, and 
Taser was fired alongside other weapons, to a reference category of incidents 
where empty hand techniques were the sole force used.  Incidents where Taser 
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firing was the sole force used were insignificant, and associated with no 
substantive change in the odds of officer injury, whilst incidents where Taser 
was fired alongside other weapons were associated with increased odds of 
officer injury, when compared to incidents where empty hand techniques were 
the sole force used.  Similar results were found in Models 3 and 4. Model 3 
compared incidents where Taser firing was the sole force used, and Taser was 
fired alongside other weapons, to a reference category of incidents where baton 
techniques were the sole force used.  Model 4 compared incidents involving 
Taser (fired by itself or with other weapons), to incidents where irritant spray 
was the sole force used.  Both models returned similar results, where incidents 
where Taser firing was the sole force used were found to be insignificant.  
Incidents where Taser was fired with other force were associated with increased 
odds of officer injury, when compared both to incidents where baton was the 
sole force used, and to incidents where irritant spray was the sole force used.  
Multicollinearity was tested for all models and was found to be within acceptable 
parameters.  
** See Appendix 1, page 291, for ‘Table 6.5: Logistic regression models 2 – 
4 **. 
Model 5: Drawing, but not firing, Taser.   
The final model looked at incidents where Taser was drawn but not fired, where 
irritant spray was drawn but not fired, and where baton was drawn but not used.  
None of these results were statistically significant, although the P value for the 
drawing of irritant spray was .058, and the P value for the drawing of Taser was 
.063.   
** See Appendix 1, page 294, for ‘Table 6.6:                                                                                  
Model results for drawing of Taser, irritant spray and baton’ **. 
Discussion and Conclusion  
This chapter has used quantitative techniques to look at the association 
between Taser use and officer injury rates.  In contrast to the hypotheses set 
out at the start of the chapter, these models have generated relatively 
inconclusive results.  Whilst incidents where Taser firing was the sole form of 
force used were associated with a decrease or little change in the odds of 
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officer injury, these results were all statistically insignificant, as were the results 
from the model looking at instances where Taser is drawn but not fired.  
Incidents where Taser is used with other force are significantly associated with 
increased risk of officer injury when compared to a variety of reference groups 
but it is unclear why this might be the case, and what role, if any, Taser might 
play in such instances.  These findings remind us that, whilst Taser may often 
be associated with a statistically significant reduction in officer injuries (e.g. 
Alpert and Dunham 2010), this may not necessarily always be the case (NIJ 
2009, NIJ 2011, Neuscheler and Freidlin 2015). 
These results nevertheless have several implications, of which I will mention 
three.  First, from a methodological perspective, these findings confirm the 
importance of differentiating between incidents where Taser is fired by itself, 
and where it is fired with other force (following Paoline et al 2012) and of 
considering and testing analytically the impact that the drawing of police 
weapons, including Taser, may have on officer injury rates (Brandl and 
Stroshine 2015, Lin and Jones 2010) – measures that could usefully be 
incorporated into future work.  
Second, however, the findings also point to a methodological issue that has 
received less attention in the literature: that the precise ordering of subject 
resistance, officer injury and the use of different force options matters - and 
being unsure about the order in which these in inter-related events occur, and 
the relationship between them, undermines the ability of analysts to reach 
conclusions about the association between Taser use and officer injury rates.  
In most analyses conducted so far, including mine, there is no indication of at 
what point in a particular incident subject aggression resulted in officer injury or, 
crucially, whether this was before, or after, the application of Taser.  Nor is there 
any indication as to the order in which different forms of force were used, how 
these intertwined with subject resistance, and how subject resistance altered 
over time, if at all.   
Yet the question of such ordering may be an important one.  For example, the 
association between incidents involving the use of Taser with other weapons 
and higher rates of officer injury, found in my work, and that of Paoline et al 
(2012), might lead some to be cautious of Taser use.  Yet instead of this 
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association reflecting the fact that Taser increases officer injury (if, for example, 
officers become over-confident in its use, or if the weapon is ineffective), it 
might instead reflect the tendency for officers to use the weapon following injury 
to themselves or a colleague. Thus Taser might be enhancing officer safety, 
even though the correlation could suggest the opposite.  So whilst controlling for 
subject resistance is essential, because the control is time invariant—and the 
outcome measure is not the rate of injury following Taser firing, but whether an 
injury occurred at any point during the incident—it does little here to clarify 
whether the association is one of officer injury necessitating Taser use, officer 
injury occurring despite Taser use, or other variations.  The interconnections 
between, and ordering of, subject resistance and use of force is also important 
so as not to ignore the possibility that, in some cases, resistance can be a 
reaction to, not a cause of, officer force.  
Third, if the results have highlighted the need for caution when assessing the 
relationship between subject resistance, Taser use and officer injury, they also 
highlight the extent to which the impact of the weapon on officer safety can also 
be mediated by a wide range of other factors.  In this regard, it is instructive that 
increases in the number of officers present at an incident (whether or not they 
use force) are associated with decreases in the odds of officer injury—a finding 
particularly relevant in the context of recent budget cuts to police services—and 
that the odds of such injury occurring vary depending on the kinds of officers 
attending an incident.  Specifically, incidents where firearms officers were 
present are associated with decreased risk of officer injury (when compared to 
incidents where firearms officers were not present), whilst incidents where 
response officers were present were associated with an increased risk of officer 
injury (when compared to instances where response officers were not present).  
The introduction of a technological innovation, such as Taser, is not only 
affected by such dynamics but, as shall be shown in the next chapter, also 
affects them in turn. 
Thus, if one needs to take care when talking about the impact that ‘the Taser’, 
conceived of as a discrete technological entity, may have on officer safety, one 
similarly needs to take care when referring to officer safety as a singular entity.  
Generalising about the impact that Taser, or other innovations, may have on 
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officer safety and injury rates as a whole may not always be appropriate: in 
England and Wales, much depends on the roles that officers carrying the 
weapon are trained to do, and are asked to perform, as well as how the weapon 
impacts on these roles. The impact of Taser on officer safety, and the extent to 
which officers are put at risk, is then also closely intertwined with a number of 
related dynamics, such as the number of officers at an incident and the 
characteristics of incident in question, all of which occur in the context of a 
statistically significant reduction in the odds of officer injuries over time: a trend 
that also merits further investigation.   
Such findings highlight the continued relevance of constructivist STS studies, 
and in particular their warnings about the difficulties encountered when trying to 
assess the impact of a particular technology in isolation from the socio-technical 
network which surrounds it.  In turn, they also highlight a weakness of binary 
logistic regression models—or at least those that do not include interaction 
effects, which includes the vast majority of models in the literature on Taser—in 
trying to capture the complexities of such relationships.  For whilst such models 
can point us towards factors, such as officer numbers, that might impact officer 
safety, they are unable to calculate the ways in which the number of officers 
interacts with Taser, and how in turn these interactions might affect officer 
safety.  These models assume that the two variables—Taser use and the 
number of officers at the incident—are independent from each other, and affect 
officer safety in different, unrelated ways.  In fact, however, as I shall show in 
the next chapter, it cannot be assumed that these variables are independent of 
each other, as an officer equipped with Taser may be more (or less) likely to be 
single crewed than his colleagues without the weapon.  And, of course, the 
relationship between Taser and officer numbers is only one of many 
relationships that may interact in complex ways to affect the outcome of 
interest. 
 I come back to the substantive implications of the relationship between officer 
numbers and Taser in the next chapter, but for now I wish to note the broader 
methodological implication that, whilst statistical analyses can usefully highlight 
some of the broader factors that may impact officer safety, bringing out the 
complexity of interactions between these different factors, and capturing the 
complexity of the network around Taser as a whole, remains a perennial 
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challenge – and it is here that the constructivist STS literature can help 
encourage us to attend to such complexities, and to consider technologies not 
as discrete variables but as part of a broader assemblage.  
Given these issues, and concerns over the ability of statistical analyses to 
capture the full nuance and complexity of dynamic use of force situations (Rojek 
et al 2012: Klahm et al 2011), it is fair to say that the impact of Taser on officer 
safety in England and Wales is unclear, complex, and unlikely to be determined 
with reference to solely quantitative forms of analysis.  Such findings contrast 
with the bulk of the literature—which tends to argue that Taser is associated 
with reduced officer injury rates—but lend some support to the work of 
Macdonald et al (2009) and Smith et al (2007), who similarly found that Taser 
did not always have a statistically significant impact on officer injury.  Given this 
complexity, it thus seems helpful to go to the officers that are charged, on a day 
to day basis, with the responsibility of carrying the weapon, to gain a fuller, 





Chapter 7.  ‘I don’t think there’s anything bad… about Taser’:                                                 
What Officer Injury Statistics won’t tell you. 
 
The last chapter used quantitative techniques to look at the association 
between Taser and officer injury, but closed with the recognition that there is a 
need for more qualitative work in this area.  Qualitative work is particularly 
valuable because, as De Angelis and Wolf (2013:4) note, very little research 
has been conducted to ascertain the views of the officers armed with the 
weapon.  Paoline and Terrill (2011: 179: 187) concur, stating that studies of 
‘officer attitudes toward less lethal force are rare’ (Paoline and Terrill 2011: 187, 
see also Rojek et al 2012).   Noting that qualitative work ‘is somewhat 
unconventional in police research’, De Angelis and Wolf explicitly call for more 
work on officer perspectives on Taser (De Angelis and Wolf 2013)– a call this 
chapter tries, in part, to answer. 
The chapter aims, in Part 1, to complement the quantitative data on officer 
injury with qualitative data, presenting a snapshot of officers’ views on Taser 
and officer and subject safety – the first time that this has been done anywhere 
outside of the USA 32..  The account that officers present, and which is 
advanced in Part 1, is broadly positive, and has much to recommend it.  Yet 
other accounts around the weapon are also possible, and a range of factors 
might help explain why officers tend towards one particular account instead of 
others.  After examining some of these factors, Part 2 presents an alternative 
account, one that draws on officer views to highlight slightly different, and less 
positive, features of the relationship between Taser, officer and subject safety.  
In so doing this chapter also provides an opportunity to discuss the utility and 
novelty of constructivist STS and ANT insights—focusing on the added value of 
their symmetrical approach to truth claims, such as those made around the 
Taser weapon—and also provides an opportunity to explore the limitations of 
quantitative methods.  Such methods, it is argued, are unable to capture the 
complexities and nuances of the relationships between Taser use, officer and 
subject safety discussed here. 
                                                          
32




Interviews were conducted with over 25 Taser officers and trainers at two forces 
in England and Wales —referred to as Force A and Force B—including firearms 
and non-firearms officers, male and female officers, officers completing their 
initial Taser training, and experienced Taser officers, in order to get a cross 
section of views.  Participants were predominantly participants on Taser training 
courses, and the Taser trainer(s) and Single Points of Contact in each force 
were also interviewed. Interviews were also conducted with a cross section of 
Taser trainers from various forces, who were both attending, and teaching on, 
the College of Policing’s Lead Instructor Taser training. 
Participants were asked a series of questions which were deliberately broad 
and open-ended.  The exact questions varied slightly from interview to 
interview33, depending on context, time constraints and the stage at which the 
interview was conducted, with later interviews allowing me to explore points 
raised in earlier discussions.  However, the interviews generally covered 
questions including: ‘what are your views on Taser’, ‘what role do you think 
Taser plays in policing’, ‘how safe do you think the weapon is’, ‘why did you 
decide to carry the weapon’, ‘should the weapon be made more widely 
available’ and ‘do you have any concerns about / risks with the weapon’ and 
their views on the medical implications of the weapon.  Officers were also asked 
to describe their experiences of using the weapon.  Participants were also given 
an opportunity to add any additional comments, or talk to points they felt might 
not have sufficiently been covered, at the end of the interview.  These 
interviews were supplemented by analysis of nearly 70 anonymised use of 
Taser forms from Force A.  These were selected by random stratified sampling 
in order to ensure the forms selected covered a number of years, covered 
different types of Taser use, and included cases where injury occurred to the 
subject.   
In both Force A and Force B individuals who had previously been Taser 
officers, but were no longer carrying the weapon, were also emailed and invited 
to participate in the research.  However, only one officer responded to this 
                                                          
33
 Therefore, where figures and proportions are stated, they should be treated as a rough indication of the 
extent to which officers expressed such views, not as an exact amount.   
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email, and indicated that he felt that he had nothing to add to the research.  
Therefore, in keeping with the only other qualitative study in this area (De 
Angelis and Wolf 2013), this chapter focuses exclusively on officers who train 
and / or use Taser, and their views about  how the weapon may impact their 
safety – a topic to which I now turn.  
Officer views on Taser safety.   
In their work with Taser officers in the USA, De Angelis and Wolf found that 
many believed Tasers ‘were safe… (and) resulted in an overall pattern of injury 
reduction’ to officers and subjects alike (2013: 7).  In general, officers in 
England and Wales also held similar views, identifying several ways in which 
the weapon advanced officer safety (often seen as closely intertwined with 
subject safety). 
The majority of officers I interviewed spoke to the value of the ‘red-dot’ function 
with one officer, for example, describing it as ‘the best thing about Taser’.  Many 
officers also told stories about times when they believed the function had been 
particularly effective.  Officers also described how the weapon that could act as 
a ‘deterrent’ by its’ mere presence:  
‘Merely having it as an option is a deterrent to a lot of people.  You don’t 
even need to draw it…  You turn up to somebody who recognises…that 
you could be carrying it, it just changes their state of mind’ (officer in 
Force B). 
 ‘Because it’s more commonly known, people that have known it before, 
or seen it on telly, just the sight of it can act as a deterrent’ (officer in 
Force B). 
Such findings are in keeping with De Anglis and Wolf’s research, which found 
that officers emphasised how Taser allowed them to  ‘de-escalate potentially 
volatile encounters without resorting to dangerous types of physical force’ 
(2013: 9-10).  They also underscore that, whilst the material features (the red 
dot, the physical presence of the Taser) and the ‘it’ of the weapon are important, 
it is not sufficient to say that the resultant effects stem solely from such material 
features alone.  Instead, they are produced from these material features 
interacting with other factors—the fact that it is ‘commonly known’, and its 
presence on ‘telly’—to produce a set of factors that can be best understood as a 
mix of the socio-technical, and to produce effects that cannot easily be 
attributed to either ‘technical’ or ‘social’ factors.  
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Officers also felt that, on those occasions where they did need to fire the 
weapon, it helped ensure their physical safety more readily than would CS or 
baton, for several, interconnected reasons.  Officers stated that they valued the 
extra distance that they felt the weapon gave them:  
‘It gives you a bit of distance and I think that’s the key thing - it’s the 
distance.  Whereas (with) the other PPE (personal protective equipment), 
you’ve got to be close.  (officer in Force B). 
‘I would always, more often than not, go straight for my Taser rather than 
CS or baton, as long as the circumstances dictated.  Its proximity, rather 
than having to be fighting and get myself injured as well’ (officer in Force 
A). 
This was linked to beliefs about the effectiveness, reliability and consistency of 
the weapon:  
‘It’s nice to have something extra that you know would work.  Baton 
might not work, I don't really fight with a baton if I can help it.  CS… could 
affect me as much as it will affect them...  Most girls are not fighters.  It’s 
not in your nature to go into some strike, strike someone with a baton, it 
doesn't occur to me to do that’ (officer in Force A).   
‘I guess it (Taser) gives you the option to control.  They have no choice: if 
you are accurate they will go down’ (officer in Force A). 
Such statements speak to Collins’ work on violence, which emphasises how 
difficult it is—even for those, such as law enforcement and military officials, 
engaged in more so-called ‘legitimate’ forms of violence—to perpetrate violent 
behaviour, and to do so accurately and effectively.  Instead, he argues, 
‘violence on the micro level is largely incompetent and abortive’ (Collins 2009: 
17).  In such circumstances, the attraction of a weapon which appears to help 
cut through human incompetence and messiness, taking responsibility for 
proportionate and effective violence solely from human hands and delegating 
them to the non-human actor of Taser—which can be relied on to deliver a 
constant ‘dose’ of force and which ‘you know would work’, should not be under-
estimated. 
The targeted, accurate nature of Taser was also compared favourably to the 
other force options available, in particular CS which is the other medium range 
option available to officers.  CS is highly indiscriminate and often affects 
officers, subjects and bystanders alike.  As such Taser was claimed  by some to 
be especially useful, particularly in confined spaces.  Officers noted that:   
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‘I tend to use Taser because it’s far better… It has got so many benefits 
that you think about.  The environment’s one of the key issues.  You’re in 
confined spaces a lot of the time and you can’t swing your arm back for 
the baton you’re not going to go to CS… Taser is the go-to’ (Officer in 
Force A). 
‘(I was faced with a situation) the initial threat was ‘where’s the knife’… I 
had a foot (of distance) to work with.  CS spray would not have worked in 
a confined space… (baton) there’s not enough room...  Taser with the 
drive stun, it was the best option available’ Officer in Force B. 
The weapon was also described as offering benefits for subject safety.  Officers 
described the weapon as ‘very safe’ and ‘essentially completely safe’ for 
subjects, for several reasons.  First, when compared to the other force 
techniques available, the injuries from Taser were seen to be ‘minimal’. Officers 
noted that: 
‘There is no lasting injuries, is there? Whereas with a baton strike you 
can cause lasting injuries and I think that’s the key thing.  Other methods 
… all have potentially damaging effects… If you are in general good 
health, and no hidden medical conditions that we know of, then the only, 
sort of, risk is where you fall, but you have to consider that when you are 
going to deploy it. But generally I would say it’s the safest, least 
damaging…  You could end up in a big struggle…everyone gets bruised 
and hurt… whereas with this it is minimal’ (Officer in Force B). 
 ‘Having used batons and… (seen) dog handlers before, I know on both 
of these occasions, the damage that you can do to people…is very high.  
With the Taser that isn’t the case.  ’ (Officer in Force B). 
This viewpoint was widely expressed, with the majority of officers stating that 
the risk of injury was relatively low, when compared to the other options. In 
order to bolster such accounts, officers often made a distinction between the 
effects of the electrical current itself—which was seen as not presenting an 
‘issue’—and so-called ‘secondary injuries’ (i.e. the falls resulting from the 
incapacitation caused by the current).  Such injuries were seen not as an 
overarching risk, nor as something unique to Taser, but as something to be 
managed on a case-by-case basis: 
‘I think Taser is very safe, I don’t think there are any issues with it at all. 
We have had some extremely well educated and well-funded individuals 
test that machine until destruction trying to find elements about it that are 
unsafe.  In its basic design and its basic use I don’t think it’s dangerous 
at all.  The danger comes from the secondary injury… that’s where the 
injuries come into it, not the Taser itself’ (Taser trainer, force with-held). 
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‘I can understand why…the public perceive it to be almost brutal at 
times… They don't realise that, from a health point of view, apart from 
the risks that we've identified, it’s not going to hurt like CS or a baton, or 
inflict a fatal injury. And unless it’s as a result of a fall, I don't think there's 
any-one whose died from the actual shock’ (Officer in Force A).   
Second, the sophisticated, less ‘intrusive’ nature of the incapacitation produced 
by the electric-shock is contrasted to the ‘crude’ effects of using other weapons.  
Whilst fewer officers (N = 3) made this point during their interview, it was striking 
enough, to deserve a mention.  Thus officers noted: 
‘I don't like CS, I’ve never used it… The baton, it’s cumbersome… and in 
any case it’s a big wooden stick and it’s not a natural thing for girls to do.  
I don't like hitting people and its short term.  To incapacitate someone is 
a lot nicer than breaking someone's bones, isn't it? There's less blood, 
less bone breakage, its indirect control.  If I can control someone by not 
hurting them, I’m happy...  You can control their physical actions without 
holding them… It’s less physical, less caveman’ (Officer in Force A)’. 
‘I tend to use Taser because its… it’s the best option all round and it’s 
the least intrusive.  You are not going to injure anybody with it’ (Officer in 
Force A). 
‘CS, it doesn’t sit well with me, hitting people with a baton it’s a bit crude.  
Taser I tend to use more than anything else, just because that is my 
decision to go to that first’ (Officer in Force B).   
Such views, especially when seen in context with the aforementioned quote 
from a female officer, that ‘its’ not in your nature to… strike, strike someone with 
a baton’, fits with Collins’ insights that most individuals are inherently reluctant 
to engage in violence, particularly that which involves face to face contact 
(Collins 2012), and that engaging in violence at a distance is one way in which 
individuals may be able to over-ride such reticence.  By contrast to other forms 
of police use of force, then, Taser may seem to offer a way of using force that is 
more remote and distant, more ‘indirect’ than other force options.  The weapon 
can thus be seen as offering a win-win: a weapon that enhances the safety of 
officers, whilst being a ‘minimal’ use of force for subjects, and which allows 
those who fire the weapon to distance themselves from the violence they are 
inflicting.  Indeed, when asked for their views on the weapon, few officers (N = 
4) proactively mentioned limitations of, or downsides to, the weapon.  When 
specifically asked about its risks and disadvantages, officers did mention certain 
limitations, including:  
 Weapons retention: ‘My biggest concern is that someone is going to have it 
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off you, use it against you.  That is a real risk, if you get into a struggle’ 
(Officer in Force B). 
 Secondary injury (as discussed above).   
 Pressure from colleagues to use the weapon: ‘In certain quarters there a 
mentality amongst officers that don’t have Taser, ‘Oh just use Taser on him, 
he’s not doing what he’s told’… There is that pressure, because they don’t 
understand’ (Officer in Force A). 
 Pressure of decision-making: ‘It is useful but obviously it’s a lot of pressure 
that comes with the responsibility of carrying one, it’s not something you 
can pick up and use willy-nilly, you know’ (Officer in Force A). 
 Efficacy: One officer noted ‘you’ve got to be careful… (not to think) I’ve got 
Taser, I can do anything, because you can’t’ – a theme also discussed, 
briefly, by some other officers, and one to which I return below (Officer in 
Force A). 
 Single shot capacity: ‘If I’m going up to a car and there’s 4 people in there, I 
don’t necessarily want to be stuck to someone with a Taser and there are 
three other people presenting themselves to me, and other officers not 
close by’ (Officer in Force A). 
 
Overall, the vast majority of interviews (with perhaps one exception) were 
overwhelmingly positive about the weapon, with many officers talking about it in 
glowing terms.  Officers noted that: 
‘It’s an extra piece of equipment that is essentially completely safe and 
that's becoming far more essential working in the rurals’ (Officer in Force 
A). 
 ‘It’s a brilliant piece of kit so long as it’s used properly’ (Taser trainer, 
force omitted). 
 ‘You have to take certain things into account, your surroundings and 
things, have to be careful but it is a tool that's good,  I don't think there's 
anything bad that I can say about Taser’ (Officer in Force A). 
Such findings are broadly in keeping with American research which found  a 
pattern of ‘widespread support’ (De Angelis and Wolf 2013) for the weapon.    
At this point in the argument, one might be tempted to make several 
conclusions.  First, officers tend to report to outsiders that they view Taser as 
enhancing their personal safety, particularly when compared to baton and CS, 
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due to its efficacy and reliability, its ability to incapacitate subjects, and the fact 
that it can be used both at distance, and at relatively close quarters.  Officers 
also state that they view the weapon as being relatively beneficial to subjects.  
Second, taking such accounts at face value, one  might be tempted to trace 
these benefits back to the material features of the weapon, and its inherent, 
innate qualities (see, for example, White 2014) – instead of looking at how such 
benefits are construed, constructed and brought into existence. 
A third conclusion might be that these officer identified benefits are not fully 
captured in many statistical analyses, including those presented earlier, for 
several reasons. Many datasets, and the one I have access to is no exception, 
are concerned with collecting data on instances where force has been used. 
Such data cannot provide evidence in support of the claim that the mere 
presence of the weapon stops many potential use of force incidents from 
materialising.  Moreover, if the datasets are not able to capture what officers 
perceive are the full benefits of Taser, neither are they able to full capture the 
disadvantages of other force techniques, in particular the noted tendency of CS 
to affect not only the subject, but bystanders and officers.   
Other conclusions could also be drawn from officer interviews, and could 
suggest a promising avenue for future research.  Thus a fourth conclusion might 
be that officers may (more or less consciously) favour Taser because it seems 
to tap into, and sit well with, pre-existing conceptions and beliefs they may have 
about the role of policing, the need to use of force, and their attitudes towards 
using it.  These conceptions operate at the individual level (with one individual 
noting, for example, ‘I don’t like hitting people’) and also interact with processes 
of gender socialisation (‘it’s not a natural thing for girls to do’) and with broader 
occupational attitudes, and even subcultures, within the police service (Paoline 
2004).  These attitudes may well influence the force options that different police 
officers choose to adopt, and the manner and frequency with which they use 
force – and may also have implications for their safety in use of force incidents.   
A final conclusion might be, however, that it is not as simple as saying that 
Taser appeals to a certain type of officer, or to officers with a certain set of 
(stated) beliefs.  Not only might the (stated) appeal of the weapon change in 
various contexts—with officers valuing different facets of a weapon in an 
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interview than they might in an operational context—the weapon may appeal to 
different officers for different reasons.  The fact that it can do so is, in no small 
part, a testament to the marketing techniques used (Wozniak and Uggen 2009).  
For example, some officers—perhaps those who have what Paoline (2004: 224) 
calls a ‘peacekeeping’ orientation towards police work, and who place a high 
emphasis on ‘non-aggressive order maintenance’ (Paoline 2004: 224)—may 
value Taser because they perceive it allows them to use less force, and a style 
of force that is ‘nicer’ than the alternatives.  Other officers place more of an 
emphasis on the ability of the weapon to help them protect themselves 
(commenting that ‘before anyone is going to hit me, they're going to get 
Tasered’, and ‘I use it as I feel fit, at the end of the day I want to go home’) and 
on its ability to help them achieve their preferred policing style, being ‘the first to 
get there’ and being ‘proactive rather than reactive’.  Still other officers may hold 
attitudes more akin to Paoline’s traditionalist, tough cop perspective, and be 
more likely to show more of a preference for aggressive styles of policing, and 
less aversion to human rights violations.  For such police officers, the weapon 
may be seen as attractive for quite a different reason – its appeal to ‘hyper-
masculinity’, and the values of ‘toughness, power, and control through coercive 
force’ (Wozniak and Uggan 2009: 276) 34. 
Citing such findings and calling for further research into the topic would, I argue, 
be a perfectly acceptable way to close this chapter.  Yet, if we are interested in 
examining the impact of the weapon on officer and subject safety, and in taking 
officers’ views ‘seriously’, it is important not just to note their beliefs about the 
success and efficacy of Taser—and to see these as reflective of what Terrill and 
Paoline (2013: 153) might call the  ‘empirical reality’ of the weapon (Terrill and 
Paoline 2013: 153)—but to examine these beliefs more closely: a task I attempt 
in the next part of this chapter.  In so doing, I seek to advance an alternative 
account based on the views officers expressed to me – one that does not 
intend, necessarily, to argue against the account that Taser improves the safety 
of officers and subjects alike – but simply seeks to demonstrate that this may 
not always be the case.  Such a move, I will argue, is perfectly compatible with 
constructivist STS notions of interpretive flexibility, and of a symmetrical 
                                                          
34
 Of course, as Wozniak and Uggen (2009) note, the challenge for electric-shock manufacturers is to 
appeal to such a diverse range of views simultaneously, whilst minimising the inherent tensions that this 
brings with it. 
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approach to truth claims, but one does not need to use such theories in order to 
take this important step.  
But why might one need to go beyond officer accounts? This is important, I 
argue, because three perennial processes—first, the common-place fallacy, as 
identified by STS scholars, to assume that ‘efficiency (of a technology) explains 
success’ (Feenberg 2010: 15), second the closely related concepts of 
‘interpretive flexibility’ and ‘closure’, again taken from constructivist STS, and 
third, the trend towards ‘confirmation bias’ identified in the social psychology 
literature—might encourage us to examine officer statements as accounts in 
their own right, and not as simple reflections of the truth around a particular 
technology.  The first process refers to our tendency to assume that the efficacy 
and usefulness of a given technology explains its success.  Applied to Taser, 
such reasoning would lead one to assume—as does White (2014)—that Taser 
is popular because it is effective.  Yet Feenberg argues the reverse is true: 
‘efficiency does not explain success, success explains efficiency’ (2010: 15).  
Feenberg notes that a multitude of potential factors—from ‘economic and 
technical criteria’ to ‘social or political requirements’-- help explain why a device 
might be adopted and that, once adopted, additional resources, research and 
development are devoted to such devices, helping increase their efficiency. The 
technology must have been ‘more or less efficient’ in the first place, but that fact 
alone does not explain why it became adopted (2010: 7).   
The second concepts are those of interpretive flexibility and closure.  These 
concepts, as outlined by Pinch and Bijker (1984), state that whilst there is 
considerable ‘flexibility in how people think of, or interpret, artefacts’, over time 
the degree of interpretive flexibility erodes and a broad consensus emerges – a 
process known as closure.  Whilst there is still a large degree of controversy 
around Taser in general, this research shows that there seems to be an equally 
large degree of consensus within the police that the weapon is safe and highly 
effective (see, for example, Lin and Jones 2010: Neuscheler and Friedlin 2015).   
Under conditions of closure differing opinions can be held, but it may be harder 
for officers to express reservations about the weapon, whilst doubts may be 




The third process, confirmation bias, refers to the tendency for individuals 
(including police officers) to ‘bolster a hypothesis by seeking consistent 
evidence while minimizing inconsistent evidence’ (O’Brien 2009: 315).   This 
tendency has been well documented in the social psychology literature amongst 
the general population, as well as in serving police officers. Whilst studies of 
confirmation bias in the police have traditionally been focused on presumptions 
of  guilt or innocence of suspects during interrogation (see Powell et al 2012 
and Taslitz 2010), the issue of confirmation bias is particularly salient in the 
case of Taser.  Because officers are not automatically issued with the 
weaponbut have to volunteer to carry it, it is highly likely that self-selection 
effects apply, and that volunteers already believe it is effective, or that it will 
have benefits.  Conversely, those who are more sceptical about the weapon 
may be more reluctant to apply in the first place.    
Given such tendencies, is there any room for alternative accounts around the 
weapon, and what might these look like? I advance one possible alternative 
account next, starting with the issue of officer safety. 
An alternative account: Officer safety. 
In light of the views detailed in the first half of this chapter, it will come as no 
surprise that many officers stated that they wanted the weapon due to a desire 
to improve their safety.  This was explicitly stated in around a quarter of 
interviews, but was also an underlying, implicit theme in many more interviews.  
The weapon was particularly valued given relatively low staffing numbers, which 
some officers felt had been exacerbated recently.  Thus officers noted the 
importance of:  
‘The safety aspect – we are now in a rural area and I cover an area 
which is...  I'd say 8 times what it was before…I have got less staff so I’m 
very that aware we are single crewed...  I want to have the confidence to 
stop a car, go to an incident and just be a little bit more protected. I can't 
create more officers... but it’s an extra piece of equipment that is 
essentially completely safe’ (Taser Officer, Force A). 
 ‘Now that firearms officers are so few and far between… if I wait for 
them, or my other backup, which is equally far away, someone's going to 
get hurt.  So it just gives me an extra tool’ (Taser Officer, Force A). 
‘I cover 137 square miles around (location omitted) and I just thought that 
it is such a large area and it’s a useful tool to have for myself and my 
colleagues.  Because it’s not necessarily me that would be in a situation 
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to need it, but it’s a useful tool to have as a backup for my colleagues as 
well’ (Taser officer, Force B). 
Yet the impact of Taser on officer safety might be slightly more complex than 
these accounts suggest, for three reasons.   First, officers can adopt a fluid 
definition of success.  Thus an officer described the weapon as ‘useful’ in the 
following situation:    
‘The first cartridge didn’t work.  He dropped to the ground on the first 
cycle (of the second strike), but he was that angry that he pulled the 
barbs out and I had to go hands on… It’s a very useful tool.   He was in a 
place where he was (still) fighting.  But it gave me that advantage to be 
able to go hands on with him’ (Officer in Force A).   
Another officer described the following incident (in both cases some details 
have been omitted for anonymity): 
‘I had a chap… being arrested for an…assault (details omitted)…  (he) 
pulled out a weapon (specifics  omitted).  So I Tasered him but he broke 
them (the wires) with the (weapon).  And I had to exit quite rapidly and I 
Tasered him again as he came out the door, so a messy one’ (Officer in 
Force B). 
Such accounts indicate that Taser does not always incapacitate (see Orbons 
2015) and, whilst it is often described as preventing the need to use hand-on 
tactics, this is not always the case.  Should the weapon be ineffective, the 
distance between officer and subject can be closed quite rapidly, and officers 
may find themselves in a dangerous situation quite rapidly.   
Second, whilst the weapon is often favourably compared to baton and CS, both 
often said to be impractical to use at close quarters, and/or in confined spaces, 
Taser is not universally effective in such conditions.  Using the weapon in probe 
firing mode in such a scenario has its limitations: indeed, research by Ho et al 
(2012) indicates that Taser is less effective at very close ranges.  Using the 
weapon in drive-stun mode is also limiting and may, on some occasions, 
exacerbate the situation.  In one case, officers went to arrest an individual who 
was: 
‘Violent towards officers… possibly in possession of a weapon (details 
omitted) only one week before… There were many persons present 
being aggressive towards the police and this aggressive behaviour was 
escalating the longer the arrest took… (The subject was) Tasered (in 
drive stun mode) allowing officers to take him to the floor and attempt to 
restrain him.  However (he) immediately became more aggressive and 
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violent following the discharge of the Taser’ (Taser reporting form, Force 
A)    
Indeed, the IPCC note that in ‘several’ cases, the use of drive stun ‘either did 
not result in the control the officers were hoping to achieve or it made the 
person involved struggle and resist further’ (2014: 21). 
Third, many of the stories officers tell in order to demonstrate the safety benefits 
of Taser involve situations where one officer is engaging one individual.  
However, these occasions only represent a portion of the work that police do.  
As noted above, when used against multiple individuals, or in situations 
involving crowds of people, it is much less likely to be effective 35 – and thus 
likely to present risks to officer safety, particularly in light of the enhanced risk 
factors (e.g. single-crewing and deployment to high risk incidents) listed above.   
Such points are important precisely because of the confidence officers have in 
the weapon - and because of the ‘confidence’ that simply having it can instil in 
officers.    However, there is a fine line between a healthy level of confidence, 
and a potentially dangerous level of complacency, particularly if this confidence 
leads officers to handle situations differently.  Thus officers noted that: 
‘It'll give me the confidence to be a bit more proactive where I think... 
people would be far less confident’ (Taser Officer in Force A).  
  'It does make you feel a bit safer. Because I’m not a huge person like 
some of the other guys.  If I was on my own and a large man was to kick 
up, it’s something else that I can think about' (Taser officer in Force B). 
'It lets you deal with situations you possibly couldn’t deal with before.  
Whereas you might have had to back off, wait for more units to come in, 
or (have) more force used in a different way by shield teams, things like 
that’ (Officer in Force A). 
‘The majority of scenarios I have been to were domestic related… (but) 
you never get trained how to search a house properly if you are just a 
Taser officer... so they might put themselves a little bit at risk, because 
some people think because they've got a Taser, they're immune, they're 
superhuman... You might go into the house a bit too quickly and get 
disarmed, say, if you breach the door too quickly (Officer in Force A)’ 
‘People with a knife, how would you have approached them before? You 
would have had to wait for armed support or you tackle them with the 
knife itself... A lot of the time, if you draw your Taser and point it at 
                                                          
35
 The Taser X26 model currently in use in the UK has a single shot capacity.  However a Taser model, 
the X2, is currently being tested for use in the UK which has a two shot capacity. 
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them…generally they stop and you've got your outcome earlier’ (Officer 
in Force A). 
Whilst on many occasions such strategies may have positive outcomes, they 
may also risk exposing the officer (and potentially subject) to more harm.  This 
risk is also exacerbated because, as some interviewees suggested, those with 
Taser are expected to ‘take control of the situation’ and to be ‘the first through 
the door’, potentially putting them at more risk.   
Thus there is some evidence to suggest that some officers’ stated views about 
the safety and capabilities of the weapon may encourage them to handle the 
situations that they come across in different ways – ways that may, at times, 
risk compromising their safety. This evidence also suggests that, far from being 
inherent to the weapon, qualities such as success, efficiency and effectiveness 
are, at least in part, constructed via a complex interplay between the material 
features and affordances of the weapon, those who are using it, and other 
socio-technical factors (e.g. how subjects respond to the weapon, the presence 
of countermeasures). 
There is also evidence to suggest that since having the weapon, not only do 
officers handle situations differently, but that the very nature of the incidents to 
which they are called has changed, in at least two ways.   First, when asked, 
some officers felt that they were now sent to riskier incidents than had 
previously been the case.  All officers that were asked whether the nature of 
their work had changed since becoming Taser officers36, indicated that they 
were now sent to a higher proportion of incidents with a potential for violence 
than had previously been the case.  Officers noted: 
‘The biggest issue you have sometimes is with spontaneous incidents 
where you have bladed weapons...  I get sent to jobs with ‘presence in 
public with knives’…  (We) get deployed as Taser now.  That would have 
been a firearms job… If that Taser fails they become a victim’ (Officer in 
Force A).   
‘The jobs with weapons and stuff, you start hearing ‘any Taser officers on 
duty’, whereas before it was always ‘we will see if we can get you a 
firearms unit’… I feel we definitely get called a lot more to jobs for 
violence… The only thing that puts us in more danger is because of the 
jobs they send us to (Officer in Force B).’ 
                                                          
36
  Picking up on a chance comment made halfway through interviews which indicated that this might be 
the case, I asked the question ‘has the nature of your role changed since you have had Taser’ in the 
remaining five interviews). 
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 ‘Up until recently nobody carried it (Taser).  But… we had a firearms 
team on the ground alongside our team and that’s all gone now… So I 
think there is going to be a much bigger shift in relying on district Taser 
trained officers to provide some kind of support… ’ (Officer in Force B). 
This trend should not be overstated, and two respondents—whilst 
acknowledging this trend—introduced some notes of caution.  For example, 
whilst a trainer noted that ‘there has been a drift from what would have 
traditionally been a firearms call into what is a Taser call’, he was at pains to 
stress that ‘in some respects it hasn’t made any difference… They have always 
sent us to jobs where you think ‘this is a firearms job’’. 
Nevertheless, this trend may still raise concerns for officer safety, particularly as 
specially trained Taser officers do not have the specialist equipment or training 
given to firearms officers.  As one Taser trainer explained:  
‘Firearms have a different mind-set to your average police officer just 
because of the training we have: a minimum of 14 days a year just 
training in firearms tactics and weapons… (After) years of experience in 
a particular role, we just think differently, we ask different questions, we 
think more tactically’.   
Risks to officers’ safety may also be exacerbated by a second change – the 
observation that Taser officers may be more likely to be single crewed, which 
was explicitly noted in around a quarter of interviews.  Trainers and officers 
noted that: 
‘Our recommendation is that there is a double Taser crew… However the 
assessment scenarios are single crewed as that's what you guys will 
be...  If you've got three staff, one Taser trained, the Taser trained officer 
will be single-crewed.  That person is you – you are going on your own’ 
(emphasis added).  (Taser trainer, Force details omitted) 
‘My understanding of how I was trained was that officers would attend a 
scene, supported by Taser officers… (who) could then concentrate on 
their use of Taser if it was needed. Numbers wise in the police service it 
doesn't happen so much now... Now you've got officers who are wearing 
it routinely going to the job, so they've got to deal with the job, and also 
think about the Taser… That increases the pressure’ (Taser trainer, 
Force details omitted). 
‘Taser officers are single crewed every day… If you have a Taser, you 
volunteer to go, to up the numbers… (But) single crewing is never safe in 
any front line situation, Taser or not’ (Officer in Force A).    
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Thus, whilst many officers chose to carry the weapon, at least in part, to 
enhance their safety, doing so may actually place them at more risk, under 
certain circumstances.   
An alternative account: Subject safety. 
Officers also described the weapon as, broadly speaking, relatively safe for 
subjects.  Yet other readings and possibilities are also suggested by the 
accounts they have offered.  One claim made by officers was the predictability 
of the Taser discharge, and the low probability of injury to subjects, compared 
with other force options that may bring with them a higher risk of physical injury, 
and / or more serious injuries.  Thus the ‘consistent and predictable’ effects of 
Taser, which will ‘not injure’, or ‘hurt’, are compared to other force techniques 
which ‘can cause lasting injuries’ and have ‘potentially damaging effects’ (see 
also the IPCC 2014a).   
Such characterisations may well be accurate and helpful, up to a point and in 
certain circumstances.  Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter 4, much (although 
not all) of the literature coming from the USA finds that Taser firings cause 
fewer injuries to subjects than other force options.   However, again, such 
characterisations should not be seen purely as due to the Taser ‘itself’, but 
should better be understood as resulting from a mix of these technical features, 
and the understandings and interpretations that have built up around them.  
Such characterisations should not be seen as a simple reflections of reality, but 
as the product of a large amount of socio-technical work. 
For example, such characterisations—which represent a ‘best-case’ scenario—
require one to put on hold the distinct possibility that individuals incapacitated 
by Taser might fall and incur significant injuries.  Whilst this is often achieved by 
making a distinction between injuries from ‘the shock’ itself and so-called 
‘secondary injuries’, such distinctions would seem to matter less for subjects 
involved in the incident, who may still incur significant injuries as a result of 
Taser having been used.  It also requires one to downplay the unpredictability 
around the weapon.  
Moreover, my research has shown that, in around a half of cases, Taser is used 
with other force options.  It may well be the case that, in many of these 
scenarios, Taser is the last force option used.  Yet in some situations other 
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force techniques are used after Taser has been fired – and in other situations, 
several types of force may be used simultaneously.  Thus positing Taser as an 
alternative to, and comparing it with, other force options is not always helpful.  
Furthermore, comparing Taser to other weapons also misses the key question 
of whether force actually needed to be used in the first place – a key point of 
contention for subjects.  Indeed, noting that officer explanations for using Taser 
include reference to other forms of force causing more injuries, the IPCC 
commented that in place of such comparisons, they ‘would expect to see 
greater emphasis placed on… using communication and the information they 
have rather than a quick escalation to use of force’ – i.e. a consideration that 
the use of Taser, regardless of its benefits, may not be warranted (IPCC 
2014a).   
Another feature of some officer accounts is a distinction between the ‘physical’ 
and ‘crude’ force options they have at their disposal, and the technologically 
advanced incapacitation achieved with Taser which may help to produce the 
distancing effect that Collins (2009, 2012) notes can assist individuals in dealing 
with the tension and fear that violent situations provoke.  Whilst officers may 
perceive that Taser is ‘nicer’ and less brutal than other forms of force, as 
Chapter 5 demonstrated, for some subjects it is experienced as just the 
opposite – as highly painful, brutal, and panic-inducing.  As the IPCC have 
noted, ‘there is an obvious mismatch between the public perception that Taser 
is a high level use of force that should only be considered when faced with the 
most serious threats of violence and… (the police’s rationale) that Taser 
presents a lower risk’ than other options (IPCC 2014: 25).  Thus Taser may not 
always be seen as the ‘nicer’, ‘minimal’ use of force option that some officers 
would like it to be.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented two differing accounts on Taser and officer 
safety: a traditional account, which stresses the benefits of the weapon, and a 
second, more challenging account. Whilst it is up to the reader to decide which 
account, or blending of accounts, they find most convincing, I want to use the 
conclusion to pull together some conclusions—substantive, theoretical and 
methodological--that I feel can be drawn from the foregoing discussion.   
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Substantively, whilst many officers view the weapon as enhancing their safety, 
and it does appear to bring many benefits, the possibility exists that carrying it 
may, under certain circumstances, actually place them at more risk.  
Specifically, they may be more likely to be single crewed, to be sent to riskier 
jobs and to take the lead in managing such situations when there.  Interestingly, 
however, these issues were generally not seen as negative by officers, and 
were only discussed in response to specific questions posed by the researcher.   
This, in turn, highlights a second substantive point worthy of attention.  Whilst 
recognising some limitations of the weapon, officers are generally highly 
positive about it.  Such views are highly compelling, have much to recommend 
them and it is certainly has not been my intention to ‘prove’ them wrong.  I 
simply hope to have demonstrated that the generic human tendencies towards 
confirmation bias, and to assume that efficiency explains success, when 
combined with the clever marketing used by electric-shock manufacturers 
(Wozniak and Uggan 2009) and the loyalty the Taser brand inspires (Stanbrook 
2008), may lead to an underestimation of the disadvantages of the weapon and 
the socio-technical network surrounding it, and that these should not be 
overlooked. Whilst the efficacy of the weapon has clearly played a key role in its 
success, it is also possible that the reverse tendency is also at work and the 
weapon’s success and positive evaluations are, in turn, influencing officer’s 
perceptions of the benefits it has for their safety, and the safety of those on 
whom it is used. Instead of just assuming that the weapon is successful 
because it is effective and relatively safe, it is necessary to consider the 
possibility that its success, and high status, may mean that individuals perceive 
and interpret events and possibilities (including the likelihood of injury, and an 
effective outcome) in particular ways. Any accounts of its safety and efficacy—
including my own—should  not be seen as explaining the weapon’s success, 
but as features in need of further investigation. 
Verdicts on the weapon’s effects,  safety and efficiency should therefore best be 
understood as the product of a range of socio-technical factors—including, but 
most certainly not limited to, the material properties of the weapon—instead of 
being seen as straightforward reflections of the ‘true’ effects of the weapon’s 
properties.  The advantages and disadvantages associated with the weapon are 
not predetermined by its properties, but are—at least in part—the products of 
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socio-technical constructions around the weapon; an insight broadly in keeping 
with constructivist STS and ANT perspectives. 
Moreover, the chapter has also shown that distinctions between the social and 
the technical are not so easily made.   So-called ‘technical’ features (e.g. the 
nature of the electrical charge producing incapacitation, the red-dot laser 
sight)—themselves products of human and non-human agency—seamlessly 
interact with so-called ‘social’ features (the fear of the ‘red-dot’, awe of the 
incapacitation effect) to produce particular results, whilst the (perceived) 
efficacy of the weapon may be precisely what puts officers at more risk, 
increasing their changes of being sent to more dangerous incidents. 
Theoretically, whilst certain features of the constructivist Science and 
Technology Studies literature can assist us in reaching such conclusions, such 
insights are by no means unique to, or the preserve of, those working from such 
a perspective.  Many STS tenets resonate closely with much of the prior 
discussion in this chapter.  STS’s symmetry postulate usefully reminds us not to 
explain away the success of certain technologies by reference to their inherent 
technical features or predetermined material impact, nor to explain away failure 
simply by reference to the ‘social’.  The success or efficacy of a technology 
should not be simply explained by the ‘fact’ that it is successful or effective: 
instead, the fact that it is seen by many to be successful or effective is exactly 
what needs to be explained in the first place.  Similarly, the STS focus not on a 
given technology, but on the broader sociotechnical network surrounding it, has 
also been useful here. 
Yet the utility and novelty of such approaches can  be overstated.  For example, 
the analytical technique of interpreting, reinterpreting and advancing different 
accounts of interviewees’ views—instead of taking them at face value—has a 
long history in academic analysis, and not least in policing research.   Similarly, 
the insight that new technologies, and the socio-technical networks around 
them, might impact police practice in ways which can improve or detract from 
officer safety is hardly new.  Thus in reaching the substantive conclusions that I 
have here, STS may well be a rich and interesting ingredient, but is hardly an 
essential one.   
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Nevertheless, on a related methodological note, this chapter has highlighted 
that attempts to assess the safety of the weapon should look not only at the 
technical features of the weapon, but at the socio-technical practices 
surrounding it – and thus techniques capable of capturing some of this nuance 
should be used.  Statistical analysis is only able to capture a fraction of what 
officers feel are the merits and demerits of the weapon, and only a fraction of 
the complex impacts that the weapon may have on their safety, and the safety 
of others.  Whilst such statistical analyses are still highly useful, one  must not 
assume that they can provide definitive assessments, and should explore how 
such analyses can usefully be complemented by qualitative techniques, 
including those drawing on constructivist STS approaches.    
The chapter has also suggested several avenues for further research.  An area 
for further exploration is the possibility, noted earlier on in the Chapter, that 
officers may favour Taser because it seems to tap into, and sit well with, pre-
existing conceptions and beliefs they may have about the role of policing, the 
need to use of force, and their attitudes towards using it – but that the weapon 
may appeal to different officers for different reasons. Further research into what 
pre-existing attitudes and beliefs the weapon is appealing to, and how such 
attitudes may, in turn, affect what kinds of force officers use, and the frequency 
with which they use it, is a matter for further research (see also Klahm et al 
2011, and Terrill et al 2003).  Such research would not only help advance our 
understanding of how and why Taser is used, and how it impacts on officer and 
subject safety, but would also advance the literature on police culture and police 
subcultures.  It may also help explain the  puzzle that whilst  officer level 
characteristics are statistically significant, and important in explaining variation 
in the use of force (Klahm et al 2011), neither officer gender, ethnicity, 
education levels or length of service are able to explain the degree of variation 
present.  Further research into the role that cognitive biases play in officers’ 
assessments of weapons may also be helpful. 
Taking such gaps in our knowledge into account, it is clear that the impact of 
Taser on officer safety is complex, with the ‘technical’ and ‘social’ facets of the 
weapon inextricably linked.  These facets need to be carefully studied, and 
appropriate mitigation measures considered, before making any 
pronouncements on the weapons’ impact on officer safety.    
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Towards Part 3.   
Taken as a whole, Section 2 of the thesis has attempted to tackle important 
questions about how Taser is used in practice and the impacts of this use for 
subjects and officers (Research Questions 1 and 2, as set out in the 
introduction to this thesis) and has explored the utility and novelty of 
constructivist and ANT approaches (Research Question 5).  In order to 
investigate such topics I have temporarily had to bracket important questions 
about the legal framework, policy, training and accountability mechanisms 
around Taser.  Yet, in reality, these issues are all closely connected.   Bearing 
this in mind, I now move to the third and final section of the thesis, which seeks 
to continue to explore question 5, whilst providing an answer to Research 
Question 3) and 4), namely: how is, and what stories are told around the 
weapon, how complete are they, and how is Taser regulated and accounted for.  
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Part 3: The Stories and Regulatory Frameworks around Taser. 
                                                                                                                                     
In Part 3 of the thesis, I focus on three inter-related stories around Taser—the 
notion of decision-making around the weapon being a responsibility for the 
individual officer, an image of the weapon as a neutral ‘tool’, and the existence 
of sufficient accountability mechanisms—and argue that these are not wholly 
inaccurate, but that they are incomplete.   
Chapter 8 focuses on the stories of ‘individual responsibility’ and ‘Taser as a 
tool’, whilst Chapter 9 focuses on the story of ‘robust’ accountability 
mechanisms. This division of labour also allows Chapter 8 to focus on the 
mechanisms in place prior to Taser use—i.e. the guidance and training  
provided to officers before they use the weapon—and Chapter 9 to focus on 
mechanisms in place after its use.  Finally, Chapter 10 provides an overall 
conclusion to the thesis.  
With these points of clarification addressed, then, I start by turning to Chapter 8, 




Chapter 8: Individual Decisions, Neutral Tools? 
This chapter seeks to engage with two commonly heard stories around the 
Taser weapon.  I start by outlining the commonly encountered theme that 
decision making around Taser is an individual responsibility for the officer 
tasked with carrying the weapon, and discuss how this intersects with police 
discretion, a prominent theme within the academic literature.  In so doing, I 
highlight the relative lack of guidance given to officers about when, how and in 
what conditions to use the weapon – a situation that contrasts markedly with the 
situation in some other countries.  In Section 2, I outline the notion, again 
widespread in both academic and non-academic circles, of Taser as a neutral 
tool.  Yet a key concept in ANT, that of generalised symmetry, sensitises us to 
the notion that technologies may be more than mere tools, and asks us to 
consider the possibility that they can ‘make others do things’ (Latour in Waltz 
2006: 58) – and Section 3 aims to explore such possibilities.   It draws on a rich 
variety of sources—from constructivist Science and Technology Studies and 
Actor-Network Theory to cognitive neuroscience, in particular Dror’s (2007) 
theory of police use of force decision making—and a range of methods, from 
interviews to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests, to argue that such 
stories are not necessarily inaccurate but are incomplete, and should be 
complemented by a focus on agency other than that of the individual officer.   
In particular I use the example of the police training curriculum to argue both 
that there is a need to focus on the decisions made by other human actants 
elsewhere in the Taser network – and that the agency supposedly exercised by 
humans is not unlimited, but subject to certain constraints.  This is particularly 
important given the weight that case law from the European Court of Human 
Rights has attached to issues of planning and control and training in assessing 
potential violations of the right to life (Skinner 2014, see also De Sanctis 2006). 
 I then discuss the role of Taser, illustrating the need to consider not just the role 
of human actants in decision making, but to consider the possibility that 
technologies such as Taser  may be more than mere tools, and engage in a 
‘dance of agency’ with human actants in ways that can impact decision making.  
This work is particularly important because, as Sousa et al note (2010: 38), ‘a 
wider range of options (of force techniques) may change the decision-making 
process’ – but this area has been little studied, and ‘researchers and 
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policymakers have not yet fully explored the impact of (Taser)… on police 
decisions’ to use force.  This chapter aims to go some way in filling this gap. 
Overall I argue that, whilst decisions around the use of Taser in probe-firing 
mode are often seen as ones for individual officers, human and non-human 
agency and decisions taken elsewhere in the chain of command will influence 
the ways in which officers make such decisions – thus bringing into question the 
extent to which they can truly be said to be individualised.  Moreover, such 
influences may combine to make officers more, not less, likely to use Taser in 
probe-firing mode.  Such findings have implications for police practice as well as 
for academic debates around discretion, which could benefit from a serious 
consideration of the role that non-human actants may play in shaping 
discretionary decisions.  I further argue that that, whilst this line of argument 
demonstrates the relevancy of constructivist Science and Technology Studies 
insights, it also demonstrates some of the weaknesses and challenges in 
applying such approaches to empirical research of this kind. 
It is important to start, however, by examining the stories themselves, beginning 
with the notion of Taser use as an individual choice for rank-and-file officers to 
make. 
Decisions around Taser use as an Individual Responsibility. 
Law and Policy Documents 
The notion of decisions around the use of Taser (and the use of force more 
generally) as ones for individual officers is a cornerstone of the English and 
Welsh legal system. Section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 states that: ‘a 
person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the 
prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders 
or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large’ and Section 117 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act similarly states that an officer can use 
‘reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power’. Section 76 of the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, building on Section 3 of the Criminal 
Law Act 1967, clarifies that ‘the question whether the degree of force used by… 
(the officer) was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference 
to the circumstances as (the officer) believed them to be’.  Whilst the Act notes 
that 'the reasonableness... of that belief' is 'relevant' to the question of whether 
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or not the officer genuinely believed it, if it is determined that the belief was 
genuinely held, then it doesn’t matter whether the belief was ‘mistaken’, or 
whether it was ‘reasonable’ for the officer to hold it. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and its case law, with its emphasis 
on proportionality and necessity as criteria for helping to assess the 
reasonableness of force used is also highly relevant here given that Section 
3(1) of the Human Rights Act (1998) states that ‘so far as it is possible to do so, 
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a 
way which is compatible with the Convention rights’, whilst  Section 6 makes it 
unlawful for a public authority to ‘act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right’.  Case law under Article 2 of the ECHR does move beyond a 
focus on the individual officer to encompass a focus on the control and planning 
of a particular operation, and of training received by the individual officer 
(Skinner 2014), however, as De Sanctis (2006: 32) notes, this approach has not 
been adopted consistently by the Court, and there is a need to consider issues 
around rules of engagement and training ‘in a more thoughtful and 
comprehensive way’. 
I return to relevant case law, and assessments of proportionality and necessity,  
in more detail in the next chapter of the thesis. For our purposes here, however, 
the key point is that, in making decisions about the proportionality, necessity 
and reasonableness of force used, the locus of responsibility, legal and 
otherwise, is placed firmly on the individual officer, who is empowered to 
exercise his or her discretion (see also Squires and Kennison 2010: 335) –even 
whilst ECHR judgements may (quite rightly) consider not just the individual 
exercise of discretion, but also consider broader factors including training, 
guidance and rules of engagement and planning and control of the operation.  
The College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice (APP) on Use of Force 
is even more explicit on this point.  It notes the latitude that officers have to 
‘exercise their discretion’ (College of Policing 2013a) and states that ‘when a 
police officer makes use of a… less lethal weapon by deliberately pointing it or 
by discharging the weapon… that will constitute a use of force for which the 
officer is both legally and organisationally accountable… If the force used is not 
reasonable and proportionate, the officer is open to criminal or misconduct 
proceedings’ (College of Policing 2013a).  It further notes that officers are 
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'individually responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions… 
(including) decisions to refrain from using force as well as any decisive action 
taken, including… the use of a less lethal weapon’ (College of Policing 2013a: 
no page number).   
Similarly the College of Policing APP for the use of Taser (College of Policing 
2014a) sets few, if any, parameters on the use of the weapon.  It notes that ‘it is 
not practicable or possible to provide a definitive list of circumstances where 
Taser would be appropriate’, but instead notes that it can be used ‘when dealing 
with an incident with the potential for conflict’.  Thus the guidance enables the 
weapon’s use in a very broad range of circumstances, and stresses that it is for 
the officers ‘decide on the most reasonable and necessary use of force’.  
Moreover, whilst officers are ‘expected’ to ‘have regard to’ the APP, it is noted 
that they can ‘deviate from…(it), provided there is a clear rationale for doing so’ 
(College of Policing 2014b). 
Whilst this might be seen by some as providing officers with insufficient 
guidance around the use of the weapon, the document reassures us that 
officers who use the weapon ‘will be both legally and organisationally 
accountable’, and that ‘officers are individually accountable in law for the 
amount of force they use on a person' (College of Policing 2014a: no page 
number) – wording to which I shall return in the next chapter.  It also notes that 
officers are provided with assistance to help them make such decisions.  
Specifically, when deciding whether or not to use Taser, the guidance states 
that officers should apply the National Decision Model (NDM) to assist them, 
and may ‘only’ use the weapon after they have done so.  As one Trainer noted, 
‘there are no specific deployment criteria for Taser officers to meet: no other 
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Centred around the Code of Ethics, the model (shown above) sets out five 
areas that should be considered by officers before making a decision.  Thus 
officers must try to consider, define and clarify the information and intelligence 
available to them, analyse the threat posed by the situation or individual and 
consider the powers, policies and legislation that apply.  Using the results of this 
information and analysis they are then required to identify the different options 
and contingencies at their disposal, before taking action.    
As the above illustration shows, the NDM is a general decision making model 
intended for use in any situations where decisions have to be made in policing, 
and is not specific to decisions involving the use of force or Taser.  Thus officers 
are provided with very little specific assistance, from either the law, APP or from 
the National Decision Model, as to when the use of Taser may be more or less 
appropriate.  Indeed, in some of the training courses I attended, officers were 
advised that a vast range of decisions could be compatible with the NDM.  
Hence trainee Taser officers were advised that: 
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‘The threat and risk is…  the most important element, as everything else 
is outside of your thought process. Every decision you make is 
influenced by what you put in that box – it influences everything that 
comes after it.  If you were scared, say ‘I was scared’ – personalising that 
threat assessment is the key to your success’.  (Taser trainer, Force 
details omitted).   
Such an approach is in stark contrast to the more traditional approaches to use 
of force regulation, many of which have taken the form of use of force 
continuums (Miller 2010).  As Miller notes, in many jurisdictions such as the 
USA, many forces use such a continuum, which detail different levels of subject 
behaviour on a continuum from no resistance up to deadly resistance, and then 
specify the degree of resistance that should be present before particular use of 
force options, including Taser, can be used (Adams and Jennison 2007, Miller 
2010).  As Adams and Jennison (2007) have noted, agencies differ greatly on 
where Taser goes on this spectrum, with little consensus on  the appropriate 
place for the weapon.  Whilst such models have, quite rightly, been subject to 
considerable criticism along various lines (Dymond and Corney 2015, Flosi 
2012), it is important to note that, in specifying deployment criteria, including the 
kinds of circumstances and levels of subject resistance to which Taser is an 
appropriate response, they provide a marked contrast to the model in England 
and Wales, which sets out far fewer standards and guidelines for use. 
Taser training  
Drawing, as it does, on such policy documents, it should be no surprise that the 
training is often unable to give much in the way of additional guidance, feedback 
to officers about when use might be appropriate, or flag up questionable 
decisions or policing styles.  Instead, Trainers explained to trainees during the 
course of the Taser training that ‘there's no right or wrong, just bounds of 
reason’, and noted the number of divergent ways in which officers might handle 
a situation.  One trainer described to me how ‘I can go into certain 
circumstances and deal with it by talking whereas... a specific colleague, who I 
know, would revert directly back to incapacitant or baton without even trying to 
talk their way out of it… (and) there might be somebody else who goes straight 
into the same situation and they'll look at it and they'll go straight for Taser’.  He 
noted, however, that: 
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‘I don't have an issue with that because that is their threat perception. 
And if their threat perception is up through the ceiling somewhere then 
they have to justify why they've gone for Taser... As a department we 
tend not to criticise people, we would say to people ‘did you consider this 
option, that option, before you tasered them? The chances are they're 
going come back and say ‘Well actually yes I did but my threat 
assessment was so high I decided to (use it)’ (Taser trainer, Force 
details omitted). 
In a similar vein, a trainer noted on several occasions that ‘it’s not for us to 
change your policing style’ and that ‘we’re not out to change how officers 
police’.  Whilst this is understandable, officers on Taser training came from a 
wide range of background and operational duties.  Some had policing styles 
that were a lot more confrontational than others. For example, my 
contemporaneous observations from one training course describe how different 
officers reacted to a training scenario where they were faced with ‘an individual 
breaking and entering a property, holding a crowbar and pickaxe, and carrying a 
bag with a screwdriver and knife inside’.  I noted that, of the three officers I 
observed face the scenario on a particular day: 
‘The first two situations were peacefully observed (sic) without any use or 
drawing of the Taser whatsoever, and the suspect was searched and 
handcuffed. The third officer came in and was aggressive off of the bat, 
immediately pointed Taser, asked him (the suspect) several times to 
drop the weapon and then Tasered him.  The officer then Tasered him 
again, as he went to move his hands to his pockets when he was lying 
down (NB the subject had the knife in his pockets).  In the debrief for this 
officer he was described as being ‘proactive straight away’ - but the 
inference was that he could justify it, and he wasn't criticised for this. 
Instead it was noted that ‘you could have spent longer talking but you 
had asked him three times’. 
Whilst trainers may not see it as their job to change how individuals police, not 
all policing styles may be equally compatible with, or suitable to, the Taser 
weapon.  Indeed, as the example above shows, some styles might encourage 
officers to use the weapon relatively early on,  or to use the weapon in 
situations where a different approach might have negated the need to use force 
(see also Squires and Kennison 2010: 32-33, who note the risk of officers 
discharging firearms as ‘necessary’ responses to a situation that their ‘own 
interventions may have provoked’). However,  some trainers did not see it as 
their job to alter policing styles, and also noted the difficulties involved in 
questioning officers’ handling of situations.  Thus, when explaining to me how 
officers could fail the training, an instructor noted that:  
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‘The usual thing (that causes officers to fail) is people that can't fire it... its 
quite black and white there. You could say ‘well I’m not sure that person's 
tactics are right’ but that’s a subjective thing from our experiences and 
we could argue with the student about that’ (Taser trainer, force omitted). 
Thus officers are taught, via the training, to make their own decisions about 
when to use the weapon – with these decisions not always open to challenge.  
This approach was contrasted, favourably, with earlier models that had been 
used in policing.  Thus trainers noted that: 
'Over the years officer... training has changed.  You used to have charts 
of what an officer did and the subject did and it had to match.... Whereas 
now...they (the officers) make a decision as to the most appropriate 
option... it puts a bit of pressure on the officers but actually I think it’s 
better, because then you can justify (it)’ (Taser trainer, force omitted). 
Officers 'can turn up to a job and, in line with NDM, make their own threat 
assessment without having to have someone else, who is sat in a control 
room, make that assessment for them.... the officers make the decision 
(and) justify their own decisions’ (Taser trainer, force omitted) .   
This notion of police use of force as an ‘individual responsibility’ accompanied 
by relatively vague guidance around when to use the weapon, was also one 
echoed by Taser trained officers at various stages of the policing hierarchy.  
Many Taser trained officers took pride in their decision making skills and 
relished the responsibility, seeing the decision to use the weapon as theirs, and 
theirs alone: 
'They don’t give you much guidance, but I think that's a good thing.  I 
wouldn't want to get to an incident and have to be thinking 'what would 
(the trainer) want me to do in this situation? (Taser officer, Force A). 
 
‘(Some officers) don't want to be responsible, perhaps, for using Taser... 
(but) it’s the same as everything, it’s down to your decision making…. I’m 
not worried as I’m sure of my decision making skills’ (Taser officer, Force 
A). 
                                                                                                                                      
Thus decisions around whether (and how) to use the Taser weapon are seen as 
individual choices to be made by individual officers, with relatively little 
assistance offered by the legal framework, by Authorised Professional Practice 
or by their training, as to when its use might be appropriate.  (For interested 
readers, a longer discussion of Taser training has also been published as 
182 
 
Dymond (2016b, where I discuss some issues around the content of Taser 
training, as well as notable gaps and ‘silences’ in the training curriculum).  
It could be argued that this situation contrasts markedly with the situation faced 
by firearms officers who, although they are ultimately responsible for their 
decision to discharge firearms, nevertheless discharge this decision making 
under what Squires and Kennison (2010: 18) describe as ‘the virtual umbrella of 
legal accountability established by the command structure’ – a structure which 
authorises their actions and alleviates their ‘burden of responsibility’. Academic 
Literature 
In the academic literature, too, the notion of police use of force as a product of 
‘individual decision and action’ is also prevalent.  The so-called  ‘discovery’ 
(Nickels 2007: 570) of discretion in the 60s allowed for a shift away from the 
previously dominant ‘legalistic’ view of the police—which saw officers 
‘unthinkingly’ applying the law (Sherman 1984: 69), including via the application 
of force—and a corresponding shift towards models that stressed the agency of 
individual officers in making complex decisions.  Thus many authors tended to 
paint a sharp distinction between legal and policy restrictions on the one hand, 
and free choice and human agency on the other.  Davis’ (in Holmberg 2000: 
181) original definition of discretion argued that a ‘public officer has discretion 
whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice 
among possible courses of action or inaction’.  Dworkin’s classic formulation 
sees discretion as ‘the hole in the doughnut...an area left open by a surrounding 
belt of restriction' (Dworkin in Campbell 1999: 80).     
Similarly, later authors have also defined discretion in terms of the ‘power of 
choice’ (Holmberg 2000: 181) and the ability to ‘exercise free choice’ (Campbell 
1999:79).  Whilst critiquing some of the ways in which the term is used, Nickels 
also finds value in a definition of the term as the ‘perceived authority to make 
choices’ (2007: 575).  Law and legal guidelines are thus contrasted with the free 
choice of the officer. 
Moreover, the officer’s choices, and the decisions he or she makes, are often 
seen as the product of conscious, rational deliberation.  For example, 
Goldstein’s classic article (1960) gave several examples of discretion in 
practice.  One such example, concerned with the use of informants in the drugs 
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trade, officers used rational cost-benefit calculations in order to make a decision 
on how best to proceed.  More recently, Rowe’s (2007: 298) study of police 
officers’ exercise of discretion in domestic violence incidents in the UK similarly 
posited a largely rational, conscious process of calculating and weighing up the 
importance of various factors—namely the possibility of getting into ‘trouble’ 
with their superior officers in light of the Department’s positive arrest policy, the 
risk of the perpetrator offending again, and the risk of injury to the subject–when 
deciding whether or not to make an arrest.  Much of the literature on police 
discretion, then, puts the emphasis firmly on the agency of individual officers in 
making decisions and, more specifically, on conscious decision making 
processes.  
Of course, the literature around police discretion has been subject to several 
critiques.  Yet these critiques often seem to operate within a human centric 
paradigm.  Pepinsky (1984: 266) was one of the first to argue that analysts were 
equating ‘individual autonomy’ with ‘freedom of choice’.  He argued that the 
absence of relevant laws did not therefore mean that officers had ‘absolute’ 
freedom of choice, as the expectations of others, whether formally codified or 
not, could impact decision making.  As such, the ‘discretionary’ choices officers 
made were, in reality, ‘as much as product of social control’ and as ‘fully 
influenced by people’ as outcomes governed by the applicability of formal rules 
(1984: 266).   Nearly fifteen years later, Campbell (1999) argued that the 
‘misconceptions’ identified by Pepinsky had not been rectified. Campbell 
invoked Giddens’ structuration theory to argue that ‘human agency is rarely, if 
ever, voluntary… all human behaviour is both structured and structuring’ (1999: 
80) – and is structured, in this case, by notions such as ‘democratic policing’ 
and the organisational structure of police forces.  Yet, she lamented, this was 
seldom considered in the literature on discretion, which failed to consider how 
‘free choice may be already… ordered, routinized and structured by (a range of) 
phenomena’ (Campbell 1999: 80). 
Of course, some work has been done to identify such ‘phenomena’.  Thus 
Finckenauer’s study of police decisions to arrest those who had committed a 
range of potential crimes stressed the role of ‘the community’ in perpetuating 
‘selective enforcement depending upon the socioeconomic status of the 
offender’ (1976: 31, 36-7).  His research also suggested that the desire to 
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maintain a positive public image of policing, as well as the experience and 
education level of the officers involved, were important factors in police decision 
making.  The voluminous literature on police subculture (as critically discussed, 
for example, in Shearing and Ericson 1991, and revisited in Paoline 2004) also 
provides an important source of insight into factors that can influence what may 
appear to be subjective, personal decisions.     More recently, the emphasis on 
‘implicit bias’ from both the College of Policing (2015b) and the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (2016) speaks to the continued interest in the 
importance of less conscious processes in informing individual decision making.   
Yet, as Latour (2005: 21) notes, all too often sociological studies such as these 
adopt a ‘shrinking definition of the social’ and, in this case, a ‘shrinking 
definition’ of the kind of factors that might influence discretionary decisions.  
Many of the factors listed above are often conceived of as largely human in 
origin, either because they are factors somehow internal to the individual officer, 
or because they are shaped by external human influences, norms and values. 
Thus, when analysts attempt to identify the ‘phenomena’ structuring 
discretionary choices, more often than not the phenomena they identify turn out 
to be human in origin.  These factors are important, but focusing almost 
exclusively on human actors ignores the important roles that non-humans can 
play, and risks adopting a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ which denies that there ‘exist 
many more figures than anthropomorphic ones’ (Latour 2005: 53 -4).  
Seen in this light, even critiques of discretion typically have the same ‘kneejerk 
reaction’.  Pepinsky’s powerful critique, and his calls for more attention to be 
paid to the factors that might influence decision making, falls back on the notion 
of the decisions of officers being ‘influenced by people’ – thus reaffirming the 
notion that these factors are solely human in origin (1984: 266).  Similarly, 
Campbell’s article uses structuration theory – a theory which sees ‘social 
structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are 
the very medium of this constitution’ (1999: 81). As Greenhalgh and Stones 
argue, the ‘technical dimension’ is ‘undertheorised’ in structuration theory, 
leading them to suggest that the approach may be profitably combined with the 
constructivist STS literature, including ANT (2010: 1287). 
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Even authors that explicitly consider the role of technology in influencing 
discretion do so in human centric ways.  Thus Bayley and Bittner’s research into 
police training programmes (1984) usefully discussed the issue of officer 
discretion, and factors that may influence it.  In their description, the very 
reporting forms that officers use to record encounters with the public, and 
specific actions that they have undertaken, are seen to exert a ‘powerful’ 
influence (1984: 40).  Thus the authors note that: 
‘These forms structure choice, because officers know that if they take an 
action not specified, they will be required to provide an explanation. 
Explicit and detailed forms not only simplify reporting, they raise the cost 
of exercising initiative’ (1984: 40). 
But read a little closer and these forms are seen as little more than what Latour 
might term ‘intermediaries’ (Latour in Waltz 2005: 61).  Bayley and Bittner note 
that the forms simply ‘convey’ the expectations of human actants, namely 
‘supervisors’, ‘sergeants’ and ‘lieutenants’ (1984: 39 – 40).  Thus when 
technologies are given a role, this role is simply seen as one of passively 
implementing human agency.   
Overall, then, much of the academic literature provides a highly human centric 
account of police decision making.  As such, it places a high emphasis on the 
agency of individual officers in making use of force decisions at exactly the 
same time that legal standards, APP, the training curriculum and the stories of 
senior and grass-roots officers all conceptualise and reduce the issues around 
police use of force to individual decisions made by individual officers.   
Taser as a tool. 
This focus on human actants is mirrored by a conception of technologies as 
mere tools.  The active consideration given to human actors is accompanied by 
a lack of consideration given to the distinct contribution that technologies might 
make, and how they might impact decision making.  Indeed, a recurring theme 
that emerged time and time again from my field work, my empirical research 
and my reading of peer-reviewed articles, was the tendency to describe Taser 
as a tool.  At the highest levels of policing, the NPCC and the UK’s largest 
police force, the Metropolitan Police, note that:  
‘On some occasions officers will have to use force and of course there 
will always be a risk when force is used – whether the tool chosen is an 
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open hand… or indeed a Taser…  Officers must be held to account when 
they use force regardless of the tool that is used’ (NPCC 2015a).  
‘Tasers can be a useful tool in safely subduing drug affected people who 
might otherwise be very difficult to restrain’ (NPCCb 2015).  
‘Taser is an additional tactical option that allows officers to manage 
situations where violence is threatened or likely from a safe distance’ 
(Metropolitan Police, nd).   
Thus Taser is a ‘tool’, option’ or piece of equipment that can be easily 
interchanged with other force options, and is another tool assisting officers in 
meeting predetermined goals (e.g. managing violent situations, safely subduing 
drug affected people).  Similarly, Taser trainers noted that: 
‘We have to provide the tools that are effective for the job… there has to 
be something there that helps boys and girls when they are out there to 
do their job effectively, and Taser is that less impact weapon’.  
‘We’re not looking to change your policing style, (but are) just giving you 
an extra tool to use’. 
Similarly, Taser officers from Forces A and B noted: 
‘It’s another tool in the box, really and it does make you feel a bit safer’ 
(Taser trained officer, in Force B). 
 
 ‘‘It’s another tool in the box, it’s an extra option, not suitable for every-
time but suitable sometimes... It’s gonna stop someone running up the 
road with a knife..., self-harming and attacking me, so It should resolve 
an issue before it gets really out of hand’ (Taser trained officer, in Force 
A). 
 
‘The opportunity was offered (to become a Taser trained officer)… and I 
just thought that it is such a large area and it’s a useful tool to have for 
myself and my colleagues’ (Taser trained officer, in Force B). 
As I noted in Chapter 1, in the academic literature, too, Taser was also 
commonly referred to as a tool to assist humans in achieving various, more or 
less progressive, pre-determined aims and objectives (see Anais 2015, 
Jauchem 2010, Oriola 2012, Spriggs 2009, Wright 1991).  These differing 
accounts—those offered by the police, the medical community, critical 
criminologists and statisticians—nevertheless share a similar conception of 
Taser as nothing more than an ‘intermediary’.   Indeed, as Anais notes in her 
analysis of the literature on LLWs more broadly, the most common conception 
is of them as ‘neutral objects that do not do anything until human beings pick 
them up, form intent, and use them to act on that intent' (emphasis in original 
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2015: 27).  She thus criticises the existing literature for ‘neglect(ing) the 
possibility that technologies take a range of contingent forms, have a range of 
unintended consequences and exist in... complex and often inarticulate 
relationship(s) ' (2015: 13: 138) – possibilities I intend to explore further here.   
Beyond these stories.   
It is perfectly understandable why these actors would use the common sense 
term ‘tool’ to describe Taser – and, indeed, to describe other weapons (Latour 
1991:31).  Yet there is also a danger with such accounts for, as Latour notes, 
describing something as a tool is to describe it as a ‘medium, a neutral carrier of 
will’ (1994: 31).  Waltz (2006: 56) agrees, noting that the use of the term acts to 
‘deflect analysis’ because technologies are simply ‘subsumed by human 
intention, design, or drive’. The term tool implies a neutral, passive entity, and 
encourages one to skip over the technology and to focus on the human actant 
wielding it. 
Similarly, it is understandable why many academics and practitioners alike 
stress the importance of individual decisions to use force.  Clearly, the use of 
Taser cannot be understood without an emphasis on the decision making of the 
officers charged with using the weapon.  Yet there is a danger that, in focusing 
solely on the responsibility of officers, we ignore the role of the socio-technical 
network around Taser in shaping the decisions that have to be made.  Taken 
together, then, these stories encourage the belief that the agency of the officer 
is the only agency that matters, when there are multiple sources of agency—
both human and non-human—at play.  
In the remainder of this chapter, then, I use two empirical examples to 
demonstrate that so-called ‘individual decisions’ can be affected by a range of 
other influences.   I look first at the impact the design of the officer safety 
training curriculum may have on ‘individual decisions’.  Whilst this serves to 
make the general point that officer decisions are not theirs and theirs alone, but 
are structured by decisions that have been made elsewhere, it maintains a 
focus on human actants and, in particular, on senior officials who design and 
implement the training. As such, my second example thus directly examines the 
question of the non-human agency of Taser.  In putting forward these examples 
I use the ANT concept of generalised symmetry to abandon a priori 
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assumptions about the importance of various actors.  Instead I seek to explore 
which actants, if any, have agency, are able to make distinct contributions and 
are active mediators, and which actants are passive, simple mediators – without 
simply assuming that such distinctions simply map onto human / non-human 
dualisms.   
Officer Safety Training. 
Regular, formalised officer safety training – including training on use of force 
techniques – has a relatively short history in England and Wales, being 
introduced in the early 1990s (Buttle 2007).  Such training is crucial: as Geller 
and Toch note, officers need to be highly skilled in order to be competent users 
of force (in Buttle 2007).  It is also imperative that officers have a range of 
options—up to and including the use of force—at their disposal if they are 
genuinely to be able to exercise choice in a given situation.  This necessitates 
providing officers with a range of communication skills and tactics to enable 
them to resolve situations without recourse to any force whatsoever.  It also 
requires that officers receive sufficient training on force techniques available to 
them other than Taser—options such as empty hand techniques, baton strikes, 
or use of irritant spray—so that they are able to make decisions based on which 
force technique is the most appropriate in a given situation, as opposed to ruling 
out certain options because they do not feel confident in their use.  
However, evidence suggests that training in each of these areas could do with 
improvement.  The IPCC has recently highlighted room for improvement around 
officer communication skills. They found that, of the 191 cases of police use of 
force which were independently investigated or managed by the IPCC between 
2009 and 2014, inadequate communication was found to have taken place in 
10% of them.  The IPCC have thus recommended that the police ‘provide 
training for their officers in communication techniques to help them manage and 
de-escalate situations without using force… (this) can be particularly useful to 
give officers the skills and confidence to communicate with groups with specific 
needs’ (IPCC 2016a: 76).   
In terms of the second area, training on other use of force techniques, ACPO 
historically recommended that a  minimum of two days a year was spent on 
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officer personal safety training —training which encompasses the use of 
everything from batons to incapacitent spray, handcuffs to empty hand 
techniques (HMIC 2007).   Yet it is not clear whether two days training is 
sufficient to cover these techniques.  Personal safety trainers, who admittedly 
depend on such courses for their livelihoods, noted: 
 ‘The National guidelines say a minimum 12 hours contact time... but as 
soon as someone who is paying bills see that, they immediately go ‘that’s 
two days then’ (Personal Safety Trainer, Force location omitted).  
‘If we were to go with the minimum time for everything that is included in 
the pack, that needs to be taught (in line with) the recommendations from 
ACPO, we'd need three days.  (With two days) we can get them back to 
where they should be, (doing) maintenance rather than development’ 
(Personal Safety Trainer, Force location omitted). 
Moreover, my Freedom of Information survey of all 43 territorial police forces in 
England and Wales found that several forces were not giving their officers two 
days of training.  Of the 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales, 16 
responded to an FOI request asking for the number of hours police officers 
received in personal training each year between 2009 and 2013 (the most 
recent full year for which data was available at the time the request was issued) 
– a response rate of 37%.  Of these 16 forces, 5 (31% of respondents) 
confirmed that their officers received  personal safety training of 2 days / 12 
hours, with one force providing more than 12 hours training.  The remaining 11 
forces (69% of respondents) gave their officers between 6 – 8 hours of 
refresher training.   These findings also fit in with the IPCC’s more recent 
research, which found that ‘officers considered the training (on police use of 
force) provided to be sufficient and adequate, but they did raise some concerns 
about the reduction in time dedicated to training… Some training modules 
around personal safety were considered insufficient and too infrequent to 
ensure that knowledge stayed up to date’ (2016: 16).  
Insufficient training has consequences for the individuals exposed to such force 
and for the officers involved.  Crucially for the purposes of our discussion here, 
it may also mean that officers are not fully equipped to be able to choose 
between the different use of force options that they should theoretically have at 
their disposal.  These themes came out strongly in interviews, with trainers 
noting:   
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 ‘(Post-incident, officers will) be asked to justify why they've used a level 
of force... (and) maybe they can, but there's a greater potential that they 
could use excessive force and not be able to justify it, or work out why 
they have done what they did, (because) they couldn't reproduce the 
skills necessary’ (Personal Safety Trainer, Force location omitted) 
‘Officers need to know they must be able to justify their decision making 
process with regard to ‘is it proportionate, is it legal’? ‘Am I using a 
recognised technique’? If they don't know how to do it, or if they are 
making it up, then they are very literally taking their career into their own 
hands. They risk injuries to themselves, injuries to their colleagues, 
injuries to the subjects they are dealing with. (Personal Safety Trainer, 
Force location omitted) .  
‘If they (senior officials) are saying we haven't got time to run… (2 days’ 
training) who's signing that off? If a police officer is in court and the 
Barrister says ‘I put it to you that you are not trained’... where do they 
then stand to say that ‘I do make the right decisions, and have the right 
skills?’  It’s a bit of a funny area, isn't it?’ (Personal Safety Trainer, Force 
location omitted). 
Such issues with training mean that, in practice, officers may have less use of 
force options available to them – and, moreover, may be less able to make 
clear, conscious decisions about the use of force options that they do have.  In 
some instances, this may mean that they resort to ‘animalistic’ behaviour – but 
in other instances, could mean that they fall back on using the Taser, given their 
lack of confidence with other techniques. Indeed, whilst not mentioning Taser 
specifically, one trainer noted that those with fewer empty handed techniques 
‘do rely on their kit quite a lot.  They shouldn't have to, they should be able to 
rely on their empty handed techniques’.   
Similar points have also been made by Buttle (2007), who conducted his 
research prior to the widespread roll out of Taser but nevertheless made some 
relevant observations about officer safety training.  He noted that the practice of 
tailoring officer safety training in response to officer feedback about the 
techniques used had unintended consequences.  He found that the relatively 
low levels of skill that officers possessed were leading them to choose the 
simpler, more offensive empty hand tactics over more complex, defensive 
strategies – strategies that were then, in turn, favoured in training.  This, in turn, 
encouraged officers to ‘take offensive action to pre-empt violence’ – including 
the use of LLWs such as CS (Buttle 2007: 170). 
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In such ways, then, the decisions that officers make around police use of force 
are not theirs alone.  Their agency is not unlimited, but is shaped by prior 
decisions taken elsewhere, such as decisions made by the NPCC and by senior 
officials on the frequency and content of training on communication skills and 
use of force techniques other than Taser.  In this case, there is a possibility that 
the comparative lack of training that officers receive on other force options may 
lead them to favour Taser over other techniques. 
The roles of non-humans. 
Thus far I have focused on the role played by other human actants in the 
network.  But what about the non-humans? The ANT concept of generalised 
symmetry encourages us to consider that, instead of Taser being just a passive 
tool, a series of complex interactions between the Taser and the officer carrying 
the weapon just might alter officer perception and mind-sets.  These 
interactions might impact how officers make decisions and exercise their 
discretion, and may make officers more likely to use force.  At the very least, 
argue ANT theorists, it is necessary to investigate the possibility that the non-
human may also have a role to play.  So exactly how might interactions 
between Taser and the officer alter discretionary decisions around the use of 
force?   
To help me answer this question, I draw on the framework advanced by the 
cognitive neuroscientist Dror (2007).  Dror differentiates between three distinct 
sets of factors that influence police decision making around use of force.  The 
first set of factors are ‘decision factors’ or variables associated with the decision 
itself: namely decision complexity, and the ‘pay-off’ matrix, or the consequences 
of different choices.  The second set of factors are ‘internal’ to the officer 
making the decision.  These include ‘the experience of the decision maker, their 
confidence, cognitive abilities, state of mind (and) personality’ (2007: 268).  The 
third set of factors are ‘external’, specifically time pressure and accountability 
mechanisms. Whilst Dror’s model is concerned with police use of force decision 
making in general, and is not concerned specifically with how technology may 
impact officer decision making, it nevertheless gives us space to consider the 
ways in which this may occur – and I argue that policing technologies (in this 
case, Taser) can impact all three parts of the model. 
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First, the presence of Taser or, more precisely, the interactions between the 
physical object of the Taser and the human actants who are wielding it, can 
affect the first part of Dror’s model, the concept of ‘decision factors’ by altering 
the ‘pay-off’ matrix (or the consequences) that using force may have.  Dror 
notes that less-lethal weapons can alter the ‘pay-off matrix’ around police use of 
force in positive ways, as ‘shooting a suspect has more severe consequences 
than…(using) Taser’ (2007: 267) - but it also seems possible that they can alter 
this matrix in less positive ways.   
As discussed in Chapter 7, officers saw the weapon as ‘minimal’, ‘nicer’ and 
‘less intrusive’ for subjects than other forms of force. At the same time, the 
ability of the weapon to be used at a longer distance than many other force 
options may appear to remove another potential ‘pay off’ or ‘consequence’ for 
using force, namely the risk that harm may occur to the officer.  These factors 
may heighten the likelihood that the weapon is used – not (just) as an 
alternative to firearms, as Dror (2007) would have it, but in a much broader 
range of circumstances where officers might otherwise have chosen other force 
options, or may not have used force at all.  Indeed, as the former ACPO Lead 
on Taser, Simon Chesterman, notes when commenting on Taser use in the 
USA: 
‘if you are faced with the choice of grappling with a drunk guy and 
wrestling him to the group or standing ten feet away and firing your 
Taser, it is easy to see which is more attractive.  There is a danger that 
the Taser will become the default weapon… Our national training, 
guidance and scrutiny is there to minimise this risk’ (quoted in Brown and 
Hanlon 2014: 206 -7). 
It is thus possible that such interactions between the beliefs of the officers, the 
affordances of the Taser weapon and its physical presence—particularly when 
combined with the concerns over the lack of use of force training—might alter 
how officers consider use of force decisions by altering the ‘pay-off matrix’, or 
consequences, that using force may have.  
If Taser can affect the first part of Dror’s (2007) model, it can also affect the 
second part of Dror’s model, that is the so called ‘internal’ factors, such as 
‘confidence’ and the ‘state of mind’, of the decision maker.  As discussed in 
Chapter 7, simply having the weapon increases the confidence that officers 
have in their ability to handle a situation. Thus even ‘internal’ states can be 
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affected by the presence of a non-human actor, and beliefs about its efficacy.  
Moreover, the presence of the weapon may also impact officers' states of mind 
by priming them to act in aggressive ways.  This point has been made in the 
psychology literature on weapons effects (see, for example, Berkowitz and 
LePage 1967, Klinesmith et al 2006, Brennan and Moore 2009).  This literature 
found that the ‘presence’ of a weapon (either physically or indirectly through 
some form of representation) was associated with increases in aggressive 
behaviour, when compared to the absence of such a weapon: a correlation 
described as ‘the gun pull(ing) the trigger’ (Anderson et al 1998: 313).    
Applying such studies to police use of Taser is clearly fraught with difficulties for 
several reasons.  First, one of the authors of the original study noted that ‘the 
effects depend to a considerable extent on the meaning these…(weapons) 
possess for the person’ (Berkowitz in Bartholow et al 2005: 50 – although the 
Klinesmith study found that the weapon exerted its effects via increases in 
testosterone levels). Such studies were conducted on civilian populations, and 
when similar studies were recreated on those with specialist knowledge of guns 
(in this case, hunters), the effect diminished (Bartholow et al 2005).  One can 
only speculate as to how trained police officers might respond – but Leyens et 
al (1976) provided some evidence that aggressive responses can indeed be 
reduced as a result of specific interventions and training. Second, it seems likely 
that reactions might vary according to the weapon displayed – a gun might 
provoke different reactions than a Taser, which in turn might elicit different 
reactions than would a baton, or irritant spray, for example.  Nevertheless, such 
studies provide some evidence that the presence of weapons may produce 
subtle changes in individuals charged with using them – changes that may not 
always be readily apparent to the individuals themselves. 
Indeed, trainers often noted the risk of over-use of Taser.  Typical of such 
comments was a statement made by one trainer that ‘it’s amazing how I give 
you this yellow bit of kit and you forget to use your mouth’.  Another commented 
on the ‘Taser officer walk’, where officers ‘walk around with your hand 
protecting your Taser’.  Students were warned, however, that this could be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, because ‘if you put your hand on Taser (as you 
approach them), all you think about is Taser’.   Such concerns were  under-
scored by comments from a Taser trainer who explained that: 
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‘The big problem I've got, is that some of the ones who are not firearms 
officers… are jumping far too quickly to red-dotting them, to thinking about 
Tasering… Unarmed skills? Empty hand skills? Errr.. (Officer mimes having 
a blank expression). Taser? Bang’ (Taser trainer, Force omitted).  
Such statements, said both during interviews and more publicly during training, 
may well have been exaggerated for dramatic effect, intended to emphasise to 
trainees—and myself—both the potential risks with this equipment and the 
dedication of the forces in question to tackling them.  Nevertheless, such 
statements do speak to the potential for the presence of the weapon to more or 
less subtly impact officer behaviour and to encourage the use of force. 
Third, the presence of Taser may also interact with the final part of Dror’s 
(2007) model, that of ‘external factors’ that impact decision making, amongst 
them time pressures.  Taser can impact the ‘time pressure’ that officers are 
under, for the flip side of one of the key ‘advantages’ of Taser—that it can be 
used at a distance—is that it should be used at a distance for it to be most 
effective.  When officers are faced, for example, with a potentially aggressive 
subject who is walking towards them, they have to make a decision earlier on in 
the encounter (i.e. when the subject is further away) whether or not to use the 
device – thus increasing, not decreasing, the time pressure that officers face.  
This particular time pressure is less present with other techniques, such as 
empty hand and baton, which can only be used at close quarters.  Thus the 
design of the weapon may encourage officers to use it sooner rather than later 
(see Buttle 2007 for a similar point on CS). 
Relatedly, the Taser cartridges in use in England and Wales can be used at a 
maximum distance of 6.4 metres but are at their most effective when used at 
slightly shorter distances than this.  Thus officers may be tempted to get within 
Taser range of particular individuals so that they have the option to use it, 
should they need to.  Yet this action could not only put them more at risk if an 
individual was to turn violent, but could also further risk inflaming the situation.  
The possibility of officers responding differently—in this case, getting in too 
close—because of the presence of Taser and, as such, affecting the event 
outcome were testified to by various trainers.  One trainer noted that:  
‘In our force (we had a situation) where the (Taser trained) officer was 
just simply too close... (when someone) was kicking off and he jumped 
him.  Distance, distance, that's what we try to teach our non-firearms 
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officers (on Taser courses), don't jump on… Because they have spent 
their whole career jumping on, getting hands on but actually if you think 
about… maybe thinking about it, talking about it, getting some space will 
resolve the issue’ (Taser trainer, Force omitted).  
Another trainer backed up these concerns and explicitly linked them to Taser: 
‘Conventional tactics with vulnerable people is to give them distance and 
space… The thing with Taser is, it is very good… but you have to be at a 
relatively close distance in for it be effective.  If I’m 7 -1 5 feet from you 
and you are in an agitated state that might not be great.  The person 
could now be thinking ‘You are starting to close me down’, the subject is 
feeling threatened.  If you go into Taser range you could up the ante with 
the subject’ (Taser trainer, Force omitted).  
Thus, in some circumstances, the design features of the weapon may interact 
with officer thought processes in ways which may mean that they are more 
likely, not less likely, to decide to use force.  Indeed, a study in America, which 
found Taser deployment to be ‘associated with a substantial increase in in-
custody sudden deaths in the early deployment period’, theorised that this might 
be due to ‘early liberal use of Tasers… possibly escalating some confrontations 
to the point that firearms were necessary’ (Lee et al 2009). 
Overall, then, the presence of Taser, and the way in which it interacts with 
human agency, can impact on each of the three key decision making variables - 
‘decision factors’ or variables associated with the decision itself, internal and 
external factors – that Dror (2007) argues can impact on how police officers 
make the decision to use force. Moreover, as Sousa et al’s  (2010) randomised 
control trial (RCT) shows, the nature of the incident itself is also important.  
Sousa et al’s RCT sought to examine the ‘impact of equipping police officers 
with TASERs on their use-of-force decisions during field-training exercises’ 
(2010: 35).  They found that the presence of the weapon did not impact how 
officers handled non-aggressive resistance but that, when faced with a subject 
showing aggressive physical resistance, officers with the weapon were more 
likely to favour its use over the use of pepper spray and baton.  Similarly, when 
confronted with a situation that was ‘potentially lethal’, the evidence suggested 
that officers were using Taser as an alternative to a firearm – even though such 
a decision was potentially in contravention of force policy.  So having Taser 
present did not affect the choices officers made in some circumstances, but did 
in others.  Such findings may further demonstrate that Taser is not a mere ‘tool’ 
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but may interact with human agents to have a range of surprising and 
unpredictable effects.   
Conclusion.  
This chapter has discussed two of the mainstream stories around Taser that are 
used by academics and practitioners alike—namely a conception of Taser as a 
neutral tool, and of decision making around the weapon as an individual 
responsibility for officers—and reached conclusions that are substantive, 
practical and theoretical.  
In terms of substance, its key findings are three-fold.  First, those stories are not 
necessarily inaccurate, but are incomplete.  Emphasising the decision making 
of individual officers is important but so, too, are decisions—such as the content 
of the training curriculum or, indeed, the decision to introduce the Taser—that 
have been taken elsewhere, and have the potential to impact on the decisions 
that officers may make.  As Punch (2010: 130) notes, with respect to firearms, 
‘when operations go wrong it should be senior officers high in the chain of 
command who should also appear in court and not just those officers at the 
front-line’.Similarly, whilst, in certain circumstances, Taser may appear as if it 
were just a passive tool, in other circumstances Taser, and the broader socio-
technical networks in which it sits, may make a difference, influencing  decisions 
and situations in more complex ways.   Such factors mean that the decisions 
that officers take should not be considered solely as their personal 
responsibility, but should be considered an outcome of a variety of phenomena, 
including human and nonhuman agency.  Indeed officer decision making 
around the use of Taser exists in, is informed by and cannot be understood 
without, the broader socio-technical network that exists around the weapon.   
Thus whilst Dror (2007: 269) is cautiously optimistic about the potential of ‘the 
use of technology in general’ to ‘contribute to higher quality decision making in 
policing’, this analysis shows that the impact of ‘technology’ on human decision 
making is more complex than that, and also helps answer Sousa et al’s call 
(2010: 38) for research into how use of force techniques may ‘change the 
decision-making process’.    
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Second, many of the factors discussed above—the stories that see Taser as a 
simple tool, the relative absence of training on communication skills and other 
uses of force, and the physical presence of the weapon—have the potential to 
impact officer decision making, subtlely incentivising officers to use the weapon.  
Third, the relative lack of guidance and standards contained within the relevant 
laws and standards, authorised professional practice documents, and training 
curriculum, mean that it is difficult to guard against such tendencies and to 
provide standards that might assist in preventing the misuse of the weapon.  
However well-intended, statements such as ‘there’s no right or wrong, just 
bounds of reason’ mean that the standards for the use of the weapon are 
highly, and inherently, subjective.  Reference to more objective elements—for 
example, the presence of certain levels of threat, or specific clauses limiting the 
use of weapon in certain circumstances –which can be found in other models, 
such as the use of force continuum approach popular in other jurisdictions 
(Adams and Jennison 2007, Miller 2010, Terrill and Paoline 2013) are 
conspicuous by their absence.   
This hardly reassures observers that the policy is able to provide clear guidance 
as to what constitutes appropriate use of Taser – and contrasts markedly to the 
approach taken by other jurisdictions, including those where use of force 
continuums are used, and those which adopt similar approaches.  For example, 
in 2008 the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) set out the guidance for 
the use of Taser as follows:  
‘The use of Taser will be justified where the officer honestly and 
reasonably believes that it is necessary in order to prevent a risk of death 
or serious injury’ (PSNI 2008). 
This guidance still gives officers flexibility—indeed, there is room for discussion 
as to what level of injury might be considered ‘serious’, and an 
acknowledgement that the situation must be judged against the facts as the 
officer ‘honestly and reasonably’ believed them to be—but also sets out some 
kind of standard against which Taser use can be judged.   
Whilst it cannot be assumed that policy wording will simply translate into action 
on the ground, Bishopp et al (2014) have demonstrated that changes to Taser 
policy in the USA—in this case, changes that further restricted when officers 
could use Taser—were associated with levels of Taser use dropping 
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significantly, suggesting that ‘officers will follow policy directives’ when these are 
available (Bishopp et al 2014: 11).  Thus, on a practical level, further 
consideration should be given to the level of specificity and detail given in the 
current guidance and training around the use of Taser -and, arguably, use of 
less lethal force more broadly. More broadly, this chapter also highlights the 
need to pay attention to the use of force guidelines in use in England and 
Wales.  Whilst traditional use of force continuum approaches have quite rightly 
been subject to criticism, this does not necessarily mean that alternative 
approaches, such as the NDM, are a panacea.  Instead, it is important to look 
carefully at such alternative options, and at their pros, cons and unintended 
consequences – a point to which I shall also return in the next chapter. 
Additional practical recommendations also flow from this chapter.  In particular, 
whilst the emphasis on individual responsibility is both important and necessary 
to help achieve accountability when force is used, responsibility for ensuring 
appropriate use of force also rests elsewhere within the police service.  Indeed, 
ECHR case law has demonstrated—albiet somewhat inconsistently (De Sanctis 
2006, see also Skinner 2014)—the need to pay attention to broader issues 
around guidance, training, control and planning, when assessing cases with 
implications for the right to life.  As such, senior practitioners should undertake 
further additional measures to ensure they are discharging their responsibility to 
assist individual officers in making use of force decisions.  In particular, officers 
should be given additional, high quality regular training on communication skills, 
as well empty hand techniques and other alternatives to Taser use.  Statistics 
on each officer’s use of force should be collected and analysed, to assist police 
forces in identifying whether individual officers, or groups of officers, may be, in 
the words of the police officer quoted above, ‘jumping to Taser too quickly’, and 
how the use of Taser, and its consequences, compares to other force options.  
In such ways, senior officials can ensure that, whilst the use of Taser is an 
individual responsibility for the officer concerned, it is not solely their 
responsibility, but a responsibility that is shared by others in the network.  Whilst 
diffusing responsibility for actions broadly amongst networks has been seen by 
some as a way of weakening accountability, recognising the different points 
where responsibility can be shared—instead of conceptualising it as something 
that is solely the task of the officer in question—can also point to additional 
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ways to regulate particular technologies, and tame some of the consequences 
of the networks in which they are embedded.  I shall return to these practical 
recommendations in more detail in the concluding chapter. 
Theoretical findings 
As this point demonstrates, then, this chapter also has implications on a more 
theoretical level, helping to demonstrate the continued relevance of 
constructivist science and technology studies to contemporary empirical issues, 
and to academic debate.  Indeed, I have shown how insights from constructivist 
STS—and in particular, the ANT notion of generalised symmetry—can usefully 
add value to Dror’s (2007) discussion on use of force decision making factors 
and to discussions around discretion, both of which have tended to neglect the 
role of the non-human.  Yet the evidence given here also speaks to some of the 
shortcomings of such approaches, of which I will pick out four. 
First, ANT tends to differentiate between three sets of outcomes.  The first is the 
familiar story discussed in the first half of this chapter, a sociological story 
where ‘what matters is what you are, not what you have’.  In this story 
technology is a ‘tool, a medium, a neutral carrier of will’ to achieve the goal of 
killing another human (Latour 1994: 31).  The second is a materialist, 
technologically determinist outcome, whereby technology and its material 
components transforms human goals and actions.  In this story, for example, a 
‘good citizen…without a gun might simply be angry’, but with the gun will 
commit murder (Latour 1994: 31).  Yet, Latour argues, these two stories are 
often mistaken.  Instead of starting with fixed essences of either human or 
technology, we need to take seriously the interactions and associations 
between human and technology that help constitute both identities and can lead 
to unpredictable consequences, up to and including ‘the creation of a new goal 
that corresponds to neither agent's program of action… You had wanted only to 
hurt but, with a gun now in hand, you want to kill’ (Latour 1994: 31).   
This is a very helpful distinction.  The third story is a very productive area to 
explore, and one which can often shed light on the dynamics between human 
and technological actants.  Yet this chapter also helps clarify—much in the spirit 
of Latour’s 1994 work, which talked about ‘possibilities’, some which are ‘more 
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commonly realised’ than others (1994: 31)—that, whilst the third outcome may 
happen in certain circumstances, the other two outcomes should not be 
dismissed (see also Schulz-Schaeffer 2006).  For example Sousa et al’s work 
(2012) demonstrates that, in at least some cases, the presence of Taser has no 
discernible, statistically significant effect on the decisions made by officers.  
Thus whilst, in some circumstances, associations between human and non-
human may produce unintended outcomes and new goals, in other 
circumstances non-human agency seems to have little impact.  It is possible 
that we may end up with a socially deterministic, ‘old-fashioned story of 
technology as a means to human ends’ (Schulz-Schaeffer 2006: 134).  
The post-humanist ‘dance of agency’ is only one possible outcome, and, under 
certain circumstances, other, more traditional stories that stress the strong pull 
exerted by social and/or technological factors may also be persuasive.  Thus 
perhaps one should not draw too sharp a distinction between ANT inspired 
accounts and between instrumentalist and substantivist perspectives. Indeed, in 
allowing for a dance of agency, ANT approaches concede that technologies and 
their material properties may influence others, and have distinct effects, even 
whilst countering the notion that such effects are pre-determined.  As such, they 
may not be a million miles away from what Kaplan refers to as weak 
technological deterministic approaches, which argue merely that technologies 
can influence the humans and institutions  with whom they interact (see also 
Callon and Latour in McLean and Hassard 2010).  Indeed, Leonardi and Barli 
(2008: 163) note that ‘those who might claim that the material properties of a 
technology can influence the organization of work risk being labelled 
‘‘determinists’, a term that has become something of a slur in academia’. 
Second, and relatedly, it is not always as easy to demonstrate empirically what 
ANT theorists would have us believe via conceptual fiat.  Latour’s examples 
often work because they are highly theoretical and abstract, and give the 
analyst the ability to accurately discern the intent (or lack of intent) of another 
and then to measure how this changes over time with the introduction of a non-
human actant.  However this is seldom possible when conducting empirical 
research.   
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There may well be a statistically significant difference between the decisions 
made by those armed with Taser compared to those without it—after all, officers 
need to be equipped with the weapon in order to decide to use it—but what 
does this actually tell us? It does not help us ascertain whether the weapon is a 
mediator or an intermediary, an active agent or a mere tool, or whether it helped 
shift the original goals of the human actant, if these even existed in the first 
place.  In the case of Sousa et al’s (2012) potentially lethal scenario, for 
example, the introduction of Taser might have resulted in the creation of a ‘new 
goal’ – for example, to disarm without injuring –or might have been a tool used 
to achieve the pre-existing aim of disarming the individual as quickly and 
effectively as possible.  Actor-Network Theory can help alert us to such 
questions, and to the possibility that interactions between humans and non-
humans can produce new goals, ‘programmes of action’ and outcomes, but 
cannot necessarily help us answer whether or not this happens in practice. This 
is particularly relevant in policing scenarios, as expecting officers to accurately 
remember and recount their rationales for using force to a relative outsider is a 
big ask (see, for example, Rojek et al 2012).  It is particularly challenging given 
the generic human tendency towards ‘rationalisation’, the (often subconscious) 
tendency to find ‘the most rational and convincing reason for behaviour with the 
goal of making it look better than it actually is’ (Hall and Holmes 2008: 138). 
Latour criticises those who ‘try to understand techniques while assuming that 
the psychological capacity of humans is forever fixed’ (1994: 31), but one 
potential extension of this observation is surely that assessing these human 
goals and capacities in the first place—let alone unpacking the role that non-
humans, and their complex relationships with human actants, may play in their 
formulation—is beset by a host of complexities and empirical difficulties that 
should not be dismissed.   To return to our earlier point, if it should not be 
assumed that human goals and ‘psychological capacities’ are fixed, neither 
should it be assumed that they are always, endlessly fluid. 
Third, the notion of generalised symmetry has been useful here – up to a point.  
Instead of assuming that humans have unlimited agency, and technologies are 
their passive tools, the concept of generalised symmetry has allowed us to 
explore which actants, if any, are able to make a difference, and are active 
mediators, and which actants are passive mediators.  These are important 
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empirical questions, and it should not be assumed that such distinctions simply 
map onto human / non-human dualisms.  It may be that both humans and non-
humans have some kind of agency, and that they both face a number of 
possibilities and constraints when exercising it. Having done that, ANT then 
invites us to go a step further, and to go beyond human / non-human divides, to 
see agency not as a property of individual actants, but of combinations of 
actants.  I can see how the first part is helpful and relevant: I struggle somewhat 
with the latter. 
In this case, this chapter has shown, on the one hand, that non-humans have 
more agency than expected and, on the other, that whilst humans are certainly 
not simple intermediaries, and they do have a large degree of agency, this 
agency is nevertheless curtailed in important ways – including by human and 
nonhuman actors.  Moreover, and at one level, agency that appears to be 
exercised by either ‘humans’ or ‘nonhumans’ is, of course, exercised by 
combinations of actants.  Humans can only decide to use Taser, for example, if 
they have the weapon in their possession in the first place: Taser (often) 
requires the presence of human beings in order for it to act, and has only come 
into being because of interactions between humans and material properties in 
the first place.  If this kind of recognition is what is meant by agency being a 
property of combinations, then all well and good.  Push this too far, however, 
and you not only risk producing ‘trivial’ insights—‘of course’, even Latour admits 
‘a piece of technology must be… activated by a human subject’—but you also 
risk losing a sense of actors as discrete entities in their own right, a notion that it 
would seem important to retain. 
 
Fourth, then, whilst historically much space has been given to discussing the 
differences between—and the relative strengths and weaknesses of—SCOT 
and ANT, understood broadly as types of constructivist Science and 
Technology Studies, both seem to be pragmatically useful to a degree, and this 
empirical study gives little ground for choosing between them.  ANT’s insistence 
not just on troubling, but on collapsing, distinctions between human and non-
human has been helpful for much of this chapter.  For example, can one talk of 
a human actant, if that actant unconsciously behaves different with Taser in 
hand? Can one talk of ‘Taser’ as a non-human technology knowing that key 
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features have been designed and programmed in by humans?  The emphasis 
on ‘the co-construction of machines by humans and of humans by machines’ 
(Lee and Brown 1994: 775) is a very helpful one.  At the same time, however, 
the notion that something non-human, that a technological entity such as Taser, 
can influence human decision-making processes and social practices, can help 
capture useful insights – perhaps because of its binary nature.  (Indeed, it is 
very difficult to write an account incorporating the non-human without using 
traditional categories).  Both sets of insights can be helpful, and it can be useful 
to think of Taser both as a discrete technological entity in its own right, whilst 
simultaneously recognising it is also a hybrid actant, comprised of human and 
non-human networks.  
Moving away from STS, this chapter also raises some interesting discussion 
points for  police discretion.  I have helped to demonstrate that the notion of an 
arena in which officers are ‘free to make a choice’, and within which they are 
able to exercise ‘free will’, can be overstated. Decisions that might appear to be 
free from any legal or policy restriction, and subject to the whims of officers, 
may well be structured not only by the human agency of others (for example, 
choices made in the training curriculum) but also by the presence of non-
humans and the socio-technical networks within which they are embedded. 
Whilst the literature on discretion has recognised the human and societal 
influences impacting officer decision making, it may also need to make space to 
consider the role of the non-human, and of interactions between human and 
non-human.   
Having explored in this chapter two of the stories that accompany Taser use in 
England and Wales—Taser as a neutral tool, and decisions around Taser as 
the responsibility of individual officers—it is time to turn to the third, inter-related 
story: that of ‘robust’ accountability mechanisms.  This third story plays a key 
role shoring up the other two: after all, the devolution of decisions down to 
individual officers is often justified precisely because accountability mechanisms 
can impose negative sanctions and act as a powerful corrective force should 
such decisions be seen to be wrong.  With this in mind, it is to a closer 
examination of these accountability mechanisms that I now turn.  
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Chapter 9: Accountability for Taser Use. 
 
The last chapter examined two stories commonly told about Taser: that it is a 
neutral tool and that its’ use is a decision for individual officers.  There is, 
however, a third, complementary story that is often told – that there are a ‘raft’ 
of ‘robust’ accountability measures in place to ensure appropriate use of the 
device by rank and file officers – and that story is the topic of this penultimate 
chapter.    
Achieving some kind of accountability in policing is as crucial as it is challenging 
(Mawby and Wright 2005, Savage 2013, Chan 1999), and I make the argument 
in this chapter that, whilst there are certain positive features of the 
accountability mechanisms in place for officers in England and Wales—and the 
processes put in place around the Taser weapon are stronger than most—there 
is nevertheless room for improvement in certain areas.  
Before developing this argument, it is first necessary to provide a definition of 
the term ‘accountability’, as it is highly ambivalent. Accountability is often seen 
as a spectrum.  At one end of this spectrum lye ‘explanatory and co-operative’ 
models of accountability, models that require decision makers to provide 
reasons and information on their decisions  without any obligation  to  take  
opposing views into  consideration.  At the other end of the spectrum are 
‘subordinate and obedient’ or ‘control’ models—models that not only ask the 
police to provide accounts, but aim to hold them to account (Marshall in Chan 
1999: 252, 253).  I follow Schedler in defining the term to include both 
‘answerability’—that is, the ‘obligation of public officials to inform about and to 
explain what they are doing’—and ‘enforcement’, or the ability to ‘impose 
sanctions on power-holders who have violated their public duties’ (Schedler 
1999: 14). In order to be accountable, then, individuals and organisations must 
not only ‘tell what they have done and why’ but must also ‘bear consequences 
for it, including eventual negative sanctions’ (Schedler 1999: 15).  As the UN 
Office of Drugs and Crime note,  accountability mechanisms should ensure that 
‘police carry out their duties properly and are held responsible if they fail to do 
so’ (2011: iv, emphasis added).  In this respect I argue that whilst there are 
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positive features around the accountability mechanisms in England and Wales, 
there is also room for improvement. 
Before making this argument, some further points of clarification are necessary. 
First, my focus here is on formal, institutional mechanisms and the various 
actants that comprise and enact them.  I recognize that a wide variety of other 
influences—including citizen accountability or ‘sousveillance’ (Mann in Reiner 
2015: 133), and police culture (Davids and Boyce 2015)—are also crucial, and 
highly interconnected with more formal accountability mechanisms.  Yet, as 
Davids and Boyce (2015: 105) note, these elements ‘must be separately 
recognised and addressed’ and, sadly, I lack the space here to give all of these 
elements the consideration they deserve. I focus on formal accountability 
mechanisms because, more often than not, they take centre stage in 
discussions around accountability, and are often pointed to as examples of 
‘robust’ mechanisms.   
Nor do I have the space to delve, as Savage (2013) has done so convincingly, 
into the internal culture and shared beliefs of those working for these institutions 
– but in line with his work, I recognize the dangers in assuming that 
‘independence’ or ‘accountability’ simply ‘exists’ a priori (or doesn’t, as the case 
may be).  Rather, effective accountability mechanisms and appropriate 
sanctions are negotiated and produced in complex interactions.  Thus 
institutional safeguards are necessary, but not sufficient, to produce effective 
oversight.  
Second, and relatedly, in my consideration of these accountability mechanisms 
I intend to give space not just to the human actants involved in overseeing 
Taser use, but also to the non-humans at work in such processes—namely the 
accountability mechanisms embedded within the Taser, the legal framework 
surrounding the weapon and the functioning of the NDM—and the way in which 
they interact to produce particular effects. If Savage (2013) asks us to pay 
attention to the ways in which the interactions between IPCC investigators, 
police officers and experts co-create particular forms of independence and 
accountability, so too must we pay attention to the ways in which these 
individuals interact with a wide range of non-humans—from the National 
206 
 
Decision Model, to the Taser weapon and its particular features—to create 
particular notions of accountability. 
Third, Reiner makes a useful distinction between the ‘individual accountability’ 
of particular officers and ‘policy accountability’: the ‘degree of influence 
exercised by external democratic bodies over police organizational policies 
concerned with overall goals, resource allocation and policing styles’ (in Jones 
2008: 1).  Given the emphasis that has been placed on the actions of rank and 
file officers throughout the thesis, this chapter focuses (somewhat reluctantly) 
on accountability in the former sense of the word. For this reason, combined 
with the fact that they were not in post for most of the duration of the PhD, I do 
not focus here on the role of the Police and Crime Commissioners in any detail, 
but come back to this issue in a little more detail in the concluding chapter. 
Section 1 outlines the internal and external accountability mechanisms around 
Taser use and demonstrates that these mechanisms are characterized, by the 
police and by external agencies alike, as robust and effective.  Section 2 delves 
a little more into this story and shows that, whilst there may be some validity in 
this conclusion, there is room for improvement if these mechanisms are to live 
up to the adjectives commonly associated with them.  I look at internal 
accountability mechanisms in force, before moving onto discuss external 
accountability mechanisms, focusing predominantly on the IPCC, but also 
looking at the role played by SACMILL and HMIC. Finally, I look at the role of 
the criminal and civil courts, before concluding.   
Accountability mechanisms in England and Wales. 
There are a range of interconnected internal and external accountability 
mechanisms in place in England and Wales pertaining to the use of Taser by 
individual officers.   
Accountability  Mechanisms In Force. 
Anti Felon Identification Devices (confetti like tags which provide confirmation 
as to which cartridge(s) were fired), and collecting the wires and probes  can 
confirm at what distance the weapon was fired.  Additional documentary 
evidence can be provided by the weapon’s internal data logging system, which 
records the time and date that the current was discharged as well as the length 
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of discharge.  Thus, unlike other weapon technologies, technical features of the 
Taser provide the ability to confirm how many times the weapon was used, for 
how long, at what distance, and when. Such details can be crucially important 
when it comes to investigating deaths following police use of force, and can also 
be equally important in helping reach determinations about whether particular 
use of force incidents are proportionate and necessary.  Moreover, the ability to 
clarify which cartridges were used, and from which weapons, may be critically 
important in fast-moving situations where there is confusion about how many 
times the weapon has been fired, and / or by whom. 
This differs markedly from many other weapons technologies which have no 
such systems built in.  Take, for example, weapons such as CS or baton, often 
held up as ‘alternatives’ to Taser.  No matter how sophisticated the baton 
designs, they are unable to capture key pieces of information around how often, 
and at what time, they are used.  Those wishing to shed light on conflicting 
accounts of events, and the number of times batons have been used (or, in 
more extreme cases, beatings administered) have often had to resort to 
examination of the injuries inflicted – a notoriously difficult task (United Nations 
2004).   
Whilst irritant sprays, such as CS canisters, might theoretically be able to yield 
information about the amount of spray used, via the weighing of the canister 
before and after use, such information is not available in an easily accessible 
form.  It also relies on appropriate measures being taken before the event in 
question.  This is not impossible as, for example, Police Service of Northern 
Ireland guidelines show (PSNI undated), but nor is it automatic.  With Taser, 
however, the information is readily recorded, and easily available to officers 
should they wish to use it (indeed, College of Policing guidance states that the 
data from the weapon must be downloaded ‘at least’ every eight weeks).  Such 
features can be a useful complement to Body Worn Cameras, which, even if 
they are available, may not be able to pick up such fine details.  The Taser 
weapon is thus relatively unique in having the capacity to provide records which 
are capable of confirming or denying the accounts provided by officers. 
In addition, whenever officers use Taser (with ‘use’ defined in the broadest 
sense of the word, so as to include drawing of the weapon), they are required to 
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fill in an 7 page Taser Deployment Form – but have historically been under no 
obligation to fill out a form when they have used other less lethal force.  . The 
completed form is then sent to the Taser Single Point of Contact (SPOC) officer 
in each force, who clarifies ‘any information on the form, disseminate(s) any 
updates and learning to staff in their own force’ (College of Policing 2014a), and 
submits the form to ACPO and the Home Office.   
As discussed in Part 2 of the thesis, it is possible that the simple act of filling out 
a form—and particularly filling out a form for some uses of force, but not 
others—shapes the details that officers provide, enabling and influencing them 
to record particular recollections and versions of the event in particular ways.  
Use of force reporting forms, then, are not a simple intermediary, a neutral, 
passive way of collecting and transmitting information about particular incidents, 
but come closer to a mediator, having the ability to shape, and frame, the 
recording of incidents, both via the questions that are asked, and the pre-
selected answers that are made available.   
In many forces the SPOCs appear to play a highly useful role, both in reviewing 
the completed forms, and more broadly.  Some see their role not just as 
performing the administrative function of receiving and submitting the forms, but 
as providing additional scrutiny around the weapon. Moreover, in certain forces, 
the role of the SPOC is accompanied by additional accountability mechanisms.  
According to HMIC, these include the following:  
 In South Wales, ‘each time a Taser is used the circumstances are 
reviewed by the on-call inspector. If the deployment involves a firing, 
drive-stun or accidental discharge the officer temporarily loses their 
authority until after the inspector has deemed the usage appropriate… 
South Wales Police have (also) established a Taser review group... (with 
a remit) to identify trends, lessons learned and consideration of the use 
of Taser on protected groups’ (HMIC 2016b: 41). 
 In Greater Manchester Police, ‘the force has an established peer review 
process… (which allows) concerns to be addressed… (via) referral for 
individual guidance: changes in training delivery: the withdrawal of an 
officer’s Taser authority: or formal misconduct investigation’ (HMIC 
2016c: 41).   
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 In Warwickshire and West Mercia there is a joint Taser reference group 
‘that considers strategic issues in relation to the use of Taser and reviews 
all the relevant data… (and) provides routine informal updates to the 
assistant chief constable’ (HMIC 2016d: 38). 
 There are additional internal mechanisms in instances involving a complaint 
about Taser use.  In these circumstances, it is for an officer of at least Chief 
Inspector rank (or a member of police staff of equivalent seniority) to decide 
how the complaint will be dealt with.  In some cases the initial complaint can be 
dealt with via the provision of information or an explanation, in which case a 
complaint is not actually formally recorded in the first place.  If, however, the 
complaint needs further action or investigation, it may be dealt with via a 
process known as ‘local resolution’—a process deemed suitable for ‘lower level 
complaints, such as rudeness or incivility’ (HMIC 2016a: 22), which is normally 
be handled by officers’ supervisors—or alternatively will be investigated by the 
police’s Professional Standards Department who will produce a report detailing 
findings against each aspect of the complaint (IPCC 2013a).  The difference 
between these two mechanisms is considerable.  Unlike police investigation, 
local resolution cannot lead to disciplinary action against the officers.  And 
whilst the complaint can appeal to the IPCC if they are dissatisfied with the 
outcome of the police’s investigation, if they have gone down the ‘local 
resolution’ route, they are only able to appeal about the process, not about the 
outcomes  (IPCC 2010).   
Thus human actors, such as Taser Single Points of Contact or police 
investigators, interact with non-human actants—such as the completed Taser 
forms and the weapon’s internal data logging system—to produce a degree of 
internal scrutiny around Taser that is seldom present for others uses of force. 
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) 
These internal accountability mechanisms are closely linked to, and reinforced 
by, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).  As the name 
suggests, the IPCC—which was established by the Police Reform Act of 2002, 
and became operational in 2004—has a mandate to ‘oversee the police 
complaints system in England and Wales and set the standards by which the 
police should handle complaints’ (IPCC undated a).   
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There are many routes by which a Taser related incident may make its way to 
the IPCC.  As indicated above, the incident may reach them in the form of an 
appeal about how the police have handled a Taser related complaint.  Police 
forces are also mandated to refer certain cases to the IPCC—which may, or 
may not, involve Taser—irrespective of whether a member of the public has 
complained about them.  This includes cases of death or serious injury where 
the person had contact with the police that might have contributed to the 
outcome in question (IPCC undated b).  Forces are also able to refer any 
incidents that they deem appropriate to the IPCC for their consideration.  In 
addition, between 2009 and 2015, police forces were mandated to refer to all 
complaints about Taser to the IPCC, for additional oversight (IPCC 2009, NPCC 
2015a). 
Once an incident reaches the IPCC, they can either refer the incident back to 
the police force to conduct a supervised or managed investigation, or the IPCC 
can conduct an ‘independent’ investigation.  Investigators do not just have 
recourse to testimony from human actors—the officers involved, those subject 
to police force, and any eyewitnesses present—but often have access to non-
human actants.  This can include CCTV evidence, may increasingly include 
footage from body worn cameras, and may also include novel sources of 
evidence unique to the Taser weapon, discussed above.  For example, when 
investigating an incident involving the use of the weapon in Liverpool, 
investigators were able to independently download the data from the Taser 
which showed that the officer had held the trigger down for 11 seconds, over 
twice the length of time that he had recalled (IPCC 2012a).  Thus interaction 
between non-human actants and the humans who access, download and 
interpret them, are able to produce new forms of knowledge and accountability 
mechanisms. As discussed above, whilst some non-human actants are mute 
observers of events, a Taser weapon is much more able to bear testimony  and 
give evidence in ways which can impact subsequent investigations and 
recommendations.  For example, in this case the IPCC recommended that the 
officer in question undertake further training to prevent him in the future 
inadvertently applying the Taser for longer than its’ five second set  cut off 
period (IPCC 2012a) – an insight that would likely not have been available to 
them were they to rely solely on evidence from human actors. 
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Upon considering the relevant evidence, investigators decide whether the 
officer in question has a case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct, 
whether there is no misconduct case to answer—but actions (such as additional 
training) that should nevertheless be undertaken—or whether the officer should 
be exonerated completely 38.  The IPCC also decide whether there is evidence 
that a criminal offence has been committed and, if so, refer the case to the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).  It is for the CPS to decide whether any 
criminal charges are appropriate and, if so, which ones are most appropriate in 
this particular circumstances. Importantly, then, the IPCC do not decide, in and 
of themselves, whether the officer is actually guilty of misconduct, gross 
misconduct or criminal charges – but merely decide whether innocence or guilt 
should be determined by other relevant authorities (the CPS in the case of 
criminal investigations and the police in misconduct issues).   
The IPCC may also produce broader recommendations around Taser use for 
the force in question and for consideration at the national level.   For example, 
following the death of Andrew Pimlott, who had doused himself in petrol and 
was Tasered, the IPCC recommended that the officer who had fired the Taser 
had a case to answer for gross misconduct.  They also recommended that the 
National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing revise their Taser 
training to ‘provide a more comprehensive guide to officers when dealing with 
flammable liquids’ (IPCC 2015b) - a recommendation broadly accepted by the 
NPCC (IPCC 2016b).  The IPCC therefore has a crucial role to play, under often 
challenging circumstances.  
Other Accountability Mechanisms 
Whilst the IPCC is  the only body in England and Wales with a mandate to deal 
directly with individual cases around the use of Taser, a number of other 
agencies have a mandate to oversee other various aspects of policing.  Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary (HMIC), founded in 1856, is 
                                                          
38
 The definitions of misconduct and gross misconduct, and how these allegations should be heard, are set 
out—albeit in extremely loose terms—by The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012.  Thus gross 
misconduct involves a ‘breach of standards of professional behavior so serious that, if admitted or proven, 
dismissal from the police service would be justified’, and is handled by a misconduct hearing handled by 
a misconduct panel, who can decide upon a range of outcomes, up to and include dismissal without 
notice.  Misconduct—a breach of standards of professional behavior that doesn’t meet the threshold for 
dismissal—is dealt with via a misconduct meeting, the most serious outcome of which is a final written 
warning (Chapman 2014). 
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responsible for overseeing and reporting upon the efficiency and effectiveness 
of territorial police forces in England and Wales more broadly (HMIC undated), 
whilst the Scientific Advisory Committee on the Medical Implications of Less 
Lethal Weapons (SACMILL), and its predecessor DOMILL, provide 
recommendations as to whether new weaponry (such as the next generation of 
Taser weapons) should be introduced into the police, and also have a crucial 
role in ‘monitor(ing) operational use, medical reports, and media reports for 
emerging problems’ around the use of Taser, and certain other LLWs and 
‘recommend(ing) changes to operational use or training’ (Payne-James et al 
2010: 608).  
These are important roles which can complement the IPCC both by offering 
broader oversight on trends in policing, including police use of force (in the case 
of HMIC) and by offering specific medical expertise to help ensure that any 
issues emerging from the use of Taser are captured, analysed and used to 
inform any necessary changes to policy, guidance, training or practice (in the 
case of SACMILL). Such interventions can go beyond seeking redress for 
individual complainants, to making far-reaching changes designed to prevent a 
similar incident occurring in the future. 
There are also a number of other measures which may help ensure 
accountability in cases involving Taser.  Individuals can bring cases via the civil 
courts, an option pursued by some affected individuals (PALG 2014) – and the 
availability of this mechanism has been praised for providing a back-up or fail-
safe should the ‘other mechanisms fail to prevent disaster’ (Young 2015: 21). 
Whilst claims can be brought against the individual officer involved in the 
incident, the Police Act 1964 ruled that a Chief Constable is vicariously liable for 
the actions or omissions of the officers under their command, whilst he or she is 
performing police duties.  Thus most civil cases are brought against the Chief 
Constable, with cases involving police use of force often centring around the 
torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment (Smith 2008: 34). 
This system of oversight and accountability for individual officers is well-
regarded by some.  The NPCC lead for Less-Lethal Weapons, including the use 
of Taser, Commander Basu has noted that ‘Taser is heavily scrutinised. Every 
time it is used - even simply drawn from its holster - this must be recorded and 
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examined by a supervisor. If the force used is disproportionate or breaches their 
training, officers can be investigated and face misconduct or even criminal 
charges’ (NPCC 2015a).  The NPCC (2015b) notes that 'every use of Taser is 
reported and scrutinised... (and) comprehensive training packages, governance 
and monitoring are in place... (Each use is) supervised within the force itself... 
(with)  safeguards at a national level'.   
The IPCC has stated that it is satisfied with how police forces are handling 
complaints around Taser, so much so that it no longer requires complaints 
about the weapon to be referred directly to it (NPCC 2015a), and notes that the 
rate of appeals upheld around Taser is less than the overall rate of appeals 
upheld more broadly (IPCC 2014a). Moreover, HMIC’s (2016a: 55) recent 
assessment of Taser use in England and Wales found not only that ‘Taser had 
been used fairly and appropriately in almost all the cases where we made an 
assessment’ but that, in general, there were ‘robust oversight systems in place’.  
They also noted that ‘in the small number (of cases) where we had concerns, 
we were pleased to see that the force had already identified the same concerns, 
and were actively working to resolve them’.  
Accountability Mechanisms – genuinely ‘robust’? 
There are thus are many positive features of the accountability system around 
Taser – and many view these accountability mechanisms in a highly positive 
light.  However the evidence I present in this next section also suggests that 
there are limits to the extent to which this system can be described as ‘robust’.  I 
look first at the limitations of internal accountability mechanisms, before looking 
at the limitations of external mechanisms. 
Internal Oversight Mechanisms. 
Whilst some forces have relatively sophisticated internal mechanisms to 
oversee and provide accountability for the use of Taser, other forces have less 
sophisticated mechanisms in place.  Returning to Schedler’s (1999) notion of 
accountability as both answerability and enforcement, some forces are not only 
failing to implement the latter part of this equation, but are failing to even ensure 
the former part of the equation: i.e. that they fully explain and account for their 
use of the weapon in the first place, so that their account can be subject to 
further scrutiny.  For example, in its inspection of Lancashire, HMIC (2016e: 39) 
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noted that ‘the constabulary should make sure that officers provide more 
complete information explaining their actions on each occasion a device is 
drawn and more frequently challenge circumstances to develop learning where 
that justification is unclear’.   
Even when officers have given an explanation of the incident in question, these 
explanations are not always subject to sufficient scrutiny.  The IPCC 
investigation into the repeated use of Taser by Merseyside Police on an 
individual, Kyle Ardle, detained in a police van found a similar pattern with uses 
of Taser not being subjected to sufficient challenge.  In this case, the IPCC 
noted that it was ‘of concern that Merseyside’s lead Taser instructor lacked 
objectivity and presented as fact the officers’ version of events without 
challenge’ (IPCC 2013b). Nor was this an isolated incident - indeed, the IPCC 
have further noted that:  
Many of the appeals… (we have) upheld have shown that police forces 
take a police officer’s account at face value without any further probing. It 
is important that police officers record their rationale for using Taser with 
reference to the specific circumstances of the case. When that rationale 
is investigated by police forces it should be subject to robust challenge 
where required (IPCC 2014a: 4) 
Nor are these issues restricted to individual SPOCs or Taser instructors.  HMIC 
also found evidence that there were issues with the internal accountability 
mechanisms in place more broadly in certain forces: 
 In Humberside, HMIC (2015f: 7, 41) noted that ‘more needs to be done 
to ensure sufficient supervision and oversight... Taser forms are not 
regularly reviewed comprehensively to identify trends and there is no 
convincing explanation for the comparatively high use of Taser… The 
force should also put in place sufficient oversight arrangements to better 
understand why Humberside has such a high use of Taser (and) to 
reassure itself that Taser is being used fairly and appropriately’. 
 In Leicestershire (2015g: 38), ‘the force recognised that its evaluation 
procedure following the submission of a Taser form required 
improvement… Once this came to light during the inspection the force 
immediately corrected this oversight. 
 Derbyshire has itself noted the need for ‘increased scrutiny of decision-
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making in relation to ‘lower-level’ Taser use such as ‘red-dotting’.  HMIC’s 
inspection further noted that ‘although the constabulary does carry out 
some reviews this is currently not systematic and… the constabulary 
(cannot) be completely confident that Taser use is consistently fair and 
appropriate’ (HMIC 2015h). 
Thus, whilst there are many examples of ‘robust’ mechanisms, there is also 
evidence to suggest that the degree of scrutiny varies from force to force. 
Whilst the on-going monitoring that forces (should) conduct is crucial for picking 
up patterns and trends around the use of Taser, another issue is how forces 
handle cases where complaints have been made. HMIC (2016a: 22, 25) has 
noted wide variations across forces.  They found evidence to suggest ‘different 
(complaint) recording practices across forces’ and no ‘consistent approach… to 
complaint handling’.   Overall, there was ‘inconsistency in the way complaints 
are assessed for investigation and then investigated’. Clients and their 
representatives have had similar experiences.  For example, Solicitor Iain Gould 
has noted that:  
‘I have come across certain police forces who are very good… (but in 
other cases) the complaint route is a complete white-wash… For 
example ( one client) who was Tasered put a complaint in himself… and 
the police went along to see him and his complaint was locally resolved. 
So you can imagine the chat that they had with this man who clearly has 
mental health issues, ‘just sign here to say local resolution is 
acceptable’…  (even though there was) clear guidance that any 
complaint of Taser must be referred to the IPCC’.   
Such practices have also been criticized by HMIC (2016a: 24), which noted its 
concern over cases ‘where complaints had been locally resolved when, in our 
opinion, they should have been investigated as potential misconduct’ and cited 
as an example a case involving ‘allegations of unlawful arrest and unnecessary 
use of force’ that was ‘inappropriately dealt with as a local resolution’.   
Thus the evidence presented in this section thus raises some concern that not 
all forces are able to monitor Taser use effectively, or to deal appropriately with 
complaints around the use of Taser when these do arise. It is out of a desire to 
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tackle such concerns that external oversight bodies, such as the IPCC and 
HMIC, were created.  However, as shall be discussed in the next section, the 
degree of accountability that such bodies are able to provide is limited by 
various factors.   
External oversight mechanisms. 
 
Taken together, the HMIC and IPCC have different, yet complementary, roles to 
play in ensuring effective oversight of, and accountability for, Taser use.  By its 
own admission, as recently as 2015, HMIC had ‘not inspected how Taser is 
used either in, or between, forces’ (HMIC 2016a: 57). Up until 2014, HMIC’s 
approach to its work had been predominantly thematic, with the organization 
undertaking inspections and producing reports on particular subjects.  However, 
none of these thematic reports focused on Taser. Whilst this is now changing – 
a point I pick up on in greater detail below - the fact remains that the 
organization was not well placed to provide oversight of Taser use throughout 
the time period covered by this PhD.   
Turning to the  IPCC, the last few years there has been a flurry of independent 
reports concerned with the role of the IPCC and the police disciplinary system.  
These include a report on the IPCC by the National Audit Office (NAO 2008), a 
report into the IPCC’s handling of the investigation following the death of Sean 
Rigg following police use of less lethal force (Casalie 2012), a Home Affairs 
Select Committee report (Home Affairs Select Committee 2013), a Triennial 
Review into the IPCC (Jenkins 2014), and an enquiry into the functioning of the 
police disciplinary system (Chapman 2014).  Concern has been expressed at 
the highest levels of government, with the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, 
stating that the current complaints system has ‘significant shortcomings’ and is 
seen as ‘lacking sufficient independence from the police’ (in The Herald 2016).  
Such analyses have been completed by the work of selected academics 
(including Savage 2013 and Porter and Prezler 2012) who have played a crucial 
role in analyzing the ongoing evolution of the complaints procedure in England 
and Wales.  The IPCC itself has also produced a concise, convincing analysis 




The broad consensus from these sources is that the degree of independent 
oversight exerted by the IPCC is comprised by several factors, all of which can 
be expected to impact how, if at all, the organization is able to investigate cases 
of Taser use.  Thus the Home Affairs Select Committee and one of the IPCC 
Commissioners found, respectively, that: 
‘The IPCC is woefully underequipped and hamstrung in achieving its 
original objectives. It has neither the powers nor the resources that it 
needs to get to the truth… It is not yet capable of delivering powerful, 
objective scrutiny’ (Home Affairs Select Committee 2013: 3). 
‘The IPCC is simply unable to do what it says on the tin: it is not an 
independent body investigating police complaints’ – Deborah Glass, 
IPCC Commissioner (Glass 2014: 8). 
First (and arguably foremost), as the quote from the Home Affairs Select 
Committee above indicates, inadequate resourcing has been  both a problem in 
itself and lies at the heart of many of the issues subsequently discussed here 
(IPCC 2013c).  The IPCC is smaller than, for example, the Metropolitan Police’s 
Professional Standards Department, meaning that it faces an uphill task when 
dealing with such bodies (Home Affairs Select Committee 2013: 3).  Efforts are 
being made to tackle under-resourcing with the Home Secretary announcing the 
transfer of additional resources for the IPCC to enable it to investigate all 
serious and sensitive cases but the IPCC is only expected to achieve this 
capacity by 2017-2018 (Home Office 2015b).  Thus, for most of the time period 
covered by this thesis, the IPCC can be considered to have been inadequately 
resourced for the scale of the tasks expected of it. 
Second, the IPCC’s ability to investigate a case clearly relies on the 
organization being aware of it in the first place – and there are concerns that the 
IPCC is not sighted on all relevant cases.  The IPCC (2014b: 6) has expressed 
concern about a case in an anonymised police force where an individual subject 
to Taser complained about the weapon’s use whilst he was still in custody but 
this complaint was not referred to the IPCC, as required at the time.  Moreover, 
the IPCC’s broader review into incidents referred by police forces to the 
organization found that ‘all of the forces we sampled lacked a formal process for 
assessing whether cases needed to be reported to their Professional Standards 
Department (PSD)’ and, in turn, that PSD staff ‘had only minimal training on the 
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referral grounds beyond reading the IPCC’s statutory guidance’ (IPCC 2015c: 
2).   
Further evidence of an inconsistent referral pattern comes from the IPCC’s 
sample of 416 cases, from 6 forces, that had not been referred to the 
organization.  Worryingly, 12 of these cases involved allegations of excessive 
force – and 11 of these cases had only been brought to the attention of the 
force because it had been subject to a complaint.  Only 1 had been picked up 
via routine internal monitoring.  Moreover, the requirement for all complaints 
about the use of Taser to be referred to the IPCC has recently been dropped 
(NPCC 2015a), further impeding their ability to offer independent oversight.   
Third, even when incidents reach the IPCC, there are concerns about the 
number of cases the IPCC refers back to forces to investigate. The IPCC can 
manage or supervise investigations carried out by the police or, in the most 
serious cases, conduct its own investigation.  Yet, due in part to the resource 
constraints noted above, the latter option is seldom used.  A recent legal case, 
specifically relating to alleged misuse of Taser, found that referring cases back 
to the force for investigation wasn’t inherently problematic (Morrison v The 
Independent Police Complaints Commission and Others, 2009).  It found that, 
whilst investigations conducted by the force subject to the original complaint 
could not be considered independent, the ability to appeal to the IPCC, 
combined with the possibility of a criminal trial, meant that there was still the 
possibility of an independent investigation in such cases. 
Nevertheless, the practice has continued to generate concern.  The then Home 
Secretary, Theresa May, noted with dismay that ‘94 per cent of cases referred 
to the IPCC in 2012 were referred back to be dealt with by the police’ (Home 
Office 2014d, see also Home Affairs Select Committee 2013: 10, which 
described such investigations as ‘no better than a placebo’).  The IPCC (2013c: 
3) has noted that, of the large amount of cases referred back to the police, ‘we 
would have preferred to investigate independently many more of the cases… 
(around) inhuman or degrading treatment - particularly those alleging use of 
excessive force’.    Of the 190 Taser cases referred to the IPPC between 2004 
– 2013 (which either involved death or serious injury, or other concerns about 
the incident) the vast majority (82%) were deemed to be suitable for 
219 
 
investigation by the police force subject to the  original complaint  (IPCC 2014a: 
19).  Similarly, of the 434 complaints about Taser use referred to the 
organisation between 2004 and 2013, the IPCC ruled that 78% could be 
investigated by the police force that was the subject of the complaint in the first 
place (IPCC 2014a: 19).   
Moreover, concern has been raised about the quality of the investigations the 
IPCC does conduct.  The IPCC (2013b: 2) has noted that, with ‘only 100 
investigators and increasingly stretched support services – (it) is not adequately 
resourced to carry out its investigative work to the standard and timeliness 
which the public and bereaved families expect’.  The Casalie review into the 
investigation into the death of Sean Rigg noted the need for ‘training for 
investigators… (to) promote consistency, particularly in terms of interviewing’, 
noting that interviewers need to be trained to conduct ‘robust questioning’ 
(Casalie 2012: 17).  Similarly, the Home Affairs Select Committee (2013: 5) 
made several criticisms of IPCC investigations, including a ‘failure to locate 
evidence and propensity to uncritically accept police explanations for missing 
evidence’, a lack of ‘thorough investigation and‘slowness in conducting 
investigations’.  The Committee also expressed concern that ‘the IPCC 
continues to employ a significant number of former police officers… who may 
naturally favour their former colleagues’ (2013: 5).  Many of these concerns are 
exemplified by the investigation into the death of a young man, Jordan Begley, 
subsequent to Taser use. 
IPCC Investigations: The Case of Jordan Begley. 
Under Sections 37 and 38 of the Chief Coroner’s Guidance No 5: Reports to 
Prevent Future Deaths (Chief Coroner 2016: 6), it is anticipated Coroners may 
wish ‘exceptionally to draw attention to a matter of concern which has arisen 
during the investigation’ and may ‘choose to write a letter expressing that 
concern’ to the relevant person or organisation.  The Coroner in the Inquest into 
the death of Jordan Begley saw fit to give me copies of two such letters he sent 
in this case, and to allow me to quote them in this thesis.  One was to Greater 
Manchester Police and the second, our focus here, was to the IPCC expressing 
his ‘concern’ about two aspects of their investigation.  One was the ‘delay in 
interviewing witnesses/subjects’.  The Coroner noted that ‘all the primary GMP 
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officers… (had) indicated a willingness to be interviewed as soon as reasonably 
possible.  However, detailed accounts were not obtained for some 2 – 3 months 
after the incident’.  The Coroner noted that ‘the difficulty in recalling events 
some months before the… (interviews) was a regular theme at the inquest’, and 
that explanations for the delay were ‘unpersuasive and unconvincing’.     
The second was ‘the failure to follow a relevant line of enquiry and secure the 
examination and retention of a very important exhibit’ – in this case, the trousers 
that Jordan Begley was wearing at the time of the incident, and of his death.  
This is a key piece of evidence as the officer who fired the Taser said that 
Begley had his hands in his pockets, which meant that he could not confirm or 
deny the presence of the knife – an account that was ‘significant(ly)’ different to 
that given by another officer.  The Coroner expressed concern that the IPCC 
investigator ‘did not think it relevant to obtain the jogging bottoms…(to) verify 
the presence and location of any pockets’.  This might not have been so 
important were it not for the fact that, ‘due to in part to human error and the 
GMP storage system, the jogging bottoms were destroyed before the 
conclusion of the IPCC investigation’.   The Coroner found that ‘had an enquiry 
been made by the IPCC to recover the jogging bottoms at an appropriate time, 
then the exhibit would not have been lost’.  As such, the ‘opportunity to verify 
and corroborate the position one way or another was lost’ 39.   
Moreover, even when IPCC investigations uncover that a particular officer’s 
actions have given cause for concern, the IPCC can only determine whether 
there are questions of (gross) misconduct and / or criminal conduct to answer – 
they cannot determine the answer to these questions.  In cases of gross 
misconduct, the IPCC can ‘recommend’ that the force hold a misconduct 
hearing – and, should they fail to do so, they can ‘direct’ them to hold such a 
hearing.  However, such hearings rarely result in dismissal.  The IPCC report 
into police use of force (2016a) does not give figures for Taser specifically but 
notes that, for all 62 cases where disciplinary hearings have been held for either 
misconduct or gross misconduct involving the use of force, 9 resulted in 
                                                          
39
 At the time of writing, it has been announced that the IPCC have applied for a Judicial Review of their 
original investigation into the Jordan Begley case (Press Association 2016).  If successful, this would 
allow them to quash their original investigation and conduct a new investigation into the incident.  I will 




dismissal.  The dismissal rate is even lower in instances where the police force 
has not taken up the IPCC’s recommendation to hold a hearing, but has held 
one subject to the IPCC using its powers to ‘direct’ it to do so.  As recently as 
2014 there had not been a single case of an officer being dismissed after the 
IPCC had directed that such a hearing should take place (Chapman 2014, IPCC 
2013b).   
Similarly, in cases where IPCC investigations uncover issues that go beyond 
those of the individual officer, and make broader recommendations, it remains a 
‘basic failing’ that there is no requirement for forces to respond to 
recommendations from the IPCC, still less to implement them’ (Home Affairs 
Select Committee 2013: 23).  The Triennial Review of the IPCC similarly 
recommended that the IPCC needed to ‘consider… how best to fulfil the 
function…to make recommendations and to give advice’ (Home Office 2015b: 
24), and the National Audit Office also noted that the IPCC ‘should develop 
suitable arrangements to satisfy itself that IPCC recommendations accepted by 
a police force have been properly implemented’ (Porter and Prenzler 2012: 162 
– 3).  Moreover, the IPCC (2013b: 3) has argued that it needs the capacity to 
look at ‘cases in areas of concern, and to undertake more thematic reviews of 
such cases’ in the first place.  
Whilst another option at the IPCC’s disposal is to refer case files to the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) to determine if criminal charges can be brought 
against officer(s) involved in the incident, this brings with it its own issues.  
IPCC statistics show that, of the 191 cases relating to police use of force that 
were independently investigated or managed by the IPCC, 24 were sent to the 
CPS for consideration (IPCC 2016a).  Criminal proceedings were taken against 
18 individuals, with 10 of those being found guilty – a 5% conviction rate.  
Statistics specifically pertaining to Taser are harder to assess, but may well be 
in the same region. 
The recent IPCC (2014a) report into the Taser cases brought before it does not 
contain statistics on the number of such cases sent to the CPS, or the number 
of such cases that resulted in prosecution40.  In order to fill this gap I reviewed 
                                                          
40 In a brief exception to this, the report notes, that of the 13 independent and three managed investigations conducted in relation to 
complaints about the use of Taser, in 14 of these cases the use of Taser was ‘was not found to be inappropriate or excessive in 
relation to current guidance’ (IPCC 2014a: 23).  In the remaining two cases, in the first incident: ‘the IPCC found that two police 
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all the investigations into the use of Taser detailed on the IPCC website – to the 
best of my knowledge, as finding these cases was more challenging than one 
might initially have thought 41.  The results of this review indicated that, of the 
Taser cases brought to the attention of the IPCC, at least 7 were referred to the 
CPS, with potential charges including gross negligence manslaughter, 
misconduct in public office and assault.  Of these cases, it appears as if two 
cases (the case of Officer Lee Birch’s alleged misconduct and assault on Daniel 
Dove, heard in April 2014 (BBC 2014), and the case of Officer Richard Jordan’s 
alleged assault on a Shaun Bebbington, heard in April 2016), were brought to 
court, with the latter of these cases resulting in a guilty verdict (McLelland 
2016).  
These figures—two cases brought to court, and one guilty verdict, both of which 
happened outside of the time span covered by this PhD—need to be seen in 
the context of the 16 independent or managed investigations conducted into the 
weapon, and the 493 Taser complaints, and the 190 referrals without a 
complaint, received by the IPCC between 2004 and 2013 (IPCC 2014a) – as 
well as the additional cases received after this date.   Thus the likelihood of an 
officer being prosecuted for Taser use in England and Wales would appear to 
be extremely low. 
 
Some additional measures—such as the requirement for police forces to 
publicly respond to IPCC recommendations--have now been put in place.  At 
                                                                                                                                                                          
officers had a case to answer for misconduct because they had not fully considered the risks in authorising the use of the Taser and 
not waiting for a negotiator to arrive at the scene. The police officers received management advice…There were no findings of 
misconduct in the use of force’.  The second case ‘in which a Taser was discharged at a partially-sighted man, resulted in a gross 
incompetence meeting. After this meeting, the police officer involved received a performance improvement notice and was required 
to apologise’ (IPCC 2014a: 23). 
41 An initial search for all results on the IPCC website tagged under the theme ‘Taser’ resulted in 15 hits (a mixture of news items 
and investigations), relating to 8 discrete cases, which were then individually reviewed.  However, my prior knowledge indicated 
that these cases did not represent the totality of cases the IPCC had handled involving Taser.  An internet search of news articles—
using the term ‘IPCC Taser officer prosecution’—and scanning the first 5 pages (some 50 search results out of a total of 78, 000 
hits) revealed 3 more cases, confirming this hypothesis.  As an additional check, the IPCC website was also searched by using the 
free text search term Taser, with results then filtered by hits that had been tagged under ‘investigation’ (thus excluding press releases 
and more general reports about the weapon that did not deal with individual cases): a process that generated an additional 7 cases.  
These cases were then cross-referenced with the anonymised 9 cases listed in the IPCC’s Learning the Lessons Bulletin that focused 
on Taser.  From the details of the cases given, many of them overlapped with the cases that had already been listed above.  However 
it was considered possible that 4 of the cases had not been previously captured.  This brought the number of identified cases up to 
22, although it is possible both that some cases may be double-counted and that not all relevant cases may have been found.  Of 
these cases, 5 were ineligible, either because investigations were still ongoing, or because information about the conclusion of the 




the time of writing, additional funding, increased remit and powers for the IPCC 
(and a possible successor body, the Office of Police Misconduct) are planned 
via the Policing and Crime Bill (see, for example, Home Office 2016), many of 
which were recommended by the IPCC (IPCC 2013b, Smith 2015). As an 
independent review of the IPCC’s governance arrangements notes, ‘major 
changes in the IPCC…(have been) under way since 2013’ (Smith 2015: 3), 
many at the behest of the IPCC, and drawing on their proposals for reform 
(Smith 2015).  It is clear things are changing, and such measures may well 
assist the IPCC to address these challenges going forward - but it is also 
important to note that such changes were  not in force for most of the time-span 
covered by this PhD.  For such reasons, then, the IPCC and HMIC have been 
unable to consistently ensure accountability for Taser use during the time period 
covered by the thesis.   
External Oversight in cases of death or serious injury: the role of SACMILL. 
Cases involving Taser and death or serious injury are not only referred to the 
IPCC, but are also meant to be referred to the Scientific Advisory Committee on 
the Medical Implications of Less Lethal Weapons, SACMILL.  Whilst the IPCC’s 
role revolves around investigating the actions of particular officers, SACMILL is 
concerned with assessing and providing guidance on the safety of the weapon, 
and where necessary suggesting changes to training and guidance around 
LLWs.   
However, the Committee’s role is limited by a number of factors.  First, the 
Committee itself has noted that its ability to analyse the medical implications of 
Taser has been limited by the fact that ‘medical audit information is mostly 
unavailable from incidents in which individuals exposed to Taser discharge 
have been transferred directly to hospital. Paradoxically, this means that 
DOMILL is unable to review outcomes in cases that are likely to be at the more 
serious end of the injury spectrum’ (2012, point 89).  The triennial review of 
SACMILL (Jenkins 2014: 2, 15) similarly called for ‘some minor changes in 
authorities and ‘permissions’… (to) allow better data capture from the use of 
systems’, including access to NHS anonymous data and ‘access to police 
tactical reports for example (which) may be restricted for legal and ethical 
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reasons’ (for a further discussion of these points and the role of SACMILL, see 
Dymond 2014c). 
Second, the Committee has limited capacity to conduct its own research into 
the use of Taser.  Instead, it is predominantly reliant on reviewing the extant 
literature around the weapon.  However, this can be problematic in the area of 
less-lethal weapons, where little research exists on certain topics, and where 
much of the research that does exist is associated with the weapons 
manufacturer and, according to at least one analysis (Azadani et al 2012), 
therefore more likely to find that the weapon is safe.  
Third, as the Triennial Review noted, ‘SACMILL advice is not binding’ (Jenkins 
2014: 3) and can be disregarded by individual police forces.    The Review 
recommended that ‘comply or explain doctrine should apply to the 
implementation of SACMILL advice’ which, whilst perhaps a step forward, still 
positions the Committee’s role closer to the ‘explain and account’ end of the 
accountability spectrum than it does to the ‘control’ and ‘enforcement’ end of the 
spectrum 
The Legal Process. 
Nevertheless, it might be objected, individuals who feel they have been 
subjected to inappropriate use of Taser have another another important 
mechanism for accountability – the legal process.  In this  section, and in light of 
the limited number of cases referred by the IPCC to the CPS, I thus examine i) 
some of the challenges associated with individuals getting their ‘day’ in court, be 
it criminal or civil and ii) some of the challenges faced once at court.  Whilst 
these two processes are different, there are nevertheless some shared 
similarities that this structure will allow us to examine in some depth.Getting 
your day in Criminal Court  
One key difficulty in bringing a successful criminal prosecution is that England 
and Wales has a test for the use of force that, as I shall shortly demonstrate, 
has been described as more subjective than other jurisdictions.  This, when 
combined with the fact that the standard of proof is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, 
means that prosecutions can be particularly difficult to achieve (see also 
Equality and Human Rights Commission 2015). 
As discussed in the last chapter, Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008, building on Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, notes 
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that ‘the question whether the degree of force used by… (the officer) was 
reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the 
circumstances as (the officer) believed them to be’.  Whilst the Act notes that 
'the reasonableness... of that belief' is 'relevant' to the question of whether or 
not the officer genuinely believed it, if it is determined that the belief was 
genuinely held, then it doesn’t matter whether the belief was ‘mistaken’, or 
whether it was ‘reasonable’ for the officer to hold it –a term sometimes referred 
to as the ‘honestly held belief’ standard.  Thus the reasonableness (or 
otherwise) of the belief is considered relevant as to whether it is honestly held—
after all, it may be more difficult to claim that one honestly holds a deeply 
unreasonable, implausible belief than a less implausible one—but if, after taking 
such factors into account, it is determined that the belief was indeed honestly 
held, it does not then have to be reasonably held in order for the force to be 
considered justifiable (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2015).  So 
under the English and Welsh standard, as the Court of Appeal found, the test is 
whether or not a particular belief was held.  If it ‘was in fact held, its 
unreasonableness… is neither here nor there’ (Regina v Williams (Gladstone) 
1983).  Thus the first question one must ask is ‘what were the circumstances 
the officer honestly believed he was faced with’.  
The second question one must ask is whether the degree of force used was 
reasonable in those circumstances. In weighing up this second question, one 
must assess whether the force used was necessary and proportionate.  The 
necessity test (absolute necessity for Article  2 cases)  asks whether it would 
have been possible to use less violent means, instead of those that were 
deployed, in order to meet the permitted and lawful objectives (McCann v. 
United Kingdom, paragraph 148).  The proportionality test asks whether the 
force used is proportionate to or consistent with the legitimate aim that is to be 
achieved, the danger to ‘life and limb’ posed by the situation, and the risk that 
the force used might result in loss of life (Stewart v United Kingdom, paragraph 
19, and McCann v. United Kingdom, paragraph 149).  Thus, for example, the 
level of force that is considered proportionate to stop a petty thief, or a shop-
lifter, who is posing no risk to themselves or others will be  less than that utilised 
to stop an individual posing an imminent risk of death or serious injury to those 
around them.   
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In applying the tests of necessity and proportionality, UK law states that one 
must  ‘take into account’, amongst other considerations, the fact that it is not 
always possible to ‘weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary 
action’ (Section 76.7 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 2008).  ECHR 
case law also highlights a number of other relevant considerations.   
Whilst Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom from 
torture and ill-treatment) has been applied in fewer cases involving mistaken 
beliefs (Leverick)—and, as a former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
other forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment has 
noted more generally, the circumstances in which bodily integrity and personal 
security can be curtailed have been less clearly defined than in cases involving 
the right to life (Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Novak, in Dymond and 
Corney 2014)—this latter right (Article 2 of the ECHR) is also relevant here.  It 
applies not just in cases where death has occurred subsequent to police use of 
force, including Taser (for some cases where this has occured, see Kroll et al 
2016), but also in cases where the force used threatens life—i.e. in cases 
where there are ‘ immediate risks of fatal harm’ (Kennison and Loumanski 
2007: 151) irrespective of whether this ultimately results in a fatality. 
ECHR case law indicates other important considerations that should be taken 
into account, as well as the difficulties involved in ‘weighing to a nicety’ the 
impact of a particular necessary action.  These include the need to; avoid 
imposing an ‘disproportionate and unrealistic obligation’ on the State (Giuliani 
and Gaggio v Italty, as quoted in Skinner 2014: 2); recognise the extreme 
pressure faced by the State; appreciate the ‘exceptional’ nature of the 
circumstances faced, which mean the State should be granted ‘a margin of 
appreciation’ around the decisions taken (Finogenov v Russia, as quoted in 
Skinner 2014: 2); and recognise the possibility of honest mistakes being made.   
As such, the subjective, so-called ‘honest mistake standard’ serves a useful 
purpose: it means that officers, who often have to make split second decisions 
about whether or not to use force, often with incomplete information and in 
uncertain circumstances, are assessed on the circumstances as they believed 
them to be at the time, not on the circumstances that may come to be known 
with the benefit of hindsight.  Indeed, as Skinner (2014: 2) has noted, the 
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ECtHR has shown an appreciation of the need to account for the ‘stresses 
involved in incidents in which state agents have to intervene, including the 
possibility of reasonable mistakes’.   
Yet it has also been argued that this standard is too easy to meet (see Norrie 
2010, for an overview of the debate).  Hessbruegge argues that such a 
standard places victims of (alleged) human rights violations at an ‘unfair 
disadvantage’, having to prove assertions about a police officer’s internal state 
of mind at the time of the incident: an extremely high barrier (Hessbruegge 
2016).  Simon (quoted in Squires and Kennison 2010: 11-12) argues that the 
genuine belief standard contains ‘a hole large enough for the proverbial truck… 
as awkward and excessive as the use of deadly force might have seemed out… 
(at the time), it reads as squeaky clean’ in the official narrative.  Punch (2010) 
notes the possibility that ‘there rarely are any prosecutions or convictions 
for…incidents conducted on behalf of the state’. 
Indeed, many other bodies and jurisdictions, including the USA, the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission,  the African Human Rights Commission 
and, arguably, the European Court of Human Rights, in their interpretation of 
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the McCann 
judgement,  ‘employ a hybrid test that combines a subjective and an objective 
element’ (Hessbruegge 2016).  Under this test, the defendant still has to have 
an ‘honest, if mistaken, belief’, but that belief ‘must have been objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances’ (Hessbruegge 2016: emphasis added, 
see also Norrie 2010). For example, the test set out by the McCann ruling—and 
repeated in subsequent ECHR case law—is of ‘an honest belief which is 
perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which subsequently turns out to 
be mistaken” (McCann v United Kingdom, para. 200, emphasis added).  Under the 
widely-held interpretation of this provision—or at least, as we shall see later, under the 
widely held interpretation that has dominated up until recently--ECHR case law 
provides for both a subjective and an objective test (Hessbruegge 2016), and English 
and Welsh law is considered to be remiss in providing only for a subjective test (Norrie 
2010, see also Leverick 2002) 
The importance of these debates can be seen in the case of Colin Farmer, who 
was Tasered by a Lancashire police officer, Stuart Wright, in 2012.  The officer 
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in question was responding to reports of a young male, a ‘skin-head with jeans’, 
in public with a two-foot long sword, whilst Colin Farmer was partially blind and 
described by a witness as ‘quite elderly and walk(ing) very slowly’ (IPCC 2012b: 
15 – 16).   The officer explained that he saw a ‘shiny and reflective object’ in 
Colin Farmer’s hand—in fact his walking stick—and mistook this for ‘a sword’.  
He described Colin Farmer as walking towards members of the public, who he 
considered to be in ‘immediate danger’ (IPCC 2012b: 15 – 16), and as not 
responding to his verbal warnings. The officer then fired the weapon in dart-
firing mode at Mr Farmer and handcuffed him, eventually removing the 
handcuffs sometime after. 
The IPCC investigation found that ‘PC Wright could have and should have dealt 
with Mr Farmer in an altogether different way rather than discharging his 
TASER at him’ (IPCC 2012b: 27).  They found that ‘there were no members of 
the public within close proximity of Mr Farmer… and therefore any perception 
that PC Wright may have had of an immediate threat to the public is flawed’, 
though the ‘radio transmissions made by PC… indicate that he did hold the 
belief that he was confronting a man with a sword’ (IPCC 2012b: 28).  They 
found that ‘PC Wright does have a case to answer for gross misconduct in 
respect of the allegation that he used a level of force upon Mr Farmer that was 
unnecessary and disproportionate to the circumstances’ and referred the case 
to the CPS (IPCC 2012b: 32).  The CPS, however, declined to bring charges, 
with a representative reportedly saying:  
‘Anyone accused of an assault who may have acted under a mistaken 
belief as to the facts must be judged on the facts as they believed them 
to be. In addition, police officers are entitled to use reasonable force in 
order to effect an arrest and where the officer is under a mistaken belief 
as to the facts the question is whether, in the circumstances as he 
believed them to be, the force was reasonable.  The officer has been 
informed by the police control room that they had received reports that a 
man was…carrying a sword.  It appears the reflective nature of the stick 
used as a walking aid… led members of the public to mistake it for a 
weapon. The officer… made the same mistake’ (The Telegraph 2013, 
emphasis added).   
Following the CPS’s decision, the force held a gross incompetence meeting 
which found that ‘the officer failed to perform his duties to a satisfactory 
standard… though his actions did not amount to gross incompetence’ 
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(Edmonds 2014).  The officer ‘received a performance improvement notice and 
was required to apologise’ (IPCC 2012b: 23).  It was reported that Mr Farmer 
has since taken civil action against the force for false imprisonment, assault and 
battery, and breach of the Human Rights Act (1998), and received an 
undisclosed amount (Peachy 2015).  This case vividly illustrates some of the 
issues with relying solely on a  subjective, honest belief test, as opposed to a 
test which considers the honestly held belief, and also explicitly asks whether 
such a belief was objectively reasonable.  (It also highlights the difference 
between criminal law and civil law, a point to which I shall return shortly).  
Yet, second, the Colin Farmer case potentially points to an additional issue in 
domestic criminal law.  For it is tempting to conceive of tests of reasonableness 
in terms of the presence (or lack thereof) of external evidence that corroborates 
the officer’s belief, and that would make such a (mistaken) belief 
understandable.  However external evidence is rarely available in a convenient, 
easy to use, ready-made format: instead, attempts have to be made to actively 
gather the necessary information, intelligence and evidence, and to piece it 
together.  There is thus a difference between a belief that is ‘unreasonable’ due 
to the fact that there is no evidence to support it, and a belief that is 
‘unreasonable’ because there have been no attempts made to ascertain 
whether such evidence exists, or not, in the first place. If we are to consider 
including elements of a more objective test, based on the reasonableness of a 
given belief in its own right (as opposed to the reasonableness of the belief 
simply being a way to assess whether it was honestly held)  I would therefore 
argue that it is necessary to consider not just how reasonable the belief is, but 
how reasonable is the process the individual officer has taken in order to arrive 
at this belief: whether the officer has taken sufficient action to try and 
corroborate this belief, and turn it from a supposition into a solid fact.  
At present, such considerations can be taken into account in assessing whether 
any belief is ‘honestly’ held – but once it has been determined that this is the 
case, they are not then taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of 
the officer’s response.  However, according to soft law, officers have a 
responsibility to use force only when ‘unavoidable’ (UN Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms (1990), Principle 5),so it could therefore be argued 
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that  they have a responsibility to put their ‘honest’ and ‘instinctive’ beliefs to the 
test, where possible, before using force 42.  
In this case it would seem clear that the officer did genuinely believe Mr Farmer 
to be armed with a sword —but equally clear that he only believed this because 
he had failed to take the necessary action to avail himself of information that 
would have likely changed his beliefs.  Of course in many situations that police 
face, this is an issue of little or no importance because they do not have 
sufficient time to enable them to corroborate their (initially reasonably held) 
beliefs.  Indeed, in making such determinations about process, the well-
recognised difficulties documented above—including the difficulties inherent in 
weighing to a nicety the impact of one’s actions, the need to avoid imposing 
unrealistic requirements on officers, the possibility of honest mistakes occurring, 
and the need to appreciate the extreme pressures and stresses faced at the 
time—should be taken into account. 
In this situation, however—and potentially in many others—the police officer in 
question had a short amount of time in which to ascertain the reasonableness of 
his honestly held belief.   As the IPCC report (2012: 30-31) noted, in this case 
the officer had sufficient time to ‘reposition and gain a better view of the man 
who he was challenging’ – an action which would have ‘allowed… (him) to see 
that (Colin Farmer) was not carrying a sword’.  Yet Officer Wright failed to take 
these actions and, as such, failed to do anything that might either confirm or 
deny his original (genuinely held and arguably initially reasonable) belief. 
In cases involving the use of force, it is sometimes presumed that officers are 
thrust into a situation where their beliefs (reasonable or otherwise) lead them to 
use force.  Yet this case shows that the reverse is also true – that officers can 
use force too quickly, in turn denying themselves the opportunity to ascertain 
the reasonableness of their beliefs.  In other words, failing to explicitly include a 
test for the process through which officers arrive at, and check, their beliefs –
cognisant of the difficulties and caveats noted above—may leave the window 
                                                          
42 Indeed, case law from the European Court of Human Rights has stressed the importance of 
looking at broader factors around use of force, including the substantive, planning and control, 
and investigative dimensions of the incident in question (Skinner 2014) - although this tends to 




open for officers to use unnecessary force too quickly – without facing the threat 
of a criminal prosecution.  Such questions are perhaps too broad to be dealt 
with in this thesis, and can only be noted for the time being.  More 
pragmatically, however, what this case does vividly illustrate is just how difficult 
it is to hold the police legally accountability for the force that they use, including 
the use of Taser.  
In such instances, then, it would appear that there is a need to consider clarifying the 
legal test that currently applies and to consider amending it so that it combines both a 
subjective and an objective element, such that mistaken beliefs must not only be 
honest but also be objectively reasonable (Hessbruegge 2016).  In this light, Norrie’s 
(2010: 377) recommendation—that there is a need for a ‘proper debate’ about the 
current legal test in England and Wales, and about the related issue of ‘the limits of 
appropriate police action and citizen liberties in a democratic society’—seems to have 
much to commend it, and the IPCC have relatedly called for a ‘wide and well-informed 
debate’ around police use of firearms (in Squires and Kennison 2010: 14.  This debate 
is all the more urgently needed given the ECHR’s ruling in the Armani Da Silva case, 
which appeared to find that the ECHR standard was not a subjective test combined 
with an objective test but was, in fact, an entirely subjective standard after all, and 
hence English and Welsh law was not ‘significantly different’ from the ECHR test 
(Armani Da Silva v United Kingdom , paragraph 252).   Hence the court ruled that the 
‘existence of ‘good reasons’—as detailed in the McCann case—‘should be determined 
subjectively’; that is, that ‘good reasons’ don’t have to be objective, but can be 
‘subjectively’ as such by the officer involved (, Armani Da Silva v United Kingdom , 
paragraph 245, 248).  As such, discussions around the status of existing law—
including whether it is necessary to further clarify its application, or even to amend the 
law itself—are urgently needed (Norrie 2010, Squires and Kennison 2010, see also 
Skinner 2014).Getting your day in Civil Court.  
As Colin Farmer’s case illustrates, however, those seeking to bring their case to 
court also have another route at their disposal: the civil courts.  As the Police 
Action Lawyer’s Group (PALG) notes, such litigation ‘is often the only means by 
which those who have suffered malpractice on the part of officers of the state 
are able to secure access to justice and thereby to defend their civil liberties’ 
(PALG 2014: no page number) – particularly because the standard of proof 
required is lower than the standard applied in criminal cases.  Yet the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act of 2012 has introduced additional 
difficulties which have had the cumulative effect of making people ‘think again 
before deciding to sue the police’ (Donogue 2014).   
These reforms are said to impact on claimants bringing (or thinking about 
bringing) civil claims by a Conditional Fee Agreement.  Under the old 
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arrangement, if claimants were successful, they were entitled to claim the cost 
of their legal fees and the cost of any After the Event Insurance they may have 
taken out, from the Defendants in addition to any compensation  they may have 
received.  The success fee for which their lawyer was entitled to charge was 
also payable by the defendant.   
Under the new arrangement, if claimants using Conditional Fee Agreements are 
successful, although they will recover their basic legal fees from the Defendant, 
they can no longer recover their success fee, or the cost of insurance (if taken 
out) separately from the defendants, but have to pay it out of their 
compensation.  However, in cases against the police, the amount of 
compensation paid is relatively low, and insurance premiums are relatively high, 
or simply not available (PALG 2014).   
On the other hand, if claimants lose their case, in certain cases they could face 
having to pay the defendant police force’s legal costs.  In theory this should 
rarely happen, as personal injury claims—which Taser cases are likely to 
involve, either on grounds of physical injury and/or psychological injury—benefit 
from Qualified One Way Cost Shifting (QOCS), which should shield 
unsuccessful claimants from the other side’s legal costs.  Nevertheless PALGS 
note that, in practice, uncertainties over the applicability of QOCS to claims 
against the police could create a potential barrier to litigation in some cases.   
Solicitor Iain Gould, one of the lawyers interviewed for the thesis, explained the 
impact on clients as follows: 
 ‘The very poor qualify for legal aid, the problem is for the middle income 
group, which is a big group…. I have to say to them: 'I think you've got a 
viable case here. But I'm not going to guarantee success, because I 
can't. And guess what? If you lose… you are going to have a cost bill of 
£25, 000 – £30, 000’. You…  are going to say 'I’m not doing that'.  As a 
result there is a huge vacuum, and that is a major, major problem’.  
Taken together, then, the effect of these new reforms has been to create a 
‘significant obstacle to litigation in meritorious cases’, and to establish an  
‘unjustified barrier to access to justice’, meaning that, unless they are in receipt 
of legal aid, claimants are ‘unable to vindicate constitutional and other 
fundamental rights, unless they are wealthy’ (PALGS 2014). 
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When Cases Reach Court. 
Furthermore, when cases reach court – be it a civil or a criminal court – those 
subjected to Taser can face additional hurdles in presenting their case 
effectively.  The factors discussed in Chapter 5—including the difficulties in 
conveying pain, and broader tendencies that trivialize the experience of being 
Tasered—may make it difficult for subjects to speak out, whilst  the very factors 
that may make individuals prone to Taser use, such as aggressive mannerisms, 
or mental health issues, may mean that they may not always be able to 
describe the experiences as convincingly as they might like (Sussman 2012).   
At the same time, police officers have additional ways to enhance their 
credibility.  One such method is the National Decision Model, introduced in the 
last chapter.  At the time of its introduction, ACPO (2012: 1) described the NDM 
‘as a values-based tool to provide a simple, logical and evidence-based 
approach to… decisions’, and to ‘help police officers and staff develop the 
professional judgement necessary to make effective policing decisions…. (and) 
learn from decisions that have a successful outcomes, as well as the small 
proportion that do not’.  It was noted that ‘decision makers can use it to 
structure a rationale of what they did during an incident and why. Managers and 
others can use it to review decisions and actions taken’.  The document 
stressed the importance of officers being ‘accountable for their decisions’ and 
being prepared to ‘provide a rationale for what they did and why’ (ACPO 2012: 
5).  As such, the National Decision Model can bring a range of benefits around 
demystifying and providing a useful checklist around the decision making 
process. 
However a ‘tool’, initially intended as an aide to help officers make decisions 
and to help others review them, has been interpreted by some in a slightly 
different way.  For some, the NDM has come to have value as a way of helping 
officers to justify their actions after the event – in a way that risks minimizing, 
not enhancing, processes of review and scrutiny.  Thus personal safety trainers 
and Taser trainers noted, both to their students, and during interviews that: 
‘If we ever end up in court justifying our actions, the barrister will be 
questioning us on the NDM. As soon as… they realise you know it, then 
the questions stop because they know they are not going to catch you 
out… The barrister sits down, so the actual justification and use of it can 
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never be questioned. Ok there's times when it goes wrong and whether it 
was the most appropriate tool, you could question that, but that goes 
back to the officer... and that's where the threat and risk assessment 
comes in’ (Personal Safety Trainer, Force location omitted, emphasis 
added). 
‘The NDM is brilliant, really good, it’s just how the mind would work.  It’s 
giving police officers permission to go and use force because, contrary to 
popular belief, a lot of officers aren't going in heavy handed, if anything 
they are worried about themselves getting into trouble.  But this gives 
them the power.  If you think you are doing the right thing you probably 
are, (and) it gives them that confidence to deal with the situation and not 
getting themselves sued’ (Taser trainer, force location omitted, emphasis 
added). 
‘The threat and risk (box on the NDM is) completely your personalised 
view of the world. Every decision you make is influenced by what you put 
in that box – it influences everything that comes after it.  ‘I was scared’ – 
personalising that threat assessment is the key to your success.  It’s 
irrefutable in court’ (Taser trainer, Force omitted, emphasis added). 
In the words of one Taser trainer, the NDM is the ‘get out of jail free card’.  The 
NDM thus appears to enhance officer’s 'account-ability’—that is, the ‘capacity to 
provide a record of activities that explains them in a credible manner so that 
they appear to satisfy the(ir) rights and obligations’—at the expense of 
accountability understood in a broader sense (Ericson in Young 2015: 42).   
Such consequences seem at odds with the stated rationale of the NDM.  They 
demonstrate that texts, such as the NDM, can become far more than tools to 
assist officers in making decisions, but may—as the ANT notion of generalised 
symmetry asks us to consider—also interact with human agency in various 
ways to have a variety of unexpected consequences.  Indeed, as Prior notes, 
‘documents do much more than serve as informants and can… be considered 
as actors in their own right’ (2008: 822).  As Anais expresses rather pithily in her 
study of less lethals, texts ‘do things rather than simply say things’ (2015: 123). 
This is not to say that the use of the NDM always precludes accountability: 
indeed, as one might expect, it can interact with a variety of human actors to 
produce a variety of effects.  Thus, in some circumstances, investigatory bodies 
have been able to use the NDM framework as a standard against which to 
assess officer’s use of force and judge whether or not it was appropriate.  Thus, 
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for example, the IPCC has examined officers’ NDM rationales in incidents 
involving the use of force and, in ‘some’ incidents, has found ‘concerns about 
the lack of information gathered before risk assessments were conducted and 
force was used’ (IPCC 2016a: vii) – intimating that the NDM has not been used 
properly.  However, holding officers to account under the NDM is necessarily 
complicated because, as one trainer noted, ‘there is no standard: the NDM is 
the standard’ – and the NDM, in turn, places a high emphasis on the officer’s 
subjective assessment of the situation, their fears and reactions.   
So whilst judging whether officers have complied with the NDM is, of course, an 
important question to ask, and the benefits of the NDM should not be ignored, 
equally care must be taken so that it doesn’t mask an equally important 
question: whether the standard (or lack thereof) set out by the NDM, is itself 
appropriate.  As Casalie noted in her review of the IPCC, the organisation’s role 
has, in the past, tended to be too narrowly focused on ‘assessing officers’ 
actions against criteria and standards derived from the police guidance 
applicable at the time’ – in this case, the NDM - instead of ‘holding the system 
to account… (by) review(ing) (this).. guidance, to identify any shortcomings’ 
(Casalie 2012: 14).  Similarly, Squires and Kennison (2010: 56) note that, in 
practice ‘police will generally be ‘covered’ if they can be shown to have followed 
their own rules and procedures and provided political complaint does not 
entirely overwhelm police management discourses’.  As Casalie notes, 
‘ultimately, the test is whether or not policing policy and practice complies with 
human rights jurisprudence and standards for combating impunity’ (2012: 14) – 
and, as I have shown, the NDM can be used in ways which arguably enhance 
officer impunity. 
Nor is this restricted to the IPCC. As I have noted, HMIC has historically not 
looked at the issue of Taser use – and whilst this is changing, their new 
approach likewise assesses officers against the NDM, instead of critically 
interrogating the NDM itself.  Under the HMIC’s new Police Effectiveness, 
Efficient and Legitimacy (PEEL) inspections, started in 2014,  HMIC 
investigators will now consider ‘whether chief officers understand how fairly and 
appropriately Tasers are being used in their forces, and whether Taser-trained 
officers are acting in accordance with the College of Policing’s Authorised 
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Professional Practice each time it is used’ (HMIC 2016a: 52).  Again, whilst 
valuable, this misses the broader question of how appropriate Authorised 
Professional Practice—based, in turn, around the NDM—actually is.  
Thus, whilst it is important that officers are given assistance and support in 
explaining their rationale for their actions, it is crucial that this support doesn’t 
allow officers to justify actions, up to and including the use of Taser, that are 
inappropriate under the circumstances.  Frameworks such as the NDM can 
have many useful applications, but should not be used to ensure that decisions 
made around the use of Taser are ‘never questioned’.  Instead, they  should 
genuinely assist officers in making the correct decisions at the time of the event 
in question.  Whilst there is understandably much support for the NDM 
framework, this analysis suggests that it can bring with it certain risks, 
particularly given the pre-existing difficulties in holding officers to account in the 
English and Welsh legal system.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has used a notion of accountability as encompassing both 
‘answerability’ and ‘enforcement’ to demonstrate that the accountability 
processes around Taser use in England and Wales have many positive features 
and, indeed, are commonly characterized as ‘robust’. Yet these accountability 
systems have not always been as ‘robust’ as they could have been.  Whilst 
HMIC has identified much good practice in some forces, in other forces, cultural 
norms encourage internal investigators to take officer accounts at ‘face value’ 
and the processes for reviewing and remedying issues around Taser leave 
room for improvement.  At the same time, external accountability mechanisms 
have provided less than robust levels of oversight during the period covered 
here.  Moreover, whilst recourse to the legal system is often seen as a final 
safeguard, a host of challenges face those who would seek to have their case 
heard in criminal and / or civil court.  This includes not only an entirely 
‘subjective’ test as to whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable, but the 
use of a decision-making model—the NDM—in ways which have been 
described as a ‘get out of jail free’ card.  
Despite all of these challenges, achieving effective accountability for Taser use 
remains particularly important – not just because of the broader imperative to 
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hold the police to account for their actions, nor just because, as I have argued in 
the last couple of chapters, several factors subtly incentivise officers to use the 
weapon.  It is also important because the promise of effective accountability is a 
key pillar used to justify the relative lack of clear standards and guidelines 
around when Taser should be deployed.  We are asked to accept officers 
making their own decisions on when to use the weapon—and the considerable 
variation that inevitably comes along with that—on the promise that, after all, if 
their use is found to be inappropriate, they can and will be held to account.  This 
chapter has demonstrated that, for a variety of reasons, this may not always be 
the case. 
Before turning to the concluding chapter—in which I discuss in more detail how 
one might practically address such issues—it is worth discussing the 
implications of this chapter has for constructivist STS approaches, of which I 
wish to highlight three. 
First, this chapter has served to demonstrate the continuing relevance of 
constructivist STS studies, in particular ANT.  Whilst it has highlighted the role 
of human actors, it has also shown that accountability is not solely a human 
phenomenon.  Instead, in keeping with ANT inspired accounts, it has pointed to 
the role of various non-human actors—from the technical features of the Taser 
weapon, to the use of force reporting form, to the National Decision Model—and 
how they can interact with human actants to have varied effects.  STS inspired 
approaches, and the ANT concept of generalised symmetry, are well suited to 
drawing our attention to this, as well as to the possibility of creating 
accountability mechanisms that incorporate the non-human.    For example, 
Latour (1992) notes that humans have ‘delegated’ to non-human actants—such 
as speed bumps or door closers—the responsibility for ensuring humans act in 
moral ways (i.e. by driving responsibly, closing doors etc.).  In a similar vein, 
responsibility could be delegated to non-human actants, in this case Taser, to 
ensure that, for example, subjects are given only the minimum amount of 
electric-shock necessary.  Thus whilst STS and ANT have been criticised by 
some for detracting attention away from human actants, such approaches can 
also point to accountability remedies which go beyond the human, to include the 
technical and its interactions with humans.   
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Second, however, whilst an STS inspired sensibility may have succeeded in 
widening our gaze to include a focus on non-human elements and the complex 
interactions between the former and the latter, it is much more tricky to go a 
step beyond this and to relinquish notions of ‘human’ and non-human all 
together, as some versions of ANT would have us do.  This critique has been 
levelled at ANT for the best part of a decade, with Whittle and Spicer (2008: 
614) noting that ANT ‘continues to rely on (binary) assumptions when 
partitioning of the world into, for instance,… guests (people)… and keys 
(material artefacts)…  recreat(ing) the dualism it seeks to overcome’.  Thus, 
whilst moderate versions of constructivist and ANT approaches can be useful, if 
taken to extremes—and used to deny the existence of a (temporarily) coherent 
actant such as a Taser—they may be less than helpful, and set up standards 
that are impossible to reach. 
Moreover, one does not need to adopt an extreme ANT approach, or even to 
work within constructivist STS, to focus on the non-human, and to produce 
broad ranging recommendations for a range of actants.   Indeed, many of those 
writing outside of ANT and STS—and, indeed, working outside of academia—
have come to similar conclusions about the need for broad accountability 
mechanisms, and to look beyond human actants.  For example, in the USA, the 
Police Executive Research Forum’s recommendations went beyond a focus on 
the human, to incorporate a focus on the non-human when they recommended 
that the length of the electric-shock produced by the Taser have a five second 
automatic cut off (PERF 2010) – a recommendation taken up in later versions of 
Taser weapons.  Similarly, Amnesty International’s (2008) report on Taser 
diagnosed a broad range of issues around the weapon and made a series of far 
reaching recommendations designed to comprehensively target the furthest 
reaches of what one might call the ‘network’ around the weapon, including 
recommendations on the guidance and training around the weapon, dealing 
with at risk populations, modes of use, interaction with other force options and 
the role of police officers (see also Moreau De Bellaing 2015). 
Whilst it might be objected that such recommendations focus either on human 
actants or on technologies, it is far from clear how one might go about 
producing recommendations focused on hybrid actors.  It is readily 
acknowledged by many outside of academia—many of whom have never heard 
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of constructivist STS or ANT—that separating social from technical 
considerations is no straightforward task, and that producing recommendations 
around technology is equally complex (Rappert 2005).  Yet in the final analysis, 
mechanisms to strengthen accountability tend to focus either on the human 
(e.g. the disciplinary measures and training regimes needed) or the non-human 
(e.g. the changes that could be made to technology).  It is not that those putting 
forward such recommendations fail to grasp the nuances and complexities in 
the debate: it is more that, all too often, there is no way to enhance regulation 
without falling back on binary distinctions (Rappert 2005).  In the end, then, it is 
not clear how one might regulate hybrid actants without resorting to traditional 
binary conceptions.  For all these reasons, then, whilst constructivist STS and 
ANT approaches may be insightful and interesting, this chapter has shown that 
their novelty and utility can be questioned – as can their ability to generate new 




Chapter 10: Conclusions and Reflections. 
 
 
This thesis set out to study police use of the Taser X26 in England and Wales 
between 2004 and 2014.  To assist me with this, I set out four key aims for the 
thesis.  First, it was explicitly intended to be exploratory in scope. As one of the 
first pieces of work looking at Taser in England and Wales, it aimed to explore 
how the weapon is currently used, and the laws, policies, training and 
accountability mechanisms surrounding its use – crucial issues in their own 
right, and topics that had not been analysed in depth before.  Second, I 
intended to move beyond mere exploration to provide a constructive critique of 
Taser in England and Wales, acting as a critical friend on this important issue. 
Third, I aimed to use the issue of Taser in England and Wales as a case study 
to contribute to broader discussions and debates in the policing literature and, 
indeed, in sociology more generally.  Fourth, I hoped that the thesis, and the 
process of writing it, would make a positive contribution to the policy debate, 
generating practical recommendations for academics and practitioners alike. 
Guided by these aims, I set out to answer five specific questions around the use 
of the weapon in England and Wales, namely: 
1) How is Taser used?  
2) How has it impacted officers and subjects?  
3) What stories are told about the weapon and its regulation, and how 
complete are they? 
4) How is Taser regulated and accounted for?  
5) How helpful are the constructivist and ANT approaches within Science 
and Technology Studies in answering these questions? 
In this final chapter I seek, in Part 1, to outline my conclusions to these 
questions and assess the extent to which I have been able to answer them.  In 
Part 2 I then outline the implications of my research findings for the broader 
academic literature more generally.  In Part 3 I turn my attention to policy and 
practice, highlighting the recommendations that come out of this thesis.  Ideas 




Key findings from the research. 
Question 1. How is Taser used (Chapter 3)?  
I sought to examine how Taser is used in England and Wales by analysing an 
internal use of force data set from one particular force in the jurisdiction.  Whilst 
it would perhaps have been preferable to conduct this analysis at the national 
level, a lack of detail in the publicly available statistics for Taser use in England 
and Wales mean that this approach was not possible at the time of writing.  As 
such it should not be presumed that the conclusions drawn are representative 
of, and hold true for, England and Wales as a whole.   
Nevertheless, an in-depth case study of Taser use in a specific force can lead 
us to some insights as to how the weapon is used in practice, and point to some 
issues that need further investigation.  Indeed, statistical analysis of use of force 
data provided by Force A shows that Taser is rarely used, and Taser firings 
constitute a small amount (less than 1%) of total uses of force.  Moreover, use 
of Taser is significantly associated with increased levels of subject resistance 
and the reported presence of a weapon.  These findings contrast markedly with 
the existing academic literature on Taser—which, based almost exclusively on 
the USA, argues that the weapon is used frequently and  often as a ‘first resort’ 
by police officers – and highlights that findings based on the  USA may not 
always have a universal applicability.  However, these findings do broadly 
accord with findings from the IPCC (2015) and HMIC (2016a) in England and 
Wales, which drew conclusions around the weapon that were generally 
‘positive’, finding that the weapon had ‘almost always’ been used ‘fairly and 
appropriately’ in the cases that they had studied HMIC (2016a: 57). 
Yet there are some indicators of concern over the proportionality and necessity 
of the weapon’s use, given that the majority of times where Taser is fired, it is 
fired on subjects not recorded as using, or having, a weapon.  Moreover, even 
after controlling for other relevant variables, Taser firings are associated with 
subject drug consumption and subjects who are experiencing mental health 





Question 2: How has Taser impacted subjects and officers (Chapters 4 – 7)?  
The results of quantitative analysis conducted on the internal use of force 
dataset provided by one force in England and Wales show a mixed picture as to 
whether Taser increases or decreases the odds of subject injury, and 
demonstrate that much depends on whether Taser is used alone or with other 
force – an issue hitherto ignored in much of the literature on the weapon (Terrill 
and Paoline 2012). Thus incidents where Taser firing was the sole force used 
were associated with higher rates of reported subject injury than incidents 
where empty hand techniques were the sole force used, with lower rates of 
subject injury when compared to incidents where irritant spray was the sole 
force fired/used, and were insignificant when compared to baton.  In keeping 
with Terrill and Paoline’s work, incidents where Taser was fired with other force 
options were generally associated with significantly increased odds of subject 
injury than incidents where Taser was the sole form of force used – suggesting 
that not all incidents where Taser is fired have the same implications for subject 
injury rates.  Incidents where Taser is drawn but not fired are associated with 
decreased odds of subject injury – as, to a lesser degree, are instances where 
baton and CS are drawn, but not fired.   
However a key limitation of my work and of most other studies on the topic 
(except Taylor and Woods 2010) is the inability to directly associate particular 
injuries with particular weapons, and to differentiate between the severity of the 
injury that is inflicted.   It might be that Taser is associated with increased risk of 
subject injury, but with a decreased risk of more serious injuries, as the bulk of 
reported injuries are lacerations from probe wounds.  Yet it may also be that 
many injuries from the weapon are more serious (e.g. injuries from falling).  
Much more work is needed not just on the rate of injury, but on its severity – 
and, as I go onto discuss in the next section, more attention needs to be paid to 
how the data itself, and concepts of injury specifically, are constructed. 
Yet it cannot be assumed—as much of the quantitative literature does—that the 
consequences of Taser use can be reduced to subject injury.  Indeed, some of 
those subjected to Taser have concerns that go beyond physical injury to 
include less visible concerns, such as the pain, fear and loss of control and 
psychological issues experienced as a result of what is believed to be part of a 
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broader trend towards the gratuitous, unnecessary use of the weapon.  Care 
needs to be taken when interpreting such findings, given the small number of 
interviews conducted, and the fact that I was not able to conduct interviews with 
those who had had more positive experiences of the weapon, or with individuals 
who had been subjected to force other than Taser.  As such, whilst it is 
important to note the negative consequences of the weapon, this should not 
detract from cases where its application has been considered appropriate by 
subjects, or had a positive impact more broadly.  Nor should it be assumed that 
the negative sequelae experienced are a result of Taser.  These are all areas 
where further research needs to be done, but it is clear that the use of the 
weapon is far from consequence free, and is not necessarily the ‘nicer’ use of 
force option that some would like it to be. 
Turning to the consequences for officers, the results of statistical analysis were 
largely inconclusive. However the analysis highlighted the need for enhanced 
data collection around police use of force, including datasets and models 
capable of controlling for the order in which injury, subject resistance and use of 
force occurred.  It also highlighted the extent to which the impact of the weapon 
on officer safety can be mediated by other factors (for example, the number of 
officers present at an incident), a finding which underscores the importance of 
looking at Taser not in isolation, but as part and parcel of the broader socio-
technical network in which it is embedded.   
If quantitative analysis is somewhat inconclusive, qualitative analysis of officer 
safety issues also reveals a mixed picture.  As Chapter 6 shows, most Taser 
trained officers are  highly positive about the weapon, and some of the benefits 
that they identify—such as the ability to stop potential use of force incidents 
before they even begin—would not be picked up by quantitative analysis.  Yet, 
whilst many officers view the weapon as enhancing their safety, other 
interpretations and accounts are also possible.  Indeed carrying the weapon 
may, under certain circumstances, actually place certain types of non-firearms 
officers at more risk.  Moreover, whilst officers tend to see Taser as being ‘nicer’ 
for subjects and ‘less intrusive’ than other forms of force, these views are often 




Such findings again point to the need to see officer safety rates and broader 
impacts of ‘the weapon’ not just as stemming from the inherent qualities of the 
technology itself, but as a result of the complex socio-technical network around 
the weapon.  They also point to the need for further work to be done on this 
topic, with further advances to be made to data collection practices, to be able 
to provide further evidence as to the effects of Taser on officers and subjects.   
Questions 3 and 4: What stories are commonly told around the weapon, and 
how complete are they? How is Taser regulated and accounted for? (Chapters 
8 and 9).  
Whilst the aforementioned debates around how Taser is used, and the 
consequences of use, are still ongoing, nevertheless a number of stories 
around the use of the weapon have repeatedly appeared in academic and 
practitioner discussions.  These include the notion that the weapon is no more 
than a neutral tool, that appropriate use is a responsibility for, and at the 
discretion of, individual officers, and that the weapon’s use is subject to robust 
accountability mechanisms.  These stories are highly intertwined with 
discussions about Taser regulation and accountability, and are thus important to 
consider.   
In this thesis I have argued that these stories are not necessarily inaccurate per 
se, but that they are incomplete.  Whilst a focus on the decision making abilities 
of individual officers is important, decisions that are made elsewhere can also 
impact on whether, when and how Taser is used, and act to incentivise or dis-
incentivise its use. For example, decisions that have been taken about the 
content and frequency of police use of force training may impact officer’s 
decisions on whether or not to use the weapon, making its use more likely.  
Similarly, rather than Taser being an interchangeable, neutral tool, the 
interaction between the Taser weapon and the officer holding it may also 
influence the decisions that officers make in ways that facilitate its use.  Using 
Dror’s (2007) three-tiered framework of officer decision making, I demonstrated 
that the presence of the weapon may impact ‘decision factors’ (with the use of 
force being perceived as posing a low risk to officers and subjects), ‘internal’ 
factors (by encouraging the officer to be more confident and proactive, in how 
they deal with policing situations) and ‘external’ factors, including the time 
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pressure officers are under.  Thus Taser may interact with human agency, and 
other factors, to have surprising, and unpredictable, effects.   
In such a situation policy and accountability mechanisms can have a role to play 
in helping to ensure the weapon is only used in appropriate circumstances 
(Bishopp 2014).  However under the system currently in use in England and 
Wales, officers are given very little guidance about when to use the weapon.  
This means that different officers faced with a similar situation may handle it in 
markedly different ways – and may, on some occasions, resort to inappropriate 
use of the weapon.  Where this does happen, the accountability mechanisms 
that have been put in place are not always as robust as is claimed.   There is 
room for improvement both in internal police oversight mechanisms and 
external mechanisms such as the IPCC, whilst considerable barriers to justice 
continue to exist in both civil and criminal courts.  Whilst the National Decision 
Model seems helpful as an aide to decision making, and as an aide to 
accountability under some circumstances, under other circumstances, it can 
also be used in ways which make it more difficult for accountability to be 
achieved.  Thus, whilst many officers use the weapon responsibly, there is no 
room for complacency - and a need for additional safeguards and measure to 
be put in place to help ensure responsible use of the weapon across the board 
(a point to which I shall return to in Section 3). 
Question 5: How helpful are constructivist STS approaches in answering these 
questions? (discussed throughout, especially Chs 1, 7-9)? 
Questions 1 – 4 are not only important topics to address in their own right, but 
also provide an interesting case study to assess the added value, if any, that 
constructivist STS approaches in general, and ANT in particular, can bring to 
the study of particular technologies, in this case Taser – the final question I set 
out to answer with this thesis.   
Overall, this thesis has argued that whilst constructivist STS  approaches do 
have some utility, their value and novelty can be overstated, and the differences 
between different approaches in the STS family aren’t always clear. Whilst 
moderate versions of constructivist STS can be helpful, directing the analyst 
towards interesting insights, there is no need to adopt an explicitly STS or ANT 
framework, or on the technical language and jargon that often accompanies it, 
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to reach many of the conclusions that I have here.  The differences between 
ANT and other approaches within constructivist STS – as well as the difference 
between constructivist STS more broadly, and other forms of analysis—can be 
over-emphasised.  Moreover, using these approaches is not a cost-free 
endeavour, but comes with a distinct set of risks.   
This can be seen through a closer examination of three areas where 
constructivist STS perspectives claim to differ from some of the more traditional 
approaches to technology, namely by: favouring a symmetrical approach to 
truth claims about Taser, instead of seeking to advance an ‘empirical reality’ 
around the weapon: using generalised symmetry to go beyond conventional 
notions of the weapon as ‘tool’: and conceiving of the weapon as part of an 
assemblage. 
A symmetrical approach to truth claims 
A symmetrical approach to truth claims  has added value at various points in 
this thesis.  Chapters 3 – 5 have demonstrated that bearing constructivist STS 
sensibilities in mind can aide interpretation of statistical models  by encouraging 
us to probe relationships between ‘variables’, and to look at the way in which 
two variables may be mutually constructed.  For example, instead of officers 
being more likely to use Taser on particular subjects, it may be that officers are 
more likely to record additional details of the subject and the encounter where 
Taser was fired, as they perceive its use to need additional justification.  
Similarly, Chapter 7 has shown that constructivist STS can encourage us to 
examine officer accounts of the weapon more closely, instead of taking them at 
face value.   
STS studies also invite us to consider the social construction of injury.  Grint 
and Woolgar (1992: 366) once invited us to consider ‘what’s social about being 
shot’ —and answered that everything was.. This implies that the 
characterisation of something as an ‘injury’ is not a straightforward 
characterisation but the product of multiple interpretations.  These 
interpretations may vary according to the weapon used, and the nature of the 
harm occasioned. Thus analyses of injury rates, for example, may say more 
about differing approaches to, and characterisations of, injury and harm, and 
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pre-existing beliefs about the safety of certain weapons, than they do about the 
‘real’ harm occasioned.   
More broadly, then, constructivist STS approaches serve to remind us that the 
results of statistical models, and the reflections of those who use, and are 
affected by the weapon, are not simply an independent, objective take on the 
‘realities’ of Taser use.  Instead such results cannot help but reflect the socio-
technical context in which the data, and the models used to analyse it, were 
created – even whilst the data is used to provide insights into this very context.  
Indeed Innes et al (2003: 40), in their commentary on crime analyses in 
policing, note that products of analysis are ‘better understood as an artefact of 
the data and methods used in 
their construction, rather than providing an accurate representation’ o 
funderlying trends.  To paraphrase Grint and Woolgar (1992), then, we would do 
well the keep the question ‘what’s social about being Tasered’ in the forefront of 
our minds when conducting data analysis.   
Yet these are not some set of privileged insights, unique to those working from 
within an STS framework. For example, as discussed in Chapter 4, the debate 
between Terrill and Paoline (2012) and Kaminski et al (2013)—both of whom 
are writing with no explicit reference to the STS and ANT literature—has served 
to highlight the extent to which injuries from Taser are not somehow inherent to 
the weapon but are a ‘social construct’ (Kaminski et al 2013: 619) and are as 
much a product of ‘decision(s)… by social scientists’ as they are a product of 
the weapon itself.  Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 7, constructivist STS 
notions—such as symmetry and interpretive flexibility—might encourage us to 
go beyond the accounts provided by officers and individuals subjected to the 
weapon, and to examine them further, but they are by no means mandatory 
reference points for analysts seeking to do this. So whilst STS studies can be 
useful, the novelty and uniqueness of the insights they help to generate should 
not be overstated. 
Generalised Symmetry 
Actor Network Theory—and its approach of generalised symmetry—has been 
somewhat helpful in dispelling commonplace notions of technologies and non-
human artefacts as simple instruments and, instead, encouraging us to consider 
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the ways in which they might have their own agency, and interact with humans 
to produce unique outcomes.  As discussed in Chapter 8, this has indeed been 
a useful corrective to a wide range of accounts, proposed by a range of actors, 
including police officials, critics and academics, that see Taser as a neutral tool.  
It has also proved useful in our discussion of the National Decision Model 
(Chapter 9), helping us understand how a model ostentatiously introduced to 
enhance accountability and promote high quality decision making can, under 
certain circumstances, interact with human actants to have the opposite effect, 
acting as a ‘get out of jail free card’.  
Yet again, however, the novelty  of this approach risks being overstated.  Many 
attempts to demonstrate the validity of ANT-ish approaches often (ironically) do 
so by imposing artificial, binary divisions onto the pre-existing literature.   
Typically, constructivist STS and ANT theorists divide analysts into 
‘instrumentalist’ or ‘substantivist’ camps, so as to better elucidate the added 
value of their chosen approach.  This takes considerable work and effort - as 
well as a willingness to disregard the varied and complex positions academics 
take, not to mention the considerable work undertaken outside of the confines 
of the academy. Another approach is to conclude that commentators are lacking 
valuable insights associated with STS simply because they ‘lack the vocabulary 
of assemblage’ (Bourne 2012: 157), or to simply assert that they do not 
consider technologies, or do so in simplistic, deterministic ways, without 
sufficiently evidencing their claims (Cutcliffe and Mitcham 2001).   
The problem is that, as I demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 8, whilst some 
accounts do retain traces of instrumentalism—in particular, the notion of Taser 
as a tool—accounts setting out technologically determinist views are much 
harder to find.  Furthermore, many accounts already inherently recognise 
(explicitly or otherwise) the complex networks of human and non-human actants 
in which Taser is embedded, and the potential not just for the former to impact 
the latter, but for the latter to impact the former.  In other words, whilst 
constructivist STS accounts are undeniably useful, they risk demonstrating their 
added value by reference to a series of fictitious straw men rather than by a 
close, attentive analysis of the existing literature and current debates.  Seen in 
the light of such a reading of the Taser literature, they still appear helpful – but 
much less novel. 
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Moreover, in my experience it is not always as easy as Latour might suggest to 
use generalised symmetry, and to demonstrate whether particular assemblages 
and actor-networks, such as Taser, are mediators or intermediaries.  As 
discussed in Chapter 8, Latour’s examples (e.g.Latour 1994) often work 
because they are highly abstract and presume that the analyst has the ability to 
accurately discern the intent (or lack of intent) of another and then to measure 
how this changes over time.  However this is much more difficult to do when 
conducting real life empirical research – particularly in traditionally closed 
policing contexts and on topics as sensitive as police use of force.  Thus, whilst 
Actor-Network Theory can help alert us to the possibility that interactions 
between humans and non-humans can produce new goals, ‘programmes of 
action’ and outcomes, it cannot always help us answer whether or not this 
happens in practice.  Moreover, as Chapter 9 demonstrated, generalised 
symmetry can be taken too far, and risks ending up being no more than 
‘symmetrical absurdity’ (MacLean and Hassard 2004: 493). 
Assemblages and networks. 
Another (purported) difference between constructivist STS approaches and 
more conventional accounts is the emphasis on technologies as part of broader 
assemblages and networks.  This PhD has demonstrated that such an 
approach can add value in several ways.   
By seeing entities such as Taser as networks in their own right, as products of 
complex human and non-human interactions, we are encouraged not simply to 
note—and then to skip over—the technology in question, but to ask questions 
about the characteristics of the weapon, the purposes that certain functions 
might serve, and whether any functions might be amended in order to 
ameliorate certain outcomes.   
Moreover, constructivist STS approaches can help encourage us to focus not 
just on the individual weapon, but on the context in which it sits.  The 
importance of this insight can be seen in discussions around the weapon and its 
implications for officer safety, as discussed previously in this chapter.  Looking 
at the weapon in isolation might lead one to draw one set of conclusions about 
its impact on officer safety – for example that, as a distance weapon, it helps 
keep officers safe by allowing them to maintain their distance from dangerous 
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subjects: a conclusion reached by, for example White (2014).  Yet looking at the 
weapon in the context of the varied webs and networks in which it is enmeshed 
allows one to reach a more nuanced conclusion – in this case, that the socio-
technical network in England and Wales may be putting officers at more risk, as 
they are sent to more risker incidents, and expected to take charge of incidents 
when they get there.  This also leads us to an understanding that the decisions 
that officers take should not be considered solely as their personal 
responsibility, but is informed by and cannot be understood without, the broader 
socio-technical network that exists around the weapon. 
In turn, this points to an additional benefit of utilising the concept of 
assemblages and networks – that our notion of responsibility is not weakened, 
as some have argued, but actually strengthened.  In the case of, for example, 
inappropriate use (or lack of use) of Taser, our gaze must quite rightly focus on 
the individual agency of the individual officer, but must also be broadened to 
include, for example, the effects of the law, guidance and training curriculum 
surrounding the weapon, decisions taken by senior officials, the culture of, and 
pressure exerted by the officer’s peer group, particular characteristics of the 
weapon, and their combined effects.  Such a conception takes nothing away 
from individual-level responsibility, but recognises that there are multiple other 
parts of the network that can have particular effects, and thus other points of 
entry to bring about change.    Ultimately, as Bennett argues:  
Autonomy and strong responsibility seem to me to be empirically false, 
and thus their invocation seems tinged with injustice...  A distributive 
notion of agency does… not thereby abandon the project of identifying…  
the sources of harmful effects. To the contrary, such a notion broadens 
the range of places to look for sources (Bennett 2005: 463). 
Yet again, however, the notion of a broader network or assemblage within 
which particular technologies come to be located – and through which 
responsibility for positive and negative consequences are jointly shared - is not 
a notion somehow unique to constructivist STS approaches.  As Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 9 showed, many commentators—particularly NGOs—already pay close 
attention to the networks around technologies, and appreciate that any 
recommendations around Taser use must be broad reaching in nature, and not 
focus on any one element of the network to the expense of others (see Amnesty 
International 2008, see also Moreau de Belliang 2015 and Rappert 2005).  Nor 
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is an STS inspired analysis of Taser nessarily unique within the policing 
literature, given earlier attempts to analyse different technologies from STS 
informed perspectives (Innes et al (2005), Lynch and Cole (2005) and Johnson 
et al (2003). 
Risks that come with the approach 
Moreover, using constructivist STS  approaches, in particular ANT, do come 
with costs, three of which I would like to mention here.  First, as others have 
already noted, the advantages detailed above are only made possible when a 
weak, less exacting, less symmetrical version of ANT is used.  For some ANT 
theorists, there are no pre-existing, individual actants whatsoever – no 
essences or inherent capabilities - and no discrete ‘it’ (whether the entity in 
question is a ‘Taser’, ‘an officer’ or something else altogether).  Agency is not 
held by actants in a network but by, and as an effect of, the network or 
assemblage as a whole.  Understood in this sense, the significance of the term 
‘assemblage’, then, is not just to convey a sense of highly intermeshed relations 
and arrangements without which technologies cannot be understood, but to 
further convey that it is these arrangements themselves that have ‘capacity to 
act and to give meaning to action’ (Callon and Caliskan in Hardie and McKenzie 
2006: 58).  It might well be interesting to see every actant as a network which 
needs to be deconstructed, but this approach risks being extremely time 
consuming, never ending and becoming the main focus of analysis in its own 
right.  
Similarly, stronger and more exacting versions of ANT also risk denying or 
ignoring the important possibility that technologies do have certain (more or less 
innate) properties and affordances and that, whilst they may both be seen as 
networks and hybrid actors, humans differ from technologies in important ways 
(Murdock 1997).  Moreover, because constructivist approaches and ANT are 
compatible with a wide range of ontological and epistemological stances (Bijker 
2010), and some in ANT tend towards anti-essentialist ontologies, talking not of 
reality but of multiple realities, there is a risk that one may tend towards such 
approaches, losing the ability to make claims about the ‘truth’.  Using such a 
strong, inflexible version of ANT—one that, it has been argued, sets high 
standards its own proponents are unable to meet—quickly leads one to 
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‘symmetrical absurdity’ (McLean and Hassard 2004: 516), and to ‘unrealistic’ 
accounts where ‘we become lost in a world of mirrors’ (Bloomfield and 
Vurdubakis in McLean and Hassard 2004: 516).  Thus, whilst ANT is useful, it is 
useful only in moderation. 
This discussion in turn points to a second risk: the danger of getting distracted 
by arcane, abstract debates that may well be interesting and important in their 
own right, but are not our key concern here.  Indeed, Acuto has criticised much 
of the ANT inspired literature for engaging in ‘methodological... and meta-
theoretical self-indulgence’ (Acuto 2010: 552).  Similarly, Castree (2002: 142) 
argues in his highly convincing analysis of ANT that one needs to be mindful not 
to buy ‘theoretical sophistication at the expense of empirical political relevance’. 
For example, on paper, there may well be important differences between SCOT 
and ANT, within the broader STS family.  There may be differences between 
those who see entities as comprised of closely related ‘social’ and the 
‘technical’ elements, and those who see them as ‘analytically composite’ and 
indivisibly socio-technical.  There may be important differences between those 
who see particular entities as constituted solely as a result of the relationships 
and interactions in which they are embedded, and those who appreciate the 
importance of these relationships and interactions, but nevertheless make some 
space for pre-existing affordances (or even essences) of the entities under 
discussion. There may also be important differences between those who see 
agency as residing in human and non-human actants, and between those who 
see agency as a network effect, produced solely in the interaction between the 
two.  Yet, in practice, empirical data does not always give us sufficient grounds 
to make a case for one view or the other.  Both views provide us with interesting 
ways of looking at the empirical data—our key criterion here—but the data does 
not always allow us to make a judgement on which kinds of constructivist and 
which kinds of ANT approaches are more relevant than others.  Nor, indeed, 
does it always provide sufficient grounds for assessing whether particular 
outcomes can be attributed to social determinism, technological determinism or 
a dance of agency.  
These risks point to a third danger - one which is quite separate from the 
traditional criticisms levelled at ANT but one that my research is well placed to 
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highlight.  This is the risk of becoming ‘enrolled’ by the approach to the 
detriment of the original aims of the research project.  This risk has traditionally 
been masked by the (ironic) tendency for many analysts using ANT to refer to 
the approach as a tool.  For Law (2007: 2), ANT is a collection of ‘semiotic 
tools’: for Williams-Jones and Graham (2003: 271), it is a ‘tool’ to support 
‘ethical analysis’ of technological innovation: for Lee and Brown it is an 
approach that, through its rhetoric of the ‘missing masses’ of non-human 
actants, takes the ‘tools’ of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘power’ to their ‘absolute 
limits’ (1994: 778).  Yet ANT, of all approaches, would urge us to show caution 
before writing off any kind of non-human assemblage as a mere tool – and, just 
in the same way that this thesis has demonstrated the risks of conceiving of 
Taser as a mere tool, it also points to the risks of dismissing ANT in such a 
fashion.  For ANT, instead of being a passive analytical device, may also have 
distinct effects, shaping and reshaping the very analysis in which it is engaged – 
and ‘enrolling’ the analyst in the process.    
Take, for example, a situation such as mine, where an analyst may start the 
process with a broad goal of an action-orientated, empirically focused and 
practically helpful thesis—concerned with advancing our understanding of Taser 
in England and Wales—but a less than fully coherent idea of what exactly what 
the precise research questions may be.  Unless care is taken, the seductive 
language of ANT, and its ‘entertaining and creative’ approach (Scott 1991: 11 
see also Lee and Brown 1994) may constitute a non-human actant in its own 
right, translating the human actant’s initial research goals— ‘to understand more 
about Taser’—into something more compatible with its approach: for example, 
to use Taser as a mere case study to advance our understanding of Actor-
Network Theory and the debates around it.  Such an interpretation lends 
additional credence to ANT’s emphasis on the role of non-human actants, and 
the way in which they can interact with humans to create new, unforeseen 
goals. 
Summarising the value of constructivist STS and ANT approaches 
Overall, then, this thesis has argued that whilst constructivist STS approaches, 
amongst them ANT, do have some utility, these approaches are far from risk 
free, and their value and novelty can be overstated, not least given the existing 
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literature on policing and technology more broadly.  In reaching these 
conclusions, however, it is necessary to bear in mind two important 
qualifications.  First, the approach taken in this thesis has undervalued the 
advantages that these approaches can bring.  My intention here has been to 
explore how constructivist STS and ANT can add value to questions asked by 
traditional criminology approaches and by those with traditional understandings 
of technology.  Yet an equally valid test would be to look, not just at how these 
approaches help us ask set questions, but at how they enlarge the types of 
questions and lines of academic enquiry available to us.  Seen in this light, 
constructivist STS and ANT have a much broader value, not only helping us to 
shed new insights into traditional questions, but encouraging us to create and 
pose entirely new questions of their own.  These include questions about the 
origin of technologies, and how they have evolved (Rejali 2009): questions 
about how ambiguities of technologies are resolved (Rappert 2005), and 
questions around how LLWs are constituted (Anais 2015). 
Second, the differences between constructivist STS accounts on the one hand, 
and instrumental and substantivist accounts on the other, should not be ignored 
- but neither should they be overstated.  I have no wish to create some kind of 
binary division between these approaches and in fact, as Bourne (2012: 162) 
notes, they each have different, potentially complementary, areas of interest.  
Instrumentalist approaches focus on ‘before things’ (i.e. human intent before the 
weapon), substantivist approaches ‘after things’ (how technology, once 
introduced, shapes the environment around it), constructivist accounts focus on 
‘about things’ (how human create interpretive flexibility around, and attach 
meaning to, technologies), whilst ANT looks ‘with things’.  This raises the 
possibility that these different approaches can usefully complement each other.   
As Peoples (2007: 277) notes in his discussion of instrumental and substantivist 
approaches to missile technologies, ‘knowledge of both these literatures is both 
helpful and necessary’ and one should  not brand different approaches ‘right or 
wrong, or… be entirely dismissive of the intentions upon which they are based’.   
Moreover, in practice there is not always a clear dividing line between what 
Kaplan (2009) has called weak technological deterministic approaches—which 
argue merely that technologies can influence those with whom they interact—
and ANT like approaches.  In allowing for a dance of agency, constructivist STS 
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approaches, such as ANT, concede that technologies may influence others, and 
have distinct effects, even whilst countering the notion that such effects are pre-
determined.  Indeed, in order to demonstrate the novelty of their approach, ANT 
theorists have to show that the technologies in question have agency and 
influence.  Callon and Latour note that, at one level, they give ‘to nature and to 
artefacts the same ontological status that realists and technical determinists are 
used to granting to them’ – even whilst they challenge ‘the very distribution 
between what is natural and what is social’ (in McLean and Hassard 2004: 506). 
Thus many inspired by ANT note that a vast range of interactions between 
society, humans and technologies are possible and that, whilst in some cases, 
these interactions may take the form of an unpredictable dance of agency in 
which all the actors involved are mutually transformed, in other cases, these 
interactions may come closer to the more traditional stories of social or 
technological determinism.  Ultimately, as Schulz-Schaafer convincingly argues: 
‘Empirical reality is less elegant than actor network theory. The view 
advocated by Latour that from the interrelation of human and technical 
programmes of action something new results… is a constricted view.  
What results from the interrelation of human actors and technological 
artefacts can be described more comprehensively as a continuum with 
the social deterministic outcomes and technical deterministic outcomes 
being its poles (2006: 136). 
I suggest then, that this thesis—providing, as it has, an empirical ‘test’ of ANT 
and constructivist STS, and an exploration of the relevance of the theory to the 
hitherto unchartered waters of weapon technologies—demonstrates that there 
is thus room for a more moderate, nuanced version of ANT going forward.  This 
version of ANT would still stress the role of non-human actants, the importance 
of interactions and relational nature of agency, but would also recognise that 
being able to study how these actants operate as ‘black-boxed entities’ 
themselves is an equally useful contribution in its own right.  It would still stress 
the contingency and unpredictability of the outcomes of relations between 
human and non-human, but would also recognise that, sometimes, either part of 
this equation might dominate, in more or less predictable ways.  It would still 
stress the notion of multiple realities, and multiple actor-networks, but would 
allow one to recognise that materiality and affordances matter, and that the 
notion of an ‘empirical reality’ cannot be dismissed so easily.  Finally, it would 
continue to remind analysts to be sensitive to, and respectful of, differing points 
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of view – but would allow, even encourage, them to be politically active, as 
opposed to politically inert.   
Such a weaker conception of ANT would no doubt be subject to criticism (Fine 
2005) but would also have important allies.  For example, Castree (2002: 135) 
has used a blend of ANT and critical approaches such as Marxism to ‘remain 
critical of binarist thinking, of asymmetry, of limited conceptions of agency and 
of centred conceptions of power’, but has called on ANT to concede that ‘social 
relations…  are often disproportionately directive, that agents, while social, 
natural and relational, vary greatly in their powers to influence others: and that 
power, while dispersed, can be directed by some (namely, specific social 
actors) more than others’. Many others, for example Frickel (1996) and Mutch 
(2013) have also worked with a watered down version of ANT, or have been 
loosely inspired by the approach, with Frickel noting many of ANT’s criticisms 
are ‘ultimately avoidable’ if the approach is not seen as an ‘all or nothing 
adventure’ (1996: 49). Indeed, Mol (2010: 265) argues that ‘the strength of, ANT 
then, is not that it is solid, but rather that it is adaptable. It has assembled a rich 
array of explorative and experimental ways of attuning to the world’. Seen as an 
adaptable, exploratory experiment, ANT may have much to offer criminology 
(Defresne et al 2015). 
Broader Implications of the research findings.  
As the previous section has shown, the answers to research questions 1 – 5 
have implications for our understanding of Taser and also speak directly to 
theoretical questions around the value of constructivist STS approaches 
approaches.  In this section I would like to draw out four additional implications 
that my findings may have for other areas of academic research, before looking 
at implications for practitioners in Section 3.  I argue this thesis has substantive 
implications for the literatures on police discretion and on regulating police use 
of force, and methodological and ethical implications for how to conduct policing 
research more generally.   
 
First, these findings have implications for academic debates around police 
discretion.  As Chapter 8 demonstrated, much of literature provides a highly 
humanistic, human centric account of police decision making – and could 
benefit from a serious consideration of the role that nonhuman actants may play 
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in shaping discretionary decisions.  Arenas and decisions that might, on the 
surface, appear to be free from any legal or policy restriction, and subject to the 
whims of officers, may well be structured not only by the human agency of 
others (for example, choices made in the training curriculum) but also by the 
presence of non-humans and the socio-technical networks within which they are 
embedded. It would be useful for future research to consider in more detail the 
relationship between non-humans, non-human agency and the exercise of 
discretion. In addition to exploring the theoretical basis of discretion in more 
depth than I have been able to here, studies could usefully explore empirical 
dimensions of the topic – specifically by examining the extent to which the 
‘weapons effect’ literature holds true not only for lethal firearms but for less 
lethal projectile weapons such as Taser. Further empirical studies could usefully 
explore whether less lethal technologies other than Taser have similar—or 
different—effects on discretionary decision making.  Moreover, whilst my focus 
here has been on how police use of force decisions may be impacted by 
particular technologies, a range of other actors—from private security 
contractors, to military officers and correctional officials—also have to make 
similar discretionary decisions, and it would be interesting to consider how 
technologies impact upon their use of force decisions.  I hope to explore some 
of these issues via my ESRC Future Research Leaders Award—which aims to 
focus, in part, on the roles that non-human actors and physical infrastructure-
can, and should, play in places of detention—but this remains an area ripe for 
further development. 
 
Second, my thesis findings also have implications for the regulation of police 
use of force.  In particular, whilst the traditional use of force continuum models 
have been subject to extensive criticism, alternatives to such models are not 
necessarily risk-free.  This points to the need for further research to be 
conducted on the implications of adopting the National Decision Model, as well 
as on other alternatives to continuum models. As I argue further the next 
section, consideration should also be given to accompanying the NDM with 
some more specific guidance on how to use a range of different force options, 
amongst them Taser – a topic I intend to explore further through my ESRC 




Third, in contrast to notions of police subculture that see it as a singular, 
monolithic entity, this research has highlighted large variations in officer’s views 
on police use of force.  Many officers appreciate Taser because it seems to tap 
into, and sit well with, pre-existing conceptions and beliefs they have about the 
role of policing, the need to use of force, and their attitudes towards using it – 
but, interestingly, the weapon may appeal to different officers for different 
reasons. Further research into what pre-existing attitudes and beliefs the 
weapon is appealing to, and how such attitudes may, in turn, affect what kinds 
of force officers use, and the frequency with which they use it, is a matter for 
further research (see also Klahm et al 2011, and Terrill et al 2003).  
 
Fourth, there are also a number of implications for the methods used to 
research use of force - and other topics in policing. This thesis has 
demonstrated that the statistical models used to assess the relationship 
between Taser use and officer and subject injuries (amongst other outcomes) 
could usefully differentiate between instances where Taser is fired by itself, and 
when it is used with other force options, and could also benefit from including an 
additional control to assess whether the subject poses a risk to themselves or 
others.  There would also be a benefit from including carefully chosen 
interaction effects in future statistical models, in order to better capture the 
interplay between different variables. 
 
The thesis has also demonstrated that the precise ordering of subject 
resistance, officer injury and the use of different force options matters - and 
being unsure about the order in which these inter-related events occur 
undermines the ability of analysts to reach conclusions about the association 
between Taser use and officer injury rates.  My ESRC funded placement with 
the National Police Chief’s Council, working directly on the Police Use of Force 
Reporting review, has allowed me to advocate for the inclusion of these 
variables into the nationwide dataset, though I have had greater success in 
incorporating some recommendations than others (see Dymond 2016a, where I 
discuss varying use of force recording practices amongst forces, and make 




This thesis has also pointed more generally to the value of complementing 
statistical models with qualitative data collection.  In particular qualitative data 
can highlight some of the limits to conventional statistical accounts, which tend 
reduce the debate around the impact of Taser to physical injury.  Fifth, I believe 
this thesis also has something useful to contribute to ongoing debates about the 
role of academics in conducting research on criminology and policing issues.   
Waddington has argued that many police researchers are embedded in an 
‘orthodoxy’ of ‘deep scepticism’ towards the police (2000: 95) – but today the 
opposite seems true.  There appears to be a view amongst some academics 
that researchers should not so much work on the police, as they should work 
with and for them (see Innes 2010 for further discussion of these terms).  In our 
context, then, there is a tendency not question the definitions of use of force, or 
of injuries, preferred by law enforcement officials, but to adopt them wholesale. 
Thus, as discussed in Chapter 5, Kaminski et al (2013: 617 - 8) criticise 
researchers for looking at ‘action that law enforcement and others do not 
consider to be uses of force’: for researching (supposedly) ‘minor’ physical and 
psychological injury: and for being ‘unhelpful to practitioners and police 
executives’.  Also of relevance here is the relative lack of attention given by 
academia to police use of force issues in the first place – a issue particularly 
noticeable in the UK context (Buttle 2007), and all the more surprising given the 
crucial importance of the police’s ability to use force. In this context, Reiner’s 
(2012: 97) description of a shift from the ‘sociology of the police to sociology for 
the police, from critical and theoretical concerns to providing practicable 
solutions to immediate policing problems’ seems increasingly accurate.      
 
This is not to argue that the latter kinds of  research cannot fulfil a useful 
function, but simply that the notion of academic work acting as a ‘motor’ for 
police reform should not be forgotten (Innes 2010).   This does not mean that all 
academics should use their research as a ‘motor’, nor overstate the practical 
recommendations that may stem from it - a risk perhaps particularly prevalent 
with quantitative work on the use of force, where some analysts have felt 
compelled to jump from data to policy without making clear the limitations of the 
latter (Terrill and Paoline 2012).  Researchers should take care when 
formulating practical recommendations on the basis of their research – but, 
equally, should not shy away from the task where the evidence is compelling.  
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In that spirit, then, let me turn to the final section of this chapter, which deals 
with such practical recommendations. 
 
Practical Recommendations  
Both the IPCC and HMIC have noted that there is much good practice around 
use of Taser in England and Wales, and my experiences researching this thesis 
would certainly suggest the same.  However,  there is no room for 
complacency, and views and recommendations emanating from outside of the 
police can be particularly useful in highlighting areas for further improvement.  
In that spirit, I draw out recommendations from the research that has taken 
place so far.  However, whilst reading these recommendations, readers should 
be cognisant of the fact that they are based on the period up until 2014, with the 
bulk of observations of Taser training conducted between 2013 and 2014.  It is 
possible that further changes to policy,  practice and the initial and refresher 
Taser training curriculum may have been implemented after this date, which 
may affect the relevancy of these recommendations.   
1) Recognise good practice and share experiences. 
First, it is important to recognise good practice around the weapon.  For 
example, statistical analysis of the dataset detailed above shows that Taser is 
rarely used by the force in question, Taser firings constitute a small amount 
(less than 1%) of total uses of force, and use of Taser is significantly associated 
with violence or the threat of violence.  Recent reports by the IPCC and HMIC, 
which drew conclusions around the weapon that were generally positive, should 
also be noted.  There is also good practice in the regulatory framework that 
surrounds it, including the internal accountability mechanisms in place in certain 
forces, a highly regarded national training package, the introduction of the NDM, 
and oversight institutions—such as the IPCC, HMIC and SACMILL—with a 
clear focus on police use of Taser.  Mechanisms to encourage the sharing of 
experiences between police forces, and the identification of particular areas of 
good practice, should be encouraged.   
2) ‘The flaw in the debate is the Taser debate’ or: Don’t focus solely on Taser. 
Whilst Taser is often considered in isolation, the research shows that, at least in 
the force in question, Taser is often used with other forms of force.  Indeed, 
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around half of incidents involving Taser firing also involve the use of other force 
options.  Moreover, many of the points made around Taser use—for example, 
concerns about how and when the weapon is used, and its impact—may well 
be relevant for other uses of force.  This doesn’t mean that less attention should 
be given to Taser, but indicates that researchers should analyse Taser in 
context, and carefully scrutinise other forms of force.  This is a recommendation 
that I personally intend to take forward in my next ESRC project (funded via the 
Future Research Leader’s Scheme) which will move beyond Taser to look at 
the use of other forms of police force in England and Wales, and will also look 
at the implications of a range of LLWs for the right to life on a more global scale.   
On a more practical level, Taser training and officer safety training should also 
incorporate the possibility—and risks—of Taser being used with other forms of 
force.  Whilst SACMILL produce statements on Taser and Attenuating Energy 
Projectiles, assessments should also be made of the risks associated with other 
use of force options, and these assessments should be made publicly available.  
Moreover, as the Triennial Review noted, where possible SACMILL should be 
provided with further data around incidents where Taser (and other weapons 
within its remit) have been used, and death or serious injury has occurred, to 
ensure it has the best information at its finger tips, to help inform its statements.  
This should include access to NHS data (anonymised where necessary) as well 
as ‘access to police tactical reports for example (which) may be restricted for 
legal and ethical reasons’ (Jenkins 2014: 2, 15). 
3) Explore ways to minimise risk for officers & subjects. 
Whilst many officers view the weapon as enhancing their safety, paradoxically 
carrying the weapon may sometimes place them at more risk.  They may be 
more likely to be single crewed, to be sent to riskier jobs and to be over-
confident when they get there.   Moreover, whilst officers tend to see Taser as 
being ‘nicer’ and ‘less intrusive’ for subjects, this is at odds with the perceptions 
of some of those subjected to the weapon, and the evidence on subject injury 
rates presented in this thesis is somewhat inconclusive.    Further ways of 
minimising risk to Taser officers—such as limiting single crewing, providing 
additional training on weapons retention, and on  certain incidents  that officers 
in the force in question are most likely to face —should  be considered.  Taser 
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training should ensure officers are more fully aware of the DOMILL 2012 Taser 
statement, and should stress that the use of the weapon can be highly 
distressing to subjects, and stress the need for reassurance afterwards.  
Options for Taser weapons to be equipped with a feature that would cut the 
electrical shock off after 5 seconds should also be explored43.    
4) Ensure officers are adequately equipped, and have a range of ways to 
handle situations. 
Officers need to be able to use options other than Taser to resolve violent 
incidents, including no force at all. Yet the extent to which officers feel able to 
do this varies considerably.  As discussed in Chapter 8, the length of PST 
training varies from force to force, with at least 11 forces providing less than 2 
days training per annum.  Personal communication and policing styles differ 
considerably between Taser trained officers.  Officers have widely differing 
views about when they would use the weapon and trainers can find it difficult to 
make subjective assessments about the approaches taken by officers.  It is 
therefore important that officers chosen to undergo Taser training are carefully 
selected in order to ensure they have the appropriate level of knowledge, 
experience and personal competencies required for this role.  Trainers should 
be carefully selected, able to provide critical feedback, and adequately 
supported in order to do so. 
In terms of the training itself, consideration should be given to providing officers 
with enhanced training in PST and communication skills, particularly when 
dealing with vulnerable subjects or those with mental health issues.  Not only 
should police officers (and any police staff and civilian employees who may 
have to use force in the course of their duties) receive Personal Safety Training 
of at least 2 days per annum, careful thought should also be given to whether 
these 2 days per annum are sufficient to equip officers not only with sufficient 
training on use of force techniques—but, equally as importantly, with 
                                                          
43 For example, the next generation of Taser weapons can be equipped with a modified battery 
pack—the APPM, or Automatic Shut-Down Performance Magazine Battery Pack—which shuts 
down the electrical current whether or not the trigger is being held down.  It is possible that 
other Projectile Electric-Shock Weapons produced by alternative manufacturers may also be 
able to offer a similar capability.  In any case, officers should also be frequently reminded 




communication and de-escalation skills that could minimise the chances of 
officers needing to use such techniques. 
Furthermore,  the package could also usefully incorporate additional material on 
considerations, risks and practicalities associated with using the weapon 
alongside other uses of force, given the large of number of incidents that involve 
the use of Taser alongside other force options.  The untimely death of Jordan 
Begley, and the findings from the Inquest (and from any subsequent SACMILL 
investigation) may be highly relevant here. 
Moreover, building on the good practice that already exists in the national Taser 
training curriculum, further scenario based assessments and other tools should 
be developed to assist trainers in identifying officers whose judgement and 
communication skills may require further development. 
Finally, given the important role that high quality training can play, and the 
potential for some degree of variation amongst forces, consideration should be 
given to creating a post, independent from police forces, with responsibility for 
regularly assessing the training courses delivered in force.  Careful 
consideration should be given to whether this role could be located in the 
College of Policing or the NPCC, or whether it could be located in an external 
agency, such as HMIC. 
5) Consider content of  guidance provided to officers. 
Whilst officers receive a range of training courses (both initial and refresher) on 
the weapon, which is accompanied by a range of policies, including Authorised 
Professional Practice and the NDM, this package serves to give them little 
substantive guidance in law, policy or training, about when to use the weapon, 
or when its deployment might be more or less appropriate.     
The statistical results set out in Part 2 indicated that, in a large proportion of 
incidents, Taser—and other uses of force—were used on unarmed (albeit 
potentially violent) individuals.  This sits in stark contrast to the views of many 
outside of the police, who see the use of the weapon as a ‘relatively high-level 
use of force’ (IPCC 2014: 4).  Relatedly, the qualitative work conducted in 
Chapters 7 and 8 revealed large differences in officers in their perception of the 
weapon, their willingness and readiness to use it, and the circumstances in 
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which use on unarmed individuals was seen as appropriate.  Indeed, as 
Chapters 8 and 9 demonstrated, the relative lack of guidance and standards 
contained within the relevant laws and standards, authorised professional 
practice documents, and training curriculum, mean that there are few clear 
standards that might assist in preventing over use or misuse of the weapon. 
Thus different officers faced with a similar situation may handle it in markedly 
different ways. 
 
Thus there would be value in a broader discussion over the possibility for more 
specific language about the threshold for use. Indeed, the UN Committee 
Against Torture has called for the UK to ‘revise the regulations governing the 
use of (Taser) weapons, with a view to establishing a high threshold for their 
use, and expressly prohibiting their use on children and pregnant women’ 
(2013: pt. 26). Following broad consultation, more concrete guidance should be 
developed around when Taser use may be appropriate—perhaps as part of the 
APP—so that there is national standardisation on this issue.  Working with a 
range of civil society organisations, I have called on the Home Affairs Select 
Committee to launch an official inquiry into the use of Taser, to provide a useful 
fora for such a debate (Amnesty International UK 2016).  A broader debate 
would be particularly valuable given what Squires and Kennison (2010: 2)  
characterise as the practice of developing police policy in England and Wales 
‘in secret’ by ‘ACPO which is perhaps the most influential group of unelected 
opinion’ formers’.  Punch (2010: 6), elaborating calls for a Royal Commission on 
the role and function of policing, similarly expresses concern, with respect to 
police use of firearms, that ‘policy ownership of that crucial – when and how 
may the state kill its own citizens?—has been delegated…largely to the police 
themselves’.  A transparent, consultative approach to policy making would have 
much to recommend it – particularly in cases as sensitive and controversial as 
police use of Taser. 
 
The need for more specific guidance around particularly vulnerable groups—for 
example, those with mental health issues and who have consumed drugs—
should also be considered, given the evidence in Chapter 3 which suggests that 
these factors are associated with the weapon’s use.  It is not clear whether this 
finding reflects a trend to use Taser, as opposed to other use of force options, 
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on these population groups, or whether it reflects an increased likelihood of 
reporting.  This issue should be further studied—particularly given DOMILL’s 
findings that ‘some drugs used in the treatment of certain mental health 
conditions… may predispose [a person] to an adverse cardiac event’ after 
Taser use (2012: 24) and that ‘the threshold for development of cardiac adverse 
outcomes in drug-intoxicated individuals subjected to Taser discharge or other 
types of force may be lowered’ (2012: 25: see also Zipes 2013 c.f. Kroll et al 
2008)—and findings should be reflected in guidance as appropriate. The current 
College of Policing Taser guidance refers only to vulnerable groups and does 
not specifically mention these factors as enhancing the risk associated with the 
weapon, but previous ACPO Guidance (2008: 11) explicitly mentioned ‘mental 
disorder and illness’ and drug consumption as ‘specific risk factors’ – wording 
which it may be necessary to consider reviving.  
 
Going forward, I intend to play a key role in stimulating such discussions via my 
ESRC Future Research Leader’s Award, which provides for a series of 
meetings between police officials, senior civil servants, academics and NGOs, 
in order to discuss such issues.  Whilst I hope that these will be useful 
endeavours consideration should also be given to a more formalised 
mechanism or process via which legal, academic and human rights expertise 
can routinely and formally be considered in the approvals process for, and 
ongoing evaluation of, police use of force options and in the design and 
development of training and guidance, and to maximising opportunities for 
transparency and consultation. 
 
6) Develop Use of Force reporting and analysis.  
The historic use of force reporting review, and the dataset now being 
implemented by Pathfinder forces, represents a significant step forward in use 
of force reporting and accountability.  My  ESRC funded involvement in this 
process—through which I sought to work alongside the National Police Chief’s 
Council to improve current police use of force data collection practices and help 
address the data gaps and methodological issues addressed in Part 2—has 
been described by senior NPCC, Home Office and police officials as 
‘constructively challenging’ and making an ‘invaluable contribution’ to the 
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proposed review and data capture measures, bringing ‘a level of academic 
scrutiny and independence that would otherwise have been absent’.  To that 
extent, I hope that this research has already had an impact in this area.  
Should further development of the dataset be considered in the future, 
measures controlling for the order in which injury, subject resistance and use of 
force occurred, capturing precisely which uses of force resulted in subject injury 
(if any), and looking to incorporate professional medical judgement into the 
assessment of injuries would be useful avenues to explore.   
There is also a need to ensure data is reviewed and effectively fed back into 
policy and practice.  Whilst there is a role for academics and civil society in this 
process—and, indeed, I have secured funding to analyse this data from the 
ESRC Future Research Leader’s Scheme between 2017 - 2020—such streams 
of funding are not necessarily sustainable over the long term and ultimately it is 
the responsibility of police and government institutions to monitor the force they 
are using, and to ensure that changes are made where necessary.  It would 
therefore be useful for police forces to create a full time position with 
responsibility for analysing and providing oversight of police use of force 
statistics, including identifying how (and how often) officers are using force and 
against whom, and picking up patterns of potential concern at the earliest 
possible stage (see also IPCC 2016).  There would also be value in analysis of 
the data at a national level being regularly conducted and fed into a multi-
stakeholder Board with representatives able to further explore the issues raised, 
and take appropriate action (e.g. reviewing training or guidance) where 
necessary. 
Finally, given the important sources of evidence that can be provided by video 
footage—both from body worn cameras, as well as from recordings by civilians 
(Young 2015)—consideration should be given to supplementing these records 
with video footage, where this is available. 
7) Ensure robust accountability measures. 
Whilst many officers may well use the weapon responsibly, there is no room for 
complacency.  Ensuring officers are held to account in those cases where 
Taser, and other use of force, has been misused is crucial.  Whilst 
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accountability measures have been described as ‘robust’, there may be a need 
for further development of such mechanisms, and the research also suggests 
that, whilst the NDM has many positive features, it can also be used in ways 
which make it more difficult for accountability to be achieved.   
There is thus a need to ensure strong internal accountability mechanisms in all 
police forces, which should include safeguarding the role of the SPOC as data 
collection arrangements evolve, providing a full time post to analyse and act on 
use of force data, and standardising the good practice identified by the HMIC.  
This includes putting place mechanisms to ensure that the use of Taser is 
actively and regularly reviewed and scrutinised by those at the highest level in 
the force (see HMIC 2016d for an example of Taser oversight mechanisms 
involving the Assistant Chief Constable).  It is also important that the managers 
of Taser trained officers—and indeed, managers of officers who are in a role to 
use force—are willing and able to provide close oversight of the force being 
used by their officers, as well as the frequency and stated rationale for it, so that 
they can closely scrutinise the rationale offered, spot any issues at an early 
stage in the process, and take any action that may be necessary. This may well 
necessitate that such officers are trained in Taser use. 
Turning to the role of various external bodies, it is recommended that both the 
IPCC and HMIC maintain their recent focus on Taser and use of force issues.  
For HMIC this might comprise including via a dedicated question around Taser 
use, police use of force and use of force reporting every year as part of the 
HMIC PEEL inspections. For the IPCC, given the additional resources the IPCC 
will now have at its disposal, it is also recommended—as the IPCC itself has 
suggested—that it is able to use some of these resources to continue to focus 
on use of force issues including, where appropriate, investigating a greater 
proportion of complaints around torture and ill-treatment and excessive use of 
force itself (IPCC 2013b).   
Systematically collating and publicising the final outcome of the independent 
investigations that the IPCC conducts, and making the text of all investigation 
reports (appropriately redacted to remove personal details where necessary) 
publicly available, would also be a useful step, helping to enhance transparency 
and improve understanding of the organisation and its results, whilst allowing 
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researchers access to crucial information and details around controversial use 
of force applications in England and Wales.  More fundamentally, as the IPCC 
is going through a period of dramatic change—including a new structure and 
new powers—it will be important for academics and others to assess these 
changes and the eventual impact of them, so as to ensure the organisation is 
supported to overcome the series of interlinked challenges that it has faced.   
It would also seem important that, whilst continuing to use the NDM as a way of 
helping them assess officers’ use of force, these bodies may also wish to 
consider the appropriateness of the NDM framework and its benefit and limits 
as a guidance document more broadly.  Moreover, in light of the crucial and 
unique role played by SACMILL, it is further recommended that the Committee 
and its Secretariat be given additional capacity to enable them to conduct 
primary research on the medical effects of less lethal weapons such as Taser, 
where necessary.   Awareness should also be raised about the important role of 
the Committee and the recommendations they make44, and additional attention 
given to their findings throughout the training.  
Police and Crime Commissioners, although not in existence for much of the 
period covered by the PhD, also have a crucial role—alongside the IPCC, HMIC 
and SACMILL—in scrutinising and holding police forces to account for their use 
of Taser, and police use of force more broadly.  The importance of their role 
here can be illustrated by the actions of the Police and Crime Commissioner for 
Dorset, Martyn Underhill, who—concerned about the use of Taser in Dorset 
custody suites and on people with mental health issues—took the issue up with 
the Chief Constable (Martin 2014) and commissioned an audit of police use of 
force, with a particular focus on the use of Taser in custody (Feavyour 2015).  
Moreover, PCCs can also have an important role in holding forces to account 
over their implementation of recommendations by the IPCC, HMIC, SACMILL 
and other bodies where appropriate.  The extent to which PCCs are willing and 
able to do this would be an interesting angle to explore in future research. 
                                                          
44
 Whilst not a central part of this thesis, the current situation whereby Chief Constables are able to use 
their discretion to deploy less lethal weapons that have not gone through the UK’s selection and testing 
process, had a SACMILL medical statement, nor been formally approved by the Home Secretary, is also 
of concern and risks undermining the useful work the Committee do (for details of a case involving 
electric-shock technology, see Dymond and Rappert 2014) .   
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Finally, when all else fails, it is important that those who feel they have been 
negatively affected by police use of force have access to civil and criminal court, 
and a fair hearing once there.  Yet individuals already face multiple challenges 
when it comes to getting, let alone winning, ‘their day’ in court.  Particular 
difficulties are posed by the Jackson Reforms in the context of civil courts, and 
by the subjective, ‘honestly held belief’ test in the context of criminal court.  The 
former is a recent change which, I would suggest, could relatively easily be 
undone in order to promote access to justice (as suggested by the Police Action 
Lawyer’s Group), whilst the latter is a more complex, well-established and 
perennially challenging issue to which there seems to be no simple solution.  
Under these conditions, Norrie’s (2010: 377) recommendation—that there is a 
need for a ‘proper debate’ about the current legal test in England and Wales, 
and about the related issue of ‘the limits of appropriate police action and citizen 
liberties in a democratic society’—seems to have much to commend it.  Again, 
the multi-stakeholder meetings I intend to hold throughout my ESRC award will 
provide a valuable forum to start to discuss such issues.   
 In Conclusion 
The process of researching this PhD has been quite a journey, taking me 
from my workspaces in South West England to the Arizona desert and the 
futuristic offices of Taser International, from having tea with research 
participants in cafes in the North of England to attending Taser training 
exercises at the College of Policing, and from accompanying officers on patrol 
to attending high level meetings at the NPCC and Home Office.  Metaphorically, 
too, I have travelled a vast distance, learning a lot about Taser use in England 
and Wales, about issues of police discretion and accountability, and about the 
sociology of science and technology studies– and hope to have been able to 
convey some of this learning, and the insights generated, throughout the thesis.   
 
Ultimately, however, whilst the aims of this thesis certainly included 
conventional academic objectives—in this case, exploring Taser use in the 
England and Wales, examining the implications the research had for broader 
academic debates and investigating the applicability and utility of the Science 
and Technology Studies literature more generally—aims that I would argue 
have largely been met, this thesis also had a fourth and final aim: to go beyond 
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the confines of academia to have an impact on policy and practice.  Whilst this 
thesis has laid firm foundations for this work, the extent to which I am able to 
achieve this final aim remains yet to be seen, and may not become apparent for 
months or, indeed, years to come.  In the final analysis, then, this piece of 
research and its conclusions represent not so much the end of a journey as the 







































Appendix 1: Statistical Tables Used in Part 1. 
Chapter 3 
Table 3.1: Variable Coding and descriptive statistics.   
Variable 
     
Coding description  
                                   
                                   S.D.   Mean           
 
Dependent    
     Taser Fired 
0 = Taser not fired 
1 = Taser fired 
.01 .11 
     Taser Drawn but not Fired 
0 = Other force used, or Taser fired 
1 = Taser Drawn but not fired 
.03 .16 
     Subject Injured by Police 
0 = Subject not Injured by Police 
1 = Subject Injured by Police 
.14 .34 
     Officer Injured 
0 = No Officer Injury 
1 = Officer Injury Recorded 
.10 .31 
    
Use of Force Options     
    Taser fired with or without     
    other force  
0 = Taser not fired in incident 
1 = Taser firing is the only force used 
2 = Taser fired with other forms of force 
.02 .17 
     Empty Hand Techniques only 
     Force used 
0 = Empty Hand Techniques only force used 
1 = Taser fired without other force 
2 = Taser fired with other forms of force 
3 = All Other Incidents 
1.87 1.45 
     Baton Strikes only force used 
0 = Baton strikes only force used 
1 = Taser fired without other force 
2 = Taser fired with other forms of force 
3 = All Other Incidents 
2.97 .30 
    Irritant Spray only force used 
0 = Irritant Spray only force used 
1 = Taser fired without other force 
2 = Taser fired with other forms of force 
3 = All Other Incidents 
2.91 .47 
     Baton Drawn but not Used 
0 = Other force used, or baton physically used. 
1 = Baton drawn but not physically used. 
.02 .15 
     Spray Drawn but not Used 
0 = Other force used, or Irritant Spray discharged 
1 = Irritant Spray drawn but not discharged. 
.03 .17 
     Taser Drawn but not Fired 
0 = Other force used, or Taser fired 
1 = Taser Drawn but not fired 
.03 .16 
Subject Characteristics    
     Subject Ethnicity
 
0 = White                                                                       
1 = Asian or Oriental                                                             
2 = Afro-Caribbean                                                          
3 = Other Non-White. 
.15 .59 
     Subject Gender
 
1 = Male                                                                           
2 = Female                                                                    
3 = Unknown Gender 
1.16 .38 
     Subject Disability 0 = No Disability Recorded                                               
1 = Physical, Sensory, Learning or Other Disability                                                                     
2 = Mental Health Disability 
.21 .59 
     Subject Drug Consumption 
0 = No drug consumption recorded                                
1 = Drug Consumption recorded 
.20 .40 
     Subject Mental Health Issues 
0 = No Mental Health Issues recorded,                          
1 = Mental Health Issues recorded 
.18 .39 
     Subject Consumed Alcohol 
0 = No alcohol consumption recorded 
1 = Alcohol consumption recorded 
.67 .47 
Officer(s) characteristics    
     Response Officer Present 0 = No Response Officers Present 
1 = At least one Response Officer Present 
.76 .43 
     Traffic Officer present  0 = No Traffic Officers Present 




      Firearms (ARV) Officer present 0 = No Firearms (ARV) Officers Present 
1 = At least one Firearms (ARV) Officer Present 
.02 .14 
    
     Officer experience  1 = Most experienced Officer 5 or < years service  
2 = Most experienced Officer has 6 – 10 years 
3 = Most experienced Officer has over ten years 
1.86 .80 
     Time Since PST training 1 = Six months or less  
2 = Between six months and a year 
3 = Over a  year since last training 
1.64 .68 
     Officer Rank 0 = Constable highest ranking officer using force 
1 = Sergeant highest ranking officer using force 
2 = Other 
.25 .51 
Incident characteristics    
     Weapon present   0 = No Weapon Recorded 
1 = Weapon Recorded  
.07 .25 
     Subject resistance 0 = Passive Resistance or Spitting 
1 = Making off or Threats 
2 = General Struggle and Unarmed Aggression 
3 = Subject using Weapon 
  
     Reason for force  0 = Force used for other Reasons 
1 = Force Used to Protect Self or Others 
.47 .50 
     Type of incident
 
 0 = Order Maintenance 
1 = Suspicious Person or Activity / Alarm 
2 = Violent Crime 
3 = Traffic 
4 = Detain Mental Health 
5 = Custody 
6 = Other or unspecified 
2.26 2.49 
     Year of incident 7 = 2007 
8 = 2008 
9 = 2009 
10 = 2010 
11 = 2011 
12 = 2012 
13 = 2013 
14 = 2014 
10.92 2.16 
     Number of officers present  1 = One Officer Present 
2 = Two Officers Present 
3 = Three or more Officers Present 
2.51 .65 
     Number of officers using force  1 = One Officer Using Force 
2 = Two Officers Using Force  
3 = Three or more Using Force  
1.55 .50 
     Number of subjects present  1 = One Subject Present 
2 = Two Subjects Present  
3 = Three or more Subjects Present 
1.35 .69 
     Lighting 0 = Night-time or low levels of lighting 
1 = Day light 
  
Other    
     APP not in place 0 = APP Not in Force 








Table 3.2: Incidents where Taser is Fired with Other Force. 
Taser fired alongside 
Percent of incidents where 
Taser was fired with the 
force technique listed  
No. of incidents where 
Taser was fired with the 
force technique listed   
Non-compliant handcuffing only  15  20  
Empty Hand techniques only  24  32  
Baton only  2  3  
Irritant Spray only  2  3  
Dog only  5  6  
ERB only  <1  1  
Shield only  <1  1  
Other only 6  8  




Table 3.3: Frequency of Taser use in instances where weapons have been recorded 
 
Types of Taser use /                      










Taser fired 145 118 263 
     % within Types of Taser use 55 45 100 
     % within Possession of 
Weapon 
1 7 1 
Taser drawn, not fired 330 294 624 
     % within Types of Taser use 53 47 100 
     % within Possession of 
Weapon 
2 16 3 
Taser not used 21272 1397 22669 
     % within Types of Taser use 94 6 100 
     % within Possession of 
Weapon 
98 77 96 
Total 21747 1809 23556 
     % within Types of Taser use 92 8 100 
     % within Possession of 
Weapon 





Table 3.4: Logistic regression results for Taser firings.   
Variable       B S.E. Exp(B) 
 
Constant -7.605  ** .563 .000 
Suspect Characteristics:    
Subject Ethnicity 
a 
   
Asian or Oriental Ethnicity -.004 .533 .996 
Afro-Caribbean Ethnicity .343 .328 1.409 
Other Non-White  -.720 .486 .487 
Subject Gender
 b 
   
Female -1.601 ** .372 .202 
Unknown Gender 1.164 .689 3.204 
Subject Disability 
c
    
Physical, Sensory, Learning or Other Disability .037 .350 1.037 
Suspect Mental Health Disability .538 ** .188 1.712 
Other subject characteristics    
Subject consumed drugs 
d
 .337 * .151 1.401 
Subject reported mental health issues 
e
  .346 * .174 1.414 
Subject consumed alcohol 
f
 .145  .155 1.156 
Officer(s) characteristics:    
Officer role 
     Firearms Officer 
g
 
1.428 ** .203 4.170 
     Traffic Officer 
h
 1.341 ** .180 3.823 
     Response 
i
 -.691 ** .173 .501 
Officer experience 
j
    
Most experienced Officer has 6 – 10 years .422 * .185 1.526 
Most experienced Officer has over ten years  .307 .209 1.359 
Officer training 
k
:    
Between six months and a year since last training .001 .151 1.001 
Over a  year since last training .493 * .195 1.638 
Highest Ranking officer using force is 
l
:    
Sergeant or higher -.204 .206 .815 
Other -16.041 1190.059 .000 
Incident characteristics:    
Subject resistance 
m
:    
 Making off (i.e. trying to escape) or Threats 1.013 ** .341 2.753 
General Struggle and Unarmed Aggression .771 * .325 2.163 
Subject using Weapon 1.238 ** .359 3.449 
Weapon present (not necessarily used) 
n
    
Yes 1.170 ** .188 3.221 
Reason for force 
o
    
Force Used to Protect Self or Others 1.261 ** .160 3.530 
Lighting 
p
    
Daylight Conditions .206 .149 1.229 
Type of incident
 q
    
Suspicious Person or Activity / Alarm -1.184  1.067 .306 
Violent Crime .011 .212 1.011 
Traffic 1.237 ** .244 3.444 
Detain Mental Health -.169  .284 .845 
Custody -2.305 * .727 .100 
Other or Unspecified .293 .180 1.340 
Year of incident 
r
    
     2008 .531 .391 1.700 
     2009 .989 ** .363 2.690 
     2010 .740 * .355 2.097 
     2011 .576 .366 1.779 
     2012 .380 .365 1.462 
     2013 .414 .369 1.513 
     2014 .474 .574 1.606 
 
Number of officers present 
s
 
   
Two Officers  .274 .295 1.316 
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More than Two Officers .027 .286 1.027 
Number of officers using force 
t
    
Two Officers  .318 .171 1.374 
More than Two Officers  .336 .193 1.400 
Number of subjects present 
u
    
Two Subjects Present .327 .212 1.387 
More Than Two Subjects Present -.172 .234 .842 
Other    
Policy Change 
v
 -.325 .444 .722 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Notes:   
N = 23, 556.   
Nagelkerke R2 = .284.    
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
a) Reference category: white ethnicity b) Reference category: male; c) Reference category: no disability; d) Reference 
category: no drug use reported; e) Reference category: no alcohol consumption reported; f) Reference category: no 
mental health issues reported; g) Reference category: no firearms officer present; h) Reference category: no traffic 
officer present; i) Reference category: no response officer present; j) Reference category: most experienced officer has 
less than five years’ experience; k) Reference category: officer safety training in under six months; l) Reference 
category: highest ranking officer is a constable; m) Reference category: passive resistance; n) Reference category: no 
weapon present; o) Reference category: force used for reasons other than for protection of human beings; p) Reference 
category: night time or low light; q) Reference category: order maintenance; r) Reference category: 2007; s) Reference 
category: one officer present; t) Reference category: one officer using force; u) Reference category: one subject 
present; v) Reference category: policy change not implemented. 
Variance Inflation Factors were within acceptable limits (ranging from between 1.0 and 1.7).  The tolerance values, all in 
the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly accepted threshold of .1 - .2 (Field 2009: 224).  In both models four of the 
condition indices exceeded ten, with the largest having a value of 36, suggestive of a moderate to strong degree of 
collinearity according to Callaghan and Chen (2008).  However Belsey et al (cited in Fidell and Tabachnick 2003: 134) 
argue that collinearity is of concern when the condition index is greater than thirty, and is combined with at least two 




Table 3.5: Logistic regression results Taser drawn but not fired.  
Variable B S.E. Exp(B) 
 
Constant -4.462 ** .328 .012 
Suspect Characteristics:    
Subject Ethnicity 
a
    
     Asian or Oriental Ethnicity .069 .310 1.072 
     Afro-Caribbean Ethnicity .340 .231 1.405 
     Other Non-White  -.268 .303 .765 
Subject Gender 
b
    
     Female -1.158 ** .214 .314 
     Unknown Gender -1.000 .782 .368 
Subject Disability 
c
    
     Physical, Sensory, Learning or Other 
Disability 
.128 .243 1.137 
     Suspect Mental Health Disability .206 .139 1.229 
Other subject characteristics    
     Subject consumed drugs 
d
 .104 .110 1.110 
     Subject reported mental health issues 
e 
 .524 ** .120 1.688 
    Subject consumed alcohol 
f
 -.250 * .104 .779 
Officer(s) characteristics    
Officer role    
     Firearms Officer 
g
 1.125 ** .146 3.079 
     Traffic Officer 
h
 1.694 ** .130 5.440 
     Response 
i
 -.687 ** .116 .503 
Officer experience 
j
    
     Most experienced Officer has 6 – 10 years .427 ** .126 1.533 
     Most experienced Officer has over ten 
years  
.058 .145 1.059 
Officer training 
k
:    
     Between 6 months and a year since last 
training 
-.044 .100 .957 
     Over a  year since last training -.037 .144 .964 
Highest Ranking officer using force is 
l
:    
     Sergeant or higher -.181 .143 .835 
     Other -17.066 1204.596 .000 
Incident characteristics:    
Subject resistance 
m
:    
      Making off (i.e. trying to escape) or 
Threats 
.333 * .143 1.395 
     General Struggle and Unarmed Aggression -1.128 ** .148 .324 
     Subject using Weapon .839 ** .173 2.314 
Weapon present (not necessarily used) 
n
    
     Weapon Present .962 ** .130 2.617 
Reason for force 
o
    
     Force Used to Protect Self or Others .501 ** .099 1.650 
Lighting 
p
    
     Daylight Conditions -.064 .103 .938 
Type of incident 
q
    
     Suspicious Person or Activity / Alarm -.240 .436 .787 
     Violent Crime .705 ** .133 2.024 
     Traffic .141 .222 1.151 
     Detain Mental Health -.170 .220 .843 
     Custody -1.745 ** .464 .175 
     Other or Unspecified .520 ** .121 1.681 
Year of incident 
r
    
     2008 .228 .293 1.256 
     2009 .919 ** .262 2.507 
     2010 .730 ** .254 2.074 
     2011 .429 .264 1.535 
     2012 .976 ** .249 2.655 
     2013 .761 ** .257 2.139 
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     2014 .819 * .364 2.268 
Number of officers present 
s
    
     Two Officers  -.061 .166 .941 
     More than Two Officers -.235 .156 .790 
Number of officers using force 
t
    
     Two Officers  .021 .119 1.021 
     More than Two Officers  .019 .139 1.019 
Number of subjects present 
u
    
     Two Subjects Present .364 ** .140 1.438 
     More Than Two Subjects Present .197 .143 1.218 
Other    
     Policy Change 
v
 .138 .266 1.148 
 
Notes:  
N = 23, 556 
Nagelkerke R2 = .342   
*p < .05. **p < .01.  
a) Reference category: white ethnicity b) Reference category: male; c) Reference category: no disability; d) Reference 
category: no drug use reported; e) Reference category: no alcohol consumption reported; f) Reference category: no 
mental health issues reported; g) Reference category: no firearms officer present; h) Reference category: no traffic 
officer present; i) Reference category: no response officer present; j) Reference category: most experienced officer has 
less than five years’ experience; k) Reference category: officer safety training in under six months; l) Reference 
category: highest ranking officer is a constable; m) Reference category: passive resistance; n) Reference category: no 
weapon present; o) Reference category: force used for reasons other than for protection of human beings; p) Reference 
category: night time or low light; q) Reference category: order maintenance; r) Reference category: 2007; s) Reference 
category: one officer present; t) Reference category: one officer using force; u) Reference category: one subject 
present; v) Reference category: policy change not implemented. 
Tests revealed that Variance Inflation Factors were within acceptable limits (ranging from between 1.0 and 1.7).  The 
tolerance values, all in the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly accepted threshold of .1 - .2 (Field 2009: 224).  In 
both models four of the condition indices exceeded ten, with the largest having a value of 36, suggestive of a moderate 
to strong degree of collinearity according to Callaghan and Chen (2008).  However Belsey et al (cited in Fidell and 
Tabachnick 2003: 134) argue that collinearity is of concern when the condition index is greater than thirty, and is 
combined with at least two variance proportions for individual variables being greater than .5, conditions that were not 





Table 4.1: Frequency of injury type. 
Type of Injury  % of types of Injuries occurring in All 
Cases where Injury Caused by Police 
% of types of injury occurring in 
incidents where Taser is fired  
Laceration  17 16 
Bruising 24 6 
Broken Bones  <1 0 
Irritant Spray  25 2 
Dog  4 4 
Other  27 70 
Multiple Injuries   3 3 





Table 4.2: Injury frequency for incidents involving different force techniques. 
Force Technique 
Percent of cases 
involving force 
technique 
No. of cases 
involving force 
technique 
Baton  39 606 
Irritant Spray  48 1690 
Hand  14 16637 
Fabric Restraint Belts  9 1659 
Handcuff 15 7797 
Dog  12 1287 
Shield 14 124 
Taser (all incidents where it was fired) 46 263 
Taser only force used 37 131 
Taser fired with other force 55 132 
Baton Gun 50 6 





Table 4.3: Incidents where Taser is Fired with Other Force. 
Taser fired alongside:  
Percent of incidents 
where Taser was used 
(fired) together with the 
force technique listed  
No. of incidents where 
Taser was used (fired) 
together with the force 
technique listed   
Non-compliant handcuffing only  15  20  
Empty Hand techniques only  24  32  
Baton only  2  3  
Irritant Spray only  2  3  
Dog only  5  6  
ERB only  <1  1  
Shield only  <1  1  
Other only 6  8  






Table 4.4: Decrease in Subject Injuries over Time. 
Year Number of subject 
injuries by police 
% of total subject 
injuries in year 
Total no. of use of 
force incidents 
% of incidents 
resulting in injury  
2007 431 14 2016 21 
2008 405 13 1983 20 
2009 372 12 2252 17 
2010 428 13 3789 11 
2011 365 11 3237 11 
2012 391 12 3375 12 
2013 468 15 3612 13 





Table 4.5: Results for Model 1. Reference Category: Incidents where Taser is not fired. 
Variable B S.E. Exp(B) 
 
Constant -2.169 ** .133 .114 
Force used 
a
    
Taser fired, no other force used 1.199 ** .194 3.315 
Taser fired with other force options 1.696 ** .186 5.450 
Subject Characteristics:    
Subject Ethnicity 
b
    
     Asian or Oriental Ethnicity -.072 .161 .931 
     Afro-Caribbean Ethnicity -.099 .128 .906 
     Other Non-White  -.239 .130 .787 
Subject Gender 
c
    
     Female -.762 ** .071 .467 
     Unknown Gender -.413 .345 .662 
Subject Disability 
d
    
     Physical, Sensory, Learning or Other 
Disability 
.072 .115 1.074 
     Suspect Mental Health Disability -.082 .078 .921 
Other subject characteristics    
     Subject consumed drugs 
e
 .086 .049 1.090 
     Subject reported mental health issues 
f 
 .035 .061 1.036 
     Subject consumed alcohol 
g
 .156 ** .049 1.169 
Officer(s) characteristics:    
Officer role    
     Firearms Officer 
h
 -.136 .140 .873 
     Traffic Officer
 i
 .208 * .102 1.231 
     Response 
j
 .233 ** .059 1.263 
Officer experience 
k
    
     Most experienced Officer has 6 – 10 years .117 * .048 1.124 
     Most experienced Officer has over ten years  .125 * .057 1.133 
Officer training 
l
:    
     Between 6 months and a year since last 
training 
.008 .042 1.008 
     Over a  year since last training -.022 .068 .978 
Highest Ranking officer using force is 
m
:    
     Sergeant or higher .062 .058 1.064 
     Other -.315 * .124 .730 
Incident characteristics:    
Subject resistance 
n
:    
     Making off (i.e. trying to escape) or Threats .381 ** .093 1.464 
     General Struggle and Unarmed Aggression .734 ** .081 2.082 
     Subject using Weapon .522 ** .136 1.685 
Weapon present (not necessarily used) 
o
    
     Weapon present .331 ** .088 1.392 
Reason for force 
p
    
     Force Used to Protect Self or Others .253 ** .041 1.288 
Lighting 
q
    
     Daylight Conditions .107 * .049 1.113 
Type of incident 
r
    
     Suspicious Person or Activity / Alarm -.059 .212 .943 
     Violent Crime .066 .061 1.068 
     Traffic .339 ** .099 1.403 
     Detain Mental Health -.236 * .116 .789 
     Custody -1.208 ** .104 .299 
     Other or Unspecified .034 .055 1.034 
Year of incident 
s
    
      2008 -.064 .080 .938 
      2009 -.312 ** .081 .732 
      2010 -.702 ** .077 .495 
      2011 -.729 ** .081 .482 
      2012 -.700 ** .080 .497 
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      2013 -.563 ** .081 .570 
      2014 -.771 ** .155 .463 
Number of officers present 
t
    
     Two Officers  -.315 ** .077 .730 
     More than Two Officers -.515 ** .075 .598 
Number of officers using force 
u
    
     Two Officers  .243 ** .052 1.275 
     More than Two Officers  .410 ** .056 1.507 
Number of subjects present 
v
    
     Two Subjects Present .118 * .064 1.126 
     More Than Two Subjects Present .088 .062 1.092 
Other    
     Policy Change 
w
 -.074 .131 .929 
 
Notes:   
N = 23, 556.   
Nagelkerke R2 = .089,   
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
a) Reference category: Taser not fired in incident; b) Reference category: white ethnicity; c) Reference category: male; 
d) Reference category: no disability; e) Reference category: no drug use reported; f) Reference category: no alcohol 
consumption reported; g) Reference category: no mental health issues reported; h) Reference category: no firearms 
officer present; i) Reference category: no traffic officer present; j) Reference category: no response officer present; k) 
Reference category: most experienced officer has less than five years’ experience; l) Reference category: officer safety 
training in under six months; m) Reference category: highest ranking officer is a constable; n) Reference category: 
passive resistance; o) Reference category: no weapon present; p) Reference category: force used for reasons other 
than for protection of human beings; q) Reference category: night time or low light; r) Reference category: order 
maintenance; s) Reference category: 2007; t) Reference category: one officer present; u) Reference category: one 
officer using force; v) Reference category: one subject present; w) Reference category: policy change not implemented. 
Multicollinearity estimates are within accepted parameters.  Variance Inflation Factors were within acceptable limits 
(ranging from between 1.0 and 1.7).  The tolerance values, all in the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly accepted 
threshold of .1 - .2 (Field 2009: 224).  four of the condition indices exceeded ten, with the largest having a value of 36, 
suggestive of a moderate to strong degree of collinearity according to Callaghan and Chen (2008).  However Belsey et 
al (cited in Fidell and Tabachnick 2003: 134) argue that collinearity is of concern when the condition index is greater 
than thirty, and is combined with at least two variance proportions for individual variables being greater than .5, 





Table 4.6: Logistic regression models 2 - 4. 
 Model 2. Reference Category: 
Empty hand sole force used. 
Model 3. Reference Category: 
Baton sole force used. 
Model 4. Reference Category:  
Irritant Spray sole force used. 
Variable    B       S.E. Exp(B)       B S.E. Exp(B)     B  S.E. Exp(B) 
Constant -2.410 ** .136 .090 -1.064 ** .207 .345 -.447 ** .161 .639 
Force used 
a
          
Taser fired, no other force used 1.489 ** .197 4.432 .098 .250 1.103 -.556 * .214 .573 
Taser fired with other force options 1.986 ** .189 7.288 .586 * .245 1.797 -.095 .207 .910 
All other force options .374 ** .044 1.454 -1.126 ** .162 .324 -1.846 ** .095 .158 
Suspect Characteristics:          
Subject Ethnicity 
b 
         
     Asian or Oriental Ethnicity -.067 .161 .935 -.074 .161 .929 -.048 .162 .953 
     Afro-Caribbean Ethnicity -.116 .129 .891 -.095 .129 .909 -.099 .130 .906 
     Other Non-White  -.261 .130 .770 -.243 .131 .785 -.231 .132 .793 
Subject Gender
 c 
         
     Female -.760 ** .071 .468 -.752 ** .071 .471 -.719 ** .071 .487 
     Unknown Gender -.438 .346 .645 -.449 .348 .638 -.441 .350 .643 
Subject Disability 
d
          
     Physical, Sensory, Learning or Other 
     Disability 
.073 .115 1.076 .076 .115 1.079 .086 .116 1.090 
     Suspect Mental Health Disability -.087 .078 .917 -.085 .078 .918 -.098 .078 .907 
Other subject characteristics          
     Subject consumed drugs 
e
 .077 .049 1.081 .085 .049 1.089 .105 .050 1.111 
     Subject mental health issues 
f
  .030 .062 1.030 .037 .062 1.038 .049 .062 1.050 
     Subject consumed alcohol 
g
 .149 ** .049 1.161 .165 ** .049 1.180 .165 ** .049 1.179 
Officer(s) characteristics:          
Officer role          
     Firearms Officer 
h
 -.160 .139 .852 -.147 .140 .863 -.093 .140 .911 
     Traffic Officer 
i
 .218 * .102 1.244 .207 * .102 1.230 .199 .102 1.220 
     Response 
j
 .252 ** .059 1.287 .223 ** .059 1.250 .157 ** .059 1.170 
Officer experience 
k
          
     Most experienced Officer 6–10 years .112 * .048 1.119 .115 * .048 1.122 .118 * .049 1.126 
     Most experienced Officer > ten years  .117 * .057 1.125 .119 * .057 1.126 .129 * .058 1.137 
Officer training 
l
:          
     Between 6 months and a year  .005 .042 1.005 .006 .042 1.006 .007 .043 1.007 
     Over a year since last training -.027 .068 .973 -.019 .068 .981 -.024 .069 .976 
Highest Ranking officer using force is 
m
:          
     Sergeant or higher .080 .058 1.084 .064 .058 1.066 .064 .059 1.066 
     Other -.254 * .125 .775 -.314 * .125 .731 -.298 * .126 .742 
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Incident characteristics:          
Subject resistance 
n
:          
      Making off or Threats .359 ** .094 1.432 .364 ** .094 1.438 .323 ** .095 1.381 
     General Struggle and Unarmed 
     Aggression 
.738 ** .081 2.091 .725 ** .081 2.065 .711 ** .081 2.036 
     Subject using Weapon .475 ** .136 1.608 .507 ** .137 1.660 .413 ** .139 1.511 
Weapon present  
o
          
     Weapon present .307 ** .088 1.360 .327 ** .088 1.386 .315 ** .089 1.371 
Reason for force 
p
          
     Force Used to Protect Self or Others .247 ** .041 1.281 .242 ** .041 1.274 .214 ** .042 1.238 
Lighting 
q
          
     Daylight Conditions .112 * .049 1.119 .109 * .049 1.116 .129 ** .049 1.137 
Type of incident 
r
          
     Suspicious Person or Activity / Alarm -.083 .213 .920 -.079 .213 .924 -.036 .216 .964 
     Violent Crime .055 .061 1.057 .066 .061 1.068 .084 .062 1.088 
     Traffic .335 ** .100 1.398 .308 ** .100 1.361 .348 ** .101 1.417 
     Detain Mental Health -.249 * .116 .780 -.230 * .116 .794 -.200 * .117 .819 
     Custody -1.161 ** .104 .313 -1.205 ** .104 .300 -1.162 ** .104 .313 
     Other or Unspecified .030 .055 1.030 .036 .055 1.037 .058 .055 1.059 
Year of incident 
s
          
      2008 -.067 .080 .935 -.054 .080 .947 -.057  .081 .945 
      2009 -.312 ** .081 .732 -.291 ** .082 .748 -.306 ** .083 .737 
      2010 -.712 ** .078 .490 -.682 ** .078 .506 -.660 ** .078 .517 
      2011 -.746 ** .081 .474 -.704 ** .081 .495 -.707 ** .082 .493 
      2012 -.717 ** .080 .488 -.678 ** .080 .507 -.680 ** .081 .507 
      2013 -.584 ** .081 .557 -.537 ** .082 .585 -.531 ** .082 .588 
      2014 -.800 ** .155 .449 -.746 ** .155 .474 -.746 ** .157 .474 
Number of officers present 
t
          
     Two Officers  -.294 ** .078 .745 -.319 ** .078 .727 -.254 ** .079 .776 
     More than Two Officers -.489 ** .075 .613 -.517 ** .075 .596 -.440 ** .077 .644 
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Number of officers using force 
u
          
     Two Officers  .233 ** .052 1.263 .260 ** .052 1.297 .321 ** .053 1.379 
     More than Two Officers  .372 ** .056 1.451 .430 ** .056 1.536 .500 ** .057 1.649 
Number of subjects present 
v
          
     Two Subjects Present .114 .065 1.121 .117 .064 1.124 .089 .065 1.093 
     More Than Two Subjects Present .060 .062 1.061 .070 .062 1.072 .057 .063 1.058 
    Other - Policy Change 
w
 -.068 .131 .934 -.072 .131 .931 -.081 .133 .922 
Nagelkerke R
2
 .094      .092  .114 
Notes:   
N = 23, 556.     
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
a) Reference category: Taser not fired in incident; b) Reference category: white ethnicity; c) Reference category: male; d) Reference category: no disability; e) Reference category: no drug use 
reported; f) Reference category: no alcohol consumption reported; g) Reference category: no mental health issues reported; h) Reference category: no firearms officer present; i) Reference 
category: no traffic officer present; j) Reference category: no response officer present; k) Reference category: most experienced officer has less than five years’ experience; l) Reference category: 
officer safety training in under six months; m) Reference category: highest ranking officer is a constable; n) Reference category: passive resistance; o) Reference category: no weapon present; p) 
Reference category: force used for reasons other than for protection of human beings; q) Reference category: night time or low light; r) Reference category: order maintenance; s) Reference 
category: 2007; t) Reference category: one officer present; u) Reference category: one officer using force; v) Reference category: one subject present; w) Reference category: policy change not 
implemented. 
Multicollinearity estimates for the empty hand model are within accepted parameters.  Variance Inflation Factors were within acceptable limits (ranging from between 1.0 and 1.7).  The tolerance 
values, all in the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly accepted threshold of .1 - .2 (Field 2009: 224).  Five of the condition indices exceeded ten, with the largest having a value of 37, but no 
two variance proportions were greater than .5.  Multicollinearity test values for the baton model were relatively high, but within accepted parameters.  Whilst variance Inflation Factors were within 
acceptable limits (ranging from between 1.0 and 1.6), and tolerance values, all in the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly accepted threshold of .1 - .2 (Field 2009: 224), six condition indexes 
exceeded ten, and one had a value of 55, but no two variance proportions were greater than .5. Multicollinearity test values for the irritant spray model were within accepted parameters.  Whilst 
variance Inflation Factors were within acceptable limits (ranging from between 1.0 and 1.6), and tolerance values, all in the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly accepted threshold of .1 - .2 








Table 4.7: Frequency with which weapons are drawn, but not physically used. 
Type of incident Total number of incidents % of all  incidents 
Baton was drawn but not used. 563 2 
Irritant spray was drawn but not used. 679 3 

























































Table 4.8: Logistic regression results for drawing of Taser, irritant spray and baton.  
Variable      B      S.E.   Exp(B) 
Constant -2.199 ** .133 .111 
Force used    
Baton drawn, but not used 
a
. -.557 ** .140 .573 
Irritant Spray drawn, but not used 
b
. -.649 ** .135 .523 
Taser drawn, but not used 
c
. -1.324 ** .179 .266 
Suspect Characteristics:    
Subject Ethnicity 
d 
   
     Asian or Oriental Ethnicity -.056 .161 .946 
     Afro-Caribbean Ethnicity -.065 .128 .937 
     Other Non-White  -.250 .130 .779 
Subject Gender
 e 
   
     Female -.818 ** .071 .441 
     Unknown Gender -.403 .346 .668 
Subject Disability 
f
    
     Physical, Sensory, Learning or Other Disability .071 .115 1.074 
     Suspect Mental Health Disability -.053 .077 .948 
Other subject characteristics    
     Subject consumed drugs 
g
 .090 .049 1.095 
     Subject reported mental health issues 
h
 .054 .061 1.055 
     Subject consumed alcohol 
i
 .161 ** .049 1.175 
Officer(s) characteristics:    
Officer role    
     Firearms Officer 
j
 .153 .136 1.165 
     Traffic Officer 
k
 .472 ** .100 1.604 
     Response 
l
 .242 ** .059 1.274 
Officer experience 
m
    
     Most experienced Officer has 6 – 10 years .127 ** .048 1.135 
     Most experienced Officer has over ten years  .123 * .057 1.131 
Officer training 
n
:    
     Between 6 months and a year since last training .003 .042 1.003 
     Over a  year since last training -.009 .068 .991 
Highest Ranking officer using force is 
o
:    
     Sergeant or higher .053 .058 1.054 
     Other -.349 ** .125 .706 
Incident characteristics:    
Subject resistance 
p
:    
      Making off (i.e. trying to escape) or Threats .454 ** .094 1.575 
     General Struggle and Unarmed Aggression .727 ** .081 2.069 
     Subject using Weapon .751 ** .137 2.120 
Weapon present (not necessarily used) 
q
    
     Weapon present .459 ** .087 1.583 
Reason for force 
r
    
     Force Used to Protect Self or Others .297 ** .041 1.346 
Lighting 
s
    
     Daylight Conditions .113 * .048 1.120 
Type of incident
 t
    
     Suspicious Person or Activity / Alarm -.059 .212 .942 
     Violent Crime .079 .061 1.082 
     Traffic .372 ** .099 1.451 
     Detain Mental Health -.247 * .116 .781 
     Custody -1.251 ** .104 .286 
     Other or Unspecified .047 .055 1.048 
Year of incident 
u
    
       2008 -.042 .080 .959 
       2009 -.261 ** .081 .770 
       2010 -.668 ** .077 .513 
       2011 -.704 ** .081 .494 
       2012 -.665 ** .080 .514 
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       2013 -.543 ** .081 .581 
       2014 -.747 ** .155 .474 
Number of officers present 
v
    
     Two Officers  -.322 ** .078 .724 
     More than Two Officers -.540 ** .075 .583 
Number of officers using force 
w
    
     Two Officers  .261 ** .052 1.298 
     More than Two Officers  .428 ** .056 1.534 
Number of subjects present 
x
    
     Two Subjects Present .142 * .064 1.153 
     More Than Two Subjects Present .128 * .062 1.137 
Other    
     Policy Change 
y
 -.071 .131 .931 
 
Notes:   
N = 23, 556. 
 *p < .05. **p < .01.   
Nagelkerke R
2 =
  0.89 
a) Reference category: all other uses of force (i.e. instances where baton was not used at all, or where it was physically used 
on a subject).  b) all other uses of force (i.e. instances where irritant spray was not used at all, or where it was physical ly used 
on a subject).  c) All other uses of force (i.e. instances where Taser was not used at all, or where it was physically fired at a 
subject).  d) Reference category: white ethnicity; e) Reference category: male; f) Reference category: no disability; g) 
Reference category: no drug use reported; h) Reference category: no alcohol consumption reported; i) Reference category: no 
mental health issues reported; j) Reference category: no firearms officer present; k) Reference category: no traffic officer 
present; l) Reference category: no response officer present; m) Reference category: most experienced officer has less than five 
years’ experience; n) Reference category: officer safety training in under six months; o) Reference category: highest ranking 
officer is a constable; p) Reference category: passive resistance; q) Reference category: no weapon present; r) Reference 
category: force used for reasons other than for protection of human beings; s) Reference category: night time or low light; t) 
Reference category: order maintenance; u) Reference category: 2007; v) Reference category: one officer present; w) 
Reference category: one officer using force; x) Reference category: one subject present; y) Reference category: policy change 
not implemented. 
Tests revealed that Variance Inflation Factors were within acceptable limits (ranging from between 1.0 and 1.7).  The tolerance 
values, all in the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly accepted threshold of .1 - .2 (Field 2009: 224).  Four of the condition 
indices exceeded ten, with the largest having a value of 36, suggestive of a moderate to strong degree of collinearity according 
to Callaghan and Chen (2008).  However Belsey et al (cited in Fidell and Tabachnick 2003: 134) argue that collinearity is of 
concern when the condition index is greater than thirty, and is combined with at least two variance proportions for individual 






Table 6.1: Injury frequency for incidents involving different force techniques. 
Force Technique 
Percent of cases 
involving the force 
technique that also 
have officer injury 
Total No. of cases 
involving force 
technique 
Baton  22 606 
Incap  19 1690 
Hand  12 16637 
Fabric Restraint Belt 12 1659 
Handcuff 14 7797 
Dog  3 1287 
Shield 11 124 
Taser (all incidents where fired) 13 263 
Taser only force used 7 131 
Taser fired with other force 20 132 
Baton Gun 17 6 





Table 6.2: Taser Fired with Other Force. 
Taser fired alongside: 
% of incidents where Taser 
was fired with other force 
No. of cases involving 
Taser & force technique 
Non-compliant handcuffing only 15 20 
Empty Hand techniques only 24 32 
Baton only 2 3 
Irritant Spray only 2 3 
Dog only 5 6 
Fabric Restraint Belt only <1 1 
Shield only <1 1 
Other only 6 8 





Table 6.3: Injury frequency for incidents involving the drawing of force options. 
Force Technique 
% in which injury 
occurred 
No. of cases involving force 
technique 
Taser drawn but not fired 5 624 
Irritant Spray drawn but not fired 13 679 





Table 6.4: Logistic regression results for Model 1. Reference Group: Incidents where Taser is not fired. 
Variable B S.E. Exp(B) 
Constant -3.308 ** .159 .037 
Force used 
a
    
Taser fired, no other force used -.084 .356 .919 
Taser fired with other force options .760 ** .233 2.138 
Subject Characteristics:    
Subject Ethnicity 
b 
   
     Asian or Oriental Ethnicity -.271 .198 .763 
     Afro-Caribbean Ethnicity .098 .130 1.103 
     Other Non-White  -.053 .143 .948 
Subject Gender
  c 
   
     Female .060 .062 1.062 
     Unknown Gender .520 .307 1.681 
Subject Disability 
d
    
     Physical, Sensory, Learning or Other Disability -.136 .138 .873 
     Subject Mental Health Disability .026 .083 1.027 
Other subject characteristics    
     Subject consumed drugs 
e
 .235 ** .053 1.265 
     Subject reported mental health issues 
f
 .011 .066 1.011 
     Subject consumed alcohol 
g
 .005 .054 1.005 
Officer(s) characteristics:    
Officer role    
     Firearms Officer 
h
 -.404 * .194 .667 
     Traffic Officer 
i
 .156 .129 1.169 
     Response 
j
 .423 ** .070 1.527 
Officer experience 
k
    
      Most experienced Officer has 6 – 10 years .158 ** .053 1.171 
     Most experienced Officer has over ten years  .054 .065 1.055 
Officer training 
l
:    
     Between six months and a year since last training .077 .047 1.080 
     Over a  year since last training .128 .074 1.137 
Highest Ranking officer using force is 
m
:    
     Sergeant or higher .155 ** .063 1.167 
     Other -.280 ** .138 .756 
Incident characteristics:    
Subject resistance 
n
:    
      Making off (i.e. trying to escape) or Threats .307 ** .116 1.359 
     General Struggle and Unarmed Aggression .942 ** .097 2.564 
     Subject using Weapon -.131 .193 .877 
Weapon present (not necessarily used) 
o
    
     Weapon present .220 * .107 1.246 
Reason for force 
p
    
     Force Used to Protect Self or Others .084 .046 1.087 
Lighting 
q
    
     Daylight Conditions .066 .055 1.069 
Type of incident 
r
    
     Suspicious Person or Activity / Alarm .390 .217 1.477 
     Violent Crime .587 ** .061 1.799 
     Traffic .063 .129 1.065 
     Detain Mental Health -.351 ** .133 .704 
     Custody -.499 ** .092 .607 
     Other or Unspecified -.053 .064 .949 
Year of incident 
s
    
       2008 -.060 .097 .941 
       2009 -.068 .095 .934 
       2010 -.294 ** .088 .745 
       2011 -.312 ** .092 .732 
       2012 -.277 ** .090 .758 
       2013 -.367 ** .096 .692 
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       2014 -.372 * .178 .689 
Number of officers present 
t
    
     Two Officers  -.195 * .094 .822 
     More than Two Officers -.449 ** .091 .639 
Number of officers using force 
u
    
     Two Officers  .369 ** .059 1.447 
     More than Two Officers  .665 ** .062 1.944 
Number of subjects present 
v
    
     Two Subjects Present .082 .074 1.086 
     More Than Two Subjects Present .191 ** .070 1.210 
Other    
Policy Change 
w
 -.055 .151 .946 
Notes:   
N = 23, 556.     




a) Reference category: all uses of force where Taser was not fired; b) Reference category: white ethnicity; c) Reference 
category: male; d) Reference category: no disability; e) Reference category: no drug use reported; f) Reference category: no 
alcohol consumption reported; g) Reference category: no mental health issues reported; h) Reference category: no firearms 
officer present; i) Reference category: no traffic officer present; j) Reference category: no response officer present; k) 
Reference category: most experienced officer has less than five years’ experience; l) Reference category: officer safety training 
in under six months; m) Reference category: highest ranking officer is a constable; n) Reference category: passive resistance; 
o) Reference category: no weapon present;            p) Reference category: force used for reasons other than for protection of 
human beings; q) Reference category: night time or low light; r) Reference category: order maintenance; s) Reference 
category: 2007; t) Reference category: one officer present; u) Reference category: one officer using force; v) Reference 
category: one subject present; w) Reference category: policy change not implemented. 
Variance Inflation Factors were within acceptable limits (ranging from between 1.0 and 1.7).  The tolerance values, all in the 
range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly accepted threshold of .1 - .2 (Field 2009: 224).  Three condition indices exceeded 
ten, with the largest having a value of 36, suggestive of a moderate to strong degree of collinearity according to Callaghan and 
Chen (2008).  However collinearity is of concern when the condition index is greater than thirty, and is combined with at least 
two variance proportions for individual variables being greater than .5, conditions not found here.   
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 Model 2. Ref Category:       
Empty hand sole force used. 
Model 3. Ref Category:           
Baton sole force used. 
Model 4. Ref Category:       
Irritant Spray sole force 
used 
Variable     B      S.E. Exp(B)       B   S.E. Exp(B)     B  S.E. Exp(B) 
Constant -3.429 ** .162 .032 -3.457 ** .308 .032 -3.423 .219 .033 
Force used          
Taser fired, no other force used .070 .358 1.072 .065 .443 1.067 .032 .387 1.033 
Taser fired with other force options .916 ** .236 2.500 .910 * .353 2.484 .878 ** .279 2.407 
All other force options .207 ** .047 1.230 .151 .268 1.163 .121 .157 1.128 
Subject Characteristics:          
Subject Ethnicity 
a 
         
     Asian or Oriental Ethnicity -.267 .198 .766 -.271 .198 .763 -.272 .198 .762 
     Afro-Caribbean Ethnicity .091 .130 1.095 .098 .130 1.103 .098 .130 1.103 
     Other Non-White  -.063 .143 .939 -.053 .142 .948 -.054 .143 .948 
Subject Gender
 b 
         
     Female .061 .062 1.063 .059 .062 1.061 .058 .062 1.059 
     Unknown Gender .503 .307 1.653 .523 .307 1.687 .521 .307 1.683 
Subject Disability 
c
          
     Physical, Sensory, Learning or Other     
     Disability 
-.135 .138 .873 -.137 .138 .872 -.136 .138 .873 
     Subject Mental Health Disability .022 .083 1.023 .026 .083 1.027 .026 .083 1.027 
Other subject characteristics          
     Subject consumed drugs 
d
 .230 ** .053 1.258 .235 ** .053 1.265 .234 ** .053 1.264 
     Subject reported mental health issues 
e
  .007 .066 1.007 .011 .066 1.011 .010 .066 1.010 
     Subject consumed alcohol 
f
 .000 .054 1.000 .004 .054 1.004 .004 .054 1.004 
Officer(s) characteristics:          
Officer role          
     Firearms Officer 
g
 -.421 * .194 .656 -.404 * .194 .668 -.406 * .194 .666 
     Traffic Officer 
h
 .159 .129 1.172 .156 .129 1.169 .156 ** .129 1.169 
     Response 
i
 .428 ** .070 1.535 .424 ** .070 1.528 .426 .070 1.530 
Officer experience 
j
          
     Most experienced Officer has 6 – 10 yrs .155 ** .053 1.167 .158 .053 1.171 .158 * .053 1.171 
     Most experienced Officer has > 10 years  .049 .065 1.050 .054 .065 1.056 .054 .065 1.055 
Officer training 
k
          
     Between 6 months and a year .075 .047 1.078 .077 .047 1.080 .077 .047 1.080 
     Over a  year since last training .126 .074 1.134 .128 .074 1.137 .128 .074 1.137 
Highest Ranking officer using force is 
l
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     Sergeant or higher .166 ** .064 1.180 .155 ** .063 1.167 .155 * .063 1.167 
     Other -.248 .138 .780 -.280 .138 .756 -.281 * .138 .755 
Incident characteristics:          
Subject resistance 
m
          
      Making off or Threats .294 * .116 1.342 .308 ** .116 1.361 .309 ** .116 1.362 
     General Struggle &Unarmed Aggression .942 ** .097 2.566 .942 ** .097 2.566 .943 ** .097 2.567 
     Subject using Weapon -.158 .193 .853 -.129 .193 .879 -.126 .193 .882 
Weapon present (not necessarily used) 
n
          
     Weapon present .206 .107 1.229 .220 * .107 1.246 .220 * .107 1.246 
Reason for force 
o
          
     Force Used to Protect Self or Others .080 .046 1.083 .085 .046 1.088 .085 .046 1.089 
Lighting 
p
          
     Daylight Conditions .068 .055 1.070 .066 .055 1.068 .065 .055 1.068 
Type of incident
 q
          
     Suspicious Person or Activity / Alarm .379 .217 1.460 .391 .217 1.479 .389 .217 1.476 
     Violent Crime .583 ** .061 1.791 .587 ** .061 1.799 .587 ** .061 1.798 
     Traffic .061 .129 1.062 .065 .129 1.067 .063 .129 1.065 
     Detain Mental Health -.357 ** .133 .700 -.351 ** .133 .704 -.352 ** .133 .703 
     Custody -.474 ** .092 .622 -.499 ** .092 .607 -.500 ** .092 .606 
     Other or Unspecified -.055 .064 .946 -.053 .064 .949 -.053 .064 .948 
Year of incident 
r
          
       2008 -.066 .097 .936 -.062 .097 .940 -.060 .097 .941 
       2009 -.069 .095 .934 -.070 .095 .932 -.068 .095 .934 
       2010 -.300 ** .088 .740 -.296 ** .088 .744 -.296 ** .088 .744 
       2011 -.323 ** .092 .724 -.315 ** .092 .730 -.314 ** .092 .731 
       2012 -.288 ** .090 .750 -.279 ** .090 .757 -.278 ** .090 .757 
       2013 -.382 ** .096 .683 -.370 ** .096 .691 -.369 ** .096 .691 
       2014 -.390 * .178 .677 -.374 * .178 .688 -.374 * .178 .688 
Number of officers present 
s
          
     Two Officers  -.184 ** .094 .832 -.195 ** .094 .822 -.198 * .094 .820 
     More than Two Officers -.434 ** .091 .648 -.449 ** .091 .638 -.452 ** .091 .636 
Number of officers using force 
t
          
     Two Officers  .363 ** .059 1.438 .368 ** .059 1.445 .366 ** .059 1.443 
     More than Two Officers  .642 ** .063 1.900 .663 ** .062 1.941 .662 ** .062 1.938 
Number of subjects present 
u
          
     Two Subjects Present .080 .074 1.083 .083 .074 1.086 .084 .074 1.088 
     More Than Two Subjects Present .176 * .070 1.193 .192 * .070 1.212 .193 ** .070 1.212 
Other - Policy Change 
v
 -.052 .151 .950 -.056 .151 .946 -.054 .151 .947 
Nagelkerke R
2
      .069       .068   .068 
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Notes:   
 
N = 23, 556.   
 
*p < .05.   **p < .01.   
 
Reference category for force used varies between models: please refer to column heading.  Reference categories for other variables are consistent throughout all models, namely: a) Reference 
category: white ethnicity b) Reference category: male; c) Reference category: no disability; d) Reference category: no drug use reported; e) Reference category: no alcohol consumption reported; f) 
Reference category: no mental health issues reported; g) Reference category: no firearms officer present; h) Reference category: no traffic officer present; i) Reference category: no response officer 
present; j) Reference category: most experienced officer has less than five years’ experience; k) Reference category: officer safety training in under six months; l) Reference category: highest 
ranking officer is a constable; m) Reference category: passive resistance; n) Reference category: no weapon present; o) Reference category: force used for reasons other than for protection of 
human beings; p) Reference category: night time or low light; q) Reference category: order maintenance; r) Reference category: 2007; s) Reference category: one officer present; t) Reference 
category: one officer using force; u) Ref category: one subject present; v) Ref category: policy change not implemented.   
 
For the empty hands model, VIFs were within acceptable limits (between 1.0 and 1.6).  The tolerance values, all in the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly accepted threshold of .1 - .2 (Field 
2009: 224).  Four of the condition indices were between ten and thirty, with a fifth totalling 37, suggestive of a moderate to strong degree of collinearity according to Callaghan and Chen (2008), but 
no two variance proportions were greater than .5.  For the baton model, VIFs  were within acceptable limits (between 1.0 and 1.6).  The tolerance values, all in the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the 
commonly accepted threshold of .1 - .2 (Field 2009: 224).  Four of the condition indices were between ten and thirty, with a fifth totalling 55,  suggestive of a moderate to strong degree of collinearity 
(Callaghan and Chen (2008), but no two variance proportions were greater than .5.  For the irritant spray model, whilst VIFs were within acceptable limits (between 1.0 and 1.6), and tolerance 
values were in the range of  .6 to .9, five condition indexes were between ten and thirty, and a sixth had a value of 43, but no two variance proportions were greater than .5. 
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Table 6.6: Logistic regression results for drawing of Taser, irritant spray and baton. 
Variable B S.E. Exp(B) 
Constant -3.313 ** .159 .036 
Force used    
Baton drawn, but not used 
a
. -.143 .155 .866 
Irritant spray drawn, but not used 
b
. .225 .118 1.252 
Taser drawn, but not used 
c
. -.352 .189 .704 
Subject Characteristics:    
Subject Ethnicity 
d 
-.264 .198 .768 
     Asian or Oriental Ethnicity .100 .130 1.105 
     Afro-Caribbean Ethnicity -.060 .143 .942 
     Other Non-White     
Subject Gender
 e 
   
     Female .054 .062 1.055 
     Unknown Gender .519 .307 1.680 
Subject Disability 
f
    
     Physical, Sensory, Learning or Other Disability -.129 .138 .879 
     Subject Mental Health Disability .030 .083 1.030 
Other subject characteristics    
     Subject consumed drugs 
g
 .239 ** .053 1.270 
     Subject reported mental health issues 
h
  .016 .066 1.017 
     Subject consumed alcohol 
i
 .004 .054 1.004 
Officer(s) characteristics:    
Officer role    
     Firearms Officer 
j
 -.306 .193 .736 
     Traffic Officer 
k
 .223 .128 1.250 
     Response 
l
 .412 ** .070 1.510 
Officer experience 
 m
    
     Most experienced Officer has 6 – 10 years .163 ** .053 1.177 
     Most experienced Officer has over ten years  .058 .065 1.059 
Officer training 
n
    
     Between 6 months and a year since last training .078 .047 1.081 
     Over a  year since last training .135 .074 1.145 
Highest Ranking officer using force is 
o
    
     Sergeant or higher .151 * .063 1.163 
     Other -.288 * .138 .750 
Incident characteristics:    
Subject resistance 
p
    
      Making off (i.e. trying to escape) or Threats .313 ** .116 1.367 
     General Struggle and Unarmed Aggression .939 ** .097 2.559 
     Subject using Weapon -.072 .193 .931 
Weapon present (not necessarily used) 
q
    
     Weapon Present .247 * .107 1.281 
Reason for force 
r
    
     Force Used to Protect Self or Others .091 * .046 1.095 
Lighting 
s
    
     Daylight Conditions .067 .055 1.070 
Type of incident
 t
    
     Suspicious Person or Activity / Alarm .378 .217 1.459 
     Violent Crime .589 ** .061 1.802 
     Traffic .072 .129 1.075 
     Detain Mental Health -.354 ** .133 .702 
     Custody -.504 ** .092 .604 
     Other or Unspecified -.049 .064 .952 
Year of incident 
u
    
      2008 -.052 .097 .949 
      2009 -.058 .095 .944 
      2010 -.286 ** .088 .751 
      2011 -.309 ** .092 .734 
      2012 -.267 ** .090 .766 
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      2013 -.362 ** .096 .696 
      2014 -.370 * .178 .691 
Number of officers present 
v
    
     Two Officers  -.199 * .094 .819 
     More than Two Officers -.451 ** .091 .637 
Number of officers using force 
w
    
     Two Officers  .374 ** .059 1.453 
     More than Two Officers  .670 ** .062 1.954 
Number of subjects present 
x
    
     Two Subjects Present .083 .074 1.087 
     More Than Two Subjects Present .190 * .070 1.209 
Other    
Policy Change 
y
 -.055 .151 .947 
 
Notes:   
N = 23, 556.     




a) Reference category: all other uses of force (i.e. instances where baton was not used at all, or where it was physically used 
on a subject).  b) all other uses of force (i.e. instances where irritant spray was not used at all, or where it was physically used 
on a subject).  c) All other uses of force (i.e. instances where Taser was not used at all, or where it was physically fired at a 
subject).  d) Reference category: white ethnicity; e) Reference category: male; f) Reference category: no disability; g) 
Reference category: no drug use reported; h) Reference category: no alcohol consumption reported; i) Reference category: no 
mental health issues reported; j) Reference category: no firearms officer present; k) Reference category: no traffic officer 
present; l) Reference category: no response officer present; m) Reference category: most experienced officer has less than five 
years’ experience; n) Reference category: officer safety training in under six months; o) Reference category: highest ranking 
officer is a constable; p) Reference category: passive resistance; q) Reference category: no weapon present; r) Reference 
category: force used for reasons other than for protection of human beings; s) Reference category: night time or low light; t) 
Reference category: order maintenance; u) Reference category: 2007; v) Reference category: one officer present; w) 
Reference category: one officer using force; x) Reference category: one subject present; y) Reference category: policy change 
not implemented.   
Multicollinearity tests for drawing model were within accepted parameters.  Whilst variance Inflation Factors were within 
acceptable limits (ranging from between 1.0 and 1.6), and tolerance values, all in the range of .6 to .9, exceeded the commonly 
accepted threshold of .1 - .2, three condition indexes were between ten and thirty, and a fourth had a value of 36, but no two 
















Appendix Four: List of topics covered during interviews. 
Please note that the exact questions varied from interview to interview, depending on 
context, time constraints, responses given and the stage at which the interview was 
conducted, with later interviews allowing me to explore points raised  earlier .   
Interview topics for Officers and Trainers in England and Wales: 
1) What are your views on Taser? 
2) What role do you think Taser plays in policing? Do you feel that it is controversial? 
3) Why did you decide to carry the weapon / come on the training? 
4) Have you used the weapon? (Prompt: when was the most recent time)? 
5) Have you had any injuries to subjects when using Taser (if relevant)? 
6) Have you had any experience of the Post Incident Procedure process? 
7) When do you consider it appropriate to fire the weapon (probe-firing)? How do you 
decide whether it is proportionate?  
 Prompt – an example? Where on UoF continuum / 1 – 10 / situations it 
shouldn’t be used?  
 If time – when do you consider it appropriate to red-dot / drive-stun? 
 For trainers – how do you teach this? 
8) How do you find the training? (For trainers: Views on current training package? 
Any improvements? How can people fail?) 
9) How do you find the guidance given around the weapon? What are your views on 
the changed wording? 
10) What are your views on the NDM? 
11) Do you find you are doing anything differently now that you have Taser? 
12) Has your role changed at all? Single crewing? (Added in later interviews). 
13) How safe do you think the weapon is? / What is your understanding of the 
medical implications of the weapon?  
14) Do you have any concerns about / risks with the weapon? 
15) What are your views on the roll-out of the weapon / making it more widely 
available? Differences between firearms and non-firearms officers? 




Additional questions for officers on Use of Force reporting form. 
These questions were asked in interviews conducted after statistical analysis had 
been completed, to enhance my appreciation of officers’ understanding of the form.   
1) Most recent time filled out form? When do you file a form? 
3) What would you include under ‘other force’ form? 
4) How do you interpret non-compliant handcuffing field? 
5) How do you interpret subject injury field? How do you decide whether to put 
something in as an injury or not? 
6) How do you interpret officer injury field? 
7) How do you record injuries from baton and CS? 
8) How do you classify probe wounds? 
9) Do you have anything to add? 
Interview topics for those subjected to Taser. 
1) What have your experiences been with Taser? (Anything comfortable to share). 
 If appropriate/possible, try to clarify their conduct and role. 
 If appropriate/possible, find out what happened after. 
2) How would you describe how it felt? 
3) Do you believe you had any injuries as a result of Taser? 
4) What do you believe would have happened if Taser wasn’t there? 
5) Has it affected you? (if need a prompt, physically, psychologically…) 
6) How, if at all, has it affected your attitude towards the police? 
7) Any other effects? 
8) Why did you decide to bring your case? 
9) What issues, if any, did you find bringing your case? How found the process? 
11) Did you try to complain internally? What happened? 
12) What would your ideal outcome be? 
13) What changes, if any, would you like to see? What needs to happen? 
14) Do you have anything to add?  
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